CRIMINAL LAW - PARTICULAR OFFENCES - DRIVING OFFENCES - DANGEROUS DRIVING - PROOF AND EVIDENCE
CRIMINAL LAW - EVIDENCE - IDENTIFICATION EVIDENCE - MODES OF IDENTIFICATION - DNA EVIDENCE
CRIMINAL LAW - EVIDENCE - IDENTIFICATION EVIDENCE - MODES OF IDENTIFICATION - CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
CRIMINAL LAW - EVIDENCE - JUDICIAL DISCRETION TO ADMIT OR EXCLUDE EVIDENCE - POLICE INTERROGATION - PROPRIETY OF POLICE QUESTIONING AND OTHER CONDUCT BY POLICE - ABORIGINALS
MAGISTRATES - APPEAL AND REVIEW - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - APPEAL TO SUPREME COURT
Appeal against convictions for driving a motor vehicle without consent (count 1), driving a motor vehicle whilst disqualified (count 2), aggravated driving dangerously to escape police pursuit (count 3), and resisting a member of the police force in the execution of his duty (count 4).
Police chased at high speed a white car that had been reported stolen (the Subaru). The pursuit ended when the driver, a male aboriginal, crashed into a police car and a parked van in Darebin Street, Mile End. He and his passenger, the appellant’s teenage niece, Ms Stott, got out and fled on foot. The officers present gave chase and quickly apprehended Ms Stott but soon lost the driver.
Star Group officers Stevenson and Rosenhahn later used their two large German Shepherd police dogs (“Riggs” and “Koda”) to enter without permission a number of properties from the streets to look for the driver. They located the appellant in the rear of a red car parked in the backyard of his uncle’s house in Clarence Street, Mile End. They yelled at him to come out. He unlocked the door and Stevenson opened it. Riggs was close to the feet of the appellant who tried to kick the dog away with the soles of his feet. He was bitten at this time. The appellant then moved toward the other side of the car whereupon on the command of Rosenhahn, Koda entered the car, bit the appellant and dragged him out onto the ground. While the appellant was struggling with Koda on the ground, Stevenson then sent Riggs forward to assist Koda, so that both dogs were attacking the appellant at once.
The appellant was taken into custody and interviewed by two of the three officers who had been involved in the foot chase and who were witnesses in the case. His clear request to see a lawyer was ignored. The appellant asserted his innocence when interviewed.
The prosecution case was based on circumstantial evidence including: that the descriptions of the driver and the appearance of the appellant were similar; that the appellant was found not far from where the driver was last sighted by police before they lost him; and that a DNA sample obtained from the steering wheel of the Subaru had three contributors and it was 13,000 times more likely that the appellant was one of the contributors than…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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Details
AGLC
Police v Williams [2014] SASC 177
Case
[2014] SASC 177
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The case of Police v Williams involved a high-speed chase and subsequent dangerous driving charges against the appellant. The dispute centered on the identification of the driver and the admissibility of certain evidence, including DNA evidence and the circumstances surrounding the police interrogation. The Supreme Court of South Australia was tasked with reviewing the decision of the Magistrates Court.
The legal issues included the admissibility of identification evidence, both DNA and circumstantial, and the propriety of police conduct during interrogation. The court had to determine whether the evidence was obtained lawfully and whether the police conduct during interrogation was appropriate, particularly considering the appellant's Indigenous background. Furthermore, the court needed to assess whether the evidence was sufficient to prove the identity of the driver beyond a reasonable doubt and if the dangerous driving charges were substantiated.
The court examined the evidence of police observations, noting the discrepancies in descriptions provided by different officers. It was highlighted that the observations were made under challenging circumstances, which affected their reliability. The court also considered the DNA evidence and its role in identifying the driver. It was concluded that while the evidence pointed towards the appellant as the driver, there were inconsistencies that needed to be resolved. The court scrutinised the police interrogation methods and found that certain aspects of the questioning could be considered coercive, impacting the voluntariness of the appellant's statements.
