Wheare v Police - [2008] SASC 13

SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Magistrates Appeals: Criminal)
WHEARE v POLICE
[2008] SASC 13
Judgment of The Honourable Justice Gray
1 February 2008
CRIMINAL LAW - JURISDICTION, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - WARRANTS, ARREST, SEARCH, SEIZURE AND INCIDENTAL POWERS - ARREST AND DETENTION - POWERS OF ARREST
POLICE - RIGHTS, POWERS AND DUTIES - ENTRY UPON PREMISES
POLICE - ACTIONS FOR WRONGFUL ARREST, TRESPASS AND OTHER WRONGS
Appeal against conviction – charges arose during arrest by police on appellant’s residential property – appellant claimed police were not authorised to enter and remain on his property after he told them to leave – appellant claimed police were not acting in execution of their duty when entering his property and effecting his arrest – appellant claimed his arrest, without warrant, was not authorised by section 75 of the Summary Offences Act 1953 (SA) or section 271 of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) – appellant claimed “reasonable excuse” for refusing to provide his name and address to police – consideration of scope and application of common law power of arrest – consideration of scope and application of statutory powers of arrest – consideration of scope of police officer duties – consideration of meaning of “reasonable excuse” in section 74A (3)(a) of the Summary Offences Act – whether common law and statutory powers authorise police to enter and remain on private property to effect an arrest –– whether entry of police on to appellant’s property was at all times proper and lawful –– whether police were acting in the execution of duties when effecting arrest – whether appellant’s refusal to provide his name and address was reasonable.
Held: Appeal dismissed – entry of police on to appellant’s property and arrest of appellant was at all times proper and lawful – appellant’s arrest authorised by section 75 of the Summary Offences Act and common law power of arrest – section 75 of the Summary Offences Act and common law power of arrest authorise police to enter on to private property and remain for a reasonable time to effect an arrest – section 271 of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act does not apply to arrest by police – police were acting in the execution of their duty at all times – no evidence to support that appellant’s refusal to provide his name and address was reasonable.
Summary Offences Act 1935 (SA) s 5, s 6(1), s 6(2), s 22(1)(c) and s 75; Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 74A(3)(a) and s 271; Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 352(1) and s 352(2); Summary Offences Act 1978 (NT) s 47; Police Administration Act 1978 (NT) s 123(1), s 126 and s 158; Criminal Law Consolidation (Felonies and Misdemeanours) Amendment Act 1994 (SA); Acts Interpretation Act 1915 (SA) s 22; Criminal Investigation (Idendifying People) Act 2001 (WA) s 16, referred to.
Entick v Carrington (1765) 19 St Tr 1029; Semayne’s Case (1604) 77 ER 194; Halliday v Neville (1984) 155 CLR 1; Plenty v Dillon (1991) 171 CLR 635; Coco v The Queen (1993-1994) 179 CLR 427; Colet v The Queen [1981] 1 SCR 2; Morris v Beardmore [1981] AC 446; Wheeler v Leicester City Council [1985] AC 1054; Marcel v Commissioner of Police [1992] Ch. 225; Raymond v Honey [1983] 1 AC 1; Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1992) 176 CLR 1; R v Conley (1982) 30 SASR 226; Dinan v Brereton [1960] SASR 101; Eccles v Bourque [1975] 2 SCR 739; Kennedy v Pagura [1977] 2 NSWLR 810; McDowell v Newchurch (1981) 9 NTR 15; Letts v King (1988) WAR 76; Lippl v Haines (1989) 18 NSWLR 620; R v Long and McDonnell (2002) 224 LSJS 193; Owen v South Australia (1996) 66 SASR 251; Police v Trzesniowski (2005) 93 SASR 136; Feldman v Buck (1966) SASR 236; Questions of Law Reserved (No 3 of 1998) (1998) 71 SASR 223; Drymalik v Feldman (1966) SASR 227; Zaravinos v State of NSW (2004) 62 NSWLR 58; Re K (1993) 46 FCR 336; Rowe v Manevski (1994) 62 SASR 468; Taikato v The Queen (1996) 186 CLR 454; Pascoe v The Nominal Defendant (Queensland) (No 2) (1964) Qd R 373; Conners v Craigie (1994) 76 A Crim R 502, considered.

WORDS AND PHRASES CONSIDERED/DEFINED
"reasonable excuse"

WHEARE v POLICE
[2008] SASC 13
Magistrates Appeal
GRAY J.

This is an appeal against conviction.
The primary issue raised on appeal concerned the right of a police officer to enter private property and remain for the purposes of pursuing a person suspected of an offence, in circumstances where the owners or occupiers of that property have demanded that the police leave.
The Trial
David Allan Wheare, the defendant and appellant, was charged with hindering police,[1] using indecent or profound language,[2] resisting arrest,[3] three counts of assault police,[4] damaging property[5] and refusing to state his full name and address.[6]
[1] Contrary to section 6(2) of the Summary Offences Act 1953 (SA).
[2] Contrary to section 22(1)(c) of the Summary Offences Act 1953 (SA).
[3] Contrary to section 6(2) of the Summary Offences Act 1953 (SA).
[4] Contrary to section 6(1) of the Summary Offences Act 1953 (SA).
[5] Contrary to section 85(3) of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA).
[6] Contrary to section 74A(3)(a) of the Summary Offences Act 1953 (SA).
The defendant pleaded not guilty. The trial proceeded before the Chief Magistrate. The defendant was found guilty of all charges. Convictions were recorded. The defendant has appealed against the convictions save for the conviction of the offence of using indecent or profane language.
The events that occurred are not in dispute. The findings of fact made by the Magistrate were not challenged on appeal. Accordingly, it is convenient to state those facts briefly. In doing so, I have drawn extensively from the Magistrate’s findings.
At or about 11.30pm on 19 December 2005, police officers were making enquiries about alleged property damage. They attended a property at Noarlunga Downs. They had information that the occupant of a nearby property, a person named “Nathan”, had been seen to have damaged a sensor light. It was common ground that Nathan was Nathan Wadin. The officers were directed to the neighbouring property where, over the fence, they observed several young men in the backyard. One matched the description of Nathan and they saw that person move through to the front yard of the property.
