R v Parr

Case [2009] VSC 468 16 October 2009

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA

Not Restricted

AT MELBOURNE

CRIMINAL DIVISION

No. 1719 of 2008

THE QUEEN

ROBERT SEAN PARR

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JUDGE:	WHELAN J
WHERE HELD:	Melbourne
DATE OF HEARING:	17, 20-21, 23-24, 27-30 April, 1 & 5 May, 22 June, 24 July, 15 October 2009
DATE OF SENTENCE:	16 October 2009
CASE MAY BE CITED AS:	R v Parr
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION:	[2009] VSC 468

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CRIMINAL LAW – Sentence – Defensive homicide – Victim stabbed 17 times – Sentence 10 years – Non-parole period 8 years.

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APPEARANCES:	Counsel	Solicitors
For the Crown	Ms S Borg	Office of Public Prosecutions
For the Accused	Mr J Kelly	Leanne Warren & Associates

HIS HONOUR:

Robert Sean Parr, on 20 April 2009 you were arraigned on one count of murder, in relation to the death of Vevil Aruma. You pleaded not guilty. On 5 May 2009 a jury of 12 found you not guilty of murder, but guilty of its statutory alternative, defensive homicide.

In finding you guilty of defensive homicide, the jury must have been satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that you killed Vevil Aruma in circumstances which would otherwise constitute murder, but that you were not guilty of murder because you believed your conduct to be necessary to defend yourself from the infliction of death or really serious injury, although you did not have reasonable grounds for that belief.

On 22 June 2009 and on 24 July 2009 I heard a plea in mitigation on your behalf. On 15 October 2009 I heard further submissions on the Court of Appeal decision in R v Edwards,[1] which was handed down on 9 October 2009.
[1][2009] VSCA 232.

The maximum penalty for the crime of defensive homicide is 20 years’ imprisonment.[2]
[2]Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 9AD.

The circumstances of your offending were as follows.[3]
[3] I am bound to sentence on a factual basis which is consistent with the jury’s verdict. Otherwise, in relation to matters adverse to the accused, I must be satisfied of those matters beyond reasonable doubt, but I may take into account matters in the accused’s favour which are established on the balance of probabilities: R v Storey [1998] 1 VR 395 at 369; R v Olbrich (1999) 1999 CLR 270; R v Cheung (2001) 209 CLR 1; and R v Ramage [2004] VSC 508 at [25].

Some time in 2007 the deceased; his girlfriend, Julie Dankevicius; and her 17-year-old son began to live in a Ministry of Housing flat in Frankston rented by their friend, Kylie Vickers. Kylie Vickers is your sister. Some time after they arrived, you also came to live in this flat with your friend, Sharmayne Brechin. Kylie Vickers’ boyfriend at that time was a person named Laurie Merceica.

Whilst the evidence at your trial was unclear as to what had happened leading up to the fatal incident, I am satisfied that there had been prior conflict between you on the one hand and your…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading R v Parr

Details

AGLC: R v Parr [2009] VSC 468
Case: [2009] VSC 468
Decision Date: 16 October 2009

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of R v Parr was heard in the Supreme Court of Queensland. The appellant, Parr, had been convicted of manslaughter in relation to the death of the victim, who was stabbed 17 times during a confrontation. The dispute centred on the appropriate sentence to be imposed on the appellant, with the prosecution arguing for a sentence that reflected the gravity of the offence, and the defence advocating for a more lenient sentence that took into account the circumstances of the incident.

The primary legal issue before the court was the appropriate sentence to be imposed on the appellant, with particular emphasis on the principles of defensive homicide and proportionality. The court needed to balance the appellant's culpability with the circumstances that may have influenced his actions during the incident. The court also had to consider the non-parole period that should be attached to the sentence.

In delivering the judgment, the court considered the principles of defensive homicide, where the appellant claimed that he acted in self-defence. The court noted that while the appellant's actions were extreme, they were a response to what he perceived as an imminent threat. The court acknowledged that the appellant had a history of mental health issues, which may have influenced his actions. After weighing these factors, the court determined that an appropriate sentence was 10 years imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 8 years. The court found that this sentence reflected the gravity of the offence while also taking into account the circumstances that may have influenced the appellant's actions.

The court's decision was that the appellant was to be sentenced to 10 years imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 8 years. The court acknowledged the gravity of the offence but also considered the circumstances that may have influenced the appellant's actions. The court found that this sentence was proportionate and reflected the principles of defensive homicide.

Orders