Rankilor v Circuit Travel Pty Ltd

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JURISDICTION     :   DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

IN CIVIL

LOCATION:   PERTH

CITATION:   RANKILOR -v- CIRCUIT TRAVEL PTY LTD [2010] WADC 170

CORAM:   BIRMINGHAM QC DCJ

HEARD:   10, 12 NOVEMBER 2010

DELIVERED          :   12 NOVEMBER 2010

FILE NO/S:   APP 58 of 2010

BETWEEN:   WENDY RANKILOR

Appellant

AND

CIRCUIT TRAVEL PTY LTD
Respondent

ON APPEAL FROM:

Jurisdiction              :  MAGISTRATES COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

Coram  :MAGISTRATE BOOTHMAN

File No  :CASE NO 2978 of 2009

Catchwords:

Appeal - Local Court - Minor case claim - Unrepresented parties - Obligation of judicial officer to assist an unrepresented litigant - Whether magistrate's failure to alert the appellant of the need to formally prove contract a denial of natural justice - Denial of natural justice - Whether reasonable apprehension of bias

Legislation:

Magistrates Court (Civil Proceedings) Act 2004

Result:

Appeal allowed

Representation:

Counsel:

Appellant:     In person

Respondent:     Mr D G Price

Solicitors:

Appellant:     Not applicable

Respondent:     D G Price & Co

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

Cameron v Cole (1944) 68 CLR 571

Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2000] HCA 63; (2000) 205 CLR 337

Johnson v Johnson [2000] HCA 48; (2000) 201 CLR 488

Long v Mayger [2004] WASCA 41

Macpherson v The Queen (1981) 147 CLR 512

Mayne Nickless t/as Wards Express v Mayne (Unreported, WASC, Library No 960736, 19 December 1996)

Minogue v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (1999) 166 ALR 129

National Companies & Securities Commission v News Corp Ltd (1984) 156 CLR 296

Re Burton; Ex parte Lowe [2003] WASCA 306

Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs; Ex parte Palme [2003] HCA 56

Restifio v Bernstein (1996) 23 MVR 347

Southern Cross Exploration NL v Fire & All Risks Insurance Co Ltd (1985) 2 NSWLR 340

Taylor v Taylor (1979) 143 CLR 1

Tobin v Dodd [2004] WASCA 288

BIRMINGHAM QC DCJ:  [The transcript of this judgment, delivered extempore on 12 November 2010, has been corrected for grammar, syntax, authority citations and quoted transcript references.]

  1. This matter comes before me by way of an appeal from a decision of his Honour Magistrate Boothman in the Minor Cases Division of the Magistrates Court in Perth.

  2. For the purpose of this appeal, it has been necessary to refer to the unrepresented appellant's submissions and to the affidavits filed by her in support of her appeal to identify precisely the grounds upon which the appellant relies.  In essence, it is the appellant's case that she was denied a fair trial, insofar as the learned magistrate:

    •made orders in the course of the trial;

    •refused to disqualify himself;

    •marshalled the evidence and restricted the manner in which the appellant's evidence was produced; and

    •decided the matter on the basis that evidence was not produced in a manner different to the way in which the trial had been conducted.

  3. On 3 March 2009 the appellant initiated a minor case claim in the civil jurisdiction of the Magistrates Court.  She claimed $10,000 from the respondent/defendant Circuit Travel Pty…

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Details
Case
[2010] WADC 170
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Rankilor v Circuit Travel Pty Ltd, the appellant, Ms Rankilor, sought to appeal against the decision of the Local Court which dismissed her claim against the respondent, Circuit Travel Pty Ltd. Ms Rankilor alleged that the respondent had breached a contract for a tour, which resulted in her being unable to return to her hotel and subsequently incurring significant expenses. The Local Court dismissed the claim on the basis that the contract had not been proved. The appellant argued that the dismissal of her claim constituted a denial of natural justice and that the magistrate had exhibited bias.

The primary legal issues before the court were whether the magistrate's failure to alert the appellant of the need to formally prove the contract amounted to a denial of natural justice, and whether there was a reasonable apprehension of bias on the part of the magistrate. The appellant contended that the magistrate's conduct, including the refusal to allow her to call additional evidence and the failure to address the issue of redacted documents, amounted to a denial of natural justice. Furthermore, the appellant argued that the magistrate's conduct demonstrated bias, as he had not treated her case with the same consideration as other cases.

The court considered the principles of natural justice, particularly the requirement for proper and full discovery of documents, which is essential to achieving a just result between the parties at trial. The court noted that while the failure to give proper discovery could result in prejudice, it did not necessarily constitute a denial of natural justice. Regarding the issue of bias, the court emphasised that the test for determining whether a judicial officer is disqualified by reason of the appearance of bias is whether a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the judicial officer might not bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind to the resolution of the question the judicial officer is required to decide. The court found that while the magistrate's conduct was not ideal, it did not amount to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The court ultimately dismissed the appeal, finding that the magistrate's conduct did not amount to a denial of natural justice or a reasonable apprehension of bias. The court held that the magistrate was not obligated to alert the appellant of the need to formally prove the contract, and that the appellant's failure to do so did not constitute a denial of natural justice. The court also found that the magistrate's conduct did not give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias, as a fair-minded lay observer would not reasonably believe that the magistrate was not impartial.

