Peek v Channel Seven Adelaide Pty Ltd

Link copied
Case Copied 62 min read

SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Miscellaneous Appeal: Civil)

PEEK v CHANNEL SEVEN ADELAIDE PTY LTD

Judgment of The Honourable Justice Gray

17 December 2004

DEFAMATION - ACTIONS FOR DEFAMATION - PLEADING - SOUTH AUSTRALIA

DEFAMATION - PRIVILEGE - QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE - STATEMENTS MADE IN RESPECT OF A DUTY OR INTEREST - PARTICULAR STATEMENTS - ON MATTERS OF PUBLIC INTEREST

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - OPERATION AND EFFECT OF THE COMMONWEALTH CONSTITUTION - RESTRICTIONS ON COMMONWEALTH AND STATE LEGISLATION - RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS IMPLIED IN COMMONWEALTH CONSTITUTION

Defamation proceedings issued by legal practitioner, against the defendant, a television company - plaintiff alleged comments in a television program publicly broadcast were defamatory - plea of qualified privilege.

Appeal against decision of Master declining to strike out plea of qualified privilege - defendant sought to plead qualified privilege on the basis that the broadcast constituted discussion of government and political matters and was an exercise of the implied freedom of political communication as protected by the Commonwealth Constitution - discussion of implied freedom of political communication - discussion of "government and political matters" - discussion of test articulated by the High Court in Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520 - discussion of judicial power and implied freedom of political communication - consideration of whether defence of qualified privilege ought to be struck out.

Held - defence of qualified privilege should not be struck out - arguable defence of qualified privilege pleaded - appeal dismissed.

Supreme Court Rules 1987 (SA), r 53, referred to.
Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520; Chapman and Chapman v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (2000) 77 SASR 181 ; Egan v The Commonwealth Minister for Transport (1976) 14 SASR 445; General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) and Others (1964) 112 CLR 125; Rogers v Legal Services Commission (SA) (1995) 64 SASR 572; Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106; Theophanous v Herald & Weekly Times Ltd (1994) 182 CLR 104; Stephens v West Australia Newspaper Ltd (1994) 182 CLR 104; The Herald & Weekly Times Ltd v Popovic [2003] VSCA 161; Wilson v Minister for Aboriginal & Torres Straight Islander Affairs (1996) 189 CLR 1; Law Society v Nicholson [2004] SASC 2 at [21]; R v Murphy (1985) 4 NSWLR 42; R v Fingleton (2003) 140 A Crim R 216, considered.

PEEK v CHANNEL SEVEN ADELAIDE PTY LTD
[2004] SASC 425

Miscellaneous Appeal: Civil

GRAY J:

  1. This is an appeal against a decision of a Master refusing an application to strike out an amended defence.

  2. The question raised by the appeal concerns the constitutional protection of freedom of speech and the reach of the extended defence of qualified privilege to a claim in defamation.  Discussion of government and political matters forms the touchstone of the test for extended defence of qualified privilege as outlined in Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation.[1]  However, as the meaning of government and political matters…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Peek v Channel Seven Adelaide Pty Ltd and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2004] SASC 425
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Peek v Channel Seven Adelaide Pty Ltd involved a defamation claim brought by David Peek, a barrister, against Channel Seven Adelaide Pty Ltd for a broadcast made on its Today Tonight program on 10 June 2002. The broadcast concerned the sale of assets of Peter Liddy, a former magistrate convicted of criminal offences. The broadcast suggested that Liddy's lawyers, including Peek, had procured a valuation of Liddy’s house and contents at an undervalue to persuade a District Court Judge to discharge a Mareva injunction, facilitating the sale of Liddy’s property and the application of the proceeds to pay his legal fees, thereby leaving his victims with nothing to recover by way of compensation. Peek sought damages for defamation, alleging that the broadcast was false and defamatory of him.

The central legal issues in the case revolved around the application of the defence of qualified privilege to the broadcast, particularly whether the broadcast could be considered a discussion on government and political matters, which would extend the protection of qualified privilege under the implied constitutional freedom of political communication. The case also addressed whether the defence of qualified privilege could be argued based on the facts pleaded in the amended defence, and whether the Master had the power to strike out the amended defence if it was devoid of merit.

The High Court, in its decision, held that the defence of extended qualified privilege, grounded in the implied constitutional freedom of political communication, was indeed arguable. The Court noted that the freedom of political communication acts as a limitation on laws and powers, providing a pro tanto immunity from laws that would prohibit free discussion of political and government matters. The Court emphasised that this freedom is limited to discussions directly connected to representative government and does not extend to a general freedom of expression. The Court further found that it was at least arguable that the broadcast concerned matters of judicial administration that had become the subject of political debate, thus falling within the scope of the implied freedom.

