Orel, in the matter of an application by Orel

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Orel, in the matter of an application by Orel [2025] FCA 590

File number(s): QUD 159 of 2025
Judgment of: SARAH C DERRINGTON J
Date of judgment: 4 June 2025
Catchwords:

SUPERANNUATION – application by undischarged bankrupt under s 126J(1)(b) of the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth) for order that the applicant is not a disqualified person in relation to a company which is the trustee of a self-managed superannuation fund – application under s 206G(1)(c) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) for leave to manage the company – business of company limited to acting as trustee of self-managed superannuation fund of which applicant and his wife are only members – consideration of interests of third parties affected – application granted

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – interlocutory application under s 1322(4) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) for declaration that originating process is not invalid by reason of non-compliance with s 206G(2) – where requirement is procedural in nature – where sufficient notice given to ASIC as to hearing of substantive application – whether substantial injustice results from non-compliance – application granted

Legislation:

Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) ss 57A, 149(1)(b)

Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 206A(2), 206B(3), 206G, 1322(4)

Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth) ss 10(1), 17A, 120(1)(b), 126J, 126K(4)

Cases cited:

Frigger, in the matter of an application by Frigger [2019] FCA 1730; 139 ACSR 329

Macalister, in the matter of an application by Macalister [2021] FCA 1455

Nenna v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2011] FCA 1193; 198 FCR 32

Porter, Application under the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 [2012] FCA 1431

Stokes, in the matter of Padbury Mining Limited [2016] FCA 1000

Division: General Division
Registry: Queensland
National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations
Sub-area: Corporations and Corporate Insolvency
Number of paragraphs: 27
Date of hearing: 2 June 2025
Counsel for the Applicant: Ms A Rae
Solicitor for the Applicant: Kilmartin Knyvett Lawyers

ORDERS

QUD 159 of 2025

IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION BY THOMAS ROBERT OREL

THOMAS ROBERT OREL

Applicant

ORDER MADE BY:

SARAH C DERRINGTON J

DATE OF ORDER:

2 JUNE 2025

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.Pursuant to s 1322(4)(a) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), the Court declares that the Originating Process filed by the Applicant on 24 March 2025 is not invalid by reason of non-compliance with s 206G(2) of the Corporations Act.

2.Pursuant to s 206G(1)(c) of the Corporations Act, the Applicant has leave to manage Tom & Elia Pty Ltd ACN 145 904 972 (the Company).

3.Until such time as the Applicant is no longer disqualified from managing corporations under Part 2D.6 of the Corporations Act, the Company must not engage in any activity other than to act as Trustee of the T & E Superannuation Fund (the Fund) and to do things that are reasonably incidental to so acting.

4.

Pursuant to s 126J(1)(b) of the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth), the Applicant is not a disqualified…

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Details
Case
[2025] FCA 590
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Orel involves an application by Mr Orel, a bankrupt, seeking to be deemed not a disqualified person in relation to a company that serves as the trustee of a self-managed superannuation fund. Mr and Mrs Orel are the only members of the fund. The dispute requires the court to consider whether Mr Orel should be granted leave to manage the company, despite his disqualification from managing corporations due to his bankruptcy. Additionally, the court must determine whether the originating process is valid despite a non-compliance with a specific section of the Corporations Act.

The court was required to decide whether Mr Orel could be granted leave to manage the company, despite his disqualification, and whether the originating process was invalid due to non-compliance with a procedural requirement. The court had to consider the interests of third parties, particularly the fund members, and assess whether the non-compliance resulted in substantial injustice. The court also needed to determine whether the company's limited business scope justified granting Mr Orel leave to manage it.

The court granted Mr Orel's application, finding that the non-compliance with the procedural requirement did not render the originating process invalid. The court considered the company's limited business scope, which was solely to act as the trustee of the superannuation fund, and the interests of the fund members, Mr and Mrs Orel. The court concluded that granting Mr Orel leave to manage the company would not result in substantial injustice to third parties and was in line with the protective purpose of the legislative provisions. Additionally, the court found that sufficient notice was given to ASIC regarding the hearing of the substantive application.

The court made several orders in favour of Mr Orel. It declared that the Originating Process was not invalid due to non-compliance with a section of the Corporations Act. Mr Orel was granted leave to manage the company, with the condition that the company must not engage in any activity other than to act as trustee of the superannuation fund. Finally, Mr Orel was deemed not to be a disqualified person in relation to the company and the fund.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Pursuant to s 1322(4)(a) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), the Court declares that the Originating Process filed by the Applicant on 24 March 2025 is not invalid by reason of non-compliance with s 206G(2) of the Corporations Act.

2. Pursuant to s 206G(1)(c) of the Corporations Act, the Applicant has leave to manage Tom & Elia Pty Ltd ACN 145 904 972 (the Company).

3. Until such time as the Applicant is no longer disqualified from managing corporations under Part 2D.6 of the Corporations Act, the Company must not engage in any activity other than to act as Trustee of the T & E Superannuation Fund (the Fund) and to do things that are reasonably incidental to so acting.

4.

