SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
R v Turner [2016] QCA 282
PARTIES:
R
v
TURNER, Raymond James
(applicant)FILE NO/S:
CA No 132 of 2016
DC No 75 of 2016
DC No 474 of 2015DIVISION:
Court of Appeal
PROCEEDING:
Sentence Application
ORIGINATING COURT:
District Court at Ipswich – Date of Sentence: 29 April 2016DELIVERED ON:
4 November 2016
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
4 October 2016
JUDGES:
Gotterson JA and Douglas and Boddice JJ
Separate reasons for judgment of each member of the Court, each concurring as to the order madeORDER:
Application for leave to appeal against sentence refused.
CATCHWORDS:
CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE – GROUNDS FOR INTERFERENCE – SENTENCE MANIFESTLY EXCESSIVE OR INADEQUATE – where the applicant pleaded guilty to a five-count indictment and a bench charge sheet alleging 14 summary offences – where the indictment included one count of dangerous operation of a motor vehicle causing grievous bodily harm while adversely affected by an intoxicating substance – where the applicant drove dangerously while under the influence of methylamphetamine, on bail, disqualified from driving, and with an overloaded vehicle – where the applicant was pursued by two police vehicles and avoided a tyre deflation device before colliding with a parked vehicle, resulting in three of his five passengers sustaining injuries which were sufficiently serious to amount to grievous bodily harm – where the applicant was sentenced to six years imprisonment for the dangerous operation offence which was declared a serious violent offence – where the applicant alleges the serious violent offence declaration renders the sentence manifestly excessive – whether the offence might properly be regarded as being beyond the norm – whether the sentence was manifestly excessive
Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld), s 161B(3)(a)(i)
R v Balic[2005] QCA 212, considered
R v Benjamin (2012) 224 A Crim R 40; [2012] QCA 188, cited
R v Bojovic [2000] 2 Qd R 183; [1999] QCA 206, cited
R v Frost; ex parte Attorney-General (2004) 149 A Crim R 151; [2004] QCA 309, considered
R v Hopper[2011] QCA 296, considered
R v Ibrahim[2003] QCA 386, considered
R v Lennon[1999] QCA 192, considered
R v McDougall and Collas [2007] 2 Qd R 87; [2006] QCA 365, cited
R v Moody[2016] QCA 92, considered
R v Pham (2016) 90 ALJR 13; [2015] HCA 39, applied
R v Slater[1997] QCA 42, considered
R v Vessey (1996) 86 A Crim R 290; [1996] QCA 11, considered
R v Wilde; ex parte Attorney-General (Qld) (2002) 135 A Crim R 538; [2002] QCA 501, consideredCOUNSEL:
The applicant appeared on his own behalf
D R Kinsella for the respondentSOLICITORS:
The applicant appeared on his own behalf
Director of Public Prosecutions (Queensland) for the respondent
GOTTERSON JA: On 29 April 2016, in the District Court at Ipswich, the applicant, Raymond James Turner, pleaded guilty to each count…
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- AGLC
- R v Turner [2016] QCA 282
- Case
- [2016] QCA 282
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court were whether the declaration of the dangerous operation of a motor vehicle causing grievous bodily harm offence as a serious violent offence was appropriate, and whether the sentence was manifestly excessive. Turner argued that the serious violent offence declaration rendered the sentence manifestly excessive, and that his dangerous driving was accidental due to his intoxication. The court rejected Turner's arguments, finding that his driving was deliberate and that the risk of injury was inherent in the manner of his driving. The court also found that Turner's injuries and psychological symptoms were not relevant to the decision to impose a serious violent offence declaration.
The court found that the discretion to declare the dangerous operation of a motor vehicle causing grievous bodily harm offence a serious violent offence was exercisable by the sentencing judge, and that the offence in respect of which a declaration is made, not the offender, is the focus of the declaration. The court found that the offence was a crime pursuant to s 328A(4) of the Criminal Code and is listed as a serious violent offence in Schedule 1 to the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld). The court found that the features of the offence, including the police pursuit, passenger overload, substantial distance driven dangerously, and the fact that the dangerous driving ceased only as a result of the collision, contributed to the characterisation of the offence as beyond the norm for this kind of offending.
The court refused Turner's application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Orders
Orders of the court
Application for leave to appeal against sentence refused.
Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Serious violent offence declaration: The discretion conferred by s 161B(3)(a)(i) of the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) to declare the dangerous operation of a motor vehicle causing grievous bodily harm offence a serious violent offence was exercisable by the learned sentencing judge.[30] It is the offence in respect of which a declaration is made, not the offender. It follows that the applicant’s self-commendation that he is not a violent person is rather misdirected.[30]This offence is a crime pursuant to s 328A(4) of the Criminal Code and is listed as a serious violent offence in Schedule 1 to the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld). Turning to other submissions made by the applicant, I mention first his reliance upon the fact that he was intoxicated and his contention that, as a result, his dangerous driving was “accidental”. I reject that argument. As was acknowledged by the applicant at the hearing of the application,[31] his prolonged erratic driving was undertaken once he knew that the police were in pursuit of him. It was therefore a response on his part that he made deliberately. Insofar as the argument seeks to characterise the injuries to the passengers as accidentally caused, I would accept that the applicant did not intend to injure his passengers.[32] However, inherent in the manner of his dangerous driving was the very significant risk that injuries of those kinds would result.[31]Appeal Transcript 1-3 ll46-47; 1-6 ll3-5.[32]Intention to cause grievous bodily harm is not an element of the offence of which the applicant was convicted. The applicant also submitted that the injuries he sustained, together with a range of “trauma-form” psychological symptoms he suffered[33] thereafter, amounted to extra-curial punishment. This submission is at odds with the disavowal by his counsel at sentence of a submission of that kind with respect to the injuries.[34] The approach taken by counsel was realistic. In any event, injuries sustained by the applicant have little, if any, relevance to a decision to impose a serious violent offence declaration.[33]As stated in the report of Dr S Morgan, psychologist, dated 15 February 2016: Exhibit 14; AB100-113. This report noted that the applicant had terminated in-custody counselling of his own volition in October 2015.[34]AB36; Tr1-26. Counsel explained that he tendered the evidence of the injuries in response to an unwillingness on the part of a previous prosecutor to accept that the applicant had been injured. In McDougall and Collas, this Court observed:“…the exercise of the discretion will usually reflect an appreciation by the sentencing judge that the offence is a more than usually serious, or violent, example of the offence in question, and, so outside ‘the norm’ for that type of offence…”[35]This was an offence that might properly be regarded as beyond the norm for this kind of offending. Features of it that contribute to such a characterisation are the police pursuits involving a number of vehicles, the passenger overload, the substantial distance driven dangerously, the foiling of the police use of stingers, and the fact that the dangerous driving ceased only as a result of the collision.[35]At [21]. Citing R v DeSalvo (2002) 127 A Crim R 229 at 230-231 [8]-[9], and 232 [16]; R v BAW [2005] QCA 334 at [27]-[28].