R v Taheri

Case [2017] SASCFC 115


SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Court of Criminal Appeal)

R v TAHERI

[2017] SASCFC 115

Judgment of The Court of Criminal Appeal

(The Honourable Chief Justice Kourakis, The Honourable Justice Peek and The Honourable Justice Nicholson)

8 September 2017

APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - APPEAL - GENERAL PRINCIPLES - INTERFERENCE WITH DISCRETION OF COURT BELOW

CRIMINAL LAW - SENTENCE - SENTENCING ORDERS - NON-CUSTODIAL ORDERS - OTHER TYPES OF ORDER

CRIMINAL LAW - SENTENCE - RELEVANT FACTORS  - NATURE AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF OFFENDER - OTHER MATTERS

Appeal against sentence of imprisonment of five years with a non-parole period of two years imposed for one count of aggravated serious criminal trespass in a place of residence, two counts of aggravated threatening harm and one count of aggravated threatening life. The offences were committed against the former wife of the appellant and her sister. The appellant came to Australia from Iran as a refugee in 2011 and is resident in Australia as the holder of a visa.

The appellant relies on a number of grounds of appeal. The appellant contends that: (1) the Judge, when declining to make a home detention order pursuant to section 33BB of the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988, erred in failing to make a finding as to the risk, if any, that the appellant posed to community safety; (2) the Judge erred in her treatment of a written reference provided on behalf of the appellant; (3) the Judge should have ordered full or nearly full concurrency as between the sentences for counts 1 to 3 and count 4; (4) the Judge failed to have regard to the risk of deportation in the event that a sentence of imprisonment longer than 12 months were to be imposed.

Held per Nicholson J (Kourakis CJ and Peek J agreeing), dismissing the appeal:

1. Section 33BB does not require a sentencing judge to make a specific finding as to the nature or level of risk to the safety of the community that a particular offender might represent. What section 33BB(3) requires is that when determining whether to make a home detention order, a paramount consideration of the court must be the safety of the community.

2.  There was no material error in the approach adopted by the Judge as to section 33BB and the discretion not to make a home detention order was within the discretion available.

3.  It was open to the Judge to arrive at the view she took with respect to the written reference and to discount the reference accordingly.

4.  The amount of concurrency ordered by the Judge was within the available discretion.

5. On the assumption that the risk of deportation, and the hardship that such a prospect would visit on both the appellant and his parents, were considerations relevant to the sentencing considerations in section 10(1) of the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988, the sentencing Judge took into account these matters.

Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 s 19, s 170; Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988

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R v Taheri [2017] SASCFC 115
Case
[2017] SASCFC 115
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal concerned the sentencing of the appellant, Mr Taheri, by a judge of the District Court of South Australia. The dispute arose from the appellant's contention that the sentencing judge had failed to adequately consider the prospect of his deportation as a relevant factor in determining an appropriate sentence.

The central legal issue before the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia was whether the sentencing judge had erred in her discretion by not giving sufficient weight to the appellant's personal circumstances, specifically the real prospect of deportation and the hardship this would cause to him and his parents. The court was required to determine if this omission constituted an error of outcome in the sentencing process.

The Full Court reasoned that the sentencing judge had indeed taken into account the prospect of deportation as a personal circumstance relevant to her sentencing discretion. The court held that any disagreement about the weight afforded to this consideration, or what other judges might have done, was irrelevant unless an error of outcome could be demonstrated. Applying the principles of sentencing under the *Sentencing Act*, the court found that the risk of deportation was a legally available consideration under sections 10(1)(j), (l), (n), and (o) and that the sentencing judge had regard to it.

Consequently, the Full Court concluded that none of the grounds of appeal had been established. Permission to appeal was granted on one specific ground (1(f)), but the appeal itself was dismissed.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

KOURAKIS CJ (dissent) NICHOLSON J (dissent)
As I have indicated, I am satisfied that her Honour did take into account as a personal circumstance relevant to her Honour’s sentencing discretion the real prospect of deportation and the hardship that such a prospect would visit on both the appellant and his parents. Any concern that her Honour placed insufficient weight on this consideration or that other judges would have placed greater weight on this consideration is not to the point in the absence of the assertion of an outcome error. On the assumption that risk of deportation was a consideration relevant to the sentencing considerations in section 10(1)(j), (l), (n) and (o) of the Sentencing Act and available, as a matter of law, to be deployed in this way, I am satisfied that her Honour had regard to it.Conclusion In my view, none of the grounds of appeal have been established and I would grant permission on ground 1(f) but dismiss the appeal.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by:

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