SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Court of Criminal Appeal)
R v A, D
[2011] SASCFC 5
Judgment of The Court of Criminal Appeal
(The Honourable Chief Justice Doyle, The Honourable Justice Duggan, The Honourable Justice Anderson, The Honourable Justice White and The Honourable Justice David)
3 March 2011
CRIMINAL LAW - PARTICULAR OFFENCES - OFFENCES AGAINST THE PERSON - HOMICIDE - MURDER - SENTENCE: PARTICULAR CASES - MINIMUM TERM, NON-PAROLE PERIOD
CRIMINAL LAW - SENTENCE - INTERPRETATION OF SENTENCING PROVISIONS
CRIMINAL LAW - SENTENCE - SENTENCING ORDERS - NON-PAROLE PERIOD OR MINIMUM TERM - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - GENERALLY
CRIMINAL LAW - SENTENCE - SENTENCING OF JUVENILES - RELEVANT FACTORS - GENERAL PRINCIPLES
CRIMINAL LAW - SENTENCE - SENTENCING OF JUVENILES - SENTENCING AS ADULT OR CHILD AND IMPRISONMENT
Respondent pleaded guilty to murder - respondent 14 years of age at the time of the offence - sentenced as an adult - sentenced to life imprisonment - non-parole period of six years - whether Judge erred in the application of s 32 and s 32A of the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA) - whether mandatory minimum non-parole period provisions apply to youths sentenced as adults - correct interpretation of the mandatory minimum non-parole period provisions - whether non-parole period manifestly inadequate - application for permission to appeal granted - appeal dismissed.
Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA) s 3A, s 31A, s 31A(1), s 32, s 32(1)(a), s 32(5), s 32(5)(ab), s 32(5)(ba), s 32(10), s 32(10)(ba), s 32(10)(d), s 32A, s 32A(2)(b), s 32A(3); Criminal Law (Sentencing) (Dangerous Offenders) Amendment Act 2007 (SA); Young Offenders Act 1993 (SA) s 3, s 4(1), s 29(1), s 29(1)(a), s 29(1)(b), s 29(1)(c), s 29(4); Statutes Amendment (Sentencing of Young Offenders) Act 1996 (SA), referred to.
R v Ironside (2009) 104 SASR 54; A, MC v Police (2008) 102 SASR 151; R v QTV (2003) 87 SASR 378; R v Barnett (2009) 198 A Crim R 251; R v Harkin [2010] SASCFC 39; R v Jones [2010] SASCFC 58; The Queen v Shrestha (1991) 173 CLR 48; The Queen v Stewart (1984) 35 SASR 477, discussed.
R v A, D
[2011] SASCFC 5Court of Criminal Appeal: Doyle CJ, Duggan, Anderson, White and David JJ
DOYLE CJ, DUGGAN, ANDERSON AND WHITE JJ: On 12 November 2008 the respondent A stabbed and killed a youth aged 14 years in the course of a fight. A also was 14 years of age.
In April 2010 A pleaded guilty in the Supreme Court to a charge of murder. When sentenced in September 2010 he was 16 years of age.
A Judge imposed the mandatory head sentence of life imprisonment. He fixed a non-parole period of six years (taking effect from 17 November 2008 when A was first taken into custody).
The Director of Public Prosecutions has applied for permission to appeal against the sentence. The Director submits that the Judge erred in law in his application to the…
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- R v A, D [2011] SASCFC 5
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- [2011] SASCFC 5
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CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issues before the court were: (1) whether the mandatory minimum non-parole period provisions in the *Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988* (SA) applied to a juvenile offender who was sentenced as an adult; and (2) the correct interpretation and application of these mandatory minimum provisions, particularly in relation to the existence and effect of "special reasons" for reducing such periods. The court also considered whether the non-parole period imposed was manifestly inadequate.
