Adams v Australian Securities and Investments Commission

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Adams v Australian Securities & Investments Commission [2003] FCA 557

CORPORATIONS – application by convicted person under s 206G of Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) for leave to manage five named corporations – history of the automatic disqualification provision and the provision for granting of leave – principles applicable to such applications – applicant convicted of defrauding the Commonwealth of sales tax revenue amounting to $156,051.20 – only seven months remaining unexpired of the five-year period of disqualification – substantial period between circumstances giving rise to conviction and conviction (11½ years) and between those circumstances and present application (a little under 17 years) – unsatisfactory state of the evidence as to consequence of leave not being granted – failure of applicant to satisfy Court that an exception from the general prohibition should be made.

Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 206G

Re Altim Pty Ltd [1968] 2NSWR 762 cited
Re Australian Limousin Breeders Society Ltd (1989) 7 ACLC 426 cited
Birdseye v Companies Auditors and Liquidators Disciplinary Board (2002) 20 ACLC 805 cited
Borsboom v Australian Securities Commission, unreported, Supreme Court of Western Australia, White J, 17 January 1997 cited
Chew v NCSC [1985] WAR 337 cited
Re Ferrari Furniture Co Pty Ltd [1972] 2 NSWLR 790 cited
Re Macquarie Investments Pty Ltd (1975) 1 ACLR 40 cited
Re Maelor Jones Pty Ltd (1975) 1 ACLR 4 cited
Re Magna Alloys and Research Pty Ltd (1975) 1 ACLR 203 cited
In re Marsden (1981) 29 SASR 454 cited
Murray v Australian Securities Commission (1993) 12 ACLC 11 cited
Pace v Australian Securities & Investments Commission (1999) 17 ACLC 1764 cited
Re Seymour [2002] TASSC 85 cited
Re Zim Metal Products Pt Ltd (1977) 2 ACLR 553 cited

HAROLD JOHN ADAMS v AUSTRALIAN SECURITIES &
INVESTMENTS COMMISSION

N 3007 OF 2003

LINDGREN J
5 MAY 2003
SYDNEY

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 3007 OF 2003

BETWEEN:

HAROLD JOHN ADAMS
PLAINTIFF

AND:

AUSTRALIAN SECURITIES
AND INVESTMENTS COMMISSION
DEFENDANT

JUDGE:

LINDGREN J

DATE OF ORDER:

5 MAY 2003

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.        The application be dismissed.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 3007 OF 2003

BETWEEN:

HAROLD JOHN ADAMS
PLAINTIFF

AND:

AUSTRALIAN SECURITIES
AND INVESTMENTS COMMISSION
DEFENDANT

JUDGE:

LINDGREN J

DATE:

5 MAY 2003

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION

  1. By his application filed on 12 February 2003 the plaintiff (“Mr Adams”) sought:

    “A declaration that the applicant be granted leave to manage proprietary companies formed under the CorporationsLaw.”

    The application is one for leave under subs 206G(1) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (“the Act”).

  2. The application named “Australian Securities & Industries [sic] Commission” as defendant. It should not have named a defendant. Subsection 206G(2) of the Act requires an applicant for leave under subs 206G(1) to lodge notice of the proposed application with…

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Details
Case
[2003] FCA 557
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Adams v Australian Securities and Investments Commission involves an application by Mr Adams seeking relief from a prohibition order that prevents him from being involved in the management of companies. The Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) opposed the application, arguing that Mr Adams had not demonstrated sufficient grounds for the court to deviate from the legislative policy that protects the public and deters misconduct. The court was tasked with determining whether Mr Adams had met the onus of proving exceptional circumstances that would warrant an exception to the prohibition order.

The legal issues before the court included the onus of proof resting on Mr Adams to justify an exception to the prohibition order, the primary legislative objectives of protecting the public and deterring misconduct, and the specific factors the court should consider in exercising its discretion. The court examined the nature of Mr Adams's involvement in the misconduct, his general character and conduct since the imposition of the prohibition order, the structure and business of the companies he sought to manage, and the potential risks to stakeholders and the public if he were to be reinstated.

