Plath v Vaccount Pty Ltd t/as Tableland Timbers
[2011] NSWLEC 202
•14 November 2011
Land and Environment Court
New South Wales
Medium Neutral Citation: Plath v Vaccount Pty Ltd t/as Tableland Timbers [2011] NSWLEC 202 Hearing dates: 11 November 2011 and 14 November 2011 Decision date: 14 November 2011 Jurisdiction: Class 5 Before: Pepper J Decision: The Court makes the following orders:
(1) Vaccount Pty Ltd t/as Tableland Timbers is convicted of the offence as charged;
(2) Vaccount Pty Ltd t/as Tableland Timbers is fined the sum of $73,000;
(3) Vaccount Pty Ltd t/as Tableland Timbers, pursuant to s 205(1) of the National Parks and Wildlife Act 1974, is to pay the Northern Rivers Catchment Management Authority within 28 days of this order, the amount of $73,000 to be used for general environmental purposes;
(4) all future public references by Vaccount Pty Ltd t/as Tableland Timbers to the payment above shall be accompanied by the following passage:
"The contribution by Vaccount Pty Ltd, trading as Tableland Timbers, to the Northern Rivers Catchment Management Authority is part of a penalty imposed on it by the Land and Environment Court of NSW after it was convicted of damaging reserved land, being an offence against s 156A of the National Parks and Wildlife Act 1974 ";
(5) Vaccount Pty Ltd t/as Tableland Timbers is to pay within 28 days of this order:
(a) the prosecutor's costs and disbursements of $47,100; and
(b) the prosecutor's investigation costs pursuant to s 203(1) of the National Parks and Wildlife Act 1974, in the amount of $2,900; and
(6) the exhibits are to be returned.
Catchwords: SENTENCE: environmental offence - whether defendant negligently or recklessly harvested trees or damaged vegetation in a national park - defendant's state of mind was one of negligence - offence one of moderate objective gravity - subjective factors of defendant to be taken into account Legislation Cited: Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999, ss 3A, 21A, 22, 23
Criminal Procedure Act 1986, ss 257B, 257G
National Parks and Wildlife Act 1974, ss 2A, 30E, 156A, 175B, 194, 203, 205Cases Cited: Axer Pty Ltd v Environment Protection Authority (1993) 113 LGERA 357
Bentley v BGP Properties Pty Ltd [2006] NSWLEC 34; (2006) 145 LGERA 234
Blackwell v R [2011] NSWCCA 93
Cabonne Shire Council v Environment Protection Authority [2001] NSWCCA 280; (2001) 115 LGERA 304
Camilleri's Stock Feeds Pty Ltd v Environment Protection Authority (1993) 32 NSWLR 683
Director-General, Department of Environment and Climate Change v Calman Australia Pty Ltd [2009] NSWLEC 182
Director-General, Department of Environment, Climate Change and Water v Forestry Commission of New South Wales [2011] NSWLEC 102
Director-General, Department of Environment, Climate Change and Water v Linklater [2011] NSWLEC 30
Director-General, Department of Environment and Climate Change v Rae [2009] NSWLEC 137; (2009) 168 LGERA 121
Director-General, Department of Environment, Climate Change and Water v Vin Heffernan Pty Limited [2010] NSWLEC 200
Director-General, Department of Environment and Climate Change v Walker Corporation Pty Limited (No 4) [2011] NSWLEC 119
Environment Protection Authority v Barnes [2006] NSWCCA 246
Environment Protection Authority v Ecolab Pty Limited [2002] NSWLEC 206; (2002) 123 LGERA 269
Environment Protection Authority v Waste Recycling and Processing Corporations [2006] NSWLEC 419; (2006) 148 LGERA 299
Gordon Plath of the Department of Environment and Climate Change v Fish; Gordon Plath of the Department of Environment and Climate Change v Orogen Pty Ltd [2010] NSWLEC 144; (2010) 179 LGERA 386
Hili v The Queen; Jones v The Queen [2010] HCA 45; (2010) 272 ALR 465
La Fontaine v R (1976) 136 CLR 62
Markarian v The Queen [2005] HCA 25; (2005) 228 CLR 357
Pemble v R (1971) 124 CLR 107
Plath v Hunter Valley Property Management Pty Ltd [2010] NSWLEC 264
Plath v Glover [2010] NSWLEC 119
Plath v Knox [2007] NSWLEC 670
Plath v Rawson [2009] NSWLEC 178; (2009) 170 LGERA 253
R v Borkowski [2009] NSWCCA 102
R v Crabbe (1985) 156 CLR 464
R v Thomson; R v Houlton [2000] NSWCCA 309; (2000) 49 NSWLR 383
Veen v The Queen [1979] HCA 7; (1979) 143 CLR 458
Veen v The Queen (No 2) [1988] HCA 14; (1988) 164 CLR 465Category: Sentence Parties: Gordon Plath (Prosecutor)
Vaccount Pty Ltd trading as Tableland Timbers (Defendant)Representation: Mr R Fox (Prosecutor)
Mr A Djemal (Defendant)
Office of Environment and Heritage, Department of Premier and Cabinet (Prosecutor)
MJO Legal (Defendant)
File Number(s): 50295 of 2011
EX TEMPORE JUDGMENT
Tableland Timbers Unlawfully Harvests Trees in a National Park
Vaccount Pty Ltd trading as Tableland Timbers ("Tableland Timbers") has pleaded guilty to an offence that between 1 November 2008 and 31 March 2009 it damaged vegetation on or in land reserved under the National Parks and Wildlife Act 1974 ("the Act") or acquired under Pt 11 of the Act, contrary to s 156A(1)(b) of the Act.
Section 156A of the Act creates an offence as follows:
156A Offence of damaging reserved land
(1) A person must not, on or in land reserved under this
Act or acquired under Part 11:
(a) remove any water other than for purposes authorised by or under any Act or for the purposes of personal use on the land, or
(b) damage or remove any vegetation, rock, soil, sand, stone or similar substance, or
(c) damage any object or place of cultural value.
The damage was the felling of trees and/or crushing of vegetation with vehicles and mechanical equipment in the Guy Fawkes River National Park ("the national park"). The vegetation that was damaged compromised 503 trees and other vegetation, including New England Blackbutts, as well as Blue gums and Stringbarks.
Tableland Timbers is now before the Court for sentencing. Having regard to the objective circumstances of the commission of the offence and the subjective circumstances of Tableland Timbers, the Court imposes a monetary penalty of $73,000 payable to a nominated third party and orders Tableland Timbers to pay the prosecutor's legal costs of $47,100 and investigation costs of $2,900.
