]IN THE DISTRICT COURT
HELD AT BRISBANE
QUEENSLAND
[Paul Joseph Neuss v Roche Bros. Pty Ltd]
[Before JUDGE FORDE DCJ]
Plaint No D2133 of 1998
BETWEEN:
PAUL JOSEPH NEUSS
Plaintiff
AND:
ROCHE BROS. PTY LTD
Defendant
JUDGMENT - FORDE D.C.J.
Judgment delivered: 24 September 1999
Catchwords: Civil Procedure - Application to strike out action - Sections 182A, 182B, 182D Workers’ Compensation Act 1990, s.39(5) Motor Accident Insurance Act 1994, Rules 149, 153(2), 375, 376, 379(1) UCPR, O22 r12, 14 Supreme Court Rules, r94 & r104 District Court Rules - Mears v Coles Myer Ltd (1999) QSC 194; State of Queensland v Multiplex Constructions Pty Ltd (unreported Court of Appeal No. 1863/97 dated 19/12/97); General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways NSW (1964) 112 CLR 125; Young v Keong (unreported Court of Appeal dated 22 May 1998); Beesly v Hollywood Estate Ltd (1960) 2 All ER 314; Salmon Nominees Pty Ltd v Moneywood Pty Ltd (unreported Court of Appeal 4852/98 dated 22/12/98; Day Ford Pty Ltd v Sciacca [1990] 2 Qd R 209; Hardacre v Jenson and Suncorp General Insurance (unreported Forde DCJ 22/1/98); Airservices Australia v Austral Pacific Group Ltd (1998) 157 ALR 125; David Grant and Co Ltd v Westpac Banking Inc (1994-1995) 184 CLR 265; The Commonwealth v Verwayen (1990) 170 CLR 394; Adam v Chas S Watson Pty Ltd (1938) 60 CLR 545; Maxwell v Murphy (1956-1957) CLR 261; Tildesley v Harper (1878) 10 Ch D 393; Graham v Ingleby 154 ER 277, 1 Ex 651; Australian Iron and Steel Ltd v Hoogland (1962) 108 CLR 471; Broad v Perkins (1888) 21 QBD 533; Moore v Gamgee (1890) 25 QBD 244; Toronto Corporation v Russell (1908) AC 493; Bock v Don-Rex Furniture (Qld) (1891) Qd R 326; Allonnor Pty Ltd v Doran (Court of Appeal 5210/98 dated 17 November 1998); Kayrasaridas v Kastoria Fur Products (1984) SASR 345; Swietlik v Cental Linen Service (1991) 56 SASR 569; Fitzpatrick v Jackson (1989) 2 QdR 542; Re Testro Bros. Consolidated Ltd [1965] VR 18; Craig v Kanssen (1943) 1 KB 256; Cockburn v Hyne and Son Pty Ltd (Plaint 17/99, dated 15 September 1999); Woods v Bate (1987) 7 NSWLR 560; Hatton v Beaumont [1977] 2 NSWLR 211, [1978] 52 ALJR 589; Wilkie v Doce Pty Ltd (unrep, D2137 of 1997, 17th September 1997); Coote v Gas Corporation (unrep, D429 of 1998, 7th May 1998); Short v Michaliczac & Ors (unrep, D3951 of 1997, 22nd May 1998); Herman v Buzza (unrep, D456 of 1997, 12th September 1998); Sheward v Toowoomba City Council & Ano (unrep, D56 of 1997, 15th December 1998); McKelvie v Page and Ors (BC 9804722 writ 6801/98, unrep 18 September 1998); Emanuele v ASC (1996-97) 188 CLR 114; Park Gate Iron Co v Coates (1870) LR 5 CP 634; Thorby v Goldberg (1964) 112 CLR 597; Scoles v Commissioner for Government Transport (1960)
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- Case
- [1999] QDC 249
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court's reasoning was influenced by previous High Court decisions, notably David Grant and Co Ltd v Westpac Banking Corporation and Emanuele v ASC. In the former, the High Court held that the phrase "may only" in section 459G imposed a strict 21-day period for setting aside a statutory demand, which could not be extended by the court. This strict interpretation was upheld even though the Act provided for extensions in other circumstances. The Emanuele case further reinforced the idea that while statutory language may appear emphatic, courts retain the ability to exercise discretion in appropriate cases to prevent injustice and to correct oversights. The court in Emanuele emphasized that the Law's drafting style should not be taken at face value and that the leave requirement was not intended to introduce an absolute strictness in procedures for winding up companies in insolvency.
