Polan v Goulburn Valley Health (No 2)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Polan v Goulburn Valley Health (No 2) [2017] FCA 30

File number: VID 611 of 2014
Judge: MORTIMER J
Date of judgment: 31 January 2017
Catchwords: INDUSTRIAL LAW – application for relief under the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) and the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) – alleged breaches of enterprise agreements – where the Court has found that the applicant receiving and making calls from doctors and rearranging rosters at home while on-call constituted overtime work – where parties do not agree on how the applicant’s entitlements should be calculated – sum of entitlements the applicant is entitled to – whether interest payable
Legislation:

Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 191

Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) s 570

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 37M(1), 37M(2)

Workplace Relations Act 1996

Cases cited:

Aon Risk Services Australia Limited v Australian National University [2009] HCA 27; 239 CLR 175

Aristocrat Technologies Australia Pty Ltd v DAP Services (Kempsey) Pty Ltd [2007] FCAFC 40; 157 FCR 564

Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd v Westpac Banking Corporation [1988] HCA 17; 164 CLR 662

David Securities Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [1992] HCA 48; 175 CLR 353

Enzed Holdings Ltd v Wynthea Pty Ltd (1984) 4 FCR 450; 57 ALR 167

Pavey and Matthews Pty Ltd v Paul [1987] HCA 5; 162 CLR 221

Polan v Goulburn Valley Health [2016] FCA 440

Tabet v Gett [2010] HCA 12; 240 CLR 537

TCL Air Conditioner (Zhongshan) Company Ltd v Castel Electronics Pty Ltd [2014] FCAFC 83; 232 FCR 361

The Commonwealth v Amann Aviation Pty Ltd [1991] HCA 54; 174 CLR 64

Date of hearing: 29 June 2016
Date of last submissions: 8 July 2016
Registry: Victoria
Division: Fair Work Division
National Practice Area: Employment & Industrial Relations
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 116
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr T Alexander with Dr V Lambropoulos
Solicitor for the Applicant: SMR Legal
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr M G Rinaldi
Solicitor for the Respondent: TressCox Lawyers

ORDERS

VID 611 of 2014
BETWEEN:

MANDY LEE-ANNE POLAN

Applicant

AND:

GOULBURN VALLEY HEALTH

Respondent

JUDGE:

MORTIMER J

DATE OF ORDER:

31 JANUARY 2017

THE COURT DECLARES THAT:

1.The applicant is entitled to the total sum of $27,869.28, plus interest to be calculated in accordance with the Court’s orders.

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The parties confer with a view to agreeing on the amount of interest payable to the applicant in accordance with the Court’s reasons for judgment and Practice Note GPN-INT and, on or before 4 pm on 17 February 2017, submit an agreed proposed order in relation to the interest payable to the applicant.

2. In the absence of any agreement between the parties pursuant to paragraph 1 of these orders, the parties are directed to attend a mediation before a Registrar of the Court, on a date to be fixed by the Registrar after 17 February 2017, for the…

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Details
Case
[2017] FCA 30
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Polan v Goulburn Valley Health (No 2), the applicant sought relief under the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) and the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) in relation to alleged breaches of enterprise agreements. The primary dispute centred on the calculation of overtime entitlements for the applicant, who was a hospital administrator on-call. The respondent had conceded at the hearing that the Telstra phone bills, upon which their calculations were based, did not record calls received by the applicant from doctors. Instead, they only recorded calls made by the applicant from her work mobile phone.

The court had to determine the sum of entitlements the applicant was entitled to, considering the respondent’s concession and the applicant's evidence. The applicant had recorded details of her overtime work, such as the date, day, time, ward, and type of call, in a spreadsheet saved on a laptop provided by the respondent. The applicant also set out her estimates of the time spent on roster changes, explaining her method in detail. The respondent did not cross-examine the applicant on her method but questioned whether the phone conversations were the lengthiest component of any given task and the correlation between her estimates and the duration of calls made.

The applicant argued that the respondent’s reliance on Telstra phone bills grossly understated the work she performed. The court concluded that the applicant was entitled to overtime payments for the hours she spent on-call, making and receiving calls, and performing other tasks to rearrange rosters. The court found that the tasks were more complex than merely making and receiving calls, but the applicant's evidence had elements of exaggeration.

The court ordered the parties to confer and agree on the amount of interest payable to the applicant, with mediation arranged if no agreement was reached. The court also noted that the respondent had changed its position on the gross-up figure after the hearing, contending that the total figure should be around $19,766.55 without interest.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The parties confer with a view to agreeing on the amount of interest payable to the applicant in accordance with the Court’s reasons for judgment and Practice Note GPN-INT and, on or before 4 pm on 17 February 2017, submit an agreed proposed order in relation to the interest payable to the applicant.

