Quinlan v Rothwell

Case [2008] QSC 143


SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Quinlan v Rothwell & Anor [2008] QSC 143

PARTIES:

DANIEL BRIAN QUINLAN
(plaintiff)
v
GARRY ST CLAIR ROTHWELL
(first defendant)
and
AUSTRALIAN INSTITUTE OF VALUERS AND LAND ADMINISTRATORS INCORPORATED
(second defendant)

FILE NO:

1683 of 1990

DIVISION:

Trial Division

PROCEEDING:

Civil Trial

ORIGINATING COURT:

Supreme Court at Queensland

DELIVERED ON:

22 May 2008

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

12 May 2008

JUDGE:

Chesterman J

ORDER:

1.          The plaintiff’s application for leave to proceed is refused

2.          The action be struck out

CATCHWORDS:

PROCEDURE – SUPREME COURT PROCEDURE – QUEENSLAND – PROCEDURE UNDER RULES OF THE COURT – TIME DELAY SINCE LAST PROCEEDING – whether plaintiff’s explanation for time delay reasonable – whether prejudice suffered by defendants as a result of delay – whether action should be struck out

Legislation
Defamation Act 1889
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (5)(3), 155(2), 155, 211(2), 214(1)(b), 280

Cases
Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor (1996) 186 CLR 541
Dunseath v Febriway Pty Ltd (2001) QCA 104
Cooper v Hopgood and Ganim 1999 2 Qd R 115
Page v The Central Queensland University (2006) QCA 478

General Credits Limited v Whiting 1970 QWN; 32
Ladbrolli Pty Ltd v Lloyd’s Bank NZI Ltd (unreported White M 9 November 1990)

COUNSEL:

Mr P Favell for the plaintiff
Mr P Applegarth SC for the first and second defendants

SOLICITORS:

Tucker and Cowen for the plaintiff
Minter Ellison for the first and second defendants

  1. The plaintiff is a valuer by profession.  In March 1988 he prepared a written valuation of two parcels of land located to the south of Coffs Harbour in New South Wales.  One parcel, having an area of 594 hectares, was described as having potential for development into a ‘major integrated resort’ and was designated ‘tourist land’ in the valuation.  The second parcel had an area of about 408 hectares and was designated ‘forest land’ (together “the Bonville land”).  In May 1987


    APM Forests Pty Ltd had sole the Bonville land to Bonville Hardwoods Ltd (‘Bonville’) for a price of $4,724,000.

  1. The plaintiff valued the tourist land ‘as is’, with its then current local authority zoning and development restrictions, at $17,000,000.  With rezoning to allow resort development it was valued at $27,000,000.  The forest land was valued separately at $8,772,000. 

  1. On 16 and 17 October 1990 the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (‘ABC’) telecast in New South Wales and Queensland respectively a current affairs program part of which was an account of dealings with the Bonville land by Bonville.  The company was controlled by Mr Robert Johnson.  The thrust of the report was that the New South Wales Investment Corporation which had lent Bonville some $4,000,000 to assist it to obtain development approval and develop the Bonville land for residential, commercial and industrial purposes, forgave the loan and extinguished the debt in return for the issue of shares in Bonville.  Its decision in that regard was based on the plaintiff’s valuation of the land, showing it had substantial worth.  The transaction increased Mr…

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Details
AGLC
Quinlan v Rothwell [2008] QSC 143
Case
[2008] QSC 143
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Quinlan v Rothwell involved a legal dispute before the Supreme Court of Queensland. The plaintiff sought leave to proceed with a claim against the defendants. The defendants opposed the application, citing a significant delay since the last proceeding and questioning the reasonableness of the plaintiff's explanation for the delay. They further argued that the delay had caused them prejudice, which warranted the striking out of the plaintiff's action.

The court was tasked with determining whether the plaintiff's explanation for the delay was reasonable, whether the defendants had suffered prejudice as a result of the delay, and ultimately, whether the action should be struck out. The court considered the length and nature of the delay, the plaintiff's reasons for the delay, and the extent of any prejudice to the defendants. The court also assessed whether the delay had caused any significant inconvenience or impairment to the defendants' ability to conduct their defence.

The court concluded that the plaintiff's explanation for the delay was not reasonable, and that the defendants had indeed suffered prejudice due to the delay. The court found that the delay had resulted in inconvenience and impairment of the defendants' ability to conduct their defence effectively. Consequently, the court refused the plaintiff's application for leave to proceed and ordered that the action be struck out. The court's decision was based on the balance of the factors considered, including the unreasonableness of the delay and the prejudice suffered by the defendants.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The plaintiff’s application for leave to proceed is refused

2. The action be struck out

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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