The police officers went to the street at the front of the premises. They approached Nathan, who appeared to be leaving, and told him that they wanted to speak to him about the property damage. They asked his name and were told “Nathan Wadin”. The defendant’s wife, Alison Wheare, was in the front yard of the property. She called Nathan inside. He ran back into the premises, pursued by Constable Thomas. He reached the front door. Constable Thomas unsuccessfully attempted to take hold of him. Nathan went inside. The defendant then came out of the front door. Constable Thomas informed the defendant that he intended to arrest Nathan. The defendant then pushed Constable Thomas in the chest.
The defendant became abusive and aggressive, using indecent and profane language. He told the police to leave his property and said that they had no right to be there without a warrant. There were other men inside the house who came into the yard. Constables Thomas and Allison withdrew to the footpath so they could watch the front and along the side of the house in case Nathan fled. At the same time they called for police assistance.
The defendant remained in the front yard using abusive and threatening language toward the police. Constables Tuckerman and Donnevert arrived soon after. The defendant was swearing loudly and holding a telephone, saying, amongst many threatening words, that the police could not enter his premises without a warrant.
Constable Tuckerman then entered the defendant’s front yard and took hold of the defendant in order to arrest him both for hindering police and for using indecent language. The defendant attempted to strike Constable Tuckerman, making contact to his hairline. A struggle ensued in which the defendant and Constable Tuckerman fell to the ground. In the course of the struggle the defendant lashed out with both feet kicking at the police officers. Constables Allison and Donnevert tried to restrain him. The defendant kicked them and continued to threaten to kill them.
In the course of the struggle, the defendant grabbed Constable Tuckerman’s shirt and tore off the epaulette. Constable Tuckerman put a handcuff on the defendant’s left wrist. The defendant had possession of a police officer’s torch. He swung the torch and struck Constable Donnevert on the right forearm. The defendant was sprayed with capsicum spray, after which he was handcuffed and the arrest completed. He was then asked for his name and address, which he refused to provide. Shortly afterwards, Nathan emerged from the premises and was also arrested. As earlier observed, the above findings were not challenged on appeal.
The defendant, his wife, Mrs Wheare, and Michael Craig Callow, a witness who had attended at the home that evening, gave evidence for the defence. Medical evidence was called about bruising to Mrs Wheare with respect to her allegation that she had been assaulted by the police.
The Magistrate reviewed the evidence and concluded that she accepted the evidence of the police officers beyond reasonable doubt. The Magistrate closely examined the evidence of the defendant and his witnesses and explained her reasons for the rejection of that evidence. The Magistrate accepted the medical evidence but concluded that the evidence did not confirm the allegations of Mrs Wheare. The Magistrate rejected a submission that an issue of self-defence arose. The Magistrate concluded:
I indicate that I reject the evidence of the defendant and his witnesses, other than Dr Elgar, in its entirety. Where there is conflict between the evidence of the defendant and his witnesses and that of the police, I indicate that I accept the evidence of the police beyond reasonable doubt.
The Magistrate discussed the defendant’s submission that the police officers were not acting in the course of the execution of their duties when entering and re-entering the house:
In this context, I have been directed to Dinan v Brereton [1960] SASR 101 @ 104 where Napier CJ states, in reference to section 75 of the Police Offences Act 1953-8, that he is;
“unable to accept the suggestion that this [section] gives the member of the police force no right or authority to follow the suspected person onto private property for the purpose of effecting the arrest”.
In the case before me, the police had located the person whose name and description fitted the person who had just a few minutes earlier committed property damage. Before they could arrest him, he fled inside the defendant’s house at the invitation of Mrs Wheare. Constable Thomas followed. He intended to arrest Nathan. I am satisfied that the police had the power to enter the defendant’s property in this situation.
It follows that I am satisfied that Constable Thomas was acting in the execution of his duty when he entered onto Mr Wheare’s property in pursuit of Nathan. I am satisfied that he told Mr Wheare of his intention and the defendant pushed him. I therefore find count 1 proved beyond reasonable doubt.
The Magistrate then reasoned:
As for the remaining counts 3 to 7, for the reasons already set out, I am satisfied that the police were acting in the course of their duty in continuing the attempt to arrest Nathan for damaging property and to arrest the defendant for both hindering police and for using indecent language. They were entitled to re-enter the premises to conclude their attempt to effect the arrest of Nathan. The defendant was attempting to prevent this happening. The events all took place within a very short span in time. I reject the submission that the police were acting unlawfully by being on the premises.
I am satisfied that the defendant was at all times the aggressor, that he resisted police after striking Tuckerman, that he kicked Allison and that he struck [Donnevert] with the police torch. I reject entirely that he was in any way protecting his wife. Rather I accept that she was trying to stop his behaviour, was attempting to get him inside and that during that attempt she was accidentally struck by his elbow. I am also satisfied that [he] wanted to make matters as difficult as possible for police as it is not disputed that some of his language was directed to the other men in the house including Nathan when he said words to the effect that he was showing the police who was boss and was putting the police in their place.
With respect to the final count, the Magistrate concluded:
In relation to the damage to the shirt, I am satisfied that the defendant did the damage alleged, that he did it recklessly in the course of the struggle which he was continuing because he wanted to continue to prevent the police from arresting him. I am satisfied that he was using every means at his disposal to inflict injury on those who were trying to arrest him. It is in this context that I am satisfied that the damage to the police shirt was, at the very least, reckless.
On the hearing of the appeal, the defendant challenged the lawfulness of the police conduct and, in particular, the right of the police to remain on the defendant’s property after the defendant told them to leave. It was contended that neither the common law nor statutory powers were available to the police in the present case. It was pointed out that the police did not hold any warrant to arrest.
Preliminary Observations
Before coming to discuss the issues raised on the appeal, it is convenient to make a number of preliminary observations about the principles to be applied.
The Trespass Principle
It is a well-established legal principle that every “invasion” of private property, be it ever so minute, is a trespass. This fundamental trespass principle turns on the notion that each person’s house “is to him as his castle and fortress, as well for his defence against injury and violence, as for his repose”.[7]
[7] Entick v Carrington (1765) 19 St Tr 1029 at 1066; see also Semayne’s Case (1604) 77 ER 194 at 195.
