Supreme Court of South Australia
(Court of Criminal Appeal)
R v ZHANG
[2017] SASCFC 5
Judgment of The Court of Criminal Appeal
(The Honourable Chief Justice Kourakis, The Honourable Justice Vanstone and The Honourable Auxiliary Justice Chivell)
16 February 2017
CRIMINAL LAW - APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE - GROUNDS FOR INTERFERENCE - SENTENCE MANIFESTLY EXCESSIVE OR INADEQUATE
CRIMINAL LAW - PARTICULAR OFFENCES - PROPERTY OFFENCES - OTHER FRAUDS AND IMPOSITIONS - FRAUD - DEFRAUDING THE COMMONWEALTH - SENTENCE
Appeal against sentence. Appellant pleaded guilty to three counts of unlawfully dealing with identification information, two counts of importing tobacco products with the intention of defrauding the revenue, one count of possessing tobacco goods knowing they were imported with the intention of defrauding the revenue, one count of dealing with money or property reasonably suspected of being proceeds of crime and one count of attempting to possess a document knowing that it was a false foreign passport.
Appellant sentenced to a total of four years and eight months imprisonment with a non-parole period of two years. Whether head sentence and non-parole period were manifestly excessive - whether the judge failed to consider the principle of totality - whether the judge erred in making the sentences on counts 4, 5 and 6 cumulative upon the sentences on counts 1, 2 and 3 - whether the judge erred in making the sentence on count 8 cumulative upon the sentence on the other counts - whether the judge gave adequate credit for the appellant's offer to assist the authorities - whether the judge failed to reduce the non-parole period in recognition of his offer of assistance.
Held per Chivell AJ (Kourakis CJ and Vanstone J agreeing): Sentence not manifestly excessive. Appeal dismissed.
Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 16A, s 16AC, s 19AB; Criminal Code (Cth) s 11.1, s 372.1(1), s 400.9(1A); Customs Act 1901 (Cth) s 233BABAD(1), s 233BABAD(2); Foreign Passports (Law Enforcement and Security) Act 2005 (Cth) s 22; Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 501, s 501CA; Tobacco Plain Packaging Act 2011 (Cth); Correctional Services Act 1982 (SA) s 37A; Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA) s 10B s 10C, s 18A, referred to.
R v Kreutzer (2013) 118 SASR 211; R v Horstmann [2010] SASC 103, (2010) 269 LSJS 42; House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499; AB v The Queen (1999) 198 CLR 111; Kentwell v The Queen [2014] HCA 37; Micallef v ICI Australia Operations Pty Ltd [2001] NSWCA 274; Lombard v Police [2016] SASC 179; R v Kopa; Ex parte DPP (Cth), R v Istogu; Ex parte DPP (Cth) (2004) 145 A Crim R 287; R v Nguyen (2005) 157 A Crim R 80; Postiglione v The Queen (1997) 189 CLR 295; R v Rossi (1988) 142 LSJS 451; Hili v The Queen (2010) 242 CLR 520; R v Creed (1985) 37 SASR 566; Mill v The Queen (1988) 166 CLR 59; R v…
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- R v Zhang [2017] SASCFC 5
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- [2017] SASCFC 5
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CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the Court of Criminal Appeal included whether the sentencing judge had erred in her consideration of the totality principle when sentencing Mr Zhang for multiple offences, and more broadly, whether the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive. The appeal also touched upon the consideration of the prospect of Mr Zhang's deportation and its impact on the sentence.
The Court considered the principle of totality, which requires a sentencing judge to ensure that the aggregate of sentences for multiple offences is a just measure of the total criminality and is not crushing. While the sentencing judge did not explicitly state she had "stood back" to consider totality, the Court found that this was not necessarily an error, particularly where a judge arrives at a total sentence without determining individual sentences separately. The Court also addressed the argument that the prospect of deportation should have been taken into account, concluding that the judge did not err in failing to do so, both in terms of the general burden of the sentence and the potential exercise of executive discretion.
Ultimately, the Court dismissed the appeal. It found that Mr Zhang was a principal in a serious scheme motivated by greed, involving substantial evasion of duty and the use of fraudulent means. While acknowledging Mr Zhang's youth, lack of prior convictions, contrition, early guilty plea, and offer of cooperation, the Court determined that these mitigating factors did not render the sentence manifestly excessive, especially given the importance of general deterrence in such cases and the significant criminality involved. The judge was found to have given appropriate weight to the mitigating factors in fixing a relatively short non-parole period.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The other matter which is noteworthy in relation to s 16A(2) is that although the court is required to take into account the fact that the offender has pleaded guilty to the charge,[24] there is no provision for specific discounts for pleas of guilty at particular stages of the proceedings.[25][24] Section 16A(2)(g).[25] Cf Criminal Law Sentencing Act 1988 (SA) ss 10B and 10C.Consideration It is convenient to commence with a consideration of the grounds which assert that process errors have occurred.Totality (Ground 2) A judge imposing a sentence for multiple offences should ensure that ‘the aggregation of the sentences appropriate for each offence is a just and appropriate measure of the total criminality involved’,[26] and that the aggregate of all the sentences did not become ‘so crushing as to call for some reduction in the aggregate’.[27] These two factors are the two ‘limbs’ of what has become known as the ‘totality principle’. [26] Postiglione v The Queen (1997) 189 CLR 295 at 307-8 per McHugh J.[27] R v Rossi (1988) 142 LSJS 451 per King CJ, cited by McHugh J in Postiglione at 308. Totality is a common law sentencing principle which applies to federal sentencing.[28] [28] Hili v The Queen (2010) 242 CLR 520 at [25]. It was submitted that because the judge made no mention of totality in her sentencing remarks, she did not consider the matter when sentencing. It is true that her Honour did not specifically indicate that she had ‘stood back’ and considered whether the sentence violated the two limbs of the totality principle quoted above.[29] [29] See R v Creed (1985) 37 SASR 566 at 568 per King CJ. In Mill v The Queen,[30] the High Court stated:Where the principle [of totality] falls to be applied in relation to sentences of imprisonment imposed by a single sentencing court, an appropriate result may be achieved either by making sentences wholly or partially concurrent or by lowering the individual sentences below what would otherwise be appropriate in order to reflect the fact that a number of sentences are being imposed. Where practicable, the former is to be preferred.[30] (1988) 166 CLR 59 at 63, per Wilson, Deane, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ (quoting Thomas, Principles of Sentencing, 2nd ed. (1979) 56). In R v E, AD, Doyle CJ said:[31] The concept of totality will usually have little part to play when a sentence is imposed in exercise of the powers conferred by s 18A of the Sentencing Act. If the sentencing judge arrives at a sentence, without determining the sentence that each offence will attract separately, the judge will necessarily have regard to the total period of imprisonment that is appropriate: see R v Major (1998) 70 SASR 488. No further reduction under the totality principle would usually be called for: see R v Bennett [2005] SASC 55 at [15]-[16] Doyle CJ; R v B, RWK [2005] SASC 84; (2005) 91 SASR 200 at [16]–[17] Doyle CJ, at [24]–[25] Vanstone J. That is not to say that the principle of totality never requires consideration in such a case. Ordinarily one would not expect it to require separate consideration.[31] (2005) 93 SASR 20 at [36].