Based on these precedents, the court in the present case concluded that the term "may only" in section 182D(1) imposed a strict time limit for setting aside a statutory demand, but retained the discretion to extend this period if justice required it. This balanced approach ensures that while the statutory requirement is stringent, it is not inflexible, allowing the court to correct procedural errors where necessary.
The court's final order reflects this reasoning, providing that the statutory demand could be set aside, but only within the prescribed time frame, with potential for extension if the circumstances warranted it.
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In David Grant and Co Ltd v Westpac Banking Corporation (1994-1995) 184 CLR 265 at 277, the meaning of the term “may only” within the meaning of s.459G of the Corporations Law was discussed by the High Court. That section required that an application to set aside a statutory demand “may only” be made within 21 days after the service of the demands. Although there was provision under that Act to allow the courts to extend periods for the doing of any act, the High Court held that s.459G imposed a time requirement as an essential condition to the right to apply to set aside a statutory demand and was not qualified by s.1322(4)(D) which gave the court power to extend the times. The words “may only” are used in both s.182D(1) and s.459G. The latter was held to define the jurisdiction of the Court. Grant’s case was distinguished in Emanuele v ASC (1996-97) 188 CLR 114. The ASC had failed to get leave to wind up a group of companies. A majority of the High Court granted leave. Kirby J made certain pertinent remarks:“There is a reason for the tendency in the series of cases cited by McHugh JA in Woods v Bate (1986) 7 NSWLR 560 at 567 and in other cases to like effect, for the reluctance of courts in recent times to invalidate acts done pursuant to a statutory provision because of a failure to comply with a prior procedural condition. Courts today are less patient with meritless technicalities. They recognise the inconvenience that can attend an overly strict requirement of conformity to procedural pre-conditions. In the morass of modern legislation, it is easy enough, even for skilled and diligent legal practitioners (still more lay persons who must conform to the law) to slip in complying with statutory requirements. The Law is a case in point. Its complexity and detail is such that it has necessitated, within a short time of its enactment, the passage of the First Corporate Law Simplification Act 1995 (Cth). A number of further stages of simplification are promised. An undue rigidity in insisting upon strict compliance with all of the procedural requirements of the Law could become a mask for injustice and a shield for wrong-doing. Against that risk, courts generally retain the facility to cure slips and to repair oversights in proceedings before them, in appropriate cases where justice requires it.” The court in Emanuele was concerned with section s.459P(2) of the Corporations Law which stated that the application may “only be made” with leave of the court. At p155 Kirby J remarked:“Whilst it is true that, superficially, the language of s.459p looks more emphatic than a number of the predecessors referred to in the cases just cited, the differences should not be taken at face value. The Law has deliberately been expressed in a different style of drafting, as the Explanatory Memorandum makes clear. Had there been some particular new problem which was thought by those who proposed the new procedures for the winding up of companies in insolvency to require leave, with a more inflexible consequence than had previously been the case in company law cases, it might have been expected that the statute would have provided expressly for the consequence of the absence of leave. Alternatively, it might have been anticipated that the Law Reform Commission’s Discussion Paper and report would have revealed the additional mischief. Instead, the explanations given for the leave requirement are the familiar ones. In the case of the ASC, already bound by obligations to conform to its statute and having other, separate entitlements to procure the winding up of a company in stated circumstances, the notion of introducing a novel procedure of absolute strictness is not an immediately attractive one.”