In Halliday v Nevill,[8] Plenty v Dillon,[9] and Coco,[10] the High Court had occasion to consider this fundamental principle. The position was reviewed in Coco[11]:
Every unauthorized entry upon private property is a trespass, the right of a person in possession or entitled to possession of premises to exclude others from those premises being a fundamental common law right[12]. In accordance with that principle, a police officer who enters or remains on private property without the leave or licence of the person in possession or entitled to possession commits a trespass unless the entry or presence on the premises is authorized or excused by law[13]. Statutory authority to engage in what otherwise would be tortious conduct must be clearly expressed in unmistakable and unambiguous language. Indeed, it has been said that the presumption is that, in the absence of express provision to the contrary, the legislature did not intend to authorize what would otherwise have been tortious conduct[14]. But the presumption is rebuttable and will be displaced if there is a clear implication that authority to enter or remain upon private property was intended. Such an implication may be made, in some circumstances, if it is necessary to prevent the statutory provisions from becoming inoperative or meaningless. However, as Gaudron and McHugh JJ observed in Plenty v Dillon:[15]
“[I]nconvenience in carrying out an object authorized by legislation is not a ground for eroding fundamental common law rights.”
In England, Lord Browne-Wilkinson has expressed the view that the presence of general words in a statute is insufficient to authorize interference with the basic immunities which are the foundation of our freedom; to constitute such authorization express words are required[16]. That approach is consistent with statements of principle made by this Court, to which we shall shortly refer. An insistence on the necessity for express words is in conformity with earlier judicial statements in England which call for express authorization by statute of any abrogation or curtailment of the citizen’s common law rights or immunities. ...
The insistence on express authorization of an abrogation or curtailment of a fundamental right, freedom or immunity must be understood as a requirement for some manifestation or indication that the legislature has not only directed its attention to the question of the abrogation or curtailment of such basic rights, freedoms or immunities but has also determined upon abrogation or curtailment of them. The courts should not impute to the legislature an intention to interfere with fundamental rights. Such an intention must be clearly manifested by unmistakable and unambiguous language. General words will rarely be sufficient for that purpose if they do not specifically deal with the question because, in the context in which they appear, they will often be ambiguous on the aspect of interference with fundamental rights[17].
[8] Halliday v Nevill (1984) 155 CLR 1.
[9] Plenty v Dillon (1991) 171 CLR 635.
[10] Coco v The Queen (1993-1994) 179 CLR 427.
[11] Coco v The Queen (1993-1994) 179 CLR 427 at 435-437.
[12] Entick v Carrington (1765), 2 Wils. 275, at p.291 [95 E.R. 807, at p.817]; Halliday v Nevill (1984), 155 CLR 1, at p.10, per Brennan J.; Plenty v Dillon (1991), 171 CLR 635 at p.639, per Mason CJ, Brennan and Toohey JJ; p.647, per Gaudron and McHugh JJ. See also Colet v The Queen, [1981] 1 SCR 2, at p.8; (1981) 119 CLR (3d) 521, at p.526.
[13] Halliday v Nevill (1984), 155 CLR , at p.10, per Brennan J; Plenty v Dillon (1991), 181 CLR , at p.639, per Mason CJ, Brennan and Toohey JJ; p.647, per Gaudron and McHugh JJ.
[14] Plenty v Dillon (1991), 171, CLR, at p.648, per Gaudron and McHugh JJ; Morris v Beardmore, [1981] AC 446, at pp. 455, 463; Colet, [1981] 1 SCR, at pp.9-10; (1981) 119 DLR (ed), at pp. 527-528.
[15] Plenty v Dillon (1991) 171 CLR at p.654.
[16] Wheeler v Leicester City Council, [1985] AC 1054, at p.1065; see also Marcel v Commissioner of Police, [1992] Ch. 225, at p.234; Lord Browne-Wilkinson, “The Infiltration of a Bill of Rights”, [1992] Public Law 397, at pp. 404-408.
[17] See Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1992), 176 CLR 1, at p.12, per Mason CJ.
As observed below, an entry on private property will not, however, constitute a trespass if the entry is by leave of some lawful authority or excuse.
Common Law Power of Arrest
At common law, police officers have power to arrest and detain a citizen where they have reasonable grounds for suspecting that an offence has been committed and that he or she is the person who committed it. The scope of the power of arrest was discussed by Brennan J in Halliday:[18]
The common law power to arrest on a criminal charge can be exercised as of right on private as well as on public property, in the home of a fugitive offender or in the homes of his friends. No leave or license is necessary to enter if no force be needed, and in some cases force may be used.
…
Of course, a constable's power to arrest without warrant is limited. At common law, a constable is empowered to arrest without warrant any person whom he suspects on reasonable grounds of having committed a felony, but he is not empowered to arrest a person guilty or suspected of misdemeanours except where an actual breach of the peace by an affray or by personal violence occurs and the offender is arrested while committing the misdemeanour or immediately after its commission: Stephen, History of the Criminal Law of England (1883), vol. 1, p. 193; Hale's Pleas of the Crown (1800), vol. 2, p. 85. And so it was held that a constable could not lawfully arrest an offender who, having assaulted the constable an hour earlier, retires to his house and closes and fastens his door: Reg. v. Marsden. At common law, a constable is entitled to enter on private property to effect an arrest within the limits of his common law power to arrest without warrant, although he would be a trespasser if he entered or remained on the property for any other purpose.
[18] Halliday v Nevill (1984) 155 CLR 1 at 12 (footnotes omitted).

The felony and misdemeanour dichotomy has been abolished by statute. Offences are now characterised as indictable – major and minor – and summary. The implications of the abolition of the characterisations, felony and misdemeanour, and its impact on the common law, are unclear. Counsel for the defendant accepted that the offence of wilful damage was an indictable offence and for the purposes of the common law, the modern statutory equivalent of a felony. If this concession is legally correct, then it follows that the police, in their pursuant of Nathan, were in pursuit of a person who was suspected of having committed the modern equivalent of a felony. Later in these reasons reference is made to the observations of King CJ that suggests that section 75 may have codified the common law. If this observation is correct, then there would be no need to further consider the common law powers of the police. However, this question is unresolved.
Implied Licence to Enter
In Halliday,[19] the High Court recognised that an entry on or invasion of private property will not constitute a trespass if the entry or invasion is by leave of a licence or some other lawful authority or excuse. Whether there is an implied licence or not is a question of fact.[20]
[19] Halliday v Nevill (1984) 155 CLR 1 at 7-8 and 10.
[20] Halliday v Nevill (1984) 155 CLR 1 at 6.
In the joint judgment of Gaudron and McHugh JJ in Plenty,[21] their Honours said:
The policy of the law is to protect the possession of property and the privacy and security of its occupier ... A person who enters the property of another must justify that entry by showing that he or she either entered with the consent of the occupier or otherwise had lawful authority to enter the premises ... Consent to an entry is implied if the person enters for a lawful purpose. In Robson v Hallett [[1967] 2 QB 939 at 951] Lord Parker CJ said:
‘the occupier of any dwelling-house gives implied licence to any member of the public coming on his lawful business to come through the gate, up the steps, and knock on the door of the house.’
