FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
QGC Pty Limited v Alberts (No 4) [2022] FCA 1590
File number(s): QUD 334 of 2018 Judgment of: RARES J Date of judgment: 23 December 2022 Catchwords: NATIVE TITLE – construction of indigenous land use agreement (ILUA) entered under Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) – where ILUA required mining company to pay benefits to nominated entity to hold on trust for native title holders – where original nominated entity placed into liquidation – where ILUA required native title party to notify company of name and address of new nominated entity – whether ILUA required notice to be given by each individual who signed ILUA or by native title party as a whole – whether ILUA required benefits to be distributed on per capita basis or to each family comprising the native title party in equal shares
EQUITY – multiple persons owing fiduciary obligations – where disagreement between fiduciaries as to course of action – whether fiduciaries can act by majority or only unanimously
LEGAL PRACTITIONERS – whether, when and how solicitor’s equitable right or lien over proceeds of judgment, award or compromise arises – where applications brought by solicitor on behalf of native title party unsuccessful but ultimately parties negotiated compromise – whether actions of solicitor sufficiently caused result of judgment, award or compromise – Held: equitable right or lien established
Legislation: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 43
Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) ss 108, 199B, 203BK and 203BF
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 40.32
Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld) ss 308 and 316
Partnership Act 1891 (Qld) s 8
Cases cited: Astbury v Astbury [1898] 2 Ch 111
Australian Olympic Committee v Big Fights Inc (1999) 46 IPR 53
Colyton Investments Pty Ltd v McSorley (1962) 107 CLR 177
Conlon v QGC Pty Ltd (No 2) (2017) 359 ALR 460
Ex parte Patience; Makinson v The Minister (1940) 40 SR (NSW) 96
Hospital Products Ltd v United States Surgical Corporation (1984) 156 CLR 41
John Alexander’s Clubs Pty Ltd v White City Tennis Club Ltd (2010) 241 CLR 1
Leyton v Sneyd (1818) 8 Taunt 532
Luke v South Kensington Hotel Company (1879) 11 Ch D 121
Maguire v Makaronis (1997) 188 CLR 448
Pilmer v Duke Group Ltd (in liq) (2001) 207 CLR 165
QGC Pty Ltd v Alberts (No 2) [2021] FCA 540
QGC Pty Ltd v Alberts [2020] FCA 1869
Roam Australia Pty Ltd v Telstra Corporation (trading as Telecom Australia) [1997] FCA 980
Sky v Body (1970) 92 WN(NSW) 934
Torres Strait Island Regional Council v Ahwang [2022] QCA 39
Union Bank of Australia v Harrison, Jones & Devlin Ltd (1910) 11 CLR 492
Division: General Division Registry: Queensland National Practice Area: Native Title Number of paragraphs: 88 Date of hearing: 27 July 2022 Counsel for the applicant: Ms E J Longbottom QC Solicitor for the applicant: Norton Rose Fulbright Solicitor for the first to fifth,…
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- Case
- [2022] FCA 1590
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court needed to determine the legal interpretation of the ILUA clause which stated that decisions by the native title party could be made by a majority. The case also examined whether the ILUA required the native title party to act unanimously or by majority when making decisions such as retaining legal representation, especially after the original entity nominated to receive benefits became insolvent. Furthermore, the court had to decide on the equitable rights of the solicitor, TH Lawyers, and whether they were entitled to a lien over the proceeds of a judgment, award, or compromise.
The court concluded that the native title party could make decisions by a majority under the ILUA, aligning with the fiduciary obligations of the individuals comprising the native title party to act in the interests of the native title group. The court ruled that the solicitor, TH Lawyers, was entitled to an equitable right to recover their costs from the proceeds of the compromise because their efforts were instrumental in obtaining the result. The court found that the requisite causal link between the solicitor's efforts and the result justified establishing the equitable right.