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, primarily due to the issues with the identification evidence and the conduct of the police during interrogation. The court found that the evidence was not sufficient to prove the appellant's identity and guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Consequently, the charges against the appellant were dismissed.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
I proceed to examine the major issues in the case.PART B: THE EVIDENCE OF POLICE OBSERVATIONS There is substantial dispute as to precisely what reliable evidence there is of police observations of the appearance and clothing of the person who was in fact the driver of the stolen Subaru. Observations of the driver of the stolen car said to have been made by police officers during the high speed chase On 3 April 2013, at about 4:30am, police received a report that a car had been stolen from an address in Brooklyn Park.[5] Soon after, Senior Constable Frisby observed the car on Marion Road, near its intersection with Anzac Highway. He attempted to apprehend the driver by positioning his police vehicle in front of the Subaru. However, he lost sight of the car when it reversed at speed down Marion Road. Other police officers soon sighted it on South Road and began pursuing it. The pursuit through the back streets and main roads of the western suburbs of Adelaide lasted for up to 58 minutes[6] and involved multiple police vehicles. The driver was travelling at times at 80–90 kilometres per hour in 50 kilometre per hour speed zones, and on one occasion, at an estimated speed of over 130–140 kilometres per hour. On occasions the car did not have its headlights on despite the limited light; at times it drove on the wrong side of the road; and it also drove through red lights and failed to give way when at signed give way intersections. The chase ended when the car collided with a police car driven by Sergeant Tollenaar on Darebin Street, Mile End, and then with a parked van (a Toyota Tarago).[5] Exhibit P3 (South Australia Police Communications Record).[6] This was Sergeant Tollenaar’s estimate but other estimates may be shorter. After the final collision, the female passenger got out of the car and ran away from police. Police did not lose sight of her and apprehended her very quickly. Within three minutes, police radio communications broadcast that her name was Keisha Emily Stott and that she resided at Milner Road, Hilton. The male driver of the car got out of the car and, at a fast pace, ran east on Darebin Street, south on Attrill Avenue, crossed over to the east side of Attrill Avenue and ran up the driveway of a house on the eastern side of Attrill Avenue. He there climbed the fence and got onto the garage roof, whereupon pursuing officers lost sight of him.Senior Constable Frisby’s observations of the driver during the high speed chase Senior Constable Frisby gave evidence that prior to the commencement of the chase, he had heard by police radio that the Subaru car had been stolen. Later, when stationary in his police vehicle, he saw the white Subaru, with the registration number of the stolen car, stationary at traffic lights. He then positioned his vehicle in front of the Subaru, got out, and ran towards the driver’s side of it, obviously focusing on the driver. The driver then took off at speed in reverse, and at that stage escaped. During the encounter, Frisby had seen the driver and described him in evidence as being an Aboriginal male in his 20’s wearing a baseball cap. He also observed that there was a passenger, but he could not describe that person.Sergeant Tollenaar’s observations of the driver during the high speed chase
Decision
Reasons for decision
PEEK J
Passage B seems to suggest that Ms Stott was here asserting that she had met Leroy “around 1 or 2am” which would be inconsistent with her statement in passage A. In fact, Ms Stott did not state that it was “around 1 or 2am” when she met Leroy. Rather she stated (in the third passage of cross-examination) that the buses stopped running “like one (1am), two (2am) or something”.Passage C in the judgment - “Then she said that it was last year so she could not remember. Then she said it was after 3am” What Ms Stott said about it being “last year” appears in the third passage: “honestly it was last year so I can’t remember what time it was exactly. … I honestly don’t know. It was last year. I can’t remember like I said.” Ms Stott is here repeating to the cross-examiner that her memory is limited to that which she had already stated in evidence. When she was asked in the third passage, “So you’re saying it’s closer to morning?”, she answered “Yeah, around that time, yeah” but these latter words clearly refer to her earlier answer in the second passage, “like around like four or five or something.” Most importantly, Ms Stott did not state “it was after 3am” as the Chief Magistrate suggests. This time of 3am had not been previously mentioned by anybody, until the cross-examiner put the short question “3 o’clock?” in the third passage. This suggestion was not accepted by Ms Stott. She responded “I honestly don’t know. It was last year. I can’t remember like I said.” When she very soon thereafter states “No, I told you that around that time …”. The words “I told you” obviously correspond with the words “like I said” and those two sets of words (and also the further words “around that time”), all refer back to her earlier evidence in cross-examination, “like around four or five or something”.Passages D to F - the comments as to Ms Stott’s inability to explain aspects of Leroy’s behaviour The Chief Magistrate stressed that Ms Stott had no explanation for aspects of behaviour of Leroy that she claimed to have witnessed and this was clearly a matter her Honour took into account adversely to Ms Stott’s credibility. Thus at passages D, E and F her Honour stated:D She had no explanation for why he would want to put the ignition removed from the stolen car into the bag which she said she had. … E She did not know why Leroy tried one glove on. She said that she then put them back in the bag. She said that the car was parked on King William Street along the road near the parade ground. According to her evidence they walked there although F there was no explanation for why Leroy would have left it there and then walked along the Torrens. (Emphasis added) The appellant submits that it was wrong to criticise Ms Stott for having no explanation for why Leroy did, or did not do, something. I consider that this submission has force for a number of reasons. It was not for the witness to know, or for the appellant to prove, why another person did something; to suggest that Ms Stott’s evidence could be rejected partly because it did not extend to also establishing why the man Leroy did what she said he did, ran a substantial risk of reversing the onus of proof.