SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
R v Randall [2019] QCA 25
PARTIES:
R
v
RANDALL, Colin David
(applicant)FILE NO/S:
CA No 116 of 2018
SC No 909 of 2017DIVISION:
Court of Appeal
PROCEEDING:
Sentence Application
ORIGINATING COURT:
Supreme Court at Brisbane – [2018] QSC 100 (Davis J)DELIVERED ON:
Date of Order: 15 February 2019
Date of Publication of Reasons: 22 February 2019DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
15 February 2019
JUDGES:
Sofronoff P and Morrison JA and Burns J
ORDER:
Date of Order: 15 February 2019
Application refused.
CATCHWORDS:
CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE – GROUNDS FOR INTERFERENCE – JUDGE ACTED ON WRONG PRINCIPLE – where the applicant plead guilty to manslaughter – where the applicant was sentenced to nine years imprisonment with parole eligibility after five years – where s 184(2) of the Corrective Services Act 2006 (Qld) provides parole eligibility after serving half of the sentence – where the trial judge exercised discretion under s 160C(5) of the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) to postpone the applicant’s parole eligibility date by six months – whether the trial judge erred in postponing the statutorily mandated halfway parole eligibility date
R v Amato[2013] QCA 158, cited
R v Assurson (2007) 174 A Crim R 78; [2007] QCA 273, applied
R v McDougall and Collas [2007] 2 Qd R 87; [2006] QCA 365, appliedCOUNSEL:
M J Copley QC, with T G Zwoerner, for the applicant
D L Meredith for the respondentSOLICITORS:
Legal Aid Queensland for the applicant
Director of Public Prosecutions (Queensland) for the respondent
THE COURT: Colin David Randall killed his ten-week-old son with a single powerful punch to the baby’s stomach. Davis J sentenced him to a term of imprisonment of nine years and ordered that he be eligible to be considered for parole after serving five years. Randall now applies for leave to appeal against that sentence, complaining that he should become eligible for parole after serving not five years of his term but six months less. Consequently, this appeal is concerned with the narrow question whether Davis J was wrong (or, because this is an application for leave, arguably wrong) to set the parole eligibility date six months beyond the halfway point of the applicant’s nine year sentence.
The applicant is an educated man. He has a science degree with a major in physics. After gaining that degree he became a teacher. He continued his studies and also earned a master’s degree in education administration. He has taught at two prestigious private schools. He then quit teaching and was accepted for training to become a Queensland policeman. After being sworn into the Queensland Police Service, the applicant was posted to various South East Queensland stations. At one of these he met the woman whom he would later marry, Debra Chambers. They had a daughter who was born in 2010 and, on 14 April 2014, their son Kai was born.
The applicant…
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- AGLC
- R v Randall [2019] QCA 25
- Case
- [2019] QCA 25
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue that the court had to determine was whether the trial judge had erred in postponing the parole eligibility date as mandated by statute. The applicant argued that the trial judge had failed to consider the statutory provisions and had instead exercised his discretion to postpone the parole eligibility date. The court had to determine whether the trial judge had acted on the wrong principle and whether the applicant was entitled to an appeal against sentence.
The court held that the trial judge had not acted on the wrong principle. The court found that the trial judge had exercised his discretion in accordance with the provisions of section 160C(5) of the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) and had not failed to consider the statutory provisions. The court held that the trial judge had the discretion to postpone the parole eligibility date and had exercised that discretion in accordance with the provisions of the Act. The court found that the applicant had not demonstrated that the trial judge had acted on the wrong principle and that there were no grounds for interference with the sentence. The appeal against sentence was dismissed, and the application was refused.
The final orders of the court were that the application for an appeal against sentence was refused. The court found that the trial judge had not acted on the wrong principle and had exercised his discretion in accordance with the provisions of the Act. The court found that the applicant had not demonstrated that there were grounds for interference with the sentence. The appeal against sentence was dismissed, and the application was refused.
Orders
Orders of the court
Date of Order: 15 February 2019
Application refused.
Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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