The court ordered that the parties confer with TH Lawyers to discuss the form of relief and file proposed orders by 25 January 2023. The proceedings were adjourned to 31 January 2023 for the making of orders and further case management.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The parties confer with each other and Trevor Hauff Lawyers as to the form of any relief that the Court should order, consistent with the Court’s reasons for judgment delivered today and file and serve on or before 25 January 2023 proposed agreed orders or in default of agreement marked-up orders showing any disagreed wording and submissions limited to 2 pages.
2. The proceeding stand over to 31 January 2023 at 9:30 am AEST for the making of orders and case management.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
QGC argued that the authorities, including Roam Australia Pty Ltd v Telstra Corporation (trading as Telecom Australia) [1997] FCA 980, required TH Lawyers to establish that their labour resulted in recovery of the fund in respect of which the equitable right of a solicitor to recover his or her costs arises. QGC contended that the “fruits of the labours” on which TH Lawyers relied included matters, such as the reestablishment of the cultural heritage committee, that appeared to be unconnected with the payment of the financial benefits to the nominated entity under the ILUA. Consideration In Patience 40 SR (NSW) at 100, 103 and 107–108, Jordan CJ explained the principle on which a solicitor is entitled to an equitable right to have his or her costs paid out of the money which the solicitor’s client recovers under a judgment, award or compromise in a proceeding in which the solicitor has acted. There, the Full Court found that the solicitor “was instrumental in obtaining for his client the verdict which has been given” (at 103). Jordan CJ made clear (at 107–108) that where the solicitor’s client was suing “for the benefit of all persons interested”, others who would benefit from the result obtained “cannot approbate and reprobate. They cannot claim to be entitled to the fruits of the action and at the same time repudiate the right of the solicitor, who caused it to fructify, to receive his costs out of the fruits”. Jordan CJ also held (at 108) that the solicitor’s remedy provided by the Court’s inherent jurisdiction “is a flexible one. It is available whenever a right to receive money has been established as a result of legal proceedings” even if the costs have not been taxed. In Roam [1997] FCA 980 at page 4, Lehane J explained that the principle applied even where the solicitor’s exertions had finished before the client obtained the judgment, award or had negotiated the compromise resulting in the client’s right to receive money. Lehane J held that the solicitor’s equitable right did not arise automatically but only when “the requisite causal link is established” (at page 5). That is, the solicitor must show that, on the evidence, his or her efforts can be regarded as having wholly or partially brought about the judgment, award or compromise. Lehane J held (at pages 5–6):Where solicitors have been actively involved over a considerable period in acting for a party to successful litigation, the conclusion is likely to follow that the solicitors have been instrumental in obtaining the result, or that the result is (at least in part) due to the solicitors’ efforts.…the solicitors received instructions in November 1995, some five months after the proceedings had been commenced. They continued to act in the proceedings for about 16 months, ceasing to do so shortly before trial. They ceased to act because they chose to terminate their retainer, in circumstances where, on Mr Monteith’s evidence, they were told that Roam was not in the position to pay sums required to meet the solicitors’ costs and counsels’ fees. They briefed counsel from time to time, they attended directions hearings, they attended to discovery and inspection and obtained affidavit evidence; they acted for Roam on a mediation, which failed to achieve settlement; they took part in some further unsuccessful settlement negotiations. On that evidence, and consistently with the authorities, I cannot resist the conclusion that the solicitors were instrumental in obtaining the compromise which led to the final orders. No suggestion was made that anything turns on the precise terms of the compromise or on any comparison between those terms and the relief which had been claimed by Roam in the proceedings. Certainly nothing in the authorities suggests that any such comparison is relevant: the questions seem to be, first, did the proceeding result in a judgments award or compromise under which money is payable to the party for whom the solicitors acted; and, secondly, was the part played by the solicitors sufficient to justify the conclusion that there is a sufficient causal link between the solicitors’ efforts and the result, so that the solicitors may be regarded as having been instrumental in obtaining the result.(emphasis added)