This implied licence extends to the driveway of a dwelling house ... . [Emphasis added]
[21] Plenty v Dillon (1991) 171 CLR 635 at 647 (footnotes omitted).
The determination of the existence and scope of a licence to enter was discussed in the joint judgment of Gibbs CJ, Mason, Wilson and Deane JJ in Halliday:[22]
While the question whether an occupier of land has granted a licence to another to enter upon it is essentially a question of fact, there are circumstances in which such a licence will, as a matter of law, be implied unless there is something additional in the objective facts which is capable of founding a conclusion that any such implied or tacit licence was negated or was revoked: cf Edwards v Railway Executive [(1952) AC 737 at 744]. The most common instance of such an implied licence relates to the means of access, whether path, driveway or both, leading to the entrance of the ordinary suburban dwelling-house. If the path or driveway leading to the entrance of such a dwelling is left unobstructed and with entrance gate unlocked and there is no notice or other indication that entry by visitors generally or particularly designated visitors is forbidden or unauthorized, the law will imply a licence in favour of any member of the public to go upon the path or driveway to the entrance of the dwelling for the purpose of lawful communication with, or delivery to, any person in the house. Such an implied or tacit licence can be precluded or at any time revoked by express or implied refusal or withdrawal of it. The occupier will not however be heard to say that while he or she had neither done nor said anything to negate or revoke any such licence, it should not be implied because subjectively he or she had not intended to give it ... Nor, in such a case, will the implied licence ordinarily be restricted to presence on the open driveway or path for the purpose of going to the entrance of the house. A passer-by is not a trespasser if, on passing an open driveway with no indication that entry is forbidden or unauthorized, he or she steps upon it either unintentionally or to avoid an obstruction such as a vehicle parked across the footpath. Nor will such a passer-by be a trespasser if, for example, he or she goes upon the driveway to recover some item of his or her property which has fallen or blown upon it or to lead away an errant child. To adapt the words of Lord Parker CJ in Robson [[1967] 2 QB 939 at 950], the law is not such an ass that the implied or tacit licence in such a case is restricted to stepping over the item of property or around the child for the purpose of going to the entrance and asking the householder whether the item of property can be reclaimed or the child led away. The path or driveway is, in such circumstances, held out by the occupier as the bridge between the public thoroughfare and his or her private dwelling upon which a passer-by may go for a legitimate purpose that in itself involves no interference with the occupier's possession nor injury to the occupier, his or her guests or his, her or their property. [Emphasis added]
[22] Halliday v Nevill (1984) 155 CLR 1 at 6-8.
Statutory Powers of Arrest
The parties’ primary submission concerned the reach of statutory provisions said to justify the police entry onto the premises in the present case. The police relied on section 75 of the Summary Offences Act 1953 (SA). The defendant submitted that the section was not in such terms as to abrogate or curtail the defendant’s common law right to control who entered his property. The defendant also raised section 271 of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) but said that it had no application in the present case. The Crown eschewed any reliance on this section.
Section 75, Summary Offences Act
Section 75 of the Summary Offences Act provides for a statutory power of arrest:
A police officer, without any warrant other than this Act, at any hour of the day or night, may apprehend any person whom the officer finds committing, or has reasonable cause to suspect of having committed, or being about to commit, an offence.
In Conley,[23] section 75 of the Summary Offences Act was held to apply to all criminal offences. King CJ observed:[24]
I think, however, that s 75, covering, as it does, all offences, is intended to be a code as to the powers of police officers to arrest on suspicion without a warrant. I think that the common law rule has been superseded, that the power to arrest without warrant in South Australia on suspicion of felony as well as on suspicion of other offences is found in s 75, and that the requirements of s 78(1) therefore apply whether the arrest is for felony, for misdemeanour or for a simple offence.
[23] R v Conley (1982) 30 SASR 226.
[24] R v Conley (1982) 30 SASR 226 at 239.
In Dinan v Brereton,[25] Napier CJ conducted a review of the legislative history and held that the exercise of the power contained in section 75 allowed a police officer to follow an offender on to private property for the purpose of effecting arrest:[26]
A consideration of the history of the legislation shows that the form of the general power given by s. 75 has been reached by a process of evolution, from the power given in the early days of the Province (Ordinance 19 of 1844, s. 7). A fuller account of the history will be found in O’Sullivan v. Hormann, but, for the present purpose, I refer to the Police Act 1936, s. 65(1), in which the power, that is now given by s. 75 in one breath, was formerly distributed over six separate categories of persons “found” doing this or that, and a seventh category, namely, any person whom the constable “has just cause to suspect of having committed or being about to commit” any offence. According to the marginal note to the Act of 1936, the prototype of this enactment is the 3 & 4 Vict. C. 50 (Imp.), s. 10, where it is, in effect, an expansion of the power which was under consideration in O’Sullivan v. Hormann.
It seems to me that the history of the legislation might well lend some support to an argument that the wide terms of s. 75 should be restricted to cases bearing at least some analogy to persons “found” committing the offence in question, but, be that as it may, I can see no justification for the suggestion that the constable has no right or authority to follow the suspected person on to private property for the purpose of effecting the arrest.
Since Dinan, a number of authorities have held that general statutory powers of arrest may be exercised on private property.[27] Subject to the satisfaction of two prerequisites,[28] such arrest powers may also justify forcible entry into a person’s home.
[25] Dinan v Brereton [1960] SASR 101.
[26] Dinan v Brereton [1960] SASR 101 at 105 (footnotes omitted).
[27] Eccles v Bourque [1975] 2 SCR 739; Kennedy v Pagura [1977] 2 NSWLR 810; McDowell v Newchurch (1981) 9 NTR 15; Letts v King (1988) WAR 76; Lippl v Haines (1989) 18 NSWLR 620; R v Long and McDonnell (2002) 224 LSJS 193 at [32].
[28] Gleeson CJ observed in Lippl v Haines (1989) 18 NSWLR 620 at 622 that a forcible entry by police officers is permitted where there is reasonable and probable grounds for belief that the person sought was in the premises and a proper announcement is made prior to entry.
