QGC Pty Limited v Alberts (No 4)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

QGC Pty Limited v Alberts (No 4) [2022] FCA 1590  

File number(s): QUD 334 of 2018
Judgment of: RARES J
Date of judgment: 23 December 2022
Catchwords:

NATIVE TITLE – construction of indigenous land use agreement (ILUA) entered under Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) – where ILUA required mining company to pay benefits to nominated entity to hold on trust for native title holders – where original nominated entity placed into liquidation – where ILUA required native title party to notify company of name and address of new nominated entity – whether ILUA required notice to be given by each individual who signed ILUA or by native title party as a whole – whether ILUA required benefits to be distributed on per capita basis or to each family comprising the native title party in equal shares

EQUITY – multiple persons owing fiduciary obligations – where disagreement between fiduciaries as to course of action – whether fiduciaries can act by majority or only unanimously

LEGAL PRACTITIONERS – whether, when and how solicitor’s equitable right or lien over proceeds of judgment, award or compromise arises – where applications brought by solicitor on behalf of native title party unsuccessful but ultimately parties negotiated compromise – whether actions of solicitor sufficiently caused result of judgment, award or compromise – Held: equitable right or lien established  

Legislation:

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 43

Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) ss 108, 199B, 203BK and 203BF

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 40.32

Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld) ss 308 and 316

Partnership Act 1891 (Qld) s 8

Cases cited:

Astbury v Astbury [1898] 2 Ch 111

Australian Olympic Committee v Big Fights Inc (1999) 46 IPR 53

Colyton Investments Pty Ltd v McSorley (1962) 107 CLR 177

Conlon v QGC Pty Ltd (No 2) (2017) 359 ALR 460

Ex parte Patience; Makinson v The Minister (1940) 40 SR (NSW) 96

Hospital Products Ltd v United States Surgical Corporation (1984) 156 CLR 41

John Alexander’s Clubs Pty Ltd v White City Tennis Club Ltd (2010) 241 CLR 1

Leyton v Sneyd (1818) 8 Taunt 532

Luke v South Kensington Hotel Company (1879) 11 Ch D 121

Maguire v Makaronis (1997) 188 CLR 448

Pilmer v Duke Group Ltd (in liq) (2001) 207 CLR 165

QGC Pty Ltd v Alberts (No 2) [2021] FCA 540

QGC Pty Ltd v Alberts [2020] FCA 1869

Roam Australia Pty Ltd v Telstra Corporation (trading as Telecom Australia) [1997] FCA 980

Sky v Body (1970) 92 WN(NSW) 934

Torres Strait Island Regional Council v Ahwang [2022] QCA 39

Union Bank of Australia v Harrison, Jones & Devlin Ltd (1910) 11 CLR 492

Zhu v Treasurer of New South Wales (2004) 218 CLR 530

Division: General Division
Registry: Queensland
National Practice Area: Native Title
Number of paragraphs: 88
Date of hearing: 27 July 2022
Counsel for the applicant: Ms E J Longbottom QC
Solicitor for the applicant: Norton Rose Fulbright
Solicitor for the first to fifth,…
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Details
Case
[2022] FCA 1590
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

QGC Pty Limited v Alberts (No 4) involved a dispute under the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) concerning the construction and effect of an Indigenous Land Use Agreement (ILUA). The primary issue was how the ILUA governed the process for appointing and retaining legal representation for the native title party, specifically when the original entity nominated to receive benefits became insolvent. Additionally, the case considered the legal principles governing fiduciary duties among multiple persons, the equitable rights of solicitors, and the conditions under which these rights can be established.

The court needed to determine the legal interpretation of the ILUA clause which stated that decisions by the native title party could be made by a majority. The case also examined whether the ILUA required the native title party to act unanimously or by majority when making decisions such as retaining legal representation, especially after the original entity nominated to receive benefits became insolvent. Furthermore, the court had to decide on the equitable rights of the solicitor, TH Lawyers, and whether they were entitled to a lien over the proceeds of a judgment, award, or compromise.

The court concluded that the native title party could make decisions by a majority under the ILUA, aligning with the fiduciary obligations of the individuals comprising the native title party to act in the interests of the native title group. The court ruled that the solicitor, TH Lawyers, was entitled to an equitable right to recover their costs from the proceeds of the compromise because their efforts were instrumental in obtaining the result. The court found that the requisite causal link between the solicitor's efforts and the result justified establishing the equitable right.

The court ordered that the parties confer with TH Lawyers to discuss the form of relief and file proposed orders by 25 January 2023. The proceedings were adjourned to 31 January 2023 for the making of orders and further case management.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The parties confer with each other and Trevor Hauff Lawyers as to the form of any relief that the Court should order, consistent with the Court’s reasons for judgment delivered today and file and serve on or before 25 January 2023 proposed agreed orders or in default of agreement marked-up orders showing any disagreed wording and submissions limited to 2 pages.

