MULLINS JA: I will ask Justice Ryan to deliver her reasons.
RYAN J: The applicant, Paul Geddes, applies for leave to appeal against a sentence of ten years’ imprisonment which was imposed upon his plea of guilty for the offence of trafficking in dangerous drugs. At his sentence hearing, the applicant pleaded guilty to other offences, namely, four other drug offences, including the aggravated possession of methylamphetamine, and 18 summary charges. The learned sentencing judge imposed a term of imprisonment upon him for the offence of trafficking only. For the other offences, the applicant was convicted but not separately punished except by way of the disqualification of his driver licence in the case of two summary offences.
The applicant submits that the sentence of ten years’ imprisonment was manifestly excessive.
The hurdle he faces in this application for leave is that the sentence imposed was one which his counsel expressly acknowledged was, in effect, within range. As his Honour Justice Keane said in R v Flew [2008] QCA 290:
“[t]he circumstance that the sentence which was imposed accorded with the submission put to the sentencing judge on the offender’s behalf means that an assertion that the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive could be upheld only in circumstances which are sufficiently exceptional to warrant relieving the applicant from responsibility for the conduct of his case at first instance.”
It is not suggested by the applicant’s current counsel that sentencing counsel erred in acknowledging that an appropriate penalty for the applicant’s offending would be ten years’ imprisonment; rather, she submits that the sentence is manifestly excessive having regard to the applicant’s voluntary cessation of his trafficking activities prior to his being charged with trafficking, and the rehabilitation undertaken by the applicant prior to his being charged with trafficking and which he continued until the sentence hearing.
It is well established that this Court will not intervene where it is submitted that a sentence is manifestly excessive, unless convinced that there must have been some misapplication of principle having regard to all of the relevant sentencing factors, including the degree to which the sentence under consideration differs from those imposed in comparable cases. The applicant here submits that the sentence imposed could have been, and should have been, lower. When the sentence imposed is considered in the context of relevant sentencing principles, including, in particular, the need for general deterrence; and when it is compared against the yardsticks of the comparable decisions to which his Honour was referred, in my view, it cannot be said that the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive.
For the reasons which follow, I am of the view that the sentence imposed by the learned sentencing judge reveals no failure by his Honour to properly exercise his sentencing discretion.
First, the offending was…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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AGLC
R v Geddes [2020] QCA 94
Case
[2020] QCA 94
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Court of Appeal was asked to decide whether the sentence imposed on Paul Geddes was manifestly excessive. The applicant, Paul Geddes, was sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment for trafficking in dangerous drugs. His counsel argued that the sentence was manifestly excessive, particularly considering Geddes' voluntary cessation of his trafficking activities and the rehabilitation he undertook. The court considered the seriousness of Geddes' offending, which involved a prolific drug trafficking business dealing primarily in methylamphetamine, as well as his threats of violence towards debtors. It also took into account his minor criminal history, longstanding issues with drugs and alcohol, and his participation in rehabilitation.
The Court of Appeal held that the sentence imposed by the sentencing judge was not manifestly excessive. The court found that the sentence was within the range acknowledged by the applicant's counsel at the sentencing hearing. The court also considered the relevant sentencing principles, including the need for general deterrence, and compared the sentence against those imposed in comparable cases. The court concluded that the sentence imposed was appropriate and did not reveal any failure by the sentencing judge to properly exercise their discretion.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the application for leave to appeal against sentence. The final order of the Court was that the application for leave to appeal against sentence was refused.