In Kennedy v Pagura,[29] Taylor CJ at CL considered the right of a police officer to enter private premises for the purpose of effecting an arrest pursuant to sections 352(1) and 352(2) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW). Those sections provided:
(1) Any constable or other person may without warrant apprehend,
(a)any person in the act of committing, or immediately after having committed, an offence punishable, whether by indictment, or on summary conviction, under any Act.
…
(2) Any constable may without warrant apprehend,
(a)any person whom he, with reasonable cause, suspects of having committed any such offence or crime, ...
[29] Kennedy v Pagura (1977) 2 NSWLR 810.
In the course of his reasons, Taylor CJ at CL cited the Canadian Supreme Court decision of Eccles v Bourque[30] as authority for the following principle:[31]
… where a police officer is authorized to make an arrest, either by virtue of a warrant, or under the terms of the Canadian Criminal Code, then he becomes authorized at common law to commit a trespass, if necessary to make the arrest, including a trespass on the premises of a person other than the fugitive.
In holding that the statute authorised the police officer to enter premises for the purpose of effecting an arrest, Taylor CJ at CL observed: [32]
The plain language of the section would cover the instant case. The defendant had committed an offence punishable on summary conviction, that is, he had driven a vehicle in a manner dangerous, and the constable was, therefore, entitled to arrest him without warrant in terms of the section.
...
There are no words in s. 352 which would warrant any reading down of the section to exclude persons on private premises or in their homes. The words are perfectly plain. The obvious purport of the section is to give police officers the right to arrest people who have committed offences or whom they suspect of having committed an offence, the suspicion being on reasonable grounds, with reasonable cause, to apprehend them wherever they may be. The results that would follow, if the decision of the learned magistrate was correct, would indeed be curious.
[30] Eccles v Bourque (1974) 50 DLR (3d) 753.
[31] Kennedy v Pagura (1977) 2 NSWLR 810 at 812.
[32] Kennedy v Pagura (1977) 2 NSWLR 810 at 811-812.
In McDowell v Newchurch,[33] the following questions of law relating to police powers of arrest on private premises were reserved to the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory:
Whether a police officer may enter upon private property and, without warrant, arrest an offender where;
(a)the police officer has reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant has committed an offence in or within hearing or view of any person in any public place; and
(b)the offence in question is one for which the maximum penalty does not exceed a term of imprisonment of six months.
[33] McDowell v Newchurch (1981) 9 NTR 15.
The factual circumstances of the decision were as follows. Following abuse from the defendant, who was then on private property, a police officer entered the private property for the purpose of arresting the defendant for the offence of “offensive behaviour in or about a dwelling-house”, pursuant to section 47 of the Summary Offences Act 1978 (NT). The defendant resisted, a struggle ensued, and the defendant was taken to the police station and subsequently charged with various offences, including charges of resisting a member of the police force in the execution of his duty contrary to s 158 of the Police Administration Act1978 (NT), and of assaulting a police officer in the execution of his duty contrary to the same section. The offence in respect of which the defendant was originally apprehended was punishable upon conviction by a fine of $200.
It was contended that the arrest of the defendant without warrant was justified by section 123(1) of the Police Administration Act, which provided:
A member of the police force may, without warrant, arrest and take into custody any person where he believes on reasonable grounds that the person has convicted is committing or is about to commit an offence.
As was noted by Muirhead J, section 126 of the Police Administration Act was also relevant to the determination of the proceedings. That section then provided:
(1)Where a member of the Police Force has, under a warrant, power to arrest a person, he may enter into or upon any premises, vehicle or vessel, by force if necessary, and with such assistance as he thinks necessary at any time of the day or night or between such times as may be specified in the warrant, for the purpose of arresting the person if the member believes on reasonable grounds that the person is in or on the premises, vehicle or vessel.
(2)Subject to sub-section (3), where a member of the Police Force may, without warrant, arrest a person, the member may enter into or upon, by force if necessary, and with such assistance as he thinks necessary, any premises, vehicle or vessel, at any time of the day or night for the purposes of arresting the person if the member believes on reasonable grounds that the person has committed an offence punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding 6 months and that he is in or on the premises, vehicle or vessel.
(3)Nothing in this section shall limit or prevent the exercise of any other powers of a member of the Police Force pursuant to any other law in force in the Territory whereby a member may enter into or upon any premises, vehicle or vessel, whether with or without a warrant.
Following an analysis of the legislative scheme, Muirhead J answered the question reserved as follows:[34]
[P]rovided a police officer believes on reasonable grounds that a person has committed, is committing or is about to commit an offence he has power without warrant to enter private land for the purpose of arresting the person, albeit the offence is punishable by a maximum sentence of imprisonment of six months or less.
[34] McDowell v Newchurch (1981) 9 NTR 15 at 20.
Muirhead J concluded that the arrest was not unlawful merely because the defendant was on private property when he was arrested without warrant and removed in custody to the police station. In the course of his reasons, Muirhead J made the following observations:[35]
It is probable that s 75(1) of the South Australian Police Offences Act 1953-1958 was used as the model for [the Police Administration Act]. This provided as follows:-
Any member of the police force, without any warrant other than this Act, at any hour of the day or night, may apprehend any person whom he finds committing or has reasonable cause to suspect of having committed or being about to commit, any offence.
The differences in the new Northern Territory legislation introduced by further pruning are differences in form rather than in effect. The decision of Napier CJ in Dinan v Brereton [1960] SASR 101 set aside any doubts as to the right of the police to enter private property for the purposes of apprehension. The Chief Justice's judgment contains a summary of the common law situation. He concluded that there “was no justification for the suggestion that the constable had no right or authority to follow the suspected person on to private property for the purpose of effecting the arrest”. The Police and Police Offences Ordinance (NT) made no provision concerning powers of entry for the purposes of arrest. The entry contemplated by s 126 is not entry upon private property but “into or upon any premises vehicle or vessel by force if necessary and with such assistance as he thinks necessary …”.
Section 126 is not, in my view, intended to limit the powers of police to enter private property to effect an arrest when the grounds referred to in s 123 exist. It is, in my view, a supplementary section which defines the police powers of entering, not land, but structures on the land. It must be remembered that the “premises, vehicle or vessel” may frequently be owned or occupied by persons other than the person the police seek. It is logical that the statutory powers of entry which include the right of forcible entry be defined, especially in view of the old position at common law.
[35] McDowell v Newchurch (1981) 9 NTR 15 at 17-18.
