DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
Garland Waddington (a firm) v Carpenter & Ors [2018] QDC 173
PARTIES:
GARLAND WADDINGTON (a firm)
(plaintiff)
v
GLEN JOSEPH CARPENTER
(first defendant)
And
GRANT SHAUN CUNNING
(second defendant)
And
SPIRE LAW PTY LTD ACN605392265
(third defendant)
FILE NO/S:
1/16 (Maroochydore)
DIVISION:
PROCEEDING:
Application
ORIGINATING COURT:
District Court at Brisbane
DELIVERED ON:
31 August 2018
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
19 June 2018
JUDGE:
Dearden DCJ
ORDER:
The plaintiff’s application for leave to proceed under UCPR r.389 is dismissed.1.
Pursuant to UCPR r.280 the proceeding be dismissed for want of prosecution.2.
The plaintiff pay the defendants’ costs of the applications and the proceeding.3.
CATCHWORDS:
PROCEDURE – CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS – TIME, EXTENSION AND ABRIDGMENT – where an application has been made to take a new step in a proceeding – where an application has been made to strike out proceeding for want of prosecution –where proceedings commenced approximately two and a half years ago – where the last step in the proceeding occurred more than two years ago – where the delay is entirely attributable to the actions of the plaintiff
LEGISLATION:
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) rr. 5, 155, 213(1), 213(2), 214(1)(b), 389, 444
CASES:
Citypoint [Hotels] Pty Ltd v AIB Pty Ltd [2012] QCA 126
Tyler v Custom Credit Corporation [2000] QCA 178
Ure v Robertson [2017] 2 QdR 566
COUNSEL:
I Erskine (for the plaintiff)
C A Wilkins (for the first, second and third defendants)
SOLICITORS:
Garland Waddington (for the plaintiff)
K&L Gates (for the first, second and third defendants)
Introduction
[1] The plaintiff, Garland Waddington (a firm) by application filed 8 June 2018, seeks leave to take a new step in the proceeding. The first defendant (Glenn Joseph Carpenter), second defendant (Grant Shaun Cunning) and third defendant (Spire Law Pty Ltd) in an application filed 17 May 2018, seek to strike out the proceeding for want of prosecution.
[2] It is common ground that if the application for leave to take a new step succeeds, then the application to strike out the proceeding for want of prosecution fails, and conversely if the application for leave to take a new step fails, then the application to strike out the proceeding for want of prosecution must succeed.
Background
[3] The plaintiff and the first defendant entered into an employment agreement on or about 13 February 2013, and that agreement contained a restraint clause pleaded at paragraph 3 of the Statement of Claim.[1] The plaintiff and the second defendant entered into an employment agreement on or about 5 October 2013, and that agreement relevantly contained a restraint clause pleaded at paragraph 6 of the Statement of Claim.[2]
[1]Statement of Claim filed 4 January 2016.
[2]Statement of Claim filed 4 January 2016.
[4] The chronology of events is helpfully set out in the defendants’ Outline of Argument[3] as follows:-
[3]Exhibit 2, [3].
Date Event Reference 15.05.15 The second defendant ceased his employment with the plaintiff. Statement of…
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- Case
- [2018] QDC 173
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court were whether the plaintiff's application for leave to proceed under UCPR r.389 should be granted, and whether the proceeding should be dismissed for want of prosecution under UCPR r.280. The court was required to consider the relevant provisions of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules and the principles of justice and fairness in determining these issues.
The court found that the delay in taking a new step in the proceeding was entirely attributable to the plaintiff, and that there were no compelling circumstances to warrant an extension of time. The court also found that the delay had caused significant prejudice to the defendants, and that it was in the interests of justice to dismiss the proceeding for want of prosecution. The court dismissed the plaintiff's application for leave to proceed and ordered that the proceeding be dismissed for want of prosecution. The court also ordered that the plaintiff pay the defendants' costs of the applications and the proceeding.
The court's orders were that the plaintiff's application for leave to proceed under UCPR r.389 was dismissed, the proceeding be dismissed for want of prosecution, and that the plaintiff pay the defendants' costs of the applications and the proceeding. The court's decision provides guidance on the principles to be considered when determining applications for leave to proceed and applications to strike out for want of prosecution.
Orders
Orders of the court
The plaintiff’s application for leave to proceed under UCPR r.389 is dismissed.1.
Pursuant to UCPR r.280 the proceeding be dismissed for want of prosecution.2.
The plaintiff pay the defendants’ costs of the applications and the proceeding.3.
Background
Background to the litigation
In response to the defendants' application, Garland Waddington sought leave to take a new step in the proceeding, specifically to serve the writ and statement of claim. The plaintiff argued that the delay was due to administrative errors and miscommunication within their office and that they were now ready to proceed with the litigation. However, the plaintiff's explanation did not address the two-year inactivity nor did it provide any justification for the significant delay in taking the new step. The defendants opposed the plaintiff’s application, asserting that the delay was entirely attributable to the plaintiff's lack of diligence and that the plaintiff had not shown any good reason for the delay or any likelihood of success if the proceeding were to continue.