How the Unlawful Harvesting Arose
The facts in this matter were not in dispute and were largely contained in a comprehensive statement of agreed facts with an attached bundle of documents.
The National Park
The national park in which the offence took place is located on the eastern edge of the New England Tablelands in north eastern New South Wales. The park covers approximately 105,000ha.
The national park protects regionally significant geological and landscape features and vegetation communities. It is an area of high biodiversity including 30 threatened plant species and 20 threatened animal species. The national park also has many Aboriginal sites and landscapes of cultural and archaeological significance.
In 2003 land was purchased from Mr Alister MacDougall totalling 1764ha to form part of the national park. This land was gazetted as part of the national park on 29 April 2005.
Approximately 30 years prior to the land becoming a part of the national park, it underwent selective clearing similar to the clearing the subject of the charge. In addition, the land has been, and is still being, exposed to cattle grazing, which is causing damage to coppice regrowth and limiting natural understorey species diversity.
Mr MacDougall is the owner of a property known as Marengo Station located at Marengo Road, Hernani, New South Wales. Marengo Station includes Lot 10 of DP 822720 ("the private property"), which borders the national park at its western boundary. At the time of the offence, the boundary between the private property and the national park was marked with survey marks, namely, trees and stumps marked with galvanised iron nails, with a nail head of about 7mm in diameter. It was, however, not fenced.
Tableland Timbers is Engaged to Carry Out Logging
In late 2008, Mr MacDougall and his wife, Mrs Joan MacDougall, engaged Tableland Timbers to carry out some logging on their land, as part of a management plan to harvest timber and let younger timber grow and to make some extra money.
Tableland Timbers is a timber milling and logging business based in Grafton. Mr Peter McPherson and Mrs Suzanne McPherson have been the directors of Tableland Timbers since 28 February 1992. Their employees include Mr Adrian Grant and their sons, Mr Craig McPherson and Mr Siman McPherson.
During an initial inspection of the intended logging work, Mr Peter McPherson attended the private property and told Mr MacDougall that it was necessary to apply to the Grafton office of the Department of Environment and Climate Change (now the Office of Environment and Heritage, Department of Premier and Cabinet ("OEH")) for permission prior to commencing logging.
On Mr Peter McPherson's second visit to the property to look at the area that was intended to be logged, Mr MacDougall indicated that the national park bordering the private property was "along the top of the escarpment". Mr MacDougall instructed Mr Peter McPherson to log whatever trees Tableland Timbers were able to on the private property without taking any of the younger trees.
On 5 September 2008, Mr Kelvin Christiansen, a senior OEH Private Native Forestry Officer, in response to an inquiry from Tableland Timbers, sent a private native forestry ("PNF") information kit, a property vegetation plan ("PVP") pack and a sketch map to Mr MacDougall and Tableland Timbers. The private property boundary was marked on the map.
On 24 September 2008, OEH received a letter from Tableland Timbers requesting re-evaluation of the representation of the old growth forest on the sketch map. The re-evaluation was completed on 3 October 2008 and a revised map was sent to Mr MacDougall and Tableland Timbers. Again the private property boundary was marked on the map.
On 8 October 2008, OEH received a letter and a sketch map from Tableland Timbers requesting a PNF-PVP for 15 years over the majority of the forested area on the private property.
On 13 October 2008, Mr Christiansen sent a PNF-PVP agreement and map to Mr MacDougall for signing. The agreement was subsequently signed and returned to OEH, and Mr Christiansen then approved the PNF-PVP. The private property boundary was marked on the map.
On 31 October 2008, Mr Jason Barker, PNF Operations Officer, returned the approved PNF-PVP, together with a Forest Operation Plan map, Forest Operation Plan pro forma and letter to Mr MacDougall and Tableland Timbers. The PNF-PVP permitted logging in certain parts of the private property. A copy of the approved PNF-PVP was attached to the agreed bundle. Again the private property boundary and area in which permission had been given to log was clearly indicated on the map.
In late 2008, Mr Peter McPherson, his son Mr Craig McPherson, and Mr Grant attended the private property with Mr MacDougall to discuss the logging work that was to be carried out and the location of the common boundary between the private property and the national park. Mr MacDougall claims that both he and the representatives from Tableland Timbers had copies of the PNF-PVP map showing the boundaries of the property at the time. Mr Peter McPherson claims that Mr MacDougall was unable to locate his copy of the PNF-PVP map.
On 3 November 2008, Mr Craig McPherson and Mr Grant commenced logging on the private property. At this time, Mr Craig McPherson asked Mr Siman McPherson and Mr MacDougall for a map showing the boundary with the national park. Mr Craig McPherson obtained from Mr Siman McPherson both a topographical map and the sketch map produced by OEH that showed the general location of the boundary of the private property, including GPS coordinates.
Mr Craig McPherson did not mark the boundary between the national park and the private land when he commenced logging operations in the northern parts of the private property. In addition, Mr McPherson did not look at the sketch map or any GPS equipment when he was felling trees on the north western part of the private property because he had "tunnel vision" and had a "million and one other things going on" in his head at the time.
It was an agreed fact that at the time of the harvesting, Mr Craig McPherson believed, based upon his understanding of the conversations in his presence between Mr Peter McPherson and Mr MacDougall, that he had not crossed the boundary between the private property and the national park.
By contrast, prior to carrying out logging on the south western part of the private property where it joined the national park, Mr Craig McPherson used the sketch map and GPS equipment to identify the boundary, which was subsequently marked with pink spray paint on the trees.
Mr Grant, on the other hand, was not shown any maps of the boundary between the private property and the national park and did not see the PNF-PVP, although he was aware that the national park was located nearby.
The logging continued up until 20 December 2008.
In mid January 2009, Mr Craig McPherson and Mr Grant recommenced the logging on the property, which continued through to March 2009.
In January 2009, Tableland Timbers brought a new mechanical harvester onto the private property and began to log with the use of the harvester in addition to handfelling trees using a chainsaw. The harvester was not fitted with a GPS.
While the logging operations were being carried out, Mr MacDougall visited the property once a week to view the progress of the work but he did not inspect the national park boundary.
At no stage did Mr MacDougall believe that the logging operations had moved into the national park.
The logging operations, excluding the act of trespassing into the national park, are described as conservative, light and selective, giving due consideration to avoiding environmental damage to the soil. The method adopted by the loggers was consistent with the loggers not being aware that logging work had travelled across the boundary into the national park.
OEH Investigation
On 4 June 2009, PNF Support Officers Mr Ben Garrett and Mr Lucas McKinnon, and PNF Operations Officer Mr Barker undertook an audit of the PNF operations on the private property, against the PNF Code of Practice ("the code"). Overall, the logging complied with the code, however, it was at this stage that they discovered that the logging had been undertaken partly within the national park.