In Lippl v Haines,[36] where Gleeson CJ observed:
I agree that the law on this subject in New South Wales is the same as the law as expounded by the Supreme Court of Canada in Eccles v Bourque (1974) 50 DLR (3d) 753; 19 CCC (2d) 129.
Section 352 of the Crimes Act 1900 does not, either by its terms or of its own force, authorise forcible entry upon land for the purposes of making an arrest. However, upon certain conditions stated in the section, it authorises arrest without warrant. If a police officer is authorised by s 352 to arrest a person without warrant then, according to common law principles, it may be lawful for him to engage in conduct that would otherwise amount to a trespass for the purpose of making, or endeavouring to make, such an arrest. His conduct will be lawful where the entry is reasonably necessary for the purpose mentioned, but always provided two conditions are satisfied. First, he must believe on reasonable and probable grounds, prior to entry, that the person he is seeking to arrest is on the premises. Secondly, save in what the Supreme Court of Canada described as “exigent circumstances”, there must be a proper announcement prior to entry so that the occupier of the premises is made aware that a police officer claims authority to enter and is given an opportunity to permit entry without force.
[36] Lippl v Haines (1989) 18 NSWLR 620 at 622. See also Hope A-JA at 632-633.
In Halliday,[37] Brennan J considered the relevant authorities in the following terms:
In South Australia, Napier C.J. held that a statutory power conferred on a police officer to arrest a person reasonably suspected of having committed an offence gave the police officer authority to follow the person on to private property for the purpose of effecting the arrest: Dinan v. Brereton. In New South Wales, Taylor C.J. at C.L. held that a similar statutory power gave a right to police officers to arrest suspected persons “wherever they may be”: Kennedy v. Pagura. In the Northern Territory, Muirhead J. held a statutory provision which conferred a power to enter “into or upon any premises, vehicle or vessel, by force if necessary” did not restrict a general statutory power to arrest so as to preclude its exercise on private property in cases that did not fall within the terms of the particular provision: McDowell v. Newchurch.
In principle, a statute which creates a general power to arrest in substitution for the common law power to arrest ought not to be read down to preclude the exercise of the statutory power on private property. Whether the person seeking to arrest another for a criminal offence is exercising a common law or statutory power, the case is one “when the King is party” and when the public interest in the prosecution of crime prevails over private possessory interests in land.
[37] Halliday v Nevill (1984) 155 CLR 1 at 16. (footnotes omitted).

In Plenty,[38] the High Court was concerned with the right to access premises for the purpose of serving a summons. Mason CJ, together with Brennan and Toohey JJ, referred to Dinan’s case, with apparent approval, observing:[39]
The present case is not concerned with the application of the third rule in Semayne's Case to an arrest without warrant on a criminal charge (a problem addressed in Lippl v Haines; and see Dinan v Brereton), ...
...
Some statutes which confer a power to arrest have not been construed as carrying a right to enter on private property (see per Lord Keith of Kinkel in Clowser v Chaplin) although, in other cases, a statutory power of arrest has been held to carry a qualified right to enter: see Eccles v Bourque; Halliday v Nevill. But a statute which confers a power to arrest is of a different order from a statute which prescribes the manner of service of a summons and which confers no power on a person to do a thing that that person is not free to do at common law.
[38] Plenty v Dillon (1990) 171 CLR 635.
[39] Plenty v Dillon (1990) 171 CLR 635 at 641, 644-645 (footnotes omitted).
The defendant submitted that section 75 of the Summary Offences Act did not authorise entry onto private premises to effect an arrest. This submission should be rejected. The above authorities establish that police officers may, if the statutory prerequisites are satisfied, enter onto private property to pursue a suspected person to effect an arrest. The police may remain on the premises as necessary to effect that purpose. They may do so in the absence of the owner’s permission and in the event of an express direction that they are not to enter the property or must leave the property.
Section 271, Criminal Law Consolidation Act
It is convenient to address the further suggestion of the defendant that there was an alternative source of power available to the police to authorise the arrest. This submission did not have the support of counsel for the police.
The defendant submitted that an alternative statutory source of police power of entry is to be found in section 271 of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA). This section provides:
(1)A person may, without warrant, arrest and detain a person liable to arrest and detention under this section.
(2)A person who arrests and detains another under this section must take the necessary action to have the other person delivered into the custody of a member of the police force forthwith.
(3)A person is liable to arrest and detention under this section if the person is in the act of committing, or has just committed—
(a)     an indictable offence; or
(b)     theft (whether the theft is a summary or indictable offence); or
(c)     an offence against the person (whether the offence is summary or indictable); or
(d)     an offence involving interference with, damage to or destruction of property (whether the offence is summary or indictable).
The defendant contended that while the definition of “a person” in section 271 included police officers, the section did not specifically grant power to enter onto private property.
The current version of section 271 of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act was enacted by clause 10 of the Criminal Law Consolidation (Felonies and Misdemeanours) Amendment Act 1994 (SA). The second reading speech[40] contains the following under the sub-title “Power of Arrest”:[41]
Currently, ss271 and 272 of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act contain a statutory version of the common law power of arrest. Because it predates the creation of the police force, it vests powers in private citizens.
It is arguable whether or not ss271 and 272 could simply be abolished without replacement. Certainly, s75 of the Summary Offences Act provides police with a comprehensive power of arrest without a warrant. Section 272 is an anachronism and there appears to be no recent record of its use. However, in the interests of caution, and taking into account the fact that this Bill is not intended to constitute a review of arrest powers, it has been decided to re-enact the effect of s271.
...
Clause 10 repeals sections 271 and 272 of the principal Act, which deal with the citizen’s power of arrest in two different circumstances, and replaces them with a general power of arrest. New section 271 would allow a citizen to arrest and detain a person found committing, or having just committed, an indictable offence, larceny, an offence against the person or property damage.
[40] It is permissible to consider the second reading speech in relation to a piece of legislation to determine its legislative objects and policy: see Owen v South Australia (1996) 66 SASR 251 at 255-256; Police v Trzesniowski (2005) 93 SASR 136 at 142; section 22 of the Acts Interpretation Act 1915 (SA).
[41] South Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, Thursday 4 August 1994, pages 48-49.
