R v Hevko

Case [2018] SASCFC 22


SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Court of Criminal Appeal)

R v HEVKO

[2018] SASCFC 22

Judgment of The Court of Criminal Appeal

(The Honourable Chief Justice Kourakis, The Honourable Justice Kelly and The Honourable Justice Nicholson)

11 April 2018

CRIMINAL LAW - APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE

CRIMINAL LAW - PARTICULAR OFFENCES - DRUG OFFENCES - DEALING AND DISTRIBUTION OF DRUGS - TRAFFICKING OR SALE AND SUPPLY

CRIMINAL LAW - SENTENCE - SENTENCING ORDERS - NON-CUSTODIAL ORDERS - OTHER TYPES OF ORDER

Appeal against sentence.  The appellant pleaded guilty to one count of trafficking in a controlled drug.  He was sentenced in the District Court to imprisonment for a period of two years and four months with a non-parole period of 15 months.  The Judge declined to suspend the sentence or order that it be served by way of home detention.

The appellant's primary contention on appeal is that the Judge erred in finding that the seriousness of the offending and the need for deterrence outweighed favourable personal circumstances of the appellant in declining to order that the sentence be served on home detention.

Held per Nicholson J (Kourakis CJ and Kelly J agreeing), granting permission to appeal, allowing the appeal, setting aside the District Court sentence and resentencing:

1. The appellant is to serve the term of imprisonment imposed by the Judge by way of home detention pursuant to the provisions of section 33BB of the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988.

Per Kourakis CJ (Kelly J agreeing):

1.  The Judge erred in failing to address the section 33BB discretion against the particular circumstances of the appellant's offending and his personal circumstances.

2.  The Judge failed to adequately explain his reasons for declining to order home detention.

Per Nicholson J (Kelly J agreeing):

1.  The Judge erred in the application of the requirements of section 33BB to the facts in this case.

2.  The Judge's reliance on the appellant's prior offending was misplaced.

3.  It was not open to the Judge to make a finding beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant's offending was not a once off isolated offence.

Controlled Substances Act 1984 (SA) s 32; Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA) s 33BB, referred to.
R v Hosking (2017) 128 SASR 37, considered.

R v HEVKO
[2018] SASCFC 22

Court of Criminal Appeal:  Kourakis CJ, Kelly and Nicholson JJ

KOURAKIS CJ.

  1. I would allow the appeal and set aside the sentence imposed in the District Court.

  2. I would identify the error of the Judge as a failure to address the question whether a home detention order should have been made in the particular circumstances of the appellant’s offending.  I acknowledge that the Judge expressly adverted to the Court’s discretion to make a home detention order, and to some of the sentencing material pertaining to it.  However just as a failure to expressly mention a sentencing consideration does not, of itself, establish that a sentencing judge did not consider it, so too, an express reference to…

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R v Hevko [2018] SASCFC 22
Case
[2018] SASCFC 22
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter concerned an appeal against sentence by the applicant, R v Hevko, before the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia, comprising Kourakis CJ, Kelly and Nicholson JJ. The applicant had been convicted of drug trafficking offences and sentenced to a term of imprisonment, with the sentencing judge refusing to suspend the sentence or make a home detention order.

The central legal issue before the Full Court was whether the sentencing judge had properly exercised their discretion in refusing to suspend the term of imprisonment and in declining to make a home detention order, specifically in relation to the requirements of section 33BB of the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act. The applicant argued that the sentencing judge had failed to adequately consider the relevant statutory tests and the material before the court when making these decisions.

The Full Court found that the sentencing judge's reasoning for refusing to suspend the sentence and for declining a home detention order was essentially identical and that this reasoning did not demonstrate a proper application of section 33BB of the Sentencing Act. While acknowledging the seriousness of the offence and the importance of deterrence, the Court concluded that the judge had not sufficiently attended to the statutory requirements. Consequently, the Court granted permission to appeal, allowed the appeal, and set aside the original sentence.

The Full Court did not depart from the head sentence or the non-parole period imposed by the sentencing judge. However, for the reasons given, the Court ordered that the applicant serve the sentence on home detention pursuant to section 33BB of the Sentencing Act, imposing terms and conditions similar to those of his existing home detention bail.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

KOURAKIS CJ NICHOLSON J
In asking himself whether there was good reason to suspend the term of imprisonment imposed, the Judge concluded:At the end of the day, the seriousness of the offence, together with your other drug offending and the need for both personal and general deterrence, outweigh the matters put on your behalf such that there is not good reason to suspend the sentence.In determining whether or not it was appropriate to exercise the discretion to make a home detention order, his Honour concluded:Given the seriousness of the offence, together with the importance of deterrence, both in this category of offending generally, and personally giving your previous subsequent drug offending, it is not appropriate to exercise the discretion to make a home detention order in this case.The essence of the expressed reasoning is identical. In this respect, the latter determination is not, in my view, saved by virtue of the preamble:The Court has regard to everything put and tendered, including the contents of the reports prepared by corrections and has applied the statutory tests set out in s 33BB of the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act, as explained in a series of Supreme Court judgments, including by Doyle J in R v Dell & Dell and by the Chief Justice in R v Filipponi.Conclusion I am not satisfied that the Judge properly attended to the requirements of section 33BB when coming to the conclusion that he arrived at. Insofar as is required, I would grant permission to appeal on ground 2 and I would allow the appeal and set aside the District Court sentence. As far as resentencing is concerned, I would not depart from the head sentence or non-parole period ordered by the Judge but I would, for the reasons set out, order that the appellant serve that sentence on home detention pursuant to the provisions of section 33BB of the Sentencing Act. The appellant is presently on home detention bail. Subject to the requirements of section 33BB, I would impose terms and conditions of home detention in material respects the same as those to which he is presently subject, including that he is not to permit his girlfriend to live at the home detention premises.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: KOURAKIS CJ, NICHOLSON J

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