The court made no orders regarding costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

At the completion of Mr Cannon's evidence, the learned magistrate asked the appellant whether she had any other witnesses or other evidence (ts 27):HIS HONOUR: Thank you. Do you have any other witnesses. Any other evidence?MS RANKILOR: I have no other witnesses but I'd like to bring out some of my evidence. I don't know if I'm permitted to do so. To do that or not.HIS HONOUR: No. Do you have any other witnesses.MS RANKILOR: I don't have any other witnesses sir, thank you.HIS HONOUR: Is that your case?MS RANKILOR: That is my case. Yes. Thank you. Ms Toman for the respondent indicated that she had evidence and wished to produce statements. The learned magistrate again (ts 28) seemingly took the view that as she was not on the tour she could not give evidence and limited her to making a closing statement. At the completion of addresses the learned magistrate reserved his decision. On 20 July the magistrate dismissed the appellant's claim. The learned magistrate found that there was no evidence as to the terms and conditions of the contract against which any alleged breach of contract could be measured. The learned magistrate dismissed the claim on the basis that the contract had not been proved. He found that the claimant had failed to show that the contract had been breached to such extent as would sound in compensation and damages. He found that the appellant had failed to prove the contractual relationship between the parties to the court so that it could properly ascertain what were the terms and what tours were included on the tour. The learned magistrate further found that even if he were to allow that to take place (viz the proof of the terms) there was insufficient evidence presented by the appellant as would cause the court to find that such breaches should sound in an award of damages. Somewhat surprisingly the learned magistrate, seemingly without knowing the terms of the contract, was prepared to find that the evidence given by the appellant did not amount to a breach of those terms. The appellant says that at all times she believed she was entitled to return to the witness box and give further evidence and had at all times intended to tender the terms and conditions of the contract. Further, Mr Tilley had been called to give evidence and it was intended that he would also refer to the terms and conditions and in that process they would be tendered. The appellant says she was denied natural justice in the following respects:(1)with the joinder of her case with that of Mr Cannon and the adjournment of the trial by Magistrate Boothman on 1 February 2010;(2)the refusal of Magistrate Boothman to recuse himself;(3)the refusal to allow the plaintiff to call evidence or to continue giving evidence and to call Mr Tilley to give evidence;(4)the failure of the learned magistrate to deal with the question of the redacted documents at trial ‑ it now being apparent that it was not appropriate to redact the documents as the defendant had done and as such discovery was incomplete;(5)that the learned magistrate, in dismissing the claim on the basis the contract had not been proved, did not give the appellant the opportunity to produce the contract in evidence ‑ and the learned magistrate having not foreshadowed that he intended to take a technical approach to the evidence and aspects of proof.

Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

As noted by Waddell J in Southern Cross Exploration NL vFire & All Risks Insurance Co Ltd (1985) 2 NSWLR 340 (356):Proper and full discovery for documents is a step in the pre-trial procedure which is essential to achieving a just result between the parties at the trial. The Court has power to order a new trial if the failure of the defendant to give proper discovery had been of such a kind or has resulted in such prejudice to the conduct of the parties' case as to allow the trial to continue would deny the party a fair trial. The failure to give proper discovery would equate to the same prejudice. That said however, in my opinion, it does not constitute a denial of natural justice 'in dealing with the minor case'. In my opinion, s 32(3)(b) of the Act looks the conduct of the presiding officer or court and not the parties. I turn briefly to the issue of bias. Fundamental to the common law system of adversarial trial is that it is conducted by an independent and impartial tribunal: Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2000] HCA 63; (2000) 205 CLR 337 [3]. In Ebner the judges forming the majority (Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ) said [8]:The apprehension of bias principle admits of the possibility of human frailty. Its application is as diverse as human frailty. Its application requires two steps. First, it requires the identification of what it is said might lead a judge (or juror) to decide a case other than on its legal and factual merits. The second step is no less important. There must be an articulation of the logical connection between the matter and the feared deviation from the course of deciding the case on its merits. The bare assertion that a judge (or juror) has an 'interest' in litigation, or an interest in a party to it, will be of no assistance until the nature of the interest, and the asserted connection with the possibility of departure from impartial decision making, is articulated. Only then can the reasonableness of the asserted apprehension of bias be assessed. Whilst the conduct of the learned magistrate on matters dealing with the appellant stands in stark contrast to that of other magistrates – particularly when regard is had to the transcript of various proceedings, in my opinion, it is important to have regard to the circumstances in which the learned magistrate made the observations that had been identified by the appellant for criticism. The test in determining whether a judicial officer is disqualified by reason of the appearance of bias is whether a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the judicial officer might not bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind to the resolution of the question the judicial officer is required to decide: Johnson v Johnson [2000] HCA 48; (2000) 201 CLR 488 [11]. Two things need to be remembered: first, the observer is taken to be reasonable, and secondly, the person being observed is a professional judicial officer whose training, tradition and oath or affirmation, require the judicial officer to discard the irrelevant, the immaterial and the prejudicial: Johnson v Johnson [12].