On 3 July 2009, Mr Garrett and Mr Barker again inspected the property and took photographs and waypoints with a GPS.
On 8 July 2009, Mr Barker informed Ranger Prior that logging activities had been carried out in the national park. Mr Barker noted that further investigation was required to determine the extent of the incursion into the national park and the number of trees felled.
Further inspections were undertaken by officers of the OEH on 9, 21, 24, 30 July, 5, 6, 8 August, 18 November 2009, 16 April 2010, 29 March and 5 April 2011. During the course of these investigation, the officers undertook mapping of the boundary of the national park using a GPS, recorded the location of tree stumps within the park, tagged the tree stumps by nailing numbered metal tags onto the stumps and photographed them. A report was subsequently prepared for the OEH by Mr Stephen Collet, a forestry consultant, detailing this work.
During the investigation, the OEH officers conducted interviews with the following people:
(a) Mr MacDougall on 30 July 2009;
(b) Mr Siman McPherson on 28 August 2009;
(c) Mr Grant on 18 September 2009; and
(d) Mr Craig McPherson on 18 September 2009 and 23 November 2010.
In November and December 2010, a survey was conducted of the national park boundary at the request of the OEH by Mr Bruce Weir. Mr Weir discovered that the boundary as surveyed varied from the boundary as previously indicated by the OEH.
The OEH Senior Technical Officer Mr Aleksander Maric calculated the number of stumps that fell within the boundary of the private property and the number of stumps that fell within the boundary of the national park, based on Mr Weir's survey. In his final count Mr Weir found:
(a) 494 stumps in the national park;
(b) 6 stumps on the boundary;
(c) 4 stumps struck by falling felled trees in the national park;
(d) 4 trees pushed over; and
(e) 1 tree cut into firewood (Tableland Timbers denies it fell and cut a tree into firewood).
On 4 May 2011, Mr Collet inspected the private property and the national park in order to update his report in line with the survey of Mr Weir. Mr Collet concluded that a total of 503 trees were felled, pushed over or struck by other falling felled trees within the national park. It is agreed by the parties that this is the number of trees unlawfully harvested or damaged in the national park. These trees were located up to 500m into the national park.
Market Value of the Timber
Mr Collet estimated that the 920m of logs felled and removed from the national park represented 37% of the total volume of logs removed and had a total estimated royalty value of $60,000 (plus GST if applicable). The royalty value is the sum of money that would payable to the forest owner for the timber. The value of the timber increased each time it was processed, for example, each time the felling rate, the extraction rate, the haulage rate, and the conversion, delivery and marketing costs of the final sawn product are added.
During the logging operations, Tableland Timbers paid Mr MacDougall $158,000 in royalties for all of the timber harvested by Tableland Timbers, including the timber harvested in the national park.
Tableland Timbers estimates that the quantity and quality of the timber harvested equated to $40,000 of the royalties paid to Mr MacDougall.
Mr Collet estimated that the value of the final sawn timber produced from the trees felled within the national park was between $150,000 and $350,000 including royalties or $110,00 and $310,000, excluding royalties.
While it is not known how much profit Tableland Timbers made from the unlawful harvest after processing, it may readily be inferred that a windfall gain was made by Tableland Timbers as a consequence.
Evidence of the McPhersons
Tableland Timbers also relied on the unchallenged evidence contained in two affidavits, namely:
(a) an affidavit of Mr Craig McPherson sworn 14 September 2011; and
(b) an affidavit of Mr Peter McPherson sworn 9 November 2011.
The affidavit of Mr Craig McPherson deposed to the fact that in November 2008, before he started logging on the property, he met with Mr MacDougall on the northern boundary of the property to clarify the boundary because the information provided by Mr Peter McPherson was not sufficient to accurately locate the boundary.
At this time there was a conversation between Mr MacDougall and Mr Craig McPherson to the following effect:
I said: "So where are the boundaries of your land and where is the National Park?"
Mr MacDougall said: "Well up here on the northern side is JA's (referring to the landowner to the north John Adams) old boundary and it's fenced. Then down the bottom (pointing to the south) on the southern side from the grid at Grasstrees across is fenced but all the rest of it, (pointing with a sweeping motion from the south along the western side to where we were) the boundary with the National Park is down off the escarpment (pointing further west). It was surveyed when I sold the land to the National Parks. There's marker pegs down the back where the boundary is and you won't be able to miss them."
I said: "How easy is it to see the pegs?"
Mr MacDougall said: "The pegs are there and you will be able to see them".
Mr Peter McPherson stated that he and his wife had been running a business of logging and sawmilling continuously since 1979, and in mid 1991 the entity "Tableland Timbers" was formed.
Mr Peter McPherson stated that in August or September 2008 he received a telephone call from Mr MacDougall requesting him to carry out logging on the land. He, along with his son Mr Craig McPherson and Mr Grant, met with Mr MacDougall on the property on the shoulder of Marengo Road overlooking the area to be harvested. Mr Peter McPherson recalled that they were looking in a generally western direction and had a view to the west, northwest and southwest of most of the areas to be logged.
Later during the inspection, Mr Peter McPherson deposed that he had a conversation with Mr MacDougall to the following effect, whilst travelling in a westerly direction towards the boundary to the national park:
I said: "So where is the boundary with the National Park"
Mr MacDougall said: "The boundary is down there near the escarpment (pointing to the west)"
Mr Peter McPherson deposed to the fact that there were further conversations that were held during the inspection that he did not specifically recall but his understanding from those conversations was that the boundary of the national park was such that if they logged to the point of the escarpment where the slope made it impractical and impossible to safely fell and remove logs, they would still be on Mr MacDougall's property.
Mr Peter McPherson stated that since the commission of the offence, he has been back to the private property and has inspected the logging that occurred and that it is consistent with the instructions given by Mr MacDougall, that is to say, the harvesting of timber generally followed the ridge line or escarpment, stopping just before the escarpment.
Mr Peter McPherson stated that there were no boundary fences between the national park and the private property and, at the time of harvesting, there were no survey pegs and no trees marked or blazed to indicate the boundary of the private property in the area where the national park was harvested. He noted that some other parts of the boundary had been marked by trees having been sprayed with paint to indicate the boundary and that some of the markings appeared to have been done by Mr Craig McPherson but others were inconsistent with the manner in which Tableland Timbers marked boundaries.
Mr Peter McPherson stated that he believed Mr Craig McPherson made an honest mistake, relying on information from Mr MacDougall as to the location of the boundary when he undertook the harvesting in the national park. However, he noted that it was a mistake that could have been avoided by the use of a GPS and accurate maps.