The court acknowledged the complexity and differing judicial opinions surrounding the interpretation and application of the new sentencing provisions, which were enacted as part of a policy to be "tough on crime." These provisions significantly altered the approach to fixing non-parole periods, requiring comparisons that did not involve like with like. The court noted that a consistent majority opinion had not emerged in previous cases, with various views expressed on whether special reasons for reduction could arise in any case or only at the lower end of objective seriousness, the scope of discretion to reduce the minimum period, the continued relevance of the minimum period after special reasons are found, and the range of possible reductions. Despite these complexities, the court ultimately dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the sentencing judge's application of the law.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The new provisions were enacted as part of the Executive Government’s policy of being “tough on crime”. That policy, embodied in the new provisions enacted by Parliament, will result in a significant increase in the non-parole period in many cases, and an increase in the average length of non-parole periods.Consideration of submissions The new provisions have been considered by the Court of Criminal Appeal in R v Ironside [2009] SASC 151; (2009) 104 SASR 54; in R v Barnett [2009] SASC 332; (2009) 198 A Crim R 251; in R v Harkin [2010] SASCFC 39 and in R v Jones [2010] SASCFC 58. In these cases a consistent majority opinion as to the construction and application of the new provisions has not emerged. Different opinions have been expressed. This is not surprising having regard to the difficult task that the new provisions set for a sentencing court. In R v Ironside Doyle CJ referred to a number of the difficulties that arise: at [39]-[49]. There is no need to repeat what Doyle CJ said. It suffices to say that the new provisions require an approach to fixing a non-parole period that departs substantially from the approach that prevailed before, and which involves the making of comparisons that do not involve comparing like with like. In his written outline Mr Muscat SC, counsel for A, summarised some of the differing opinions that have been expressed by members of this Court. There is no need to decide whether or not the summary captures all of the differing opinions expressed, and whether or not it is completely accurate. It gives a helpful sketch of the differences. We now set out that summary, incorporating Mr Muscat’s footnotes to the cases. We do not necessarily endorse his attribution of opinions to particular Judges. The different views are as follows:(a)That in considering whether special reasons exist for reducing the mandatory minimum non-parole period for a serious offence against the person those special reasons:(i) can only arise in the case of offences at the lower end of the range of objective seriousness (R v Ironside at [56] per Doyle CJ, R v Barnett at [52] per Vanstone J and R v Harkin at [40] per Anderson and Kelly JJ).(ii) can be considered in any type of case (R v Jones at [53]-[54] per Anderson J, [109]-[110] per David J and [172]-[173] per Peek J).(b)That if special reasons are found to exist, the discretion to reduce the mandatory minimum non-parole period:(i) is limited to a consideration of only those factors and not the full range of factors which are normally taken into account in determining the length of a non-parole period (R v Ironside at [47]-[48] and [82] per Doyle CJ and [180] per Kourakis J).(ii) the full range of factors ordinarily relevant to the fixing of a non-parole period can be considered (R v Barnett at [30]-[32] per Gray J, [46]-[50] per Vanstone J, [92] per Kourakis J and R v Jones at [111] per David J and [174]-[178] per Peek J).(c)That once special reasons are found to exist:(i) the mandatory minimum non-parole period is still relevant to the extent of the reduction to be made (R v Ironside at [37]-[38], [47] per Doyle CJ and [181] per Kourakis J, R v Barnett at [50] per Vanstone J, [73]-[74] and [92] per Kourakis J, R v Harkin [36] per Anderson and Kelly JJ, R v Jones [73], [80] per Anderson J and [187] per Peek J).(ii) the mandatory minimum non-parole period does not need to be further considered (R v Barnett [31]-[32] per Gray J and R v Jones [111] per David J).(d)That the range of the possible reduction:(i) is limited to a relatively small degree (R v Ironside [179], [181] and [183] per Kourakis J, R v Barnett [49] per Vanstone J).(ii) is not so limited (R v Jones at [81] per Anderson J (for murder) and [195] per Peek J (where it is disapproved or qualified)).(e)That different considerations may apply under section 32(5)(ab) and section 32(5)(ba) (R v Jones at [81] per Anderson J).