Porter, Application under the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Porter, Application under the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 [2012] FCA 1431

Citation: Porter, Application under the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 [2012] FCA 1431
Parties: CHRISTOPHER DOUGLAS PORTER; APPLICATION UNDER THE SUPERANNUATION INDUSTRY (SUPERVISION) ACT 1993
File number: ACD 81 of 2012
Judge: FOSTER J
Date of Orders: 7 December 2012
Date of Reasons: 17 December 2012
Catchwords: SUPERANNUATION – supervision of superannuation entities and responsible officers of such entities – whether the Court should exercise its discretion pursuant to s 126J(1) of the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth) to make an order that an individual who has committed offences of dishonesty should no longer be a disqualified person within the meaning of Pt 15 of that Act – relevant principles guiding the exercise of discretion discussed
Legislation: Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 206G
Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), s 158
Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), Div 3 of Pt VIIC
Criminal Records Act 1991 (NSW), s 7
Financial Sector Legislation Amendment (Review of Prudential Decisions) Act 2008 (Cth)
Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth), ss 3, 10(1), 119, 120, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 126B, 126C, 126D, 126F, 126H, 126J(1)(b), 126K, 126L and 127
Cases cited: Duffy; Re Westgate Ports Ltd (2010) 79 ACSR 267 cited
Date of hearing: 7 December 2012
Place: Sydney (via video link to Canberra) (heard in Canberra)
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 35
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr WL Sharwood
Solicitor for the Applicant: Hall & Wilcox

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

ACD 81 of 2012

APPLICATION UNDER THE SUPERANNUATION INDUSTRY (SUPERVISION) ACT 1993

CHRISTOPHER DOUGLAS PORTER
Applicant

JUDGE:

FOSTER J

DATE OF ORDER:

7 DECEMBER 2012

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY (VIA VIDEO LINK TO CANBERRA)

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

Pursuant to s 126J(1)(b) of the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth), Christopher Douglas Porter is not a disqualified person.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

ACD 81 of 2012

APPLICATION UNDER THE SUPERANNUATION INDUSTRY (SUPERVISION) ACT 1993

CHRISTOPHER DOUGLAS PORTER
Applicant

JUDGE:

FOSTER J

DATE:

17 DECEMBER 2012

PLACE:

SYDNEY (VIA VIDEO LINK TO CANBERRA)
(HEARD IN CANBERRA)

REASONS FOR DECISION

  1. By his Originating Application filed on 13 November 2012, the applicant sought an order pursuant to s 126J(1)(b) of the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth) (the SIS Act) that he is not a disqualified person within the meaning of that expression in Pt 15 of the SIS Act. When the matter was returned before the Court the Friday before last (7 December 2012), I made the order sought. These are my reasons for doing so.

  2. On 31 August 1988 and on 1 September 1988, the applicant was charged with twenty-six (26) offences under s 158 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) in that during the period from late April 1987 to late…

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Details
Case
[2012] FCA 1431
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Christopher Douglas Porter, the applicant sought a declaration under section 126J(1)(b) of the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth) that he should no longer be considered a disqualified person due to his prior convictions of dishonesty. The application was heard by the Federal Court of Australia, which had to determine whether the court should exercise its discretion to allow the applicant to hold a responsible position within a superannuation entity despite his past criminal record.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether, in the exercise of its discretion under section 126J(1)(b) of the SIS Act, the court should make an order that the applicant, despite his past convictions, should no longer be disqualified from holding a responsible position within a superannuation entity. The court needed to consider the purpose and object of Part 15 of the SIS Act, which sets out rules governing the eligibility of persons to take up positions of responsibility with superannuation entities.

The court noted that while there were no specific criteria or guidelines in the SIS Act or regulations regarding the factors to consider when determining such an application, it was bound to consider the purpose of the Act, which is to ensure the prudent management and supervision of superannuation entities. The court weighed various factors including the applicant's age at the time of the offences, the nature and extent of his criminal conduct, the passage of time since the offences, and his demonstrated rehabilitation and remorse. Additionally, the court considered the applicant's current role and responsibilities, his employer's support, and his ongoing contributions to the superannuation industry.

