SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Miscellaneous Appeal: Civil)
PEEK v CHANNEL SEVEN ADELAIDE PTY LTD
Judgment of The Honourable Justice Gray
17 December 2004
DEFAMATION - ACTIONS FOR DEFAMATION - PLEADING - SOUTH AUSTRALIA
DEFAMATION - PRIVILEGE - QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE - STATEMENTS MADE IN RESPECT OF A DUTY OR INTEREST - PARTICULAR STATEMENTS - ON MATTERS OF PUBLIC INTEREST
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - OPERATION AND EFFECT OF THE COMMONWEALTH CONSTITUTION - RESTRICTIONS ON COMMONWEALTH AND STATE LEGISLATION - RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS IMPLIED IN COMMONWEALTH CONSTITUTION
Defamation proceedings issued by legal practitioner, against the defendant, a television company - plaintiff alleged comments in a television program publicly broadcast were defamatory - plea of qualified privilege.
Appeal against decision of Master declining to strike out plea of qualified privilege - defendant sought to plead qualified privilege on the basis that the broadcast constituted discussion of government and political matters and was an exercise of the implied freedom of political communication as protected by the Commonwealth Constitution - discussion of implied freedom of political communication - discussion of "government and political matters" - discussion of test articulated by the High Court in Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520 - discussion of judicial power and implied freedom of political communication - consideration of whether defence of qualified privilege ought to be struck out.
Held - defence of qualified privilege should not be struck out - arguable defence of qualified privilege pleaded - appeal dismissed.
Supreme Court Rules 1987 (SA), r 53, referred to.
Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520; Chapman and Chapman v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (2000) 77 SASR 181 ; Egan v The Commonwealth Minister for Transport (1976) 14 SASR 445; General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) and Others (1964) 112 CLR 125; Rogers v Legal Services Commission (SA) (1995) 64 SASR 572; Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106; Theophanous v Herald & Weekly Times Ltd (1994) 182 CLR 104; Stephens v West Australia Newspaper Ltd (1994) 182 CLR 104; The Herald & Weekly Times Ltd v Popovic [2003] VSCA 161; Wilson v Minister for Aboriginal & Torres Straight Islander Affairs (1996) 189 CLR 1; Law Society v Nicholson [2004] SASC 2 at [21]; R v Murphy (1985) 4 NSWLR 42; R v Fingleton (2003) 140 A Crim R 216, considered.
PEEK v CHANNEL SEVEN ADELAIDE PTY LTD
[2004] SASC 425Miscellaneous Appeal: Civil
GRAY J:
This is an appeal against a decision of a Master refusing an application to strike out an amended defence.
The question raised by the appeal concerns the constitutional protection of freedom of speech and the reach of the extended defence of qualified privilege to a claim in defamation. Discussion of government and political matters forms the touchstone of the test for extended defence of qualified privilege as outlined in Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation.[1] However, as the meaning of government and political matters…
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- Case
- [2004] SASC 425
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issues in the case revolved around the application of the defence of qualified privilege to the broadcast, particularly whether the broadcast could be considered a discussion on government and political matters, which would extend the protection of qualified privilege under the implied constitutional freedom of political communication. The case also addressed whether the defence of qualified privilege could be argued based on the facts pleaded in the amended defence, and whether the Master had the power to strike out the amended defence if it was devoid of merit.
The High Court, in its decision, held that the defence of extended qualified privilege, grounded in the implied constitutional freedom of political communication, was indeed arguable. The Court noted that the freedom of political communication acts as a limitation on laws and powers, providing a pro tanto immunity from laws that would prohibit free discussion of political and government matters. The Court emphasised that this freedom is limited to discussions directly connected to representative government and does not extend to a general freedom of expression. The Court further found that it was at least arguable that the broadcast concerned matters of judicial administration that had become the subject of political debate, thus falling within the scope of the implied freedom.
In conclusion, the Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the decision of the Master to disallow the amended defence of qualified privilege. The Court held that the defence of qualified privilege based on the implied freedom of political communication was arguable and should not be struck out. The case underscored the importance of protecting discussions on matters of public interest and political debate, which are crucial to the functioning of representative government in Australia.
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Counsel for the defendant further submitted that the plea of qualified privilege in the amended defence concerned matters of judicial administration and which had become the subject of political debate. It was said that it was at least arguable that the broadcast concerned a government and political matter.Consideration of Issues on AppealConstitutional Basis of the Defence of Extended Qualified Privilege It has been established that there is no constitutionally recognised right to freedom of expression in Australia.[6] However, there is an implied Constitutional guarantee of freedom of communication at least in relation to governmental and political discussion.[7] This implied freedom stems from sections 7 and 24 of the Commonwealth Constitution which outline and entrench the system of responsible and representative government. [6] Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106[7] Theophanous v Herald & Weekly Times Ltd (1994) 182 CLR 104; Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corp (1997) 189 CLR 520 The concept of representative government is enshrined in the Constitution. From this concept, an implication of freedom of communication arises. It has been established that the implied freedom of political communication is necessary to effectuate the free election of representatives at periodic elections and makes up an indispensable incident of the system of representative government which the Constitution creates. In Theophanous v The Herald and Weekly Times Ltd & Anor Deane J observed:[8]Essentially, the freedom of political communication and discussion which is an implication of the Constitution's incorporation of the doctrine of representative government constitutes a limitation or confinement of Commonwealth and State laws and powers. Of itself, such a limitation or confinement of laws and powers gives rise to a pro tanto immunity on the part of the citizen from being adversely affected by those laws or by the exercise of those powers rather than to a "right" in the strict sense.[8] (1994) 182 CLR 104 at 168 per Deane J The implied freedom acts to limit the passage of laws that would prohibit free discussion of political and government matters as such discussion is seen as an essential component to the system of representative government. As Deane J further commented in Theophanous:[9]In a democracy such as Australia, ordinary political communications and discussions commonly involve the making of statements which injure or are likely to injure the reputation of others. State defamation laws which provide that the making of such statements to another person is wrongful and which render the maker liable in damages unless one of the available defences can be established by admissible evidence to the satisfaction of a court seriously and directly curtail a particular class or type of communication or discussion which is a necessary ingredient of effective political communication and discussion. Such a curtailment of the freedom of political communication and discussion is consistent with the implication only to the extent to which it can, according to the standards of our society, be justified in the public interest either for the reason that it is conducive to the overall availability of the effective means of political communication and discussion in a democratic society or it does not go beyond what is necessary either for the preservation of an ordered society or for the protection or vindication of the legitimate claims of individuals to live peacefully and with dignity in such a society.As earlier observed, the implied freedom is limited in scope and does not extend to a freedom of expression generally.[10] The implied freedom only extends to communication directly connected to the concept of representative government. Its scope has been described as limited to “political discussion”, “political discourse” and “government matters”. [11][9] (1994) 182 CLR 104 at 178[10] Theophanous v The Herald Weekly Times Ltd & Anor (1994) 182 CLR 104 per Mason CJ, Toohey, Gaudron JJ[11] Theophanous v The Herald Weekly Times Ltd & Anor (1994) 182 CLR 104 per Mason CJ, Toohey, Gaudron JJ