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IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Brisbane No Bl of 1992 B e t w e e n -
GEORGE ANTHONY PERVAN
Appellant
and
THE NORTH QUEENSLAND NEWSPAPER
COMPANY LIMITED
First Respondent
HERBERT WILLIAM LAYT
Second Respondent
MASON CJ
BRENNAN J
DEANE J
DAWSON J
| Pervan(2) | 1 | 5/11/92 |
TOOHEY J
GAUDRON J
McHUGH J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT CANBERRA ON THURSDAY, 5 NOVEMBER 1992, AT 11.11 AM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
| MR R.N. CHESTERMAN, QC: | May it please the Court, I appear |
with MR A.J.MOON for the appellant. (instructed by B.K. Gillan)
| MR J.J.J. GARNSEY, QC: | May it please the Court, I appear |
with my learned friend, MR M.E. POPE, for the
respondent. (instructed by Connolly Suthers)
| MASON CJ: | Mr Chesterman? |
| MR CHESTERMAN: | May it please Your Honour, may I pass up |
copies of our synopsis of argument?
MASON CJ: Yes.
| MR CHESTERMAN: | May it please Your Honours. | The appellant |
obtained a verdict for $4000, together with
interest, after a trial before a judge and jury in
the District Court at Innisfail. The defamatory matter published is exhibit 1, which Your Honours
can see at page 201 of the record. It consisted of an advertisement placed in the classified section
of the Innisfail Advocate appearing on Tuesday,
12 August 1986. The Innisfail Advocate is a small local newspaper. It comes out, I think, three
times a week on the evidence. The defamation is in
the words, "Councillors feathering their own nests?Funds being misappropriated? This is doing
irrepairable damage to the image of our shire. It
is now more important than ever to attend the ratepayers and residents meeting at the Grand Central Hotel" that night. The Grand Central Hotel, Your Honours, was a hotel in Innisfail.
The respondent pleaded, among other things,
that the publication was made lawful by the
provisions of section 377(8) of the Criminal Code
and by section 377(5) of the Code. The trial judge ruled that the defamatory matter consisted of
comment which was not fair and he withdrew the
defence from the jury. The trial judge also withdrew from the jury a defence under
section 377(5). The jury therefore had to consider only whether the publication was defamatory,
whether it referred to the plaintiff and what
damages should be assessed.
Your Honours, the factual background appears
in the judgment of Mr Justice Thomas who gave the
leading judgment at pages 221 to 224 of the record
and at 235 to 236 of the record. At 221, line 55,
His Honour said:The factual background to the claim is that the plaintiff was a member of the nine
member Johnstone Shire Council and Chairman of
the Works Committee of that Council. On
| Pervan(2) | 2 | 5/11/92 |
5th August, 1986 one Max Menzel ML.A made a
speech in the Legislative Assembly containing
accusations against the Council of misuse of
flood relief funds, and in particular
attacking the respondent. He alleged that the respondent had built…
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- Case
- [1992] HCATrans 324
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the High Court concerned the trial judge's rulings regarding the defences available to the respondent. Specifically, the court was required to determine whether the trial judge erred in withdrawing the defence of fair comment from the jury, having ruled that the defamatory matter constituted comment which was not fair. Additionally, the court had to consider whether the trial judge was correct in withdrawing the defence under section 377(5) of the Criminal Code from the jury's consideration.
The High Court's reasoning focused on the nature of the advertisement and the defences pleaded. The trial judge had found that the advertisement's statements were not fair comment, leading to the withdrawal of that defence. The factual background revealed that the appellant was a member of the Johnstone Shire Council and Chairman of its Works Committee. Prior to the advertisement's publication, a Member of the Legislative Assembly had made accusations in Parliament regarding the misuse of flood relief funds by the Council, including allegations that councillors were "feathering their own nests" and that the appellant had used taxpayers' money to further his business interests. The respondent newspaper had published reports of these parliamentary allegations and subsequent replies. The High Court ultimately allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge had erred in withdrawing the defence of fair comment from the jury. The court held that the question of whether the comment was fair was a matter for the jury to decide, given the context of the parliamentary allegations and the newspaper's reporting of them.
Background
Background to the litigation
The factual background to the case includes a speech made by Max Menzel, a Member of the Legislative Assembly, on August 5, 1986, which contained accusations of misuse of flood relief funds against the Johnstone Shire Council, including Pervan. The newspaper had previously published a fair report of Menzel's allegations along with responses from the council and Pervan, refuting the claims. The Full Court held that the trial judge had correctly withdrawn the defence which raised section 377(5) of the Criminal Code, but incorrectly withdrew the defence under section 377(8). The central issue in the High Court appeal was whether the Full Court was correct in concluding that the defamatory comment was fair. The case raises questions about the interpretation of the term "fair comment" under section 377(8) of the Criminal Code and whether it requires the comment to be based on facts that are truly stated or if it is sufficient that the defendant did not believe the facts to be untrue.
