Polan v Goulburn Valley Health

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Polan v Goulburn Valley Health [2016] FCA 440

File number: VID 611 of 2014
Judge: MORTIMER J
Date of judgment: 29 April 2016
Catchwords: INDUSTRIAL LAW – application for relief under the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) and the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) – alleged breaches of enterprise agreements – meaning of phrase “recall to duty” in applicable enterprise agreements – whether recall to duty clauses limited to the issuing of a direction by an employer to perform duties on a specific occasion – difference between recall to duty and overtime work – whether the applicant making and receiving calls to and from doctors and rearranging rosters at home while on-call constituted a “recall to duty” where the requirement to do so was an ongoing arrangement rather than a specific request from employer – whether the applicant receiving and making calls from doctors and rearranging rosters at home while on-call was overtime work
Legislation:

Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) ss 15AA, 46

Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth)

Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth)

Cases cited:

Akiba v Commonwealth [2013] HCA 33; 250 CLR 209

Amcor Ltd v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union [2005] HCA 10; 222 CLR 241

Australasian Meat Industry Employees Union v Golden Cockerel Pty Ltd [2014] FWCFB 7447; 245 IR 394

Certain Lloyd’s Underwriters v Cross [2012] HCA 56; 293 ALR 412

City of Wanneroo v Australian Municipal, Administrative, Clerical and Services Union [2006] FCA 813; 153 IR 426

Cooper Brookes (Wollongong) Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) [1981] HCA 26; 147 CLR 297

Director of Public Employment v New South Wales Fire Brigades Employees' Union [2008] NSWIRComm 158; 180 IR 170

Independent Commission Against Corruption (NSW) v Cunneen [2015] HCA 14; 89 ALJR 475

Kucks v CSRLtd (1996) 66 IR 182

Lacey v Attorney-General (Qld) [2011] HCA 10; 242 CLR 573

Lee v NSW Crime Commission [2013] HCA 39; 251 CLR 196

Short v FW Hercus Pty Ltd [1993] FCA 72; 40 FCR 511

Toll (FGCT) Pty Ltd v Alphapharm [2004] HCA 52; 219 CLR 165

Toyota Motor Corp Australia Ltd v Marmara [2014] FCAFC 84; 222 FCR 152

Transport Workers’ Union of Australia v Linfox Australia Pty Ltd [2014] FCA 829; 318 ALR 54

Warramunda Village Inc v Pryde [2002] FCA 250; 116 FCR 58

Date of hearing: 5 November 2015
Registry: Victoria
Division: Fair Work Division
National Practice Area: Employment & Industrial Relations
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 89
Counsel for the Applicant: Dr T Alexander with Dr V Lambropoulos
Solicitor for the Applicant: SMR Legal
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr M G Rinaldi
Solicitor for the Respondent: TressCox Lawyers

ORDERS

VID 611 of 2014
BETWEEN:

MANDY LEE-ANNE POLAN

Applicant

AND:

GOULBURN VALLEY HEALTH

Respondent

JUDGE:

MORTIMER J

DATE OF ORDER:

29 APRIL 2016

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.If the parties agree on the sum to which the applicant is entitled and…

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Details
Case
[2016] FCA 440
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Polan v Goulburn Valley Health, the applicant, Ms Polan, brought proceedings against her former employer, Goulburn Valley Health, alleging breaches of enterprise agreements and the Fair Work Act 2009. The central issue before the court was whether Ms Polan's activities, such as making and receiving calls from doctors and rearranging rosters while on-call at home, constituted a "recall to duty" under the relevant enterprise agreements, and if so, whether these activities should be classified as overtime work for which she was entitled to compensation.

The court was required to determine the precise meaning of the phrase "recall to duty" within the context of the enterprise agreements. Additionally, it needed to distinguish between a recall to duty and overtime work, considering whether the ongoing requirement for Ms Polan to perform certain duties at home while on-call constituted a recall to duty or simply overtime work. The court also had to consider the effect of amendments to the agreements, particularly those relating to on-call allowances, on the interpretation of the recall to duty clauses.

The court concluded that Ms Polan's activities while on-call constituted overtime work, for which she was entitled to compensation at the relevant overtime rates. The court rejected the argument that the recall to duty clauses were limited to specific directions or requests from the employer to perform duties on particular occasions. Instead, the court found that the nature of Ms Polan's role, which required her to be on-call 24/7 and to perform certain duties at home, meant that her activities while on-call were indeed overtime work. The court also noted that the on-call allowance Ms Polan received did not cover the overtime work she performed.

