FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Porter, Application under the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 [2012] FCA 1431
Citation: Porter, Application under the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 [2012] FCA 1431 Parties: CHRISTOPHER DOUGLAS PORTER; APPLICATION UNDER THE SUPERANNUATION INDUSTRY (SUPERVISION) ACT 1993 File number: ACD 81 of 2012 Judge: FOSTER J Date of Orders: 7 December 2012 Date of Reasons: 17 December 2012 Catchwords: SUPERANNUATION – supervision of superannuation entities and responsible officers of such entities – whether the Court should exercise its discretion pursuant to s 126J(1) of the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth) to make an order that an individual who has committed offences of dishonesty should no longer be a disqualified person within the meaning of Pt 15 of that Act – relevant principles guiding the exercise of discretion discussed Legislation: Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 206G
Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), s 158
Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), Div 3 of Pt VIIC
Criminal Records Act 1991 (NSW), s 7
Financial Sector Legislation Amendment (Review of Prudential Decisions) Act 2008 (Cth)
Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth), ss 3, 10(1), 119, 120, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 126B, 126C, 126D, 126F, 126H, 126J(1)(b), 126K, 126L and 127Cases cited: Duffy; Re Westgate Ports Ltd (2010) 79 ACSR 267 cited Date of hearing: 7 December 2012 Place: Sydney (via video link to Canberra) (heard in Canberra) Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 35 Counsel for the Applicant: Mr WL Sharwood Solicitor for the Applicant: Hall & Wilcox
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
ACD 81 of 2012
APPLICATION UNDER THE SUPERANNUATION INDUSTRY (SUPERVISION) ACT 1993
CHRISTOPHER DOUGLAS PORTER
Applicant
JUDGE:
FOSTER J
DATE OF ORDER:
7 DECEMBER 2012
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY (VIA VIDEO LINK TO CANBERRA)
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
Pursuant to s 126J(1)(b) of the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth), Christopher Douglas Porter is not a disqualified person.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
ACD 81 of 2012
APPLICATION UNDER THE SUPERANNUATION INDUSTRY (SUPERVISION) ACT 1993
CHRISTOPHER DOUGLAS PORTER
Applicant
JUDGE:
FOSTER J
DATE:
17 DECEMBER 2012
PLACE:
SYDNEY (VIA VIDEO LINK TO CANBERRA)
(HEARD IN CANBERRA)REASONS FOR DECISION
By his Originating Application filed on 13 November 2012, the applicant sought an order pursuant to s 126J(1)(b) of the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth) (the SIS Act) that he is not a disqualified person within the meaning of that expression in Pt 15 of the SIS Act. When the matter was returned before the Court the Friday before last (7 December 2012), I made the order sought. These are my reasons for doing so.
On 31 August 1988 and on 1 September 1988, the applicant was charged with twenty-six (26) offences under s 158 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) in that during the period from late April 1987 to late…
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- Case
- [2012] FCA 1431
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the court was whether, in the exercise of its discretion under section 126J(1)(b) of the SIS Act, the court should make an order that the applicant, despite his past convictions, should no longer be disqualified from holding a responsible position within a superannuation entity. The court needed to consider the purpose and object of Part 15 of the SIS Act, which sets out rules governing the eligibility of persons to take up positions of responsibility with superannuation entities.
The court noted that while there were no specific criteria or guidelines in the SIS Act or regulations regarding the factors to consider when determining such an application, it was bound to consider the purpose of the Act, which is to ensure the prudent management and supervision of superannuation entities. The court weighed various factors including the applicant's age at the time of the offences, the nature and extent of his criminal conduct, the passage of time since the offences, and his demonstrated rehabilitation and remorse. Additionally, the court considered the applicant's current role and responsibilities, his employer's support, and his ongoing contributions to the superannuation industry.
After a thorough review, the court concluded that it should exercise its discretion to declare the applicant not a disqualified person. The court found that the applicant had demonstrated genuine remorse and had fully rehabilitated, having maintained a clean record and a successful career for over two decades. Furthermore, the applicant's current role did not involve access to member records, mitigating the risk associated with his past misconduct.
In light of the above, the court made the declaration sought by the applicant, determining that he should no longer be considered a disqualified person for the purposes of the SIS Act. This decision allows the applicant to continue his role within the superannuation industry, subject to any conditions or exceptions the court may deem appropriate.
Orders
Orders of the court
Pursuant to s 126J(1)(b) of the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth), Christopher Douglas Porter is not a disqualified person.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The District Court file confirmed the facts and matters which I have described at [2]–[5] above. It also established the following:(a)All of the stolen funds were used to pay personal debts of the applicant. There was nothing in the file that supported his assertion that the monies were used to assist his sister.(b)The dishonest conduct of the applicant was systematic and calculated. It extended over a period of 16 months. At various times in that period he had attempted to conceal his thefts from his employer.(c)He had co-operated fully with the police after he was arrested. He had shown genuine remorse. CONSIDERATION The applicant relies upon s 126J(1)(b) of the SIS Act. That subsection gives to this Court a discretion to declare that an individual is not a disqualified person for the purposes of Pt 15 of the SIS Act notwithstanding that that individual has, prior to the making of the Court order, been caught by the definition of disqualified person in s 120 of the SIS Act. An order under s 126J(1) may be expressed to be subject to such exceptions and conditions as may be determined by the Court. Notice of the application for an order under s 126J(1) must be given by the disqualified person at least 21 days before the application is filed (s 126J(3)(a)). In the present case, that notice was given by the letter dated 17 August 2012 from the applicant’s lawyers to APRA. There are no criteria or guidelines expressed in the SIS Act or in the regulations made under that Act as to the matters which should, or could, be taken into account by the Court when considering and determining an application under s 126J(1). This state of affairs may be contrasted with the position under subdiv A of Div 3 of Pt 15 where the regulator (the Commissioner of Taxation) called upon to consider waiving an individual’s status as a disqualified person is required to comply with detailed procedures and protocols (as to which see s 126B, s 126C, s 126D and s 126F). In particular, the regulator is obliged to satisfy himself or herself that the waiver applicant is highly unlikely to contravene the SIS Act (s 126D(1A)(f)) or do anything that would result in a self-managed superannuation fund not complying with the SIS Act (s 126D(1A)(g)). In determining whether he or she is satisfied of those matters, the regulator must have regard to the factors listed in s 126D(1A)(a) to (e). The language of s 126J(1)(b) is curious. A disqualified person may (emphasis added) apply to the Court for an order that the person is not a disqualified person. Clearly, the provision is intended to authorise the making of the relevant application if the applicant decides to bring it forward. The subsection does not, however, speak in terms which ordinarily denote the grant of a discretionary power to the Court (eg “… upon application by a disqualified person, the Court may order …”). Nonetheless, I think that s 126J(1)(b) should be interpreted as conferring a broad discretion upon the Court to decide whether to make the order contemplated by the subsection and, if so, on what terms. In considering whether to exercise the discretion and, if so, how, the Court must take into account the purpose or object of the SIS Act and, in particular, the purpose or object of Pt 15 of that Act. The object of the SIS Act is set out in s 3. The object of Pt 15 is specified in s 119. Therefore, in any given case, when the Court’s jurisdiction under s 126J(1)(b) is engaged, the Court is obliged to determine the application by paying due regard to the fact that:(a)Part 15 of the SIS Act is intended to set out rules governing the eligibility of persons to take up positions of responsibility with superannuation entities; and (b)The principal object of the SIS Act generally insofar as superannuation entities are concerned is to make provision for the prudent management and supervision of such entities.