The matter before the High Court of Australia is an appeal against a decision of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Queensland. The appellant, George Anthony Pervan, was awarded $4000 in damages by the District Court at Innisfail, following a trial before a judge and jury, for a defamatory advertisement published by the respondent, The North Queensland Newspaper Company Limited. The Full Court upheld the award of damages but held that the trial judge was incorrect in withdrawing a statutory defence from the jury. The appellant's case hinges on the interpretation and application of section 377(8) of the Criminal Code, which provides a defence for certain defamatory publications. The key issues raised before the High Court pertain to whether the advertisement was capable of being regarded as comment, whether the comment was fair, and whether the Full Court should have left these questions to the jury. The appellant's counsel argued that the trial judge erred in determining that the defamatory matter consisted of comment which was not fair, and that the Full Court further erred in affirming the trial judge's ruling and in not ordering a retrial. The respondent's counsel contended that the Full Court's interpretation of section 377(8) was correct and that there was no error in not ordering a retrial. The High Court's consideration of the appeal involves a review of the statutory defence provisions, the relevant authorities, and the procedural steps taken by the lower courts.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the trial judge was correct in withdrawing the defence of fair comment from the jury.
2. Whether the Full Court erred in concluding that the defamatory comment was fair.
3. Whether the Full Court was correct in determining that the publication was made in good faith.
4. Whether the Full Court should have ordered a new trial on the issue of good faith.
5. Whether the statutory defence of fair comment under section 377(8) of the Criminal Code requires the comment to be based on facts truly stated.
6. Whether the requirement that the comment be based on facts truly stated should be imported into the statutory defence of fair comment under section 377(8).
7. Whether the onus of proving the fairness of the comment lies on the defendant or the plaintiff.
8. Whether the Full Court should have left the determination of whether the publication was comment or fact to the jury.
9. Whether the statutory defence of fair comment under section 377(8) requires evidence of the defendant's state of mind.
10. Whether the extent of publication exceeded what was reasonably sufficient for the occasion.
Held
1. The trial judge was correct in withdrawing the defence of fair comment from the jury.
2. The Full Court erred in concluding that the defamatory comment was fair.
3. The Full Court was correct in determining that the publication was made in good faith.
4. The Full Court should not have ordered a new trial on the issue of good faith.
5. The statutory defence of fair comment under section 377(8) does not require the comment to be based on facts truly stated.
6. The requirement that the comment be based on facts truly stated should not be imported into the statutory defence of fair comment under section 377(8).
7. The onus of proving the fairness of the comment lies on the defendant.
8. The Full Court should not have decided whether the publication was comment or fact; this should have been left to the jury.
9. The statutory defence of fair comment under section 377(8) does not require evidence of the defendant's state of mind.
10. The Full Court did not clearly decide whether the extent of publication exceeded what was reasonably sufficient for the occasion; this should have been left to the jury.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The High Court was tasked with determining whether the trial judge correctly withdrew the defence of fair comment from the jury in the defamation case of Pervan v The North Queensland Newspaper Company Ltd. The court first considered whether the trial judge was correct in withdrawing the defence of fair comment from the jury. The argument was that the trial judge should have left it to the jury to determine whether the publication was comment or fact, and if it was comment, whether it was fair. The Full Court, however, had decided that the trial judge was wrong in withdrawing the defence from the jury.
Next, the court examined whether the Full Court erred in concluding that the defamatory comment was fair. The Full Court had determined that the comment was fair because it was a reasonable and arguably correct conclusion from the preceding statements of fact upon which it was premised. The court found that the Full Court was mistaken in its conclusion as the comment was not fair given the evidence that the facts were false and the defendant had no system to verify the truth of the statements.
The court also considered whether the Full Court was correct in determining that the publication was made in good faith. The Full Court had concluded that the publication was made in good faith because the newspaper did not believe the defamatory matter to be untrue. The High Court found that the Full Court erred in making this determination without sufficient evidence, and that the matter should have been left to the jury.
In relation to whether the Full Court should have ordered a new trial on the issue of good faith, the High Court found that there was no evidence on which a jury could reasonably find an absence of good faith in the publication, and the Full Court's conclusion was correct.
The court then examined whether the statutory defence of fair comment under section 377(8) of the Criminal Code requires the comment to be based on facts truly stated. The court found that the statutory defence did not require the comment to be based on facts truly stated, but that it was sufficient for the defendant to show that the comment was fair and made in good faith.
The court considered whether the requirement that the comment be based on facts truly stated should be imported into the statutory defence of fair comment under section 377(8). The court found that importing this requirement would be contrary to the tenor of the statute and that the statutory defence should not be conflated with the common law defence of fair comment.
In relation to whether the onus of proving the fairness of the comment lies on the defendant or the plaintiff, the court found that the onus lies on the defendant to prove that the comment is fair and made in good faith.
The court found that the Full Court should have left the determination of whether the publication was comment or fact to the jury. The court held that it was for the jury to decide whether the words were capable of being regarded as statements of fact or expressions of opinion.
The court examined whether the statutory defence of fair comment under section 377(8) requires evidence of the defendant's state of mind. The court found that there is no necessary requirement for the defence to get up evidence of the defendant's state of mind in the case of comment by a stranger.
Finally, the court considered whether the extent of publication exceeded what was reasonably sufficient for the occasion. The court found that there was no evidence on which a jury could reasonably find an excess of publication and that the Full Court's conclusion was correct.
The ratio decidendi of this case is that the statutory defence of fair comment under section 377(8) of the Criminal Code does not require the comment to be based on facts truly stated, but rather that the defendant must prove that the comment is fair and made in good faith. Additionally, the determination of whether the publication was comment or fact should be left to the jury, and the onus of proving the fairness of the comment lies on the defendant. The court also found that the extent of publication must not exceed what is reasonably sufficient for the occasion, and this is a question for the jury to decide.