R v Hopper; Ex parte Attorney-General (Qld)

Link copied
Case Copied 60 min read

SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

R v Hopper; Ex parte Attorney-General (Qld) [2014] QCA 108

PARTIES:

R
v
HOPPER, Meghan Catherine Elizabeth
(respondent)
EX PARTE ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF QUEENSLAND
(appellant)

FILE NO/S:

CA No 291 of 2013
DC No 1083 of 2013

DIVISION:

Court of Appeal

PROCEEDING:

Sentence Appeal by Attorney-General (Qld)

ORIGINATING COURT:

District Court at Brisbane

DELIVERED ON:

16 May 2014

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

9 April 2014

JUDGES:

Fraser and Morrison JJA and Boddice J
Separate reasons for judgment of each member of the Court, Fraser JA and Boddice J concurring as to the order made, Morrison JA dissenting

ORDER:

Appeal dismissed.

CATCHWORDS:

CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE – APPEALS BY CROWN – EXERCISE OF DISCRETION – GENERALLY – where the respondent pleaded guilty to dangerous driving causing death and grievous bodily harm – where the respondent was sentenced to two and a half years imprisonment wholly suspended for three years, and was disqualified from holding a driver’s licence for three years – where the trial judge considered that the circumstances of the offence and the respondent’s personal circumstances and youthfulness favoured a non-custodial sentence – where the Attorney-General argued a wholly suspended period of imprisonment was plainly unreasonable and unjust – consideration of the relevance of personal and general deterrence, the gravity of the consequences of the offence, and a subsequent traffic offence – whether the sentence was manifestly inadequate

CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE – APPEALS BY CROWN – OTHER MATTERS – where five months have passed since the respondent was sentenced to a wholly suspended term of imprisonment – where the respondent is psychologically vulnerable and has made substantial efforts toward rehabilitation – whether, if the sentence was manifestly inadequate, the Court should exercise its residual discretion not to return the respondent to custody

Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld), s 9(2)(a), s 9(3)(b), s 9(4)

Barbaro v The Queen; Zirilli v The Queen (2014) 88 ALJR 372; [2014] HCA 2, cited
Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v Gregory (2011) 34 VR 1; [2011] VSCA 145, cited
Green v The Queen (2011) 244 CLR 462; [2011] HCA 49, cited
Hili v The Queen (2010) 242 CLR 520; [2010] HCA 45, applied
House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499; [1936] HCA 40, cited
Lahey v Sanderson [1959] Tas SR 17; [1959] TASStRp 10, cited
Munda v Western Australia (2013) 87 ALJR 1035; [2013] HCA 38, considered
R v Damrow[2009] QCA 245, considered
R v Dowel; Ex parte Attorney-General (Qld)[2013] QCA 8, cited
R v Gruenert; ex parte A-G (Qld)[2005] QCA 154, considered
R v Hart[2008] QCA 199, considered
R v Horne[2005] QCA 218, cited
R v Lovi[2012] QCA 24, cited
R v Major; Ex parte Attorney-General [2012] 1 Qd R 465; [2011] QCA 210, cited
R v…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read R v Hopper; Ex parte Attorney-General (Qld) and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2014] QCA 108
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appellant, the Attorney-General of Queensland, appealed against the sentence imposed on the respondent, Hopper, who had pleaded guilty to dangerous driving causing death and grievous bodily harm. The trial judge sentenced Hopper to two and a half years imprisonment, wholly suspended for three years, and disqualified him from holding a driver’s licence for the same period. The judge based this decision on the circumstances of the offence, Hopper’s personal circumstances, and his youth. The Attorney-General argued that the wholly suspended sentence was plainly unreasonable and unjust, urging the court to consider personal and general deterrence, the gravity of the consequences of the offence, and a subsequent traffic offence.

The court examined whether the wholly suspended sentence was manifestly inadequate. It weighed the need for personal and general deterrence against the personal circumstances and efforts toward rehabilitation demonstrated by Hopper. The court acknowledged the gravity of the consequences of the offence but also recognised the trial judge's assessment of Hopper’s personal circumstances and efforts to rehabilitate. Despite the Attorney-General’s arguments, the court found that the sentence, although lenient, did not amount to a manifest inadequacy. The court emphasised the importance of the trial judge’s assessment of the individual circumstances and the potential impact of returning Hopper to custody after five months.

Given the court's conclusion that the sentence was not manifestly inadequate, it declined to exercise its residual discretion to return Hopper to custody. The court acknowledged Hopper's psychological vulnerability and his substantial efforts toward rehabilitation since sentencing. The court found that these factors, coupled with the passage of five months since the original sentence, made it inappropriate to alter the sentence at that juncture. The appeal was therefore dismissed.

ORDERS:
Appeal dismissed.

Orders

Orders of the court

Appeal dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.