In conclusion, the Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the decision of the Master to disallow the amended defence of qualified privilege. The Court held that the defence of qualified privilege based on the implied freedom of political communication was arguable and should not be struck out. The case underscored the importance of protecting discussions on matters of public interest and political debate, which are crucial to the functioning of representative government in Australia.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

The question raised by the appeal concerns the constitutional protection of freedom of speech and the reach of the extended defence of qualified privilege to a claim in defamation. Discussion of government and political matters forms the touchstone of the test for extended defence of qualified privilege as outlined in Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation.[1] However, as the meaning of government and political matters remains ill defined, the scope application of the defence of qualified privilege is to be developed on a case-by-case basis.[1] (1997) 189 CLR 520Background The appellant and plaintiff, David Peek, a barrister, instituted proceedings against the defendant and respondent, Channel Seven Adelaide Pty Ltd, claiming damages for defamation. The claim concerned an item broadcast by the defendant on its Today Tonight “current affairs” program on 10 June 2002. The item concerned the sale of assets of the convicted former magistrate, Peter Liddy. The item discussed proceedings in the District Court brought by some of Mr Liddy’s former victims and the lifting of a Mareva injunction granted by a District Court Judge in favour of those victims. The text of the item is reproduced later in these reasons. It was said that the broadcast item suggested that Mr Liddy’s lawyers had procured a valuation of Mr Liddy’s house and contents at a gross undervalue and had used this misleading valuation to persuade a District Court Judge to discharge the Mareva injunction. It was then asserted that this was done to facilitate the sale of the property and the application of the proceeds to the payment of Mr Liddy’s legal fees, leaving Mr Liddy’s victims with nothing to recover by way of compensation. The plaintiff represented Mr Liddy as senior counsel in criminal proceedings in the Supreme Court, including the Court of Criminal Appeal, between 21 August 2001 and 4 June 2002. He did not appear in the District Court proceedings referred to in the broadcast item. In the plaintiff’s statement of claim the following particulars were set out relating to the Today Tonight broadcast on 10 June 2002:The said words and pictures were defamatory of the plaintiff in that in their natural and ordinary meaning they meant and were understood to mean that Mr Liddy’s lawyers (including the plaintiff):- procured and presented to the District Court a valuation of Mr Liddy’s that was false or misleading or manifestly inadequate;- in the alternative, negligently procured and presented to the District Court a valuation of Mr Liddy’s property that was false and misleading or manifestly inadequate;- conspired with lawyers acting for some of the victims of his offending to vary the injunction so that Mr Liddy’s property could be sold to pay his lawyers’ fees;- conspired with or knowingly assisted Mr Liddy to deprive the victims of his offending of their compensation by disposing of his assets at gross undervalue for a sum sufficient to pay the lawyers’ fees but so as to leave nothing over for the victims;- conspired with or knowingly assisted Mr Liddy in a vindictive scheme to deny the victims of his offending their due compensation;- acted unscrupulously and unethically in their own interests and to the detriment of Mr Liddy’s victims to procure payment of their fees;- acted unscrupulously and unethically in their own interests to procure payment of the fees that were exorbitant;- conspired with or knowingly assisted Mr Liddy to connive with a person of ill-repute, one Terry Stephens, to put his assets beyond the reach of the victims of his offending.It was said that the publication of the Today Tonight broadcast injured the plaintiff’s credit, character and reputation and brought the plaintiff into “public scandal, odium and contempt”.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