The police submitted that section 271 should be construed as a statutory recognition of the power of a citizen to effect an arrest, and did not afford a separate basis for police officers effecting arrests for the following reasons:
-the reference to “person” throughout the section and the requirement to deliver the arrested person into the custody of a member of the police force, pursuant to section 271(2), was language consistent with the provision being tailored specifically in relation to citizens’ arrests;
-the offence categories in section 271(3), whilst comprehensive and arguably expansive of the limited common law categories for citizens’ arrests were not exhaustive or definitive so far as the calendar of criminal offences was concerned. This was in contrast to the non-specific phrase, “an offence” in section 75 of the Summary Offences Act, which prima facie applied to any and every criminal offence;
-the content of the second reading speech made plain that the section had been retained “in the interests of caution” to vest power in private citizens.
As a matter of construction and policy, section 271 does not afford any greater or additional power than that conferred by section 75 of the Summary Offences Act. It is apparent that the “new” section 271 was enacted by the legislature as a statutory acknowledgement of the power of a citizen to effect an arrest in certain circumstances. The section does not extend to police officers.
The Application of the Principle to the Facts
Entry in the present case on to property and the arrest
The police in the present case, having obtained information from the complainant neighbour in relation to alleged offending and notwithstanding that they had not witnessed the alleged offending, were entitled to exercise their arrest power in relation to Nathan.
As Napier J observed in Feldman v Buck:[42]
[Counsel for the appellant] has argued that under this enactment the power to arrest is as it always has been – a power exercisable by the constable upon his own observation, or, at any rate, upon his beat. But it seems to me that it is impossible to restrict the application of the language to the case of a person encountered by a police officer on the beat or on patrol. It is a power given, indifferently, to every member of the police force, and it authorizes the apprehension of any person whom the officer (1) finds committing or (2) has reasonable cause to suspect of (a) having committed, or (b) being about to commit, any offence. Speaking generally, the power to arrest persons whom the officer “finds committing ... any offence” must, no doubt, be taken to contemplate the situation of a policeman on the beat or on patrol, and the power to arrest on suspicion of being “about to commit an offence” is, no doubt, directed, primarily, to the keeping of the peace, but the power to arrest “any person whom he ... has reasonable cause to suspect of having committed any offence” must plainly be taken as referring to cases in which “the power of arrest may be exercised some time after the offence has been committed. It may be based, not on the constable’s own observation, but on information received from others” (per Lord Denning M.R. in Wiltshire v. Barrett; cf. “what was he told that the plaintiff had done, and what was his suspicion?”
[42] Feldman v Buck (1966) SASR 236 at 238-239 (footnotes omitted).
The police were entitled to look over the defendant’s boundary fence to determine the whereabouts of Nathan. They were standing on parkland at the time of looking over the fence and their use of sensory perception – in this case, those of eyes and ears – did not constitute a trespass or a search. As Prior J observed in Questions of Law Reserved (No 3 of 1998):[43]
I agree in particular with the submission put by the Director of Public Prosecutions that mere sensory perception, whether by eye, ear or nose, cannot of itself constitute a search. It follows that odours which emit from a person’s bag are exposed to the plain perception of the public at large. Thus a dog sniffing the area around a bag or parcel does not effect a search of that bag or parcel. It could perhaps be described as an act of identification, but certainly not a search.
[43] Questions of Law Reserved (No 3 of 1998) (1998) 71 SASR 223 at 224.
The police were entitled to enter on the defendant’s property to pursue and effect the arrest of Nathan. At this particular time, prior to the defendant’s appearance and utterances, the police were entitled to enter by virtue of utilising an implied, and not yet revoked, licence to enter on to private property for a legitimate purpose or, alternatively, by virtue of the power contained in section 75 of the Summary Offences Act.
Once the defendant appeared, blocking and pushing Constable Thomas and thereby hindering him in the execution of his duty, he and other officers were entitled to remain and enter on to the property to effect the arrest for the hinder offence.
The defendant’s conduct provided a further basis for effecting his arrest. Such conduct, however, constituted a revocation of any implied licence or permission for the police to enter or remain on his property. A basis for arresting was the power in section 75 of the Summary Offences Act. Implicit in the section is the power for police, having regard to the circumstances of the particular case, to remain on property for a reasonable period of time to effect an arrest.
When the police officers desisted from attempting to arrest the defendant, they withdrew from the front yard and remained on the footpath. Having regard to the nature of the defendant’s conduct and the presence of other men inside the house, the officers considered themselves “outnumbered” and thereby decided to withdraw and call for assistance. They were entitled to so act.
While the police officers waited for assistance and as that assistance arrived, the defendant was behaving in a threatening and abusive fashion toward the police officers, uttering profane language with a threat to kill on at least one occasion. The defendant was engaging in an ongoing breach of the peace. This ongoing conduct provided a further basis for effecting his arrest. Section 75 provided authority to the police to enter onto or remain on the property.
The statutory arrest power must be exercised within limits. However, there is no basis for concluding that those limits were breached in the present case. On the occasions when the police entered on to the defendant’s property, they did so acting in good faith and for a proper purpose. A review of the evidence discloses that the conduct of the police was not overbearing or unreasonable.[44]
[44] Drymalik v Feldman (1966) SASR 227 at 231; Feldman v Buck (1966) SASR 236 at 239; Zaravinos v State of NSW (2004) 62 NSWLR 58 at 70-72.
Whether, if the common law remains, by virtue of the exercise of the common law power of arrest or the statutory power of arrest contained in section 75 of the Summary Offences Act, the entry of the police on to the property of the defendant was at all times proper and lawful, as was the arrest of the defendant himself.
The Magistrate’s finding that the police were entitled to enter and remain on the defendant’s property was correct as a matter of both law and fact. Whether that finding be justified on the basis of the exercise of the common law arrest power, or by the exercise of the statutory arrest power contained in section 75, the arrest of the defendant was made within its power and was justified at law.
Police acting in the execution of their duty
The scope of a police officer’s duties was considered by the Full Court of the Federal Court in Re K.[45]After considering numerous authorities, the Court observed:[46]
The effect of all those cases is that a police officer acts in the execution of his duty from the moment he embarks upon a lawful task connected with his functions as a police officer, and continues to act in the execution of that duty for as long as he is engaged in pursuing the task and until it is completed, provided that he does not in the course of the task do anything outside the ambit of his duty so as to cease to be acting therein.
[45] Re K (1993) 46 FCR 336.
[46] Re K (1993) 46 FCR 336 at 340-341.
The police contact with the defendant came about as a result of their frustrated attempt to arrest Nathan. After initially speaking with Nathan and making the necessary inquiries, the police decided to arrest Nathan on the complaint of property damage and in relation to an outstanding theft matter.
On the prosecution case, the defendant appeared virtually simultaneously with Nathan running into the house, blocking the path of and pushing Constable Thomas as he was giving chase.