In light of its findings, the court ordered that the parties had time to agree on the sum to which Ms Polan was entitled for overtime work. If the parties could not agree, they were required to file submissions and evidence to support their positions regarding the appropriate orders. The court emphasized that the parties' disclaimers of reliance on the overtime provisions in the agreements did not bind the court in its construction of the applicable instruments.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. If the parties agree on the sum to which the applicant is entitled and on any further or other orders the parties propose to be made in accordance with these reasons for judgment, the parties are to file a minute of proposed consent orders on or before 4 pm on 17 May 2016.

2. If the parties do not agree on the sum to which the applicant is entitled or do not agree on any further or other orders which should be made in accordance with these reasons for judgment, then the applicant and the respondent are each to file and serve on or before 4 pm on 17 May 2016:

(a) a minute of proposed orders;

(b) an outline of submissions relating to the proposed orders (limited to three pages); and

(c) any necessary evidence relating to the proposed orders.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Ms Polan was employed by Goulburn Valley Health (the Respondent) in the position of Medical Resource Officer, which was later retitled Medical Resource Manager. Her duties included managing rosters, attending to Work Visas and medical registrations for international doctors, being on-call to manage doctors seeking various types of leave, arranging accommodation and locums for doctors, performing budgetary tasks, and facilitating the transition of doctors in and out of Goulburn Valley Health. Ms Polan was required to be on-call to receive phone calls from junior doctors if they needed to communicate their unavailability for their next rostered shift. These calls could be received at any time during the week, or over the weekend, day or night. The junior doctors’ obligation was to inform Ms Polan of their absence within 2 hours of the commencement of their next rostered shift. Ms Polan performed these duties by telephone at all times, and did not return to the workplace to perform these duties when they were performed during an off-duty period. The Respondent enabled a Citrix log-in account so that Ms Polan could access this program on the smartphone provided to her by the Respondent for that purpose. Ms Polan recorded the calls she received in an Excel spreadsheet, which forms the basis of her claim.

Ms Polan filed an application for relief under the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) and the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth), alleging breaches of enterprise agreements. The matter was heard in the Fair Work Commission, and subsequently in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia, where the Court was required to determine the meaning of the phrase "recall to duty" in the applicable enterprise agreements, and whether Ms Polan's activities while on-call constituted a "recall to duty" or overtime work. The Court heard arguments from both parties and considered the evidence before it, including a statement of agreed facts dealing with the manner in which Ms Polan discharged her duties.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Given that the applicant’s claims end on 17 September 2012, this amendment in 2014 has no relevant application to her claims for payment. Each of the parties contends, however, that the insertion of this allowance, and its terms, can be used to construe the provisions which are in issue, although obviously their contentions about its effect differ.THE EVIDENCE BEFORE THE COURT As I have noted, the parties filed a statement of agreed facts dealing in particular with the manner in which the applicant discharged her duties. In their statement of agreed facts, the parties stated that Ms Polan’s duties at work included the following: a. managing rosters;b. attending to Work Visas and medical registrations for international doctors;c. on-call duty at all times to manage doctors seeking compassionate leave, sick leave, family leave, stress leave and other types of unexpected leave;d. arranging accommodation for the doctors;e. arranging locums;f. budgetary tasks;g. recruitment; andh. facilitating the transition of doctors in and out of Goulburn Valley Health. As to her hours of work and the manner in which her duties were discharged, the agreed statement of facts states as follows: 4.The Applicant generally performed the duties relevant to her role during normal business hours. During that time, the Applicant was on-duty in the sense used in the Agreements. 5.After the completion of her duties during normal business hours, the Applicant was off-duty in the sense used in the Agreements. 6.At all times outside her ordinary hours of work, while off-duty, the Applicant was rostered on-call to deal with junior medical staff rostering issues, with the exception of a period in 2010 when other staff were rostered on call for this purpose. 7.The Applicant was required to be on-call to receive phone calls from junior doctors if and when they needed to communicate their unavailability for their next rostered shift. The Applicant was then required, when necessary depending on availability and the doctors rostered on already, required [sic] to locate other junior doctors to fill the vacancies in the roster. These phone calls could be received at any time during the week, or over the weekend, day or night.8.The junior doctors’ obligation was to inform the Applicant of their absence within 2 hours of the commencement of their next rostered shift.9.The Respondent enabled a Citrix log in account so that the Applicant could access this program on the smart phone provided to her by the Respondent for that purpose. The Applicant says she recorded the calls she received in an Excel spreadsheet, which forms the basis of her claim.10.The Applicant performed these duties by telephone at all times, and did not return to the Respondent’s workplace to perform these duties when they were performed during an off-duty period. There was no agreed fact about the classification of the applicant’s position under the relevant industrial instruments. However, the agreed facts were that she relevantly held the position of Medical Resource Officer, which was later retitled Medical Resource Manager.

