influenced by irrelevant considerations-Misdirection-Setting aside findings- New trial-Criminal Code of Queensland (63 Vict. No. 9, Sched. 1), secs. 366, 367, 368, 373, 377, 382.

In a letter published in a newspaper the appellant denied the accuracy of certain evidence given by the respondents on oath before a Land Board upon an inquiry in respect of improvements effected on land which had been held from the Crown by one of the respondents, and for which the appellant was applying as a selector, as to the quantity of prickly pear on the land-the outgoing tenant being entitled to compensation for such improvements, which was payable by the incoming tenant. The letter challenged the respon- dents to accept the appellant's wager of a sum of money that their evidence was incorrect. The respondents having ignored this challenge, the appellant

22 CLR 2

published another letter in the same newspaper in which he said that as the respondents "should have a true sense of honour, if they do not come out from behind their shelter there is only one reason I can attribute to their silence in the matter of not accepting my challenge, that when they made their statements in the witness-box they threw their honour to the winds and are not now prepared to sacrifice their good money in the same way" and also that

if they have a spark of honour or manhood left in their composition they will come out and uphold" their evidence or disprove his statements. The respondents brought an action for defamation upon the second letter, and, in answer to questions put to them by the trial Judge, the jury found (1) that the matter complained of was not defamatory (2) that it was published in good faith for the protection of the appellant's interests, and in good faith for the public good; (3) that the appellant honestly believed that at the time the respondents gave their evidence and at the time of the publication of the letters there were on his selection 500 bunches or more of pear bearing ripe fruit and (4) that at the time he caused the matter to be published he did not believe his statement as to the quantity of such pear on the selection to be untrue. Judgment was accordingly entered for the appellant, but, on appeal, the Full Court ordered a new trial. On appeal to the High Court,

Held, by Griffith C.J., Barton and Powers, JJ. (Isaacs and Gavan Duffy JJ. dissenting), that the respondents were entitled to a new trial on the grounds that the above findings (1) and (2) were against evidence and that the other two findings were not material, and also on the ground that the issue of libel or no libel had been so left to the jury by the Judge that their finding thereon must have been…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Ryan v Ross

Details

AGLC: Ryan v Ross [1916] HCA 43
Case: [1916] HCA 43
Decision Date: 1 August 1916

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of *Ryan v Ross* involved an appeal to the High Court of Australia from a decision of the Supreme Court of Queensland. The dispute arose from two letters published in a newspaper by the appellant, Patrick Francis Ryan, concerning evidence given by the respondents, Hugh Macdonald Ross and others, before a Land Board. The respondents had testified about the quantity of prickly pear on land for which Ryan was applying as a selector, impacting the compensation payable to the outgoing tenant, Ross. Ryan's letters challenged the accuracy of the respondents' evidence, suggesting their statements were dishonourable and potentially untrue. The respondents initiated a defamation action based on the second letter.

The legal issues before the High Court included whether the matter complained of was defamatory, whether it was published in good faith for the protection of the appellant's interests or for the public good, and whether the jury's findings on these matters were against the evidence or influenced by irrelevant considerations. The jury at the trial had found that the matter was not defamatory and that it was published in good faith for the appellant's interests and the public good. They also made findings regarding the appellant's honest belief about the quantity of prickly pear and his belief about the truth of his statements. The Supreme Court of Queensland had set aside these findings and ordered a new trial.

The High Court, by a majority, held that the respondents were entitled to a new trial. The majority reasoned that the jury's findings that the matter was not defamatory and that it was published in good faith for the protection of the appellant's interests and for the public good were against the evidence. Furthermore, the Court found that the trial judge had misdirected the jury, particularly by overemphasising the appellant's belief about the quantity of prickly pear, which was an irrelevant consideration to the defamation claim. This misdirection, the Court concluded, likely influenced the jury's findings on the core issue of whether the publication was defamatory.

Consequently, the High Court affirmed the decision of the Supreme Court of Queensland and ordered that the appeal be dismissed, upholding the direction for a new trial.

Orders