On the defence case, Constable Tuckerman attacked Mrs Wheare with a baton for no apparent motive or reason after having been briefed by the other officers as to what had taken place at the scene. And it was supposedly in this context that the defendant came to the rescue of his wife and hence his conflict and struggle with the police officers.
The Magistrate correctly assessed and rejected the defence case. The evidence of the defendant was unsatisfactory; the evidence of Mrs Wheare was demonstrably unreliable; the evidence of the only potential corroborating witness, Mr Callow, was vague and the medical evidence was at best equivocal.
It was clearly open to the Magistrate to reject the defence case and find that, at all times prior to and during the course of their contact with the defendant, the police were acting in the execution of their duty.
Reasonable excuse by the defendant in not providing name and address
Constable Tuckerman gave evidence that the defendant failed to provide his name, address and date of birth upon request contrary to section 74A(3)(a) of the Summary Offences Act. Constable Tuckerman was not questioned nor challenged in cross-examination about his evidence on this topic. The defendant asserted that he did not provide his name and address as the police “were already there and they already know my name”.
Section 74A relevantly provides as follows:
74A—Power to require statement of name and other personal details
(1)     Where a police officer has reasonable cause to suspect—
(a)that a person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit, an offence; or
(b)that a person may be able to assist in the investigation of an offence or a suspected offence,
the officer may require that person to state all or any of the person's personal details.
…
(3)     A person who—
(a)refuses or fails, without reasonable excuse, to comply with a requirement under subsection (1) or (2); or
(b)     in response to a requirement under subsection (1) or (2)—
(i)    states a personal detail that is false; or
(ii)    produces false evidence of a personal detail,
is guilty of an offence.
…
[Emphasis added]
Pursuant to section 5 of the Summary Offences Act the onus is on the defendant to establish “reasonable excuse” on the balance of probabilities.[47] Section 5 provides as follows:
Subject to any provision to the contrary, where this Act provides that an act done without lawful authority, without reasonable cause, without reasonable excuse, without lawful excuse or without consent constitutes an offence, the prosecution need not prove the absence of lawful authority, reasonable cause, reasonable excuse, lawful excuse or consent, and the onus is upon the defendant to prove any such authority, cause, excuse or consent upon which he or she relies.
[47] Rowe v Manevski (1994) 62 SASR 468.
In Taikato,[48] the majority of the High Court recognised that what constitutes a reasonable excuse:
… depends not only on the circumstances of the individual case but also on the purpose of the provision to which the defence of "reasonable excuse" is an exception.”
Dawson J, in dissent, observed:[49]
A reasonable excuse is no more or less than an excuse which would be accepted by a reasonable person.
[48] Taikato v The Queen (1996) 186 CLR 454 at 464 (Brennan CJ, Toohey, McHugh, Gummow JJ).
[49] Taikato v The Queen (1996) 186 CLR 454 at 470
To a similar effect in Pascoe v The Nominal Defendant,[50] Mansfield CJ stated:
What is to be determined is whether the applicant has shown any cause which can be deemed by the Court to be a reasonable excuse. I think this means a cause which a reasonable man would regard as an excuse, a cause consistent with a reasonable standard of conduct ...
I respectfully agree with the above observation.
[50] Pascoe v The Nominal Defendant (Queensland) (No 2) (1964) Qd R 373 at 378.
More recently in Houndslow v Woodward,[51] Johnson J considered the meaning of “reasonable excuse” in the context of an appeal against conviction for the offence of failing to provide personal details (full name, date of birth, address) when requested to do so, contrary to section 16(6) of the Criminal Investigation (Identifying People) Act 2002 (WA). Section 16 relevantly provided as follows:
[51] Hounslow v Woodward [2007] WASC 27.
(2)If an officer reasonably suspects that a person whose personal details are unknown to the officer —
(a) has committed or is committing or is about to commit an offence; or
(b) may be able to assist in the investigation of an offence or suspected offence,
the officer may request the person to give the officer any or all of the person's personal details.
…
(6)A person who, without reasonable excuse, does not comply with a request made under subsection (2) … commits an offence.
Johnson J made the following observations about the meaning of “reasonable excuse” which are apposite to an understanding of the expression in section 74A(3)(a) of the Summary Offences Act which is in substantially simliar terms and statutory context to section 16 of the Criminal Investigation (Identifying People) Act:[52]
The appellant submits that the Magistrate erred in law in so far as he found that, in the circumstances, the appellant did not have a reasonable excuse for refusing the police officer's request.
It is well established that what constitutes a "reasonable excuse" depends upon the circumstances of the individual case and the purpose of the provision to which the defence of "reasonable excuse" is an exception: Taikato v R (1996) 186 CLR 454 per Brennan CJ, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ at 464. I accept the respondent's submission that in the context of the Act, the purpose of s 16(2) is to enable a Police officer to identify a person suspected of committing an offence. In that regard it is a significant forensic tool. The provision also facilitates identification of those suspected of being involved in offences, and those who have witnessed offences, who might not otherwise wish to assist the police in their inquiries. The imposition of the penalty emphasises the importance of the power and must have been intended to influence those who might not wish to assist the police to do so. In those circumstances, I believe that the term "reasonable excuse" was not intended to have a broad operation.
Under s 16(7), the fact that the officer requesting a person's personal details does not, when requested by that person, identify himself, constitutes a reasonable excuse. I would imagine that the rationale behind s 16(7) is that, as the section requires personal details to be provided, a person should not have to divulge identifying information to a person who will not identify themselves. In that way, identifying information is not divulged to an unknown officer and the potential for misuse of the information is restricted. Otherwise, s 16(7) provides little assistance in identifying the scope of a reasonable excuse. One can readily imagine situations which would constitute a reasonable excuse but which would not adversely impact on the effectiveness of the provision. For example, a person would have a reasonable excuse if because of injury or other reason he was unable to answer the police officers request, or if he had a hearing difficulty which prevented him from understanding the nature of the request.
[Emphasis added]
[52] Hounslow v Woodward [2007] WASC 27 at [96] – [98].

Having regard to the circumstances of the alleged offence on either a subjective or objective analysis, there was either no or insufficient evidence upon which the magistrate could find on the balance of probabilities that the defendant had a reasonable excuse for his failure to provide his name and address.[53]
[53] Conners v Craigie (1994) 76 A Crim R 502 at 507.
Conclusion
This appeal is dismissed.