FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Polan v Goulburn Valley Health [2016] FCA 440
File number: VID 611 of 2014 Judge: MORTIMER J Date of judgment: 29 April 2016 Catchwords: INDUSTRIAL LAW – application for relief under the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) and the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) – alleged breaches of enterprise agreements – meaning of phrase “recall to duty” in applicable enterprise agreements – whether recall to duty clauses limited to the issuing of a direction by an employer to perform duties on a specific occasion – difference between recall to duty and overtime work – whether the applicant making and receiving calls to and from doctors and rearranging rosters at home while on-call constituted a “recall to duty” where the requirement to do so was an ongoing arrangement rather than a specific request from employer – whether the applicant receiving and making calls from doctors and rearranging rosters at home while on-call was overtime work Legislation: Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) ss 15AA, 46
Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth)
Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth)
Cases cited: Akiba v Commonwealth [2013] HCA 33; 250 CLR 209
Amcor Ltd v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union [2005] HCA 10; 222 CLR 241
Australasian Meat Industry Employees Union v Golden Cockerel Pty Ltd [2014] FWCFB 7447; 245 IR 394
Certain Lloyd’s Underwriters v Cross [2012] HCA 56; 293 ALR 412
City of Wanneroo v Australian Municipal, Administrative, Clerical and Services Union [2006] FCA 813; 153 IR 426
Cooper Brookes (Wollongong) Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) [1981] HCA 26; 147 CLR 297
Director of Public Employment v New South Wales Fire Brigades Employees' Union [2008] NSWIRComm 158; 180 IR 170
Independent Commission Against Corruption (NSW) v Cunneen [2015] HCA 14; 89 ALJR 475
Kucks v CSRLtd (1996) 66 IR 182
Lacey v Attorney-General (Qld) [2011] HCA 10; 242 CLR 573
Lee v NSW Crime Commission [2013] HCA 39; 251 CLR 196
Short v FW Hercus Pty Ltd [1993] FCA 72; 40 FCR 511
Toll (FGCT) Pty Ltd v Alphapharm [2004] HCA 52; 219 CLR 165
Toyota Motor Corp Australia Ltd v Marmara [2014] FCAFC 84; 222 FCR 152
Transport Workers’ Union of Australia v Linfox Australia Pty Ltd [2014] FCA 829; 318 ALR 54
Date of hearing: 5 November 2015 Registry: Victoria Division: Fair Work Division National Practice Area: Employment & Industrial Relations Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 89 Counsel for the Applicant: Dr T Alexander with Dr V Lambropoulos Solicitor for the Applicant: SMR Legal Counsel for the Respondent: Mr M G Rinaldi Solicitor for the Respondent: TressCox Lawyers ORDERS
VID 611 of 2014 BETWEEN: MANDY LEE-ANNE POLAN
Applicant
AND: GOULBURN VALLEY HEALTH
Respondent
JUDGE:
MORTIMER J
DATE OF ORDER:
29 APRIL 2016
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.If the parties agree on the sum to which the applicant is entitled and…
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- Case
- [2016] FCA 440
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court was required to determine the precise meaning of the phrase "recall to duty" within the context of the enterprise agreements. Additionally, it needed to distinguish between a recall to duty and overtime work, considering whether the ongoing requirement for Ms Polan to perform certain duties at home while on-call constituted a recall to duty or simply overtime work. The court also had to consider the effect of amendments to the agreements, particularly those relating to on-call allowances, on the interpretation of the recall to duty clauses.
The court concluded that Ms Polan's activities while on-call constituted overtime work, for which she was entitled to compensation at the relevant overtime rates. The court rejected the argument that the recall to duty clauses were limited to specific directions or requests from the employer to perform duties on particular occasions. Instead, the court found that the nature of Ms Polan's role, which required her to be on-call 24/7 and to perform certain duties at home, meant that her activities while on-call were indeed overtime work. The court also noted that the on-call allowance Ms Polan received did not cover the overtime work she performed.
