R v Hansen

Case [2011] SASCFC 10


SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Court of Criminal Appeal)

R v HANSEN

[2011] SASCFC 10

Judgment of The Court of Criminal Appeal

(The Honourable Justice Sulan, The Honourable Justice Vanstone and The Honourable Justice White)

9 March 2011

CRIMINAL LAW - SENTENCE - SENTENCING ORDERS - NON-PAROLE PERIOD OR MINIMUM TERM  - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - PARTICULAR CASES

CRIMINAL LAW - PARTICULAR OFFENCES - OFFENCES AGAINST THE PERSON - HOMICIDE - MANSLAUGHTER - SENTENCE - PARTICULAR CASES

Appeal against sentence - appellant charged with murder but convicted for manslaughter - sentenced to imprisonment for 12 years with non-parole period of 10 years - prior to trial appellant offered to plead guilty to manslaughter on the basis of self-defence that was not reasonably proportionate to the perceived threat - sentencing judge declined to set non-parole period of less than four-fifths of head sentence - whether judge erred in finding that this was a serious case of manslaughter - whether, having found that a criterion under s 32A of Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA) was met, judge erred in refusing to find that special reasons existed to lower mandatory non-parole period - whether sentencing judge erred in failing to take account, when fixing the head sentence, of the pre-trial offer to plead.

Held:  Vanstone and Sulan JJ agreeing, White J dissenting - appeal dismissed.

Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA) s 32A, s 10(1)(g); Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 15(1), referred to.
R v Kirkman (1987) 44 SASR 591; Cameron v The Queen (2002) 209 CLR 339; R v Place (2002) 81 SASR 395; R v Oinonen [1999] NSWCCA 310; R v Pennisi [2001] NSWCCA 326; R v Cardoso (2003) 137 A Crim R 535; R v Forbes [2004] NSWSC 241; R v Glanville [2010] NSWSC 364; R v Marshall (1995) 1 Qd R 673; R v Wiggins [2003] QCA 367; R v Bartlett [1996] 2 VR 687; R v Parr [2009] VSC 468; R v Jones [2010] SASCFC 58, considered.

R v HANSEN
[2011] SASCFC 10

Court of Criminal Appeal:  Sulan, Vanstone and White JJ

  1. SULAN J:             I would dismiss the appeal.  I agree with the reasons of Vanstone J.

  2. VANSTONE J:     After a trial by jury, the appellant was found not guilty of murder but guilty of manslaughter.  He stabbed a man in the neck four times late at night in Hindley Street, Adelaide.  There was a history of bad feeling and violence between them.  He was sentenced to 12 years imprisonment with a 10 year non-parole period.  He now appeals against the sentence arguing that the judge imposed a sentence which was too high and also that he erred in failing to reduce the non-parole period below the mandatory minimum provided in the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988.

    Background

  3. Both the appellant and the victim come from Port Pirie.  In July 2004 they were involved in a confrontation there.  The victim stabbed the appellant in…

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R v Hansen [2011] SASCFC 10
Case
[2011] SASCFC 10
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Supreme Court of South Australia, constituted by Sulan, Vanstone, and White JJ, heard an appeal against a sentence imposed on the appellant. The appellant had been charged with murder but was ultimately convicted of manslaughter. The sentencing judge imposed a head sentence of 12 years imprisonment with a non-parole period of 10 years. The appeal concerned the propriety of this sentence, particularly the non-parole period.

The central legal issues before the Court were whether the sentencing judge erred in several respects. Firstly, it was argued that the judge failed to adequately consider the mitigating effect of the appellant's pre-trial offer to plead guilty to manslaughter on the grounds of excessive self-defence when fixing the head sentence. Secondly, the appellant contended that the head sentence was manifestly excessive given the circumstances of the offence and his personal situation. Thirdly, the appeal challenged the judge's refusal to find special reasons, beyond those already identified under s 32A(3)(c) of the *Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988* (SA), to reduce the mandatory non-parole period, specifically arguing that the victim's conduct constituted a special reason under s 32A(3)(a). Finally, the appellant argued that the judge erred by failing to set a non-parole period of less than the statutory minimum of four-fifths of the head sentence.

The Court addressed the appellant's argument regarding the non-parole period, noting that the sentencing judge had set a period slightly exceeding the mandatory four-fifths proportion without providing specific reasons. The Court found that the judge was entitled to use rounded figures that approximated the statutory proportion, as there was no expectation for judges to apply the minimum mathematically to arrive at precise periods of time. The Court concluded that the sentence imposed was not manifestly excessive and dismissed the appeal. The Court also noted that the jury's verdict of manslaughter on the basis of excessive self-defence was consistent with the appellant's earlier offer to plead guilty on the same grounds.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

WHITE J (dissent)
As I mentioned, the judge selected a non-parole period which was slightly more than the mandatory minimum proportion of four-fifths. He did not give any specific reason for so doing. It seems to me that all the judge did was to use round figures which approximated the statutory proportion. I think he was quite entitled to do so. The Parliament does not, presumably, wish judges to apply the statutory minimum in a mathematical way, so as to arrive at periods of years, months and days. That has never been the practice of sentencing judges and I do not consider that the introduction of a statutory minimum period changes that fact.Conclusion I am quite unable to say that the sentence imposed is manifestly excessive. I would dismiss the appeal. The circumstances giving rise to this appeal are set out in the reasons of Vanstone J. The appellant argued four matters:(1)The sentencing Judge had erred when fixing the head sentence of 12 years by failing to have regard to the mitigatory effect of the appellant’s offer on 14 September 2009 to plead guilty to manslaughter on the basis of excessive self-defence;(2)The head sentence was in any event manifestly excessive having regard to the circumstances of the offence and the appellant’s personal circumstances;(3)The sentencing Judge had erred in fixing the non-parole period by failing to find that, in addition to the special reason arising under s 32A(3)(c) of the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA) (the Sentencing Act), special reason also arose under s 32A(3)(a) because the appellant’s conduct had been substantially mitigated by the victims conduct.(4)The Judge had in any event erred by failing to fix a non-parole period which was less than the mandatory minimum of four-fifths of the head sentence.The Offer to Plead Guilty and the Head Sentence The offence was committed on 28 February 2009. The appellant was arrested and remanded in custody on the same day. Just on seven months later and before he was committed for trial on the charge of murder, the appellant’s solicitors wrote to the Director of Public Prosecutions conveying his offer to plead guilty to the offence of manslaughter on the basis of excessive self-defence. The Director rejected that offer and the appellant was committed for trial in this Court. The letter containing the appellant’s offer was not placed before the Court but these matters were common ground. Apart from the possibility that the jury verdict is a merciful verdict of the kind to which King CJ referred in R v Kirkman,[1] it is explicable only on the basis that the jury was satisfied that the prosecution had not excluded as a reasonable possibility that the appellant genuinely believed his stabbing of the victim to be necessary and reasonable for his own defence. The jury must also have been satisfied that the prosecution had established that the appellant’s conduct was not, in the circumstances he genuinely believed them to be, reasonably proportionate to the threat which he genuinely believed to exist: Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 s 15(1). Put more shortly, the verdict is explicable on the basis that while the jury considered that the appellant may have had a defensive purpose, his response was excessive. This was the same basis upon which the appellant had offered to plead guilty to manslaughter on 14 September 2009. [1] (1987) 44 SASR 591 at 593

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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