Pursuant to s 126J(1)(b) of the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth), the Applicant is not a disqualified person in relation to the Company and the Fund.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons that follow, I made the orders sought by Mr Orel at the conclusion of the hearing on 2 June 2025.BACKGROUND The circumstances of Mr Orel’s disqualification from managing corporations are described in the First and Second Orel Affidavits, and the Elia Affidavit. In short, prior to 24 August 2022, Mr Orel was the sole director of Oracle Building Corporation Pty Ltd, which operated a residential construction business in New South Wales and Queensland until it was placed into liquidation on that date (First Orel Affidavit at [11]). The Queensland Building and Construction Commission (QBCC) subsequently obtained judgment against Mr Orel on 14 December 2023 for $4.1 million in respect of statutory warranty claims arising from the liquidation of Oracle, as Mr Orel was also claimed against for breaches of personal guarantees he had given in relation to that business (First Orel Affidavit at [14]-[15]). Being unable to satisfy those judgment debts, Mr Orel presented a debtor’s petition to the Official Receiver on 25 January 2024, which was accepted on 29 January 2024 (First Orel Affidavit at [16]), with the result that Mr Orel became bankrupt by operation of s 57A of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) (Bankruptcy Act). At the time of his disqualification, Mr Orel was a director of the Company. In consequence of his bankruptcy, Mr Orel was automatically disqualified from managing corporations by operation of s 206B(3) of the Corporations Act and ceased to be a director of the Company pursuant to s 206A(2). He also became a “disqualified person” for the purposes of s 120 of the SIS Act (being “insolvent under administration” as defined by ss 10(1) and 120(1)(b)) and, therefore, was prohibited from being a director of the Company by operation of s 126K(4) of the SIS Act. Unless his bankruptcy is varied, Mr Orel will be automatically discharged from bankruptcy on 30 January 2027, pursuant to s 149(1)(b) of the Bankruptcy Act. From the time of its registration in August 2010, the Company has only acted as the Trustee of the Fund and has not undertaken any other activity (First Orel Affidavit at [4]; Elia Affidavit at [3]). Mr and Mrs Orel were the only directors and shareholders. Since Mr Orel’s disqualification, Mrs Orel has been the sole director of the Company and has conducted its affairs (First Orel Affidavit at [19]; Elia Affidavit at [5]). Since the establishment of the Fund in September 2010, Mr and Mrs Orel have been its only members (First Orel Affidavit at [5]). By clause 1 of the Trust Deed for the Fund, the sole purpose is the provision of “Old-Age Pensions” or “Benefits” to members and, on their death, to their dependants. The Fund’s assets are comprised of cash deposited with Westpac and three parcels of real estate which together are leased to a third party (First Orel Affidavit at [6]-[9]; Elia Affidavit at [4]). The net assets of the Fund comprise at least $2.2 million (Elia Affidavit at Exhibit EO2). Other than the present issue concerning Mr Orel’s directorship of the Company, the Fund is compliant with its tax and reporting obligations and with its obligations under the SIS Act (Elia Affidavit at [6]-[8]).PRELIMINARY ISSUE – IS THE ORIGINATING PROCESS INVALID?

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In Frigger, Jackson J summarised the principles relating to s 206G of the Corporations Act as follows (at [8]-[12]):8In Re Altim Pty Ltd [1968] 2 NSWR 762 at 764, Street J identified the fundamental principles which informed the court's discretion under a statutory predecessor to s 206G as follows: The section under which this application is made proceeds upon the basis that a person who is an undischarged bankrupt is prima facie not to be permitted to act as a director or to take part in the management of a company. The Court is given jurisdiction to grant leave for such activities to be carried on, but an applicant who comes to the Court seeking leave must bear the onus of establishing that the general policy of the Legislature laid down in this section ought to be made the subject of an exception in his case. It should be borne in mind that the section is not in any sense a punishment of the bankrupt. Nor should a refusal to grant leave under the section be regarded as punitive. The prohibition is entirely protective, and the power of the Court to grant leave is to be exercised with this consideration in the forefront. 9 Even in the absence of a contradictor it is for the applicants for leave to place before the court evidence in appropriate form that is capable of satisfying the court that, in the given case, an exception should be made to the legislative policy underlying the prohibition in the Act. ASIC's absence is not necessarily to be given significant weight: Watts, in the matter of Watts [2011] FCA 1185; (2011) 284 ALR 403 at [18] (Yates J).10 Generally, before it can lift the disqualification the court needs to know what the applicants propose to do by way of corporate management, although this may not be necessary if the application is for leave to take part in the management of a specified corporation or corporations: Re Shneide (1996) 71 FCR 69 at 73 (Drummond J). In those cases the court will consider the structure of the companies, the nature of their businesses and the interests of their shareholders, creditors and employees, and any risks to those persons or to the public which may be involved in the applicants assuming positions on the board or in management: Adams v Australian Securities & Investments Commission [2003] FCA 557; (2003) 46 ACSR 68 at [8] (Lindgren J). 11 As one would expect, the attitude of the shareholders to the application can be a relevant factor: see e.g. Jansen v Australian Securities & Investments Commission [2003] FCA 1564 at [12], [14] (Mansfield J). 12 The court will also look to the circumstances in which the debts giving rise to the bankruptcy were not paid, and the extent to which an applicant has cooperated with the trustee in bankruptcy: GRD v BJD [2018] WASC 374 at [12] (Master Sanderson), applying Chye v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2012] FCA 1405 (Bromberg J). (Emphasis added.) These principles are also relevant to the exercise of discretion for applications under s 126J of the SIS Act, which the Court must determine having regard to the principal object of that legislation – namely, to provide for the prudent management and supervision of superannuation entities (Frigger at [17]-[18], citing Porter, Application under the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 [2012] FCA 1431 at [29]-[31]).