2. The proceeding stand over to 31 January 2023 at 9:30 am AEST for the making of orders and case management.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Clause 3(a) of the ILUA provides:The Native Title Party … agrees that:(a)where it is required to make any decision under this Agreement, such decision is to be made by a majority of persons comprising the Native Title Party.(emphasis added) Ms Jerome argued that the native title party was not “required to make any decision under the [ILUA]” in relation to TH Lawyers’ retainer to act for it. She contended, with some support from QGC, that such a decision was outside the scope of cl 3(a) of the ILUA and that, accordingly, the native title party had to act unanimously in the absence of any other provision in the ILUA authorising it to act by majority. She contended that there was no provision in the ILUA dealing with the native title party appointing or retaining a lawyer. Accordingly, she submitted, apart from the brief period between April 2018 and June 2018 when she also agreed to TH Lawyers’ retainer, the native title party had not engaged the firm but rather the majority as individuals had. On this basis, she asserted that the work done by TH Lawyers, while retained only by the decisions of the majority signatories, was not performed on behalf of the native title party or any other person with functions under the ILUA.Construction of cl 3(a) In my opinion, for the reasons that follow, the circumstances in which the native title party found itself after BCJWY became incapacitated required the native title party “to make [a] decision under this [ILUA]” within the meaning of cl 3(a) as to how to enable the trust moneys constituting the unpaid but due benefits that QGC was holding to be paid to a new nominated entity or other person under cll 1–3 of annexure 3, including to appoint a lawyer to act for it. The construction of cl 3(a) of the ILUA is not without difficulty. While it is clear that the native title party can make a “decision” by majority, the question is what is the nature of such a decision. The expression “it is required to make any decision under this [ILUA]” in relation to the native title party can refer to, either, an obligation or duty to decide some existing issue (the duty meaning) or, alternatively, a description of the decision-maker in whom the instrument has reposed a discretion (the description meaning). In Torres Strait Island Regional Council v Ahwang [2022] QCA 39 at [38], Mullins JA, with whom Boddice and Crow JJ agreed, construed a statutory provision that applied to a trustee who “is required to make a decision about land” as conveying the description meaning; that is: the provision identified the person to whom the statute entrusted a discretion. The purpose of cl 3(a) was to enable a majority of the native title party to make discretionary decisions in performing its role under the ILUA. Each of the individuals who comprised the native title party owed fiduciary obligations to the members of the native title group as a whole, because of its responsibilities under cl 9 of the ILUA and cl 1.1 of annexure 3 to ensure that the benefits that QGC provided were used or distributed for the benefit of the families, the individuals comprising the native title party and the members of the native title group. Thus, the individuals comprising the native title party were under an obligation to act in the interests of the families and the members of the native title group as a whole, as envisaged by the provisions of the ILUA.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

QGC argued that the authorities, including Roam Australia Pty Ltd v Telstra Corporation (trading as Telecom Australia) [1997] FCA 980, required TH Lawyers to establish that their labour resulted in recovery of the fund in respect of which the equitable right of a solicitor to recover his or her costs arises. QGC contended that the “fruits of the labours” on which TH Lawyers relied included matters, such as the reestablishment of the cultural heritage committee, that appeared to be unconnected with the payment of the financial benefits to the nominated entity under the ILUA. Consideration In Patience 40 SR (NSW) at 100, 103 and 107–108, Jordan CJ explained the principle on which a solicitor is entitled to an equitable right to have his or her costs paid out of the money which the solicitor’s client recovers under a judgment, award or compromise in a proceeding in which the solicitor has acted. There, the Full Court found that the solicitor “was instrumental in obtaining for his client the verdict which has been given” (at 103). Jordan CJ made clear (at 107–108) that where the solicitor’s client was suing “for the benefit of all persons interested”, others who would benefit from the result obtained “cannot approbate and reprobate. They cannot claim to be entitled to the fruits of the action and at the same time repudiate the right of the solicitor, who caused it to fructify, to receive his costs out of the fruits”. Jordan CJ also held (at 108) that the solicitor’s remedy provided by the Court’s inherent jurisdiction “is a flexible one. It is available whenever a right to receive money has been established as a result of legal proceedings” even if the costs have not been taxed. In Roam [1997] FCA 980 at page 4, Lehane J explained that the principle applied even where the solicitor’s exertions had finished before the client obtained the judgment, award or had negotiated the compromise resulting in the client’s right to receive money. Lehane J held that the solicitor’s equitable right did not arise automatically but only when “the requisite causal link is established” (at page 5). That is, the solicitor must show that, on the evidence, his or her efforts can be regarded as having wholly or partially brought about the judgment, award or compromise. Lehane J held (at pages 5–6):Where solicitors have been actively involved over a considerable period in acting for a party to successful litigation, the conclusion is likely to follow that the solicitors have been instrumental in obtaining the result, or that the result is (at least in part) due to the solicitors’ efforts.…the solicitors received instructions in November 1995, some five months after the proceedings had been commenced. They continued to act in the proceedings for about 16 months, ceasing to do so shortly before trial. They ceased to act because they chose to terminate their retainer, in circumstances where, on Mr Monteith’s evidence, they were told that Roam was not in the position to pay sums required to meet the solicitors’ costs and counsels’ fees. They briefed counsel from time to time, they attended directions hearings, they attended to discovery and inspection and obtained affidavit evidence; they acted for Roam on a mediation, which failed to achieve settlement; they took part in some further unsuccessful settlement negotiations. On that evidence, and consistently with the authorities, I cannot resist the conclusion that the solicitors were instrumental in obtaining the compromise which led to the final orders. No suggestion was made that anything turns on the precise terms of the compromise or on any comparison between those terms and the relief which had been claimed by Roam in the proceedings. Certainly nothing in the authorities suggests that any such comparison is relevant: the questions seem to be, first, did the proceeding result in a judgments award or compromise under which money is payable to the party for whom the solicitors acted; and, secondly, was the part played by the solicitors sufficient to justify the conclusion that there is a sufficient causal link between the solicitors’ efforts and the result, so that the solicitors may be regarded as having been instrumental in obtaining the result.(emphasis added)