Decision

Reasons for decision

It is not possible to discern from the schedule what period of time the applicant worked on each occasion alleged. As the general allegation which I have reproduced above acknowledges, the times no doubt varied. It may have depended, for example, on whether the applicant had to make one phone call or five. It may have depended on the length of each phone call. It may have depended on whether, as a result of one phone call, other phone calls had to be made. The applicant was entitled, in my opinion, to be paid for the periods she worked in accordance with the overtime rates in the applicable award or agreement. Unless the award or agreements otherwise provided (and it does not appear to me that they did), if she only worked for ten minutes in one period, then the proportion of her hourly rate which would be subject to payment at time and a half, or double time, would only be that ten minutes.Conclusion I note that both parties disclaimed any reliance on the overtime provisions in each of the applicable instruments, despite my inquiry about this at the hearing, although neither party developed an explanation for the disclaimer in detail. The parties’ position does not bind the Court in its construction of the applicable instruments. I have concluded the better view is that the applicant was entitled to payment by way of overtime (which she did not receive for the period in dispute), in addition to her on-call allowance (which she did receive). That means the applicant has been successful to some extent, but not on the basis of her principal contention, and therefore not in the sums sought. I propose to give the parties time to consider my reasons and to attempt to agree on a sum to which the applicant is entitled, and on any further or other orders which should be made to reflect the Court’s reasons and the relief sought by the applicant. I note penalties were sought in the originating application, but no submissions were made on this issue at the hearing, given it was restricted to liability. Whether the applicant continues to press for penalties is a matter to be considered in light of the Court’s reasons. If there is no agreement between the parties about the orders which should be made, they will be required to file submissions, together with any necessary supporting evidence, on the orders they contend that the Court should make in light of its reasons for judgment.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

There is no dispute that Ms Polan was paid an on-call allowance at all relevant times, although as can be seen from the terms of the instruments, the allowance is a small one compared to her overall salary ($11 - $16 per day), although payable at double time rates on Saturdays and Sundays. In contrast, if the applicant is correct about her entitlement to be paid, over a four year period, allowances pursuant to cl 25 of the Award (as incorporated into the 2006 Agreement) and cl 38 of the 2009 Agreement, her claim amounts to a large sum of money, quantified in her amended statement of claim for the two claim periods respectively.CONSIDERATION A number of general matters are not in dispute. The applicant’s classification under the various agreements is not material, since the clauses in issue apply to all employees. The parties did not submit that the minor variations in the wording, headings, or other textual aspects of the relevant provisions in the agreements meant that different constructions should be given to each of them. In other words, the parties’ approach, which I accept as correct, is that the same construction issue arises in each version of the recall clauses. The parties both submitted that there must be a “recall to duty” at the request of the employer: that is, the clauses should not be construed as extending to an election by the employee to return to performance of employment duties but rather are confined to a recall to duty at the request or direction of an employer. This issue may assume some significance in relation to the applicant’s claims, including the question of proof of such a request or direction, and the form it may need to take. The parties accepted that the phrase “recall to duty” should be interpreted as referring to a recall to the employee’s duty or duties, and in this way it was capable of applying across all classifications in the agreements. The applicant’s written submissions contended:The position of medical resource officer was always one where the employee was required to be on-call 24 hours a day/ 7 days a week. It was indeed expected that the Applicant perform her normal duties of rostering doctors of the hospital outside ordinary hours. This was a central feature of the role. There is general agreement in the approach taken by the parties to the applicable principles of construction in relation to industrial instruments. These were recently summarised by Tracey J in Transport Workers’ Union of Australia v Linfox Australia Pty Ltd [2014] FCA 829; 318 ALR 54 at [29]-[41]. Like other instruments creating normative rules, such as statutes and regulations, industrial instruments are to be construed in accordance with their language (or text), taking into account their context in the wider scheme or structure of the instrument, and the purpose of the provisions, again as seen in the wider scheme or structure of the instrument: see generally Lacey v Attorney-General(Qld) [2011] HCA 10; 242 CLR 573; Certain Lloyd’s Underwriters v Cross [2012] HCA 56; 293 ALR 412 at [24]–[25]. In the latter case, French CJ and Hayne J said at [25]:Determination of the purpose of a statute or of particular provisions in a statute may be based upon an express statement of purpose in the statute itself, inference from its text and structure and, where appropriate, reference to extrinsic materials.