By application dated 3 June 2003 the plaintiff sought a disallowance of the amended defence or striking out of the amendments with the consequence that the original defence would stand as the defence of the defendant. One question before the Master was whether the defence of qualified privilege, on the grounds that the item constituted discussion on government and political matters, should be permitted to stand.Master’s Decision On 2 October 2003 the Master delivered reasons for his decision to refuse the plaintiff’s application to strike out the respondent’s amended defence. At the hearing of the application it was agreed that in order for the application to be granted, the plaintiff had to establish that the defences referred to in the amended defence were devoid of merit.[4] As acknowledged by the Master, the power to strike out a pleading must be exercised sparingly and only in clear cases.[5] Further, the decision to strike out must be determined with reference to the pleading itself - a trial of the merits of the particular defence ought not to be embarked upon.[4] Chapman and Chapman v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (2000) 77 SASR 181 at 185[5] See Egan v The Commonwealth Minister for Transport (1976) 14 SASR 445; General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) and Others (1964) 112 CLR 125; Rogers v Legal Services Commission (SA) (1995) 64 SASR 572 The Master rejected the submission of counsel for the plaintiff that the Lange defence of extended qualified privilege was not an arguable defence:As I understand [counsel for the defendant’s] argument, the Lange defence was different from the ordinary defence of qualified privilege such that it was permissible for the defendant to rely upon the facts as pleaded in paragraphs 8.6 to 8.89 to support the contention that the broadcast consisted of the discussion of government and political matters and to support the contention that the broadcast was reasonable. Although [counsel] did not specifically submit that the decision in Rogers v Allen should be distinguished, I understand that to be the essence of his submission. Such a submission requires me to consider whether or not there must be a material link between the particulars relied upon and the conduct of the plaintiff. This is in the context where the application before me was argued on the assumption that if the broadcast or any part of it defamed the plaintiff, such defamation occurred accidentally.In my view, it is at least arguable that the decision in Rogers v Allen does not apply where the Lange defence is relied upon. Because the particulars are said to support the contention that the broadcast consisted of discussions of governmental and political matters and that it was reasonable, it would be inappropriate to disallow paragraph 9 of the amended defence. For these reasons the application by the plaintiff to disallow paragraph 9 should be refused.As earlier observed, the application to strike out the amended defence was rejected. Chronology of Publications

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Counsel for the defendant further submitted that the plea of qualified privilege in the amended defence concerned matters of judicial administration and which had become the subject of political debate. It was said that it was at least arguable that the broadcast concerned a government and political matter.Consideration of Issues on AppealConstitutional Basis of the Defence of Extended Qualified Privilege It has been established that there is no constitutionally recognised right to freedom of expression in Australia.[6] However, there is an implied Constitutional guarantee of freedom of communication at least in relation to governmental and political discussion.[7] This implied freedom stems from sections 7 and 24 of the Commonwealth Constitution which outline and entrench the system of responsible and representative government. [6] Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106[7] Theophanous v Herald & Weekly Times Ltd (1994) 182 CLR 104; Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corp (1997) 189 CLR 520 The concept of representative government is enshrined in the Constitution. From this concept, an implication of freedom of communication arises. It has been established that the implied freedom of political communication is necessary to effectuate the free election of representatives at periodic elections and makes up an indispensable incident of the system of representative government which the Constitution creates. In Theophanous v The Herald and Weekly Times Ltd & Anor Deane J observed:[8]Essentially, the freedom of political communication and discussion which is an implication of the Constitution's incorporation of the doctrine of representative government constitutes a limitation or confinement of Commonwealth and State laws and powers. Of itself, such a limitation or confinement of laws and powers gives rise to a pro tanto immunity on the part of the citizen from being adversely affected by those laws or by the exercise of those powers rather than to a "right" in the strict sense.[8] (1994) 182 CLR 104 at 168 per Deane J The implied freedom acts to limit the passage of laws that would prohibit free discussion of political and government matters as such discussion is seen as an essential component to the system of representative government. As Deane J further commented in Theophanous:[9]In a democracy such as Australia, ordinary political communications and discussions commonly involve the making of statements which injure or are likely to injure the reputation of others. State defamation laws which provide that the making of such statements to another person is wrongful and which render the maker liable in damages unless one of the available defences can be established by admissible evidence to the satisfaction of a court seriously and directly curtail a particular class or type of communication or discussion which is a necessary ingredient of effective political communication and discussion. Such a curtailment of the freedom of political communication and discussion is consistent with the implication only to the extent to which it can, according to the standards of our society, be justified in the public interest either for the reason that it is conducive to the overall availability of the effective means of political communication and discussion in a democratic society or it does not go beyond what is necessary either for the preservation of an ordered society or for the protection or vindication of the legitimate claims of individuals to live peacefully and with dignity in such a society.As earlier observed, the implied freedom is limited in scope and does not extend to a freedom of expression generally.[10] The implied freedom only extends to communication directly connected to the concept of representative government. Its scope has been described as limited to “political discussion”, “political discourse” and “government matters”. [11][9] (1994) 182 CLR 104 at 178[10] Theophanous v The Herald Weekly Times Ltd & Anor (1994) 182 CLR 104 per Mason CJ, Toohey, Gaudron JJ[11] Theophanous v The Herald Weekly Times Ltd & Anor (1994) 182 CLR 104 per Mason CJ, Toohey, Gaudron JJ