Mr Peter McPherson expressed deep regret on behalf of the company for the damage occasioned to the national park. He stated that the company has strived for many years to achieve a reputation in the private sector as a professional, responsible timber and logging operation. The company has logged timber from more than 500 properties and has at all times sought to comply with the code. The company has also made contributions to the community in which they operate in the form of regular charitable donations totalling $5,232.55.
Finally, Mr Peter McPherson deposed to the fact that in March 2009 Tableland Timbers engaged Glen Poole Contracting to meet with landowners and government departments in regard to resource identification and utilisation on behalf of the company. This service included the identification, mapping and marking of property boundaries. In addition, all of the employees of Tableland Timbers, including Mr Craig McPherson, have now been given strict instructions to use GPS locating equipment to check all property boundaries before carrying out harvesting.
Sentencing Principles
Section 3A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 ("CSPA") sets out the purposes of imposing a sentence on an offender. The most relevant purposes for which a sentence should be imposed on Tableland Timbers are those in s 3A(a), (b), (e), (f) and (g) of that Act.
The correct method of sentencing is the instinctive synthesis method, where the judge identifies all the factors relevant to the sentence and weighs their significance in determining an appropriate sentence ( Markarian v The Queen [2005] HCA 25; (2005) 228 CLR 357 at [35]-[39], [50]-[84] and [136]-[139]).
The sentence imposed by the Court for an offence must both reflect, and be proportionate to, the objective circumstances of the offence and the personal or subjective circumstances of the offender ( Veen v The Queen [1979] HCA 7; (1979) 143 CLR 458 at 490 and Veen v The Queen (No 2) [1988] HCA 14; (1988) 164 CLR 465 at 472).
Section 21A of the CSPA identifies matters that the Court must take into account when sentencing, including those in aggravation (s 21A(2)) and those in mitigation (s 21A(3)).
Section 194 of the Act also sets out matters that the Court must take into account when imposing a sentence for an offence under the Act.
The Objective Circumstances
The primary factor the Court must consider when determining sentence is the objective gravity or seriousness of the offence. In determining the objective gravity or seriousness of the offence, the circumstances of the offence to which the Court may have regard include ( Bentley v BGP Properties Pty Ltd [2006] NSWLEC 34; (2006) 145 LGERA 234 at [163], Plath v Rawson [2009] NSWLEC 178; (2009) 170 LGERA 253 at [48] and Plath v Glover [2010] NSWLEC 119 at [23]):
(a) the nature of the offence;
(b) the maximum penalty for the offence;
(c) the harm caused to the environment by the commission of the offence;
(d) Tableland Timbers' state of mind in committing the offence;
(e) Tableland Timbers' reasons for committing the offence;
(f) the foreseeability of the risk of harm to the environment;
(g) the practical measures available to Tableland Timbers' to avoid harm to the environment; and
(h) Tableland Timbers' control over the causes of harm to the environment.
Nature of the Offence
A fundamental consideration of relevance that illuminates the objective seriousness of an environmental offence is the degree to which the offender's conduct would offend against the legislative objectives expressed in the statutory offence ( Director-General, Department of Environment and Climate Change v Rae [2009] NSWLEC 137; (2009) 168 LGERA 121 at [15] and Rawson at [49]).
The objects of the Act set out in s 2A of the Act include:
2A Objects of Act
(1) The objects of this Act are as follows:
(a) the conservation of nature, including, but not limited to, the conservation of:
(i) habitat, ecosystems and ecosystem processes, and
(ii) biological diversity at the community, species and
genetic levels, and
(iii) landforms of significance, including geological
features and processes, and
(iv) landscapes and natural features of significance
including wilderness and wild rivers,
(b) the conservation of objects, places or features (including biological diversity) of cultural value within the landscape, including, but not limited to:
(i) places, objects and features of significance to Aboriginal people, and
(ii) places of social value to the people of New South Wales, and
(iii) places of historic, architectural or scientific significance,
(c) fostering public appreciation, understanding and enjoyment of nature and cultural heritage and their conservation,
(d) providing for the management of land reserved under this Act in accordance with the management principles applicable for each type of reservation.
(2) The objects of this Act are to be achieved by applying the principles of ecologically sustainable development.
As Preston CJ recently observed in the context of an offence against s 156A of the Act committed in a nature reserve ( Glover at [25] and [27]):
[25] The offence of damaging land reserved under the NPW Act has an important function in the statutory framework. Compliance with the regulatory scheme is vital if the objects of the NPW Act are to be achieved.
...
[27] These objects are achieved in part through the creation of a reserve system which makes provision for nature reserves as well as national parks, historic sites, State conservation areas, regional parks, karst conservation reserves and Aboriginal areas.
The purpose of reserving land as a national park under the Act is set out in s 30E(1) as follows:
The purpose of reserving land as a national park is to identify, protect and conserve areas containing outstanding or representative ecosystems, natural or cultural features or landscapes or phenomena that provide opportunities for public appreciation and inspiration and sustainable visitor or tourist use and enjoyment so as to enable those areas to be managed in accordance with subsection (2).
The removal of, and damage to, vegetation within the national park by Tableland Timbers, with the resulting adverse impacts on the ecosystem and natural landscape, is wholly incompatible with this purpose and with the objects of the Act set out above.
Maximum Penalty
The maximum statutory penalty is of considerable significance in determining the objective gravity of the offence ( Camilleri's Stock Feeds Pty Ltd v Environment Protection Authority (1993) 32 NSWLR 683 at 698).
The maximum penalty for a breach of s 156A of the Act by a corporation is $1,100,000. This demonstrates the seriousness with which Parliament views such an offence.
Harm to the Environment
The extent of harm caused or likely to be caused by the commission of the offence can increase the objective seriousness of the offence (s 194(1)(a) of the Act).
As stated above, it was an agreed fact that 503 trees were felled, pushed over or damaged by Tableland Timbers in the national park by way of a selective harvest. The trees harmed predominantly consisted of New England Blackbutt ( Eucalyptus campanulate ), but also included at least five stringybark species, namely, Round-leaved Gum ( Eucalyptus brunnea ), Diehard Stringybark ( Eucalyptus cameronii ), Silver-topped Stringybark ( Eucalyptus laevopinea ), Messmate ( Eucalyptus obliqua ) and Red Stringbark ( Eucalyptus macrorhyncha ). The remaining 1% of the damaged trees included She-oak species ( Allocasuarina species ).
Because of their maturity, the replacement of the 503 trees is estimated to take in excess of 100 years.
Notwithstanding this estimate, Mr Collet was of the view that following the offence the area logged could still constitute a viable, mature forest structure, albeit at a markedly reduced commercial value.