The matter of Garland Waddington (a firm) v Carpenter came before the court as an application to strike out the proceeding for want of prosecution and an application for leave to take a new step in the proceeding. The proceedings were initially commenced approximately two and a half years prior to the court’s hearing. However, the last step in the proceeding had occurred more than two years ago, with the delay being entirely attributable to the actions of the plaintiff. The plaintiff sought leave under Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (UCPR) rule 389 to take a new step in the proceeding, which the defendants opposed. In response to the delay, the defendants applied to strike out the proceeding under UCPR rule 280. The court dismissed the plaintiff's application for leave to proceed under UCPR rule 389 and granted the defendants' application to strike out the proceeding for want of prosecution. The plaintiff was ordered to pay the defendants’ costs of the applications and the proceeding.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Does the delay in the proceedings, attributable entirely to the actions of the plaintiff, justify the dismissal of the proceeding under UCPR r.280?
2. Is the plaintiff entitled to leave to take a new step in the proceeding under UCPR r.389, given the delay and circumstances of the case?
3. Should the plaintiff be required to pay the defendants' costs of the applications and the proceeding under the court's inherent jurisdiction or applicable rules?
Held
1. The court concluded that the delay in the proceedings, attributable entirely to the actions of the plaintiff, justifies the dismissal of the proceeding under UCPR r.280. As a result, the proceeding is dismissed for want of prosecution.
2. The court dismissed the plaintiff’s application for leave to take a new step in the proceeding under UCPR r.389, given the delay and circumstances of the case. Consequently, the application was dismissed.
3. The court held that the plaintiff should be required to pay the defendants' costs of the applications and the proceeding. Therefore, the plaintiff is ordered to pay the defendants' costs.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court in Garland Waddington (a firm) v Carpenter faced a significant delay in the proceedings, attributable entirely to the plaintiff's actions. The plaintiff had commenced the proceeding approximately two and half years prior, yet the last step in the proceeding occurred more than two years ago. The court was required to consider whether this delay justified the dismissal of the proceeding under UCPR r.280 and whether the plaintiff should be granted leave to take a new step under UCPR r.389. Additionally, the court had to determine whether the plaintiff should be required to pay the defendants' costs of the applications and the proceeding under the court's inherent jurisdiction or applicable rules.
In addressing the first issue, the court applied the principles established under UCPR r.280, which provides that a proceeding may be dismissed for want of prosecution if it has not been proceeded with diligently or if it is not expedient to do so. The court considered the entire period of delay and the extent to which it was attributable to the plaintiff. Given that the delay was entirely attributable to the plaintiff and the proceedings had not been proceeded with diligently, the court found that dismissal was warranted. The delay of more than two years without any action from the plaintiff constituted a significant lapse that justified the dismissal under the rule. The court emphasised that the rule serves to ensure that proceedings are not left pending indefinitely and that the administration of justice is not unduly delayed.
Turning to the second issue, the court examined whether the plaintiff should be granted leave to take a new step in the proceeding under UCPR r.389. This rule allows a court to grant leave to take a new step in a proceeding despite the delay, provided it is just to do so. The court assessed the circumstances surrounding the delay, including whether the plaintiff had a satisfactory explanation and whether there was a reasonable prospect of success if the proceeding were to proceed. The court found that the plaintiff's explanation for the delay was inadequate and that there was no reasonable prospect of success if the proceeding were to continue. The court held that despite the discretionary nature of the rule, the delay and the lack of a satisfactory explanation or reasonable prospect of success meant that it was not just to grant leave to proceed.
Finally, the court considered whether the plaintiff should be required to pay the defendants' costs of the applications and the proceeding. The court exercised its inherent jurisdiction to order costs where it is just to do so, considering the delay and the plaintiff's conduct. The court noted that the plaintiff's actions had resulted in the proceedings being delayed for an excessive period without justification. The court determined that it was appropriate to order the plaintiff to pay the defendants' costs, reflecting the plaintiff's responsibility for the delay and the inefficiency caused by the proceedings.
The ratio decidendi of this decision is that a significant delay in proceedings, entirely attributable to the plaintiff, justifies the dismissal of the proceeding under UCPR r.280. The court will not grant leave to take a new step in such circumstances where there is no satisfactory explanation for the delay and no reasonable prospect of success. Additionally, the court may exercise its inherent jurisdiction to order the plaintiff to pay the defendants' costs where the delay and the plaintiff's conduct warrant such an order. This case reinforces the importance of diligent prosecution of proceedings and the consequences of inaction by the plaintiff.