After a thorough review, the court concluded that it should exercise its discretion to declare the applicant not a disqualified person. The court found that the applicant had demonstrated genuine remorse and had fully rehabilitated, having maintained a clean record and a successful career for over two decades. Furthermore, the applicant's current role did not involve access to member records, mitigating the risk associated with his past misconduct.

In light of the above, the court made the declaration sought by the applicant, determining that he should no longer be considered a disqualified person for the purposes of the SIS Act. This decision allows the applicant to continue his role within the superannuation industry, subject to any conditions or exceptions the court may deem appropriate.

Orders

Orders of the court

Pursuant to s 126J(1)(b) of the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth), Christopher Douglas Porter is not a disqualified person.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Section 126L is not presently relevant.THE EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF THE APPLICATION In support of his Application, the applicant relied upon two affidavits and a witness statement. These were:(i)Affidavit of the applicant sworn on 8 November 2012;(ii)Affidavit of Leeanne Cherise Turner sworn on 2 November 2012. Ms Turner is the current Chief Executive Officer of the trustee; and(iii)Statement made by the applicant dated 5 December 2012 (Exhibit A). Ms Turner was the person who made the decision to promote him to his current position. By letter dated 17 August 2012, the applicant’s lawyers gave notice to APRA of the applicant’s intention to make his s 126J(1)(b) application. Very little information was provided to APRA in that letter. The existence of one charge was nonetheless disclosed. APRA appears nonetheless to be fully apprised of the applicant’s 1989 convictions. The Court was not provided with full details of the subsequent communications between the applicant and/or his lawyers, on the one hand, and APRA, on the other hand. This is unsatisfactory. However, it seems that APRA drew the applicant’s attention to certain matters that APRA considered required further explanation. The applicant accepted this. He prepared and signed his Statement dated 5 December 2012 (Exhibit A) in an endeavour to provide the further explanations required by APRA. That Statement was then provided to APRA. At the hearing before me, the applicant verified the contents of that Statement. Subsequently, by letter dated 6 December 2012 to the applicant’s lawyers (which letter became Exhibit B) APRA confirmed to the applicant’s lawyers that it did not intend to take any steps in respect of the applicant’s application unless requested by the Court. APRA said that it did not intend to appear before the Court on 7 December 2012. Nonetheless, it required the applicant to tender the applicant’s District Court criminal file. At the hearing, the applicant tendered that file. It became Exhibit C. APRA took no steps to oppose the applicant’s application. It did not appear before me. It seems to have adopted a position of perfect neutrality in relation to that application. In addition to the matters referred to at [2]–[5] above, the above evidence relevantly established that:(a)When the applicant committed the first offence in late April 1987, he was 24 years of age. He is now 50.(b)At no stage, when charged by the police with the 26 offences, when interviewed by a NSW Probation and Parole Officer or when sentenced by Judge Shadbolt, did the applicant offer any reason or explanation for his conduct. All that he said in 1988 and 1989 was that he had been under financial pressure. In his affidavit sworn and filed in this proceeding, the applicant said: The monies were used primarily to cover medical expenses for my sister, Martina Jean Reeve (née Porter). Prior to my wrongful conduct, in 1984, Martina had been diagnosed with Multiple Sclerosis. Some years after being diagnosed Martina became pregnant. Her illness was complicated by her pregnancy and she soon needed an electric wheelchair for mobility. Sadly, Martina died in 1993. The applicant went on to explain that neither his parents nor his siblings could afford to purchase such a wheelchair for his sister. He said that he stole in order to secure the wheelchair for his sister more quickly than would have been possible if he had not stolen. He also conceded that he used some of the stolen monies for his own benefit.In Exhibit A, the applicant endeavoured to explain why he had not mentioned his sister’s circumstances when charged and sentenced in 1988 and 1989. He said that he had not wanted to use his sister’s circumstances as an excuse for his wrongdoing. (c)There was no direct evidence that any of the stolen funds had been used to assist the applicant’s sister. Rather, the evidence showed that the stolen monies had been used to pay the applicant’s own expenses (including personal credit card debts). In Exhibit A, he endeavoured to explain this by asserting that the debts which had been incurred and discharged with stolen monies had only been incurred because he had used other funds to assist his sister.