It was agreed that the offence occasioned environmental harm at the local level, the regional landscape level and the State and national level.
The offence has resulted in the following actual harm and potential harm at the local level:
(a) the disturbance of formally reserved forest habitats that directly contravenes and compromises the conservation management intent and direction of the National Park Plan of Management;
(b) the significant loss of habitat resources and a lowering of habitat quality for a suite of forest fauna including threatened species;
(c) the disturbance of an ecologically important forest stand leading to elevated potential for penetration by cattle and weeds with consequential indirect impacts on forest biodiversity, including on formally threatened fauna and flora species;
(d) potential insidious local impacts by plant diseases and pathogens transported by logging machinery; and
(e) an impact on the quality of the habitat of at least two species of threatened forest fauna and at least three species of threatened forest flora, including the Spotted-tail Quoll , Stephens Banded Snake, Powerful Owl, Masked Owl, Eastern False Pipistrelle, Greater Broad-nosed Bat, Eastern Bent-wing Bat, Yellow-bellied Sheathtail Bat, Glossy Black-cockatoo, Little Lorikeet, Varied Sitella, Square-tailed Kite and Little Eagle.
It was an agreed fact, which I find, that the impact of the offence at the local level was significant, with direct and indirect consequences for local biodiversity.
At the regional landscape level, the logging operation carried out by Tableland Timbers in the national park resulted in the following:
(a) the disturbance of productive tablelands tall open forest ecosystems that are under-represented in the national park and within the overall formal reserve system;
(b) the disturbance and reduced ecological functioning of a landscape forest link that provides habitat connectivity and movement potential for fauna between the national park and large forest areas to the east; and
(c) the lowering of the habitat quality for suites of forest fauna, including threatened species, directly and indirectly as a result of the logging operation.
The ecological impact of the offence at the regional level was agreed to be material, but with a lower overall consequence to the ecology of the national park and its biodiversity than the impact at the local level.
The offence has also resulted in the disturbance of a connectivity conservation focus within an important part of the Great Eastern Ranges Initiative ("GER Initiative") at a State and national level.
The GER Initiative assumes that formal reserves like the national park are a cornerstone of the New South Wales biodiversity conservation strategy. Logging within the national park, a recognised core area within the GER Initiative, has therefore compromised broader landscape conservation efforts. The level and significance of that compromise was agreed to be negligible, however, it must still be taken into account in determining the overall harm caused by the commission of the offence.
The prosecutor submitted that the overall actual harm caused to the environment was "significant" taking into account that 503 trees and other vegetation were damaged in an ecologically important forest stand in the national park and when consideration is given to the fact that this damage resulted in loss of habitat and a lowering of habitat quality for forest fauna, including 24 threatened species together with associated regional impacts. Its overall characterisation of the harm to the environment was serious, albeit not at the worst end of the scale.
In submitting that the overall level of environmental harm was at the lower end of the scale, Tableland Timbers noted that prior to the commission of the offence the area of the national park where the clearing occurred had been selectively cleared and had been, and still was, exposed to cattle grazing.
In some cases it is necessary for the Court to consider the state of the environment prior to the commission of the offence in order to assess the extent of the environmental harm caused by the offence and to avoid the offender being made responsible for the environmental harm inflicted by others ( Environment Protection Authority v Ecolab Pty Limited [2002] NSWLEC 206; (2002) 123 LGERA 269 at [12]-[15] and Director-General, Department of Environment and Climate Change v Walker Corporation Pty Limited (No 4) [2011] NSWLEC 119 at [88]).
However, as the prosector correctly submitted, the fact that the affected environment had already been modified or disturbed cannot be a factor mitigating Tableland Timber's conduct ( Ecolab at [14], Environment Protection Authority v Waste Recycling and Processing Corporations [2006] NSWLEC 419; (2006) 148 LGERA 299 at [149] and Walker Corporation (No 4) at [89]).
In having regard to the direct harm caused to the 503 trees, as well as the consequential harm, both actual and potential, caused to the ecological systems at the local, regional, State and national level, and bearing in mind the prior disturbance, I find beyond reasonable doubt that there was actual and potential environmental harm caused by the unlawful clearing of moderate seriousness, but not of "significant" seriousness as contended for by the prosecutor.
Significance of the National Park
A factor relevant to the imposition of an appropriate sentence under the Act is the significance of the reserved land that was harmed, or likely to be harmed, by the commission of the offence (s 194(1)(b) of the Act).
The purpose of reserving land as a national park, as identified above, includes to protect and conserve areas containing outstanding or representative ecosystems, natural or cultural features or landscapes or phenomena that provide opportunities for public appreciation and inspiration and sustainable tourist use and enjoyment.
It was an agreed fact that the national park protects regionally significant geological and landscape features, and vegetation communities. It is an area of high biodiversity including 30 threatened plant species, 20 threatened animal species and Chinese and Australian Migratory Bird Agreement and Japanese and Australian Migratory Bird Agreement species. Significantly, in the logged area of the national park at least 24 species of threatened forest fauna and at least three species of threatened forest flora are recorded as occurring, or predicted to occur.
Accordingly, the national park is of national significance for its biological and landscape values and of regional significance for cultural heritage and recreation.
The fact that the commission of the offence involved the harming of a national park reserved for the protection of its ecological, landscape and cultural significance, in my view serves to increase the objective seriousness of the offence.
Tableland Timbers' State of Mind
A strict liability offence, such as the offence in question, that is committed intentionally, negligently or recklessly will be objectively more serious than one not so committed ( Rae at [42] and Glover at [36]).
Evidence that an employee of a corporation had, at any particular time, a particular state of mind is evidence that the corporation had the same state of mind. Section 175B(4) of the Act states:
175B Offences by corporations
(4) Without limiting any other law or practice regarding the admissibility of evidence, evidence that an officer, employee or agent of a corporation (while acting in his or her capacity as such) had, at any particular time, a particular state of mind, is evidence that the corporation had that state of mind.
(5) In this section, the state of mind of a person includes:
(a) the knowledge, intention, opinion, belief or purpose of the person, and
(b) the person's reasons for the intention, opinion, belief or purpose.
