FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Orel, in the matter of an application by Orel [2025] FCA 590
File number(s): QUD 159 of 2025 Judgment of: SARAH C DERRINGTON J Date of judgment: 4 June 2025 Catchwords: SUPERANNUATION – application by undischarged bankrupt under s 126J(1)(b) of the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth) for order that the applicant is not a disqualified person in relation to a company which is the trustee of a self-managed superannuation fund – application under s 206G(1)(c) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) for leave to manage the company – business of company limited to acting as trustee of self-managed superannuation fund of which applicant and his wife are only members – consideration of interests of third parties affected – application granted
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – interlocutory application under s 1322(4) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) for declaration that originating process is not invalid by reason of non-compliance with s 206G(2) – where requirement is procedural in nature – where sufficient notice given to ASIC as to hearing of substantive application – whether substantial injustice results from non-compliance – application granted
Legislation: Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) ss 57A, 149(1)(b)
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 206A(2), 206B(3), 206G, 1322(4)
Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth) ss 10(1), 17A, 120(1)(b), 126J, 126K(4)
Cases cited: Frigger, in the matter of an application by Frigger [2019] FCA 1730; 139 ACSR 329
Macalister, in the matter of an application by Macalister [2021] FCA 1455
Nenna v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2011] FCA 1193; 198 FCR 32
Porter, Application under the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 [2012] FCA 1431
Stokes, in the matter of Padbury Mining Limited [2016] FCA 1000
Division: General Division Registry: Queensland National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations Sub-area: Corporations and Corporate Insolvency Number of paragraphs: 27 Date of hearing: 2 June 2025 Counsel for the Applicant: Ms A Rae Solicitor for the Applicant: Kilmartin Knyvett Lawyers ORDERS
QUD 159 of 2025 IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION BY THOMAS ROBERT OREL
THOMAS ROBERT OREL
Applicant
ORDER MADE BY:
SARAH C DERRINGTON J
DATE OF ORDER:
2 JUNE 2025
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.Pursuant to s 1322(4)(a) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), the Court declares that the Originating Process filed by the Applicant on 24 March 2025 is not invalid by reason of non-compliance with s 206G(2) of the Corporations Act.
2.Pursuant to s 206G(1)(c) of the Corporations Act, the Applicant has leave to manage Tom & Elia Pty Ltd ACN 145 904 972 (the Company).
3.Until such time as the Applicant is no longer disqualified from managing corporations under Part 2D.6 of the Corporations Act, the Company must not engage in any activity other than to act as Trustee of the T & E Superannuation Fund (the Fund) and to do things that are reasonably incidental to so acting.
4.
Pursuant to s 126J(1)(b) of the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth), the Applicant is not a disqualified…
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- Case
- [2025] FCA 590
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court was required to decide whether Mr Orel could be granted leave to manage the company, despite his disqualification, and whether the originating process was invalid due to non-compliance with a procedural requirement. The court had to consider the interests of third parties, particularly the fund members, and assess whether the non-compliance resulted in substantial injustice. The court also needed to determine whether the company's limited business scope justified granting Mr Orel leave to manage it.
The court granted Mr Orel's application, finding that the non-compliance with the procedural requirement did not render the originating process invalid. The court considered the company's limited business scope, which was solely to act as the trustee of the superannuation fund, and the interests of the fund members, Mr and Mrs Orel. The court concluded that granting Mr Orel leave to manage the company would not result in substantial injustice to third parties and was in line with the protective purpose of the legislative provisions. Additionally, the court found that sufficient notice was given to ASIC regarding the hearing of the substantive application.
The court made several orders in favour of Mr Orel. It declared that the Originating Process was not invalid due to non-compliance with a section of the Corporations Act. Mr Orel was granted leave to manage the company, with the condition that the company must not engage in any activity other than to act as trustee of the superannuation fund. Finally, Mr Orel was deemed not to be a disqualified person in relation to the company and the fund.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Pursuant to s 1322(4)(a) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), the Court declares that the Originating Process filed by the Applicant on 24 March 2025 is not invalid by reason of non-compliance with s 206G(2) of the Corporations Act.
2. Pursuant to s 206G(1)(c) of the Corporations Act, the Applicant has leave to manage Tom & Elia Pty Ltd ACN 145 904 972 (the Company).
3. Until such time as the Applicant is no longer disqualified from managing corporations under Part 2D.6 of the Corporations Act, the Company must not engage in any activity other than to act as Trustee of the T & E Superannuation Fund (the Fund) and to do things that are reasonably incidental to so acting.
4.
Pursuant to s 126J(1)(b) of the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth), the Applicant is not a disqualified person in relation to the Company and the Fund.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In Frigger, Jackson J summarised the principles relating to s 206G of the Corporations Act as follows (at [8]-[12]):8In Re Altim Pty Ltd [1968] 2 NSWR 762 at 764, Street J identified the fundamental principles which informed the court's discretion under a statutory predecessor to s 206G as follows: The section under which this application is made proceeds upon the basis that a person who is an undischarged bankrupt is prima facie not to be permitted to act as a director or to take part in the management of a company. The Court is given jurisdiction to grant leave for such activities to be carried on, but an applicant who comes to the Court seeking leave must bear the onus of establishing that the general policy of the Legislature laid down in this section ought to be made the subject of an exception in his case. It should be borne in mind that the section is not in any sense a punishment of the bankrupt. Nor should a refusal to grant leave under the section be regarded as punitive. The prohibition is entirely protective, and the power of the Court to grant leave is to be exercised with this consideration in the forefront. 9 Even in the absence of a contradictor it is for the applicants for leave to place before the court evidence in appropriate form that is capable of satisfying the court that, in the given case, an exception should be made to the legislative policy underlying the prohibition in the Act. ASIC's absence is not necessarily to be given significant weight: Watts, in the matter of Watts [2011] FCA 1185; (2011) 284 ALR 403 at [18] (Yates J).10 Generally, before it can lift the disqualification the court needs to know what the applicants propose to do by way of corporate management, although this may not be necessary if the application is for leave to take part in the management of a specified corporation or corporations: Re Shneide (1996) 71 FCR 69 at 73 (Drummond J). In those cases the court will consider the structure of the companies, the nature of their businesses and the interests of their shareholders, creditors and employees, and any risks to those persons or to the public which may be involved in the applicants assuming positions on the board or in management: Adams v Australian Securities & Investments Commission [2003] FCA 557; (2003) 46 ACSR 68 at [8] (Lindgren J). 11 As one would expect, the attitude of the shareholders to the application can be a relevant factor: see e.g. Jansen v Australian Securities & Investments Commission [2003] FCA 1564 at [12], [14] (Mansfield J). 12 The court will also look to the circumstances in which the debts giving rise to the bankruptcy were not paid, and the extent to which an applicant has cooperated with the trustee in bankruptcy: GRD v BJD [2018] WASC 374 at [12] (Master Sanderson), applying Chye v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2012] FCA 1405 (Bromberg J). (Emphasis added.) These principles are also relevant to the exercise of discretion for applications under s 126J of the SIS Act, which the Court must determine having regard to the principal object of that legislation – namely, to provide for the prudent management and supervision of superannuation entities (Frigger at [17]-[18], citing Porter, Application under the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 [2012] FCA 1431 at [29]-[31]).