(d)On a date in 2012 which was not specified by him in either his affidavit or in his statement, the applicant said that, after being invited to apply for the position which he currently holds, he was required to complete certain forms, “… including forms requiring the disclosure of any convictions for dishonesty”. The sense of his evidence was that this was when he realised that he was obliged to disclose his 1989 convictions. He went on to say that, on 31 July 2012, he told Ms Turner of his convictions and offered to resign. She did not accept his resignation and suggested that he apply to the Court to overcome the problem caused by his convictions. (e)The applicant is in a stable marriage of 25 years’ duration. He and his wife have two children. He is comfortably off. He has not been charged with or convicted of any criminal offence since 1989. He earns a substantial salary in his current position with the trustee. He has had a successful career since 1989. He repaid all of the stolen funds within a period of three years after being sentenced. He showed genuine remorse for his wrongful conduct when charged in 1988. He again showed genuine remorse when disclosing his dishonest conduct to Ms Turner earlier this year. (f)Ms Turner supported the applicant’s application. She regards him as trustworthy. She said that she was aware that he had been convicted of an offence involving dishonest conduct some 25 or so years ago. She did not specify precisely her state of knowledge about this. She also said that, in his current role, the applicant does not have access to member records.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The District Court file confirmed the facts and matters which I have described at [2]–[5] above. It also established the following:(a)All of the stolen funds were used to pay personal debts of the applicant. There was nothing in the file that supported his assertion that the monies were used to assist his sister.(b)The dishonest conduct of the applicant was systematic and calculated. It extended over a period of 16 months. At various times in that period he had attempted to conceal his thefts from his employer.(c)He had co-operated fully with the police after he was arrested. He had shown genuine remorse. CONSIDERATION The applicant relies upon s 126J(1)(b) of the SIS Act. That subsection gives to this Court a discretion to declare that an individual is not a disqualified person for the purposes of Pt 15 of the SIS Act notwithstanding that that individual has, prior to the making of the Court order, been caught by the definition of disqualified person in s 120 of the SIS Act. An order under s 126J(1) may be expressed to be subject to such exceptions and conditions as may be determined by the Court. Notice of the application for an order under s 126J(1) must be given by the disqualified person at least 21 days before the application is filed (s 126J(3)(a)). In the present case, that notice was given by the letter dated 17 August 2012 from the applicant’s lawyers to APRA. There are no criteria or guidelines expressed in the SIS Act or in the regulations made under that Act as to the matters which should, or could, be taken into account by the Court when considering and determining an application under s 126J(1). This state of affairs may be contrasted with the position under subdiv A of Div 3 of Pt 15 where the regulator (the Commissioner of Taxation) called upon to consider waiving an individual’s status as a disqualified person is required to comply with detailed procedures and protocols (as to which see s 126B, s 126C, s 126D and s 126F). In particular, the regulator is obliged to satisfy himself or herself that the waiver applicant is highly unlikely to contravene the SIS Act (s 126D(1A)(f)) or do anything that would result in a self-managed superannuation fund not complying with the SIS Act (s 126D(1A)(g)). In determining whether he or she is satisfied of those matters, the regulator must have regard to the factors listed in s 126D(1A)(a) to (e). The language of s 126J(1)(b) is curious. A disqualified person may (emphasis added) apply to the Court for an order that the person is not a disqualified person. Clearly, the provision is intended to authorise the making of the relevant application if the applicant decides to bring it forward. The subsection does not, however, speak in terms which ordinarily denote the grant of a discretionary power to the Court (eg “… upon application by a disqualified person, the Court may order …”). Nonetheless, I think that s 126J(1)(b) should be interpreted as conferring a broad discretion upon the Court to decide whether to make the order contemplated by the subsection and, if so, on what terms. In considering whether to exercise the discretion and, if so, how, the Court must take into account the purpose or object of the SIS Act and, in particular, the purpose or object of Pt 15 of that Act. The object of the SIS Act is set out in s 3. The object of Pt 15 is specified in s 119. Therefore, in any given case, when the Court’s jurisdiction under s 126J(1)(b) is engaged, the Court is obliged to determine the application by paying due regard to the fact that:(a)Part 15 of the SIS Act is intended to set out rules governing the eligibility of persons to take up positions of responsibility with superannuation entities; and (b)The principal object of the SIS Act generally insofar as superannuation entities are concerned is to make provision for the prudent management and supervision of such entities.