The prosecutor submitted Tableland Timbers was reckless, or at the very least negligence, in the commission of the offence. In doing so it relied on the following:
(a) the state of mind of Mr Craig McPherson;
(b) that Tableland Timbers is a professional logging company that negotiated and obtained the PNF-PVP on behalf of Mr MacDougall;
(c) that Mr Craig McPherson and Mr Grant were aware that the private property adjoined the national park and the location of the boundary was specifically discussed at the second meeting on the property;
(d) that Mr Craig McPherson and Mr Grant were not aware of the exact location of the boundary and that Mr Grant was not given any maps of the boundary;
(e) that Mr MacDougall had indicated to Mr Peter McPherson that the "boundary is down there near the escarpment (pointing to the west)" and had indicated to Mr Craig McPherson on another occasion that the "boundary with the national park is down off the escarpment (pointing further to the west)";
(f) that Mr Craig McPherson stated that the information provided to him by Mr Peter McPherson was not sufficient to accurately locate the boundary between the private property and the national park;
(g) that despite the fact that neither Mr Craig McPherson nor Mr Grant had a clear understanding of where the boundary with the national park was located they nevertheless proceeded with the logging;
(h) that Mr Craig McPherson, when operating the harvesting machine, did not look at the sketch map when he was felling trees in the north western part of the private property; and
(i) that Mr Craig McPherson made no effort to locate the boundary with the national park, which had had been told by Mr MacDougall was indicated by survey markers, before commencing logging.
In these circumstances, the prosecutor submitted that the relevant belief of Mr Craig McPherson at the time of the commission of the offence equated to reckless indifference to the prospect of crossing the boundary into the national park.
Tableland Timbers, in contrast, submitted that it was Mr Craig McPherson's honestly held but mistaken belief that the area being logged was the private property not the national park, which was based on the conversations that he had with Mr MacDougall.
It accepts that Mr Craig McPherson was negligent in not using the GPS equipment provided, but denies that this amounted to being reckless as to the consequences of crossing the boundary into the national park. In support of this submission Tableland Timbers relied on the fact that at the time of harvesting Mr Craig McPherson believed, based upon his understanding of conversations in his presence between Mr Peter McPherson and Mr MacDougall, that he had not crossed the boundary between the private property and the national park.
What amounts to criminal negligence was described in the context of an offence against s 118 of the Act in Gordon Plath of the Department of Environment and Climate Change v Fish; Gordon Plath of the Department of Environment and Climate Change v Orogen Pty Ltd [2010] NSWLEC 144; (2010) 179 LGERA 386 as follows (at [81]-[82]):
[81] ... in the criminal context, negligence means more than a breach of a duty of care. To amount to criminal negligence, the degree of carelessness must be such as to show such a disregard for the objects of the statute as to amount to a crime against the state ( R v Bateman [1925] All ER Rep 45; (1925) 19 Cr App R 8; see also Andrews v DPP [1937] AC 576 per Lord Atkin at 583; applied in Cittadini v The Queen [2009] NSWCCA 302 at [38]-[40]). For there to be negligence, there must have been an indifference to an obvious risk ( R v Taktak (1988) 14 NSWLR 226 at 247, applied in Cittadini ).
[82] The test for criminal negligence is objective. The risk of harm must have been foreseeable to the reasonable person in the position of the Defendants ( NSW Sugar Milling Co-operative Ltd v Environmental Protection Authority (1992) 59 A Crim R 6 per Hunt CJ at CL at 7). In this case, of course, the allegation of foresight of harm is not of foresight of damage to threatened species habitat. The Defendants were aware damage was being caused to habitat. That awareness is an element of the offence addressed in the Defendants' pleas of guilty. Rather the allegation must be that a reasonable person in the position of the Defendants would have foreseen that the damage was unlawful as being an offence against the NPW Act.
The term recklessness describes the state of mind of an offender who, while performing or failing to perform an act, is aware of the risk that a particular consequence is likely, in the sense of probable or possible, to result from that act or omission ( Pemble v R (1971) 124 CLR 107, La Fontaine v R (1976) 136 CLR 62 and R v Crabbe (1985) 156 CLR 464). Recently in Blackwell v R [2011] NSWCCA 93, the Court of Criminal Appeal described the mental element of "reckless" as (at [76]):
[76] The effect of this line of authority is that where the mental element of an offence is recklessness, the Crown must establish foresight of the possibility of the relevant consequence.
Tableland Timbers was aware that the private property bordered the national park and did not make any attempt to locate the survey markers already in place; to remark the boundary between the national park and the private property; or to use the GPS. To log in these circumstances clearly amounted to negligence, but did it amount to recklessness?
The prosecution relied on the decision in Director-General, Department of Environment, Climate Change and Water v Linklater [2011] NSWLEC 30 in support of its submission that the offence had been committed recklessly by Tableland Timbers. In Linklater the offender was aware of the existence of pink markers delineating the area not to be cleared but could not locate them at the time of clearing. In these circumstances the Court had no difficulty holding that the offender was reckless (at [41]-[44]).
In the present case, however, Mr Craig McPherson honestly believed, based on the conversations with Mr Peter McPherson and Mr McDougall that he was not harvesting in the national park. Critically, it was only after the harvesting had taken place that he entertained doubts as to whether or not this belief was correct. In these circumstances I cannot find that Tableland Timbers was reckless at the time the offence was committed.
However, the fact that the offence was committed negligently is nevertheless a circumstance of the conduct constituting the offence that increases the objective seriousness of the offence ( Plath v Hunter Valley Property Management Pty Ltd [2010] NSWLEC 264 at [13]).
Practical Measures Tableland Timber Could Have Taken to Prevent the Risk of Environmental Harm
Tableland Timbers conceded that the use of GPS equipment would have adverted the offending conduct. While it had provided the operator of the machinery with a GPS device to assist in detecting the location of boundary lines when conducting clearing operations, Mr Craig McPherson had not used the device in the south western area of the boundary. If he had done so, his erroneous belief that the harvesting was occurring outside the national park would have been corrected. But Tableland Timbers submitted that no further practical measures could have been implemented to prevent the harm.
I do not agree. Tableland Timbers could and should have taken additional steps to identify the boundary between the private property and the national park before commencing the logging (s 194(1)(c) of the Act).
Specifically, and as submitted by the prosecutor, Mr Craig McPherson could have used the sketch map provided by OEH or the Forest Operation Plan map and/or the GPS equipment to locate and mark the national park boundary; Mr Grant could have been shown a map of the boundary to gauge its location and could have been provided with similar GPS equipment; and either Mr Craig McPherson or Mr Grant could have located the survey markers already in place along the boundary before logging commenced.
There were, therefore, practical measures that Tableland Timbers could have taken to prevent the harm caused by the offence.
Foreseeability of the Risk of Harm
Having regard to the nature and extent of the clearing and the fact that there was no effort made to identify the boundary between the private property and the national park before logging started, Tableland Timbers could readily have foreseen the harm caused or likely to be caused to the environment by the commission of the offence (s 194(1)(d) of the Act).