In light of its findings, the court ordered that the parties had time to agree on the sum to which Ms Polan was entitled for overtime work. If the parties could not agree, they were required to file submissions and evidence to support their positions regarding the appropriate orders. The court emphasized that the parties' disclaimers of reliance on the overtime provisions in the agreements did not bind the court in its construction of the applicable instruments.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. If the parties agree on the sum to which the applicant is entitled and on any further or other orders the parties propose to be made in accordance with these reasons for judgment, the parties are to file a minute of proposed consent orders on or before 4 pm on 17 May 2016.
2. If the parties do not agree on the sum to which the applicant is entitled or do not agree on any further or other orders which should be made in accordance with these reasons for judgment, then the applicant and the respondent are each to file and serve on or before 4 pm on 17 May 2016:
(a) a minute of proposed orders;
(b) an outline of submissions relating to the proposed orders (limited to three pages); and
(c) any necessary evidence relating to the proposed orders.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Ms Polan filed an application for relief under the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) and the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth), alleging breaches of enterprise agreements. The matter was heard in the Fair Work Commission, and subsequently in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia, where the Court was required to determine the meaning of the phrase "recall to duty" in the applicable enterprise agreements, and whether Ms Polan's activities while on-call constituted a "recall to duty" or overtime work. The Court heard arguments from both parties and considered the evidence before it, including a statement of agreed facts dealing with the manner in which Ms Polan discharged her duties.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
There is no dispute that Ms Polan was paid an on-call allowance at all relevant times, although as can be seen from the terms of the instruments, the allowance is a small one compared to her overall salary ($11 - $16 per day), although payable at double time rates on Saturdays and Sundays. In contrast, if the applicant is correct about her entitlement to be paid, over a four year period, allowances pursuant to cl 25 of the Award (as incorporated into the 2006 Agreement) and cl 38 of the 2009 Agreement, her claim amounts to a large sum of money, quantified in her amended statement of claim for the two claim periods respectively.CONSIDERATION A number of general matters are not in dispute. The applicant’s classification under the various agreements is not material, since the clauses in issue apply to all employees. The parties did not submit that the minor variations in the wording, headings, or other textual aspects of the relevant provisions in the agreements meant that different constructions should be given to each of them. In other words, the parties’ approach, which I accept as correct, is that the same construction issue arises in each version of the recall clauses. The parties both submitted that there must be a “recall to duty” at the request of the employer: that is, the clauses should not be construed as extending to an election by the employee to return to performance of employment duties but rather are confined to a recall to duty at the request or direction of an employer. This issue may assume some significance in relation to the applicant’s claims, including the question of proof of such a request or direction, and the form it may need to take. The parties accepted that the phrase “recall to duty” should be interpreted as referring to a recall to the employee’s duty or duties, and in this way it was capable of applying across all classifications in the agreements. The applicant’s written submissions contended:The position of medical resource officer was always one where the employee was required to be on-call 24 hours a day/ 7 days a week. It was indeed expected that the Applicant perform her normal duties of rostering doctors of the hospital outside ordinary hours. This was a central feature of the role. There is general agreement in the approach taken by the parties to the applicable principles of construction in relation to industrial instruments. These were recently summarised by Tracey J in Transport Workers’ Union of Australia v Linfox Australia Pty Ltd [2014] FCA 829; 318 ALR 54 at [29]-[41]. Like other instruments creating normative rules, such as statutes and regulations, industrial instruments are to be construed in accordance with their language (or text), taking into account their context in the wider scheme or structure of the instrument, and the purpose of the provisions, again as seen in the wider scheme or structure of the instrument: see generally Lacey v Attorney-General(Qld) [2011] HCA 10; 242 CLR 573; Certain Lloyd’s Underwriters v Cross [2012] HCA 56; 293 ALR 412 at [24]–[25]. In the latter case, French CJ and Hayne J said at [25]:Determination of the purpose of a statute or of particular provisions in a statute may be based upon an express statement of purpose in the statute itself, inference from its text and structure and, where appropriate, reference to extrinsic materials.