The court found that Mr Adams had not sufficiently demonstrated the exceptional circumstances necessary to warrant an exception to the prohibition order. While the court acknowledged that there might be disadvantages to Mr Adams's interests if the prohibition were to remain in place, it was not convinced that these disadvantages were significant enough to justify an exception. The court emphasized that the primary objectives of the prohibition order were to protect the public and deter similar misconduct by others. The court also noted that the prohibition itself was intended to impose some hardship on the offender, and that mere hardship alone was not a sufficient ground for relief.

The application was dismissed, but the court left open the possibility for Mr Adams to make a fresh application if new evidence emerged that would demonstrate a significant disadvantage to the interests associated with him if the prohibition order were to remain in effect. The court concluded that, based on the current evidence, there was insufficient justification to deviate from the legislative policy underlying the prohibition order.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application be dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

The following principles relevant to an application of the present kind have been consistently recognised and applied in the authorities:1.The applicant bears the onus of establishing that the Court should make an exception to the legislative policy underlying the prohibition: Re Altim Pty Ltd [1968] 2NSWR 762 (“Altim”) at 764 as applied in Re Ferrari Furniture Co Pty Ltd [1972] 2 NSWLR 790 (“Ferrari”) at 792; Re Macquarie Investments Pty Ltd (1975) 1 ACLR 40 at 42; Re Maelor Jones Pty Ltd (1975) 1 ACLR 4 at 13; Re Magna Alloys and Research Pty Ltd (1975) 1 ACLR 203 at 205; Re Zim Metal Products Pt Ltd (1977) 2 ACLR 553 (“Zim”) at 555; In re Marsden (1981) 29 SASR 454 (“Marsden”) at 460; Re Australian Limousin Breeders Society Ltd (1989) 7 ACLC 426 at 429—430; Murray v Australian Securities Commission (1993) 12 ACLC 11 (“Murray”) at 13; Pace v Australian Securities & Investments Commission (1999) 17 ACLC 1764 (“Pace”) at [21]; Re Seymour [2002] TASSC 85 at [6].2.That legislative policy is one of protecting the public, not one of punishing the offender: Altim at 764, as applied in Ferrari at 791—792; Zim at 555; Murray at 13: Chew v National Companies and Securities Commission [1985] WAR 337 (“Chew”) at 340—341; Pace at [21]; Re Seymour at 2; Borsboom v Australian Securities Commission, unreported, Supreme Court of Western Australia, White J, 17 January 1997.3.Another objective is to deter others from engaging in conduct of the particular kind in question: Chew at 340—341; Zim at 555; Murray v ASC at 13; Pace at [21]; Re Seymour, above, at [6].4.A further objective is the more general one of deterring others from abusing the corporate structure to the disadvantage of investors, shareholders and others dealing with a company: Re Marsden, above at 459; Zim at 555; Murray at 13; Re Magna Alloys at 205; Pace at [21]; Re Seymour, above, at [6].5.The prohibition itself contemplates that there will be hardship to the offender. Therefore hardship to the offender alone is not a persuasive ground for the granting of leave: Chew at 340—341; Re Maelor Jones Pty Ltd (1975) 1 ACLR 4 at 13; Murray at 14.6.“The court in exercising its discretion will have regard to the nature of the offence of which the applicant has been convicted, the nature of his involvement, and the general character of the applicant, including his conduct in the intervening period since he was removed from the board and from management. Where, as here, the applicant seeks leave to become a director and to take part in the management of particular companies the court will consider the structure of those companies, the nature of their businesses and the interests of their shareholders, creditors and employees. One matter to be considered will be the assessment of any risks to those persons or to the public which may appear to be involved in the applicant’s assuming positions on the board or in management”, per Bowen CJ in Eq in Re Magna Alloys at 205, followed in Zim at 555—556.This passage does not purport to be an exhaustive statement of the matters appropriate to be taken into account by the Court as relevant to the exercise of its discretion under the section. Clearly, there can be no such exhaustive statement.FACTS AND REASONING

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

LINDGREN J
For this reason the application will be dismissed. It will remain open to Mr Adams to make a fresh application if evidence becomes available that there will, indeed, be a great disadvantage to the interests with which he is associated if he is not granted leave to manage the companies during the remainder of the five year period. I find it hard to accept that there will be, but there is always the possibility that additional circumstances may arise.CONCLUSION For the above reasons the application will be dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: LINDGREN J