Control of the Causes of the Harm to the Environment
As the company engaged to carry out the logging on the private property, as well as the employer of the two people carrying out the logging, namely Mr Craig McPherson and Mr Grant, Tableland Timbers had complete control over the causes that gave rise to the offence (s 194(1)(e) of the Act). Tableland Timbers did not commit the offence under an order or direction from anyone else, for example, Mr McDougall (s 194(1)(g) of the Act).
Reasons for Committing the Offence
A factor by which the objective seriousness of an offence may be augmented is the reason for its occurrence.
In this case, it was submitted by the parties, and I accept, that the offence was not committed for commercial gain notwithstanding that profit was generated by the criminal act (s 21A(2)(o) of the CSPA and s 194(1)(h) of the Act).
However, it should be noted that Tableland Timbers did make a windfall gain from the commission of the offence. This fact is discussed further below in relation to the issue of deterrence.
The Offence is One of Moderate Objective Gravity
Having regard to the nature of the offence; the maximum penalty; the extent of likely harm to the environment; the practical measures able to have been taken to prevent the harm; the state of mind of Tableland Timbers; the reasonable foreseeability of harm likely to be caused by the commission of the offence; the extent to which Tableland Timbers had control over the causes that gave rise to the offence; and the absence of any deliberate or commercial motive in committing the offence, I find that the offence committed is one of moderate objective gravity.
The Subjective Circumstances of Tableland Timbers
When considering the appropriate penalty to be imposed, the Court must take into account the mitigating and aggravating factors personal to Tableland Timbers (s 21A(2) and (3) of the CSPA).
The subjective circumstances of Tableland Timbers to be considered relevantly include:
(a) any prior criminal record;
(b) any plea of guilty;
(c) any contrition and remorse expressed;
(d) Tableland Timbers' good character; and
(e) any cooperation with, and assistance to, the regulatory authorities provided by Tableland Timbers.
Prior Criminality
Tableland Timbers has no prior convictions for any environmental offences (s 21A(3)(e) of the CSPA).
Prior Good Character of Tableland Timbers
I accept, absent any evidence to the contrary, that Tableland Timbers, an entity engaged in the business of logging and sawmilling for the past 20 years, is, but for the commission of this offence, of good character (s 21A(3)(f) of the CSPA). It has contributed to the community in the area in which it operates by way of regular donations to charitable organisations and community events, as described above.
Assistance to Authorities
Tableland Timbers has wholly cooperated with the prosecutor throughout the conduct of this matter, starting with the investigation on site, continuing through to the provision of interviews, documents and information and culminating in the filing of a statement of agreed facts (ss 21A(3)(m) and 23 of the CSPA).
Plea of Guilty
Tableland Timbers pleaded guilty to the offence at the fourth occasion the matter was before the Court. Whilst this was not the first available opportunity, it should still be afforded a substantial discount for the utilitarian value of the plea of guilty ( R v Thomson; R v Houlton [2000] NSWCCA 309; (2000) 49 NSWLR 383 and ss 21A(3)(k) and 22 of the CSPA).
Tableland Timbers asserted that the reason for the delay in entering a plea was due to the prosecutor filing further evidence on environmental harm and the need to obtain instructions in respect of this evidence. Generally, the reason for the delay in the plea is irrelevant because, if a plea is not forthcoming, the utilitarian value is eroded ( Rae at [63] citing R v Borkowski [2009] NSWCCA 102). In this case the utilitarian value of the guilty plea remains high and a discount of 23% is warranted ( Director-General, Department of Environment, Climate Change and Water v Vin Heffernan Pty Limited [2010] NSWLEC 200 at [54]).
Contrition and Remorse
The contrition or remorse of an offender must be taken into account as a mitigating factor in determining the appropriate sentence for an offence (s 21A(3)(i) of the CSPA).
Tableland Timbers submitted that it has expressed contrition and remorse in two ways: first, by the entry of a plea of guilty, and second, through the affidavit evidence of Mr Peter McPherson.
However, as the Court has noted on a number of occasions, a plea of guilty may by inference amount to evidence of remorse but, of itself, will rarely be sufficient to meet the pre-conditions of s 21A(3)(i) of the CSPA to be used as a mitigating factor ( Vin Heffernan at [54(c)] and Director-General, Department of Environment, Climate Change and Water v Forestry Commission of New South Wales [2011] NSWLEC 102 at [110]-[112] ).
I accept, however, the genuine expression of remorse and regret given on behalf of Tableland Timbers by Mr Peter McPherson.
Costs
Tableland Timbers has agreed to pay the prosecutor's costs and disbursements in the amount of $47,100 and the prosecutor's investigation costs, pursuant to s 203(1) of the Act, in the amount of $2,900 ( although this provision came into force after the commission of the offence, an order under Pt 15 Div 3 may be made in relation to the commission of an offence that occurred before the commencement of that Division: cl 68 of Sch 3 of the Act).
The payment of a prosecutor's costs is an aspect of punishment ( Environment Protection Authority v Barnes [2006] NSWCCA 246 at [78]; Rae at [68]). There is no question that this Court is empowered to order an offender to pay the prosecutor's costs as specified or as may be determined under s 257G of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (see s 257B of that Act) . I have therefore taken this factor into account.
Conclusion on Subjective Considerations
The subjective considerations of Tableland Timbers operate to mitigate to a considerable degree the penalty to be imposed.
The Appropriate Sentence to be Imposed on Tableland Timbers
The imposition of a sentence serves a number of purposes. As s 3A of the CSPA sets out, these purposes include retribution and denunciation, as well as deterrence, both specific and general.
Deterrence
The parties submitted, and I accept, that specific deterrence is of very minor consideration in the determination of an appropriate penalty in the circumstances of this case. This is because the offence was an isolated incident for a company that had, until the commission of this offence, operated faultlessly. In addition, Tableland Timbers has since met with its employees and given strict instructions to use GPS locating equipment to establish property boundaries when logging.
In respect of general deterrence, the deterrent effect of a fine must send a message to companies in the timber industry that harming vegetation on reserved land without a licence or authorisation is not acceptable. This is particularly so in circumstances where the logging occurred in a remote area and Tableland Timbers was able to derive a profit from its illegal activities.
While there is no evidence as to what precise amount of profit was generated by the commission of the offence, the Court nevertheless takes into account the fact that there was a windfall gain to Tableland Timbers in harvesting the timber. The imposition of a fine in this instance must deter other companies from seeking a similar profit by trespassing into national parks.
Accordingly, there is a need to have regard to general deterrence as a component of the penalty.
Denunciation and Retribution
The imposition of an appropriate sentence serves the purpose of ensuring that retribution and denunciation are properly addressed. The sentence of this Court is a public denunciation of Tableland Timbers and must ensure that it is held accountable for its actions and is adequately punished ( Rae at [8]-[9], Glover at [67] and ss 3A(a) and (e) of the CSPA). Therefore, I also take these elements of sentencing into account.
