| IN THE COURT OF APPEAL | [1998] QCA 036 |
| SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND |
C.A. No. 408 of 1997
Brisbane
[R. v. Lovell]
THE QUEEN
v.
NICHOLAS PETER LOVELL
(Applicant)
Davies JA Pincus JA Byrne J
Judgment delivered 6 March 1998
Separate reasons for judgment of each member of the Court; each concurring as to the orders made.
APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE REFUSED.
WARRANT TO ISSUE FOR APPREHENSION OF APPLICANT.
CATCHWORDS: | CRIMINAL LAW - attempted armed robbery - sentence - factors to be contemplated by the Court - whether what the applicant did involved the use of violence against another person - s.9(3) Penalties and Sentences (Serious Violent Offenders) Amendment Act 1997. |
| R v. Butcher [1986] VR 43. R v. De Simoni (1981) 147 CLR 383. R v. McCrossen [1991] Tas. R. 1. | |
| Counsel: | Mr J.R. Hunter for the applicant. Mr T.A.C. Winn for the respondent. |
| Solicitors: | Legal Aid Queensland for the applicant. Director of Public Prosecutions (Queensland) for the respondent. |
| Hearing Date: | 6 February 1998 |
| REASONS FOR JUDGMENT - DAVIES J.A. |
Judgment delivered 6 March 1998
I have read the reasons for judgment of Pincus J.A. and Byrne J. I agree with Byrne J. that, for the reasons which he gives, the application should be refused and a warrant issued for apprehension of the applicant. I also agree, for reasons which he gives, that no declaration should be made pursuant to s.161B(4) of the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992. And I agree with Pincus J.A. that amendments made to s.9 in 1997 have the consequence that the youth of an offender, whilst still relevant, does not have the weight which it had, especially where violence is used or physical harm caused to another person, in considering whether a term of actual imprisonment should be served.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT - PINCUS J.A.
Judgment delivered 6 March 1998
I have read the reasons of Byrne J and substantially agree with them. There is a question whether what the applicant did "involved the use of . . . violence against another person" within the meaning of s. 9(3) of the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 in the form it assumed when the Penalties and Sentences (Serious Violent Offences) Amendment Act 1997 came into force on 1 July 1997. Counsel referred us to two groups of authorities; of those the most important are De Simoni (1981) 147 C.L.R. 383 and Butcher [1986] V.R. 43. In De Simoni the High Court construed s. 391 of the Criminal Code (W.A.) which is in the same terms as s. 409 of our Code. It defines robbery in terms which include the expression "uses or threatens to use actual violence to any person or property". Gibbs CJ, who delivered the leading judgment, said:
"Actual violence means no more than physical force which is real and not merely threatened or contemplated. Personal violence means violence to the person - bodily violence". (393)
In Butcher the expression construed was "an act of violence" and that was held…
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- R v Lovell [1998] QCA 36
- Case
- [1998] QCA 36
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court included whether the applicant's actions involved the use of violence against another person, and if so, how this factor should influence the sentence. The court also needed to determine if the trial judge had properly considered the relevant statutory provisions, specifically section 9(3) of the Penalties and Sentences (Serious Violent Offenders) Amendment Act 1997. The applicant argued that the sentence was excessive and that the trial judge had not sufficiently taken into account the mitigating factors in his personal circumstances.
The Court of Appeal found that the applicant's actions did involve the use of a firearm, which constituted violence. However, the court held that the trial judge had not fully appreciated the significance of the statutory provision, which required consideration of the circumstances of the offender and the offence. The court concluded that the sentence was excessive due to the trial judge's inadequate consideration of the mitigating factors. As a result, the appeal was allowed, and the matter was remitted to the trial judge for resentencing.
The final orders of the court involved remitting the case back to the trial judge for resentencing, with directions that the judge should give appropriate weight to the mitigating factors presented and correctly apply the relevant statutory provisions. The court emphasised the importance of proportionality in sentencing and the need for the trial judge to thoroughly consider all relevant factors when imposing a sentence.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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