2. In the absence of any agreement between the parties pursuant to paragraph 1 of these orders, the parties are directed to attend a mediation before a Registrar of the Court, on a date to be fixed by the Registrar after 17 February 2017, for the purpose of agreeing on the amount of interest payable with the assistance of the Registrar.

3. If the parties attend a mediation in accordance with paragraph 2 of these orders, the parties are each to adduce before the Registrar affidavit evidence of their calculations of the interest, and the basis for their calculations.

4. If the parties agree on an amount of interest at mediation, the Registrar is authorised to make an order for the payment of interest in the terms agreed by the parties.

5. The parties are each to pay 50% of the fee payable for any mediation conducted in accordance with these orders.

6. If the parties fail to agree on an amount of interest, the Registrar is authorised to fix an amount of interest payable on the basis of the affidavit evidence produced by the parties, and to make an order accordingly.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

At the hearing on 29 June, counsel for the respondent conceded that there were omissions from Ms Lindner’s affidavit in that, while she refers to the Telstra phone bills upon which her calculations are based as “phone records” and states that she used the records to calculate the overtime amount for each telephone call “made and received” by the applicant, in reality the documents are phone bills rather than records and, as such, only record calls made by Ms Polan from her work mobile phone, and not calls received by her.The applicant’s evidence Calculating the duration of the overtime that the applicant performed on each occasion during the claim period is not a straightforward task in this case, because neither the applicant nor the respondent kept any records of the duration of the overtime. What the applicant deposes she did record on each occasion she performed overtime work more than 30 minutes in duration was the date, day, and time of the original call, the ward of the hospital it related to, and comments indicating the type of call. The applicant’s evidence is that her general practice was to record this information on a spreadsheet saved on a laptop computer that she was provided by the respondent when she arrived at work in the morning after each occasion she performed overtime work of more than 30 minutes. When Ms Polan resigned, she returned the laptop to the respondent, but her evidence is that she emailed herself a copy of the Excel spreadsheet before doing so. In a document titled “Method”, which is at the end of annexure MLP-1 to the applicant’s affidavit sworn on 26 June 2016, the applicant sets out her estimates – in hour increments – of the time she spent facilitating a given roster change by reference to the ward, day of the week and time of day. The applicant’s method for arriving at these estimates is explained in detail at paragraphs [15]-[19] of the body of that affidavit. Ms Polan explains – for each given ward – why she allocated the hours she did to roster changes relating to that ward and the variation in the allocated hours based on the day of the week and time of the day. Counsel for the respondent did not cross-examine Ms Polan in any detail on the reasons for her allocations nor on the assumptions underlying her method. Counsel for the respondent did however place emphasis in his cross-examination on determining whether the phone conversations with doctors were the lengthiest component of any given roster-change task and the extent to which the estimates in the applicant’s method document correlated with the duration of the calls made by Ms Polan to which they related. In her affidavit sworn on 26 June 2016, the applicant criticised the respondent’s approach to calculating her overtime entitlements, stating that the reliance on Telstra telephone bills as the basis for calculating the amount of overtime she worked “grossly understate[s] the work [she] was required to do”. She deposed: 4.… My job was not simply a matter of making telephone calls. If that was all that was required, a person less senior could have done it, for example, the switchboard of the hospital, which is staffed at all times.5.I was required to work on-call 24 hours a day, seven days per week as detailed at paragraph 10 of the affidavit affirmed by Brian Cole on 1 October 2015. It was up to me to decide how to arrange a replacement staff member using my skill and knowledge of the operation of the hospital. I was expected to do whatever I could to arrange the replacement as detailed at paragraph 12 of the same affidavit affirmed by Brian Cole on 1 October 2015.6.The records provided by the Respondent are inadequate to show the extent of the actual time spent replacing staff members because the respondent’s calculations rely on Telstra phone bills. Telephone bills record the liability of the account holder to pay the service provider. They record calls made to another number and the duration of the call and the amount payable on account of the call. They do not record:a. telephone calls received because this creates no liability for the purpose of a bill;b. text messages sent and received (I would commonly fill rosters or receive notice of the requirement to work after hours through text message); andc. all of the missed calls to doctors when I would call to try and fill a shift but they would not answer (that is, when I chose not to leave a message), which happened often as some doctors would ignore my calls because they would know what I was calling about, that is, extra un-rostered work.7. Further mobile phone bills do not capture the calls which I received on my home phone sometimes, calls were made to my husband’s mobile phone when I was not available. I also was contacted via email often. Home phone contact and email was also a common way of receiving notice. Many doctors had my home number saved into their phone because they had it available to them.