Consistency in Sentencing
The principal of consistency in sentencing requires the Court to have regard to the general pattern of sentencing for offences of the kind being considered. But care must be taken given the wide divergence of facts and circumstances leading to the imposition of specific penalties and because a sentence in one case does not demonstrate the limits of a sentencing judge's discretion ( Axer Pty Ltd v Environment Protection Authority (1993) 113 LGERA 357 at 365, Cabonne Shire Council v Environment Protection Authority [2001] NSWCCA 280; (2001) 115 LGERA 304 at 312 and Hili v The Queen; Jones v The Queen [2010] HCA 45; (2010) 272 ALR 465 at [54] ).
There have only been two other prosecutions under s 156A of the Act, namely, Glover and Plath v Knox [2007] NSWLEC 670.
The prosecutor submitted, with which I agree, that these cases have little comparative value , given the facts of both these offences were materially different to the offence before the Court. Both were objectively less serious than the offence presently under consideration and both were committed by individuals, not corporations.
In Glover , the defendant collected cones from Banksia intergrifolia trees in the Moonee Beach Nature Reserve, and in the process drove a quad bike in the reserve crushing vegetation, in contravention of s 156A(1)(b) of the Act. The Court imposed a penalty of $7,500 in circumstances where the environmental harm was low; the offence was premeditated and intentional; the offence was committed for financial gain; the defendant had two prior convictions; the defendant pleaded guilty; demonstrated remorse; and the defendant had provided assistance to the authorities. The defendant had also agreed to the pay the prosecutor's costs in the amount of $9,000.
In Knox, the defendant was charged with damaging 3.7ha of vegetation in the Goulburn River National Park as a result of aerial spraying of pesticides on neighbouring land in contravention of s 156A(1) of the Act. The Court imposed a penalty of $13,200 in circumstances where the environmental harm was found to be serious; the offence was committed negligently; the defendant pleaded guilty and expressed remorse; the defendant did not have any prior convictions; the defendant took practical measures to prevent the harm; and the defendant had a limited capacity to pay a fine. The Court ordered the defendant to pay the prosecutor's costs in the sum of $35,000.
In addition to the above cases, Tableland Timbers submitted that several native vegetation clearing cases under the Native Vegetation Act 2003 served as relevant comparators. The Court was referred, in this regard, to the decisions in Rae , Vin Heffernan (and the authorities cited thereat) and Director-General, Department of Environment and Climate Change v Calman Australia Pty Ltd [2009] NSWLEC 182. Significantly, the maximum penalty for the relevant offence in each of these cases was the same as under s 156A of the Act, namely, $1,100,000.
In Rae the defendant pleaded guilty to an offence under s 12(1) of the Native Vegetation Act . An area of 215ha was partially cleared, including an area of 155ha that was cleared of 95% of all trees. Most of the trees cleared were mature, with some in excess of 17m in height. The Court imposed a fine of $160,000 in circumstances where the defendant knew that he needed consent to clear but proceeded without it; the offence was committed for financial gain; there was a high degree of environmental harm; and the native vegetation that was cleared had significant conservation status and contributed to biodiversity. Overall, the offence was considered to be of medium objective gravity. Mitigating factors considered included the absence of prior offences; the defendant's good character; the defendant's early guilty plea (although not at the earliest opportunity); the defendant's expression of contrition and remorse; and the defendant's assistance in the investigation.
In Vin Heffernan , the Court fined the defendant $30,150 for the negligent clearing of 22ha of native vegetation of high conservation value at a local scale but of low conservation at a landscape scale, contrary to s 12(1) of the Native Vegetation Act . The defendant had cleared the land largely at the direction of a third party; had pleaded guilty; had provided assistance to the authorities; was of good character; and had expressed contrition and remorse.
In Calman the Court fined three defendants (two landowners and a contractor) the sum of $22,000 each for the unlawful clearing of 21ha of land that included mature trees, contrary to s 12(1) of the Native Vegetation Act . In committing the offence the defendants acted neither deliberately nor recklessly, and moreover, were not negligent. Rather, the offences were committed without any knowledge that the clearing was illegal under any law. The defendants' culpability was assessed as low, however, the environmental harm caused was reasonably substantial. The defendants pleaded guilty; had no prior convictions; had expressed contrition and remorse; and had agreed to a remediation order. The prosecutor's costs of $73,000 were significant and each defendant was ordered to pay a third of them.
I find the facts of this offence to be less serious than those present in Rae , but more serious than those underlying the imposition of the penalties in Glover , Knox , Vin Heffernan and Calman .
Monetary Penalty to be Imposed
Taking into account the objective circumstances of the commission of the offence and the subjective circumstances of Tableland Timbers, I find that a fine of $100,000, discounted by 27%, should be imposed. The total monetary penalty to be imposed is therefore $73,000.
Orders
The prosecutor sought an order under s 205(1)(d) of the Act (cl 68 of Sch 3 of the Act) that Tableland Timbers pay a specified amount to - in this case the amount of what would otherwise be imposed by way of fine - the Northern Rivers Catchment Management Authority for general environmental purposes.
Tableland Timbers consented to such an order being made and in my view such an order is appropriate.
Accordingly, for the reasons expressed above, the Court makes the following orders:
(1) Vaccount Pty Ltd t/as Tableland Timbers is convicted of the offence as charged;
(2) Vaccount Pty Ltd t/as Tableland Timbers is fined the sum of $73,000;
(3) Vaccount Pty Ltd t/as Tableland Timbers, pursuant to s 205(1) of the National Parks and Wildlife Act 1974, is to pay the Northern Rivers Catchment Management Authority within 28 days of this order, the amount of $73,000 to be used for general environmental purposes;
(4) all future public references by Vaccount Pty Ltd t/as Tableland Timbers to the payment above shall be accompanied by the following passage:
"The contribution by Vaccount Pty Ltd, trading as Tableland Timbers, to the Northern Rivers Catchment Management Authority is part of a penalty imposed on it by the Land and Environment Court of NSW after it was convicted of damaging reserved land, being an offence against s 156A of the National Parks and Wildlife Act 1974 ";
(5) Vaccount Pty Ltd t/as Tableland Timbers is to pay within 28 days of this order:
(a) the prosecutor's costs and disbursements of $47,100; and
(b) the prosecutor's investigation costs pursuant to s 203(1) of the National Parks and Wildlife Act 1974, in the amount of $2,900; and
(6) the exhibits are to be returned.
*******
Decision last updated: 17 November 2011
23
28
3