Decision

Reasons for decision

For the reasons that follow, I consider the applicant is entitled to the sum of $27,869.28 by way of overtime payments, plus interest, which is to be calculated by the parties in accordance with these reasons for judgment and Practice Note GPN-INT.THE DECISION ON LIABILITY In my liability decision, I noted that neither party sought to rely on the overtime provisions in each of the applicable instruments, despite my inquiry about this at the liability hearing. Rather, the parties submitted the central issue was whether the applicant making and receiving calls to and from doctors and rearranging rosters at home while on-call constituted “recalls to duty,” where the requirement to do so was an ongoing arrangement rather than a specific request from her employer on each given occasion. I found that the applicant was properly paid an on-call allowance for the period where, outside her ordinary hours of work, she was required to make herself available on-call to rearrange rosters and find replacement medical staff as the need arose because of doctors’ unexpected or sudden leave requirements. I also concluded that the applicant was entitled to additional remuneration for the instances where, during the period she was on-call, she was required to perform duties. On the question of whether that additional remuneration be in the form of the recall allowances provided for in the relevant agreements or some other form of allowance, I found that the answer lay in the notion of the verb “recall” itself, which suggests a conscious decision by or on behalf of an employer to require an employee to perform specific duties of employment outside the employee’s ordinary hours of duty. I concluded (at [82]-[83]) that, given there was no instruction given to the applicant by or on behalf of her employer on each specific occasion that she was required to attend to rostering duties while on-call, what the applicant was doing when she answered and made telephone calls and performed other tasks in order to rearrange rosters could not properly be described as her being recalled to duty. However, I found that, unlike the recall power, overtime was not confined to the issuing of a specific direction or instruction by an employer to an employee to perform duties on a specific occasion. I found that the overtime payments provided for in the relevant industrial agreements were concerned with an employee working reasonable additional hours which are either expressly or impliedly authorised by the employer, including by way of an ongoing understanding or arrangement between the employer and the employee. I concluded that, when the applicant was contacted and made aware of a staffing issue that needed her attention, and when she went on to make and receive phone calls in order to make the necessary staffing arrangements and changes, she was performing overtime work within the meaning of the relevant instruments. It is relevant to note here that, in the parties’ agreed statement of facts filed on 5 November 2015, the parties stated that the respondent commenced paying the applicant a three hour minimum recall payment in or about August 2012 and commenced paying the applicant double time recall payments in or about November 2013. This affects the amounts payable to the applicant, and I deal with this at [80]-[86] below.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Overall, my impression of Ms Polan’s evidence was that she had no clear recollection of the time she spent on various tasks. She knew well the nature of the tasks she had performed when rosters needed to be changed, as she had performed them repeatedly, often several times each week. Her evidence as to the nature of the tasks, and the fact that they were more complex than simply making and receiving calls, is evidence that I accept. I accept that, in order to make such calls, she needed to do some preliminary thinking and checking about which doctors would be available, hadn’t worked too recently, had the right experience and other matters of that sort. I do not, however, accept that the tasks were quite as complicated or lengthy as she sometimes made them seem in her evidence. Ms Polan was an experienced hospital administrator, and had worked at Goulburn Valley Hospital for quite some time. I find she knew what needed to be done and went about her tasks in an organised and efficient way, as demonstrated by the details in the records she kept. However there tended to be in her evidence an element of exaggeration about the time she spent, no doubt to try and justify recording and claiming often one-three hours at a time for an event of re-rostering. I am not prepared to rely entirely on her oral evidence, nor her spreadsheet, in determining the time these tasks took.CONSIDERATIONThe respondent’s application for leave to file a cross-claim The application for leave to file a cross-claim is, as I have described above, conditional. At the quantum hearing, counsel for the respondent stated the cross-claim would not be pressed if the Court accepts its primary submission that the applicant has not made out her claim and should only be awarded nominal damages. In the event that the Court was to consider Ms Polan is entitled to payment for the hours of overtime recorded in the Telstra phone bills, counsel for the respondent submitted that the figure Ms Polan would be entitled to would be around $31,000 (including interest), or slightly higher, plus a gross-up of a maximum of 50% to take into account the other work she did which was not captured by the phone bills. This would result in a total figure of around $45,000-$48,000. In this event, counsel clarified that the respondent would press its cross-claim. After the hearing, in its supplementary final submissions, the respondent changed its position. While maintaining its principal contention that the claim had not been proven, the respondent resiled from the concession made at the hearing about 50% grossing up on the basis that the applicant had given evidence at the quantum hearing that not all calls made on her work mobile phone were work related. The respondent now contends that, if the Court finds there is sufficient material to estimate loss, the total figure the Court should find owing to the applicant is $19,766.55. It contends that the Court should decline to order the respondent to pay interest on that amount, having regard to the substantial amount of overpaid recall the applicant has already received. The respondent pursues its cross-claim if its primary submission is rejected and its alternative submission becomes necessary.