Scoles v Commissioner for Government Transport

Link copied
Case Copied 11 min read

HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Dixon C.J., McTiernan, Fullagar, Menzies and Windeyer JJ.

SCOLES v. COMMISSIONER FOR GOVERNMENT TRANSPORT

(1960) 104 CLR 339

26 May 1960

Negligence

Negligence—Action against government department—Claim form—Letter from plaintiff to defendant—Notice in writing of intended action—Action for damages—Transport Act, 1930 (N.S.W.), ss. 232 (2), 233.

Decisions


The following written judgments were delivered: -
DIXON C.J., McTIERNAN, FULLAGAR and MENZIES JJ. Section 233 (1) of the Transport Act, 1930 (N.S.W.) provides that "no action shall be commenced against the Commissioner . . . for anything done or omitted . . . under this Act, until one month at least after notice in writing of such intended action has been delivered or left at the office of the secretary to the Commissioner, by the party intending to commence such action, or by his attorney or agent". The section proceeds by its second sub-section to prescribe what the notice should contain but by the third sub-section it is provided that a notice under the section shall not be deemed to be invalid by reason of any defect or inaccuracy therein unless the judge before whom the action is tried is of opinion that the defendant in the action has been prejudiced in his defence by such defect or inaccuracy. (at p340)

2. The question upon the present appeal is whether the plaintiff appellant gave a notice of such intended action within this provision or, in the words of the third sub-section, "a notice under the section". (at p341)

3. Section 232 (2) provides that actions against the Commissioner of the description stated shall be commenced within one year after the act or omission complained of was committed or made. The cause of action in the present case arose on 19th March 1954 and the writ was issued on 2nd March 1955. So at the date of the issue of the writ a failure to give the required notice was irreparable. The document or documents relied upon as constituting the notice do not give the particulars prescribed but it is said and not contested that if they or either of them amounts to a notice in writing of such intended action and a notice under the section, the defects might have been cured by the judge holding that the defendant had not been prejudiced by the defects or inaccuracies. The question seems clearly enough thus to be narrowed to the simple point whether the documents or either of them amounts to a notice of intended action and a notice under the Act. (at p341)

4. The plaintiff, who was employed by the Department of Motor Transport, suffered injuries on his way home from work. He received worker's compensation from that department as his employer but owing to the circumstances of the accident an action by the plaintiff for damages would lie against the Department of Government Transport, that is to say against the defendant based on the negligence of its servants, a negligence since admitted. (at p341)

5. The claims…
CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Scoles v Commissioner for Government Transport and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[1960] HCA 29
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The parties to this matter were Scoles, the appellant, and the Commissioner for Government Transport, the respondent. The dispute concerned the appellant's claim for workers' compensation for injuries sustained while travelling to work. The case was heard in the High Court of Australia.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the appellant's injury, sustained during his commute to work, arose out of or in the course of his employment, thereby entitling him to workers' compensation under the relevant legislation. This required the court to consider the scope of employment in the context of travel to and from the workplace.

The High Court, in a joint judgment, held that the appellant's injury did not arise out of or in the course of his employment. The court reasoned that the appellant was not performing any duty for his employer at the time of the accident, nor was he under any obligation to his employer to travel in the manner he did. The general principle established was that an employee travelling to or from their place of employment is not considered to be acting in the course of their employment unless there are special circumstances, such as the employer providing the transport or the employee being engaged in a task connected with their employment during the journey. In this instance, no such special circumstances were present.

The appeal was dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

The plaintiff in the case was an employee of the Department of Motor Transport who was injured in a tram collision while on his way home from work. He received worker's compensation from his employer but was also able to bring an action for damages against the Department of Government Transport based on the negligence of its servants. The incident occurred on 19th March 1954, and five days later, the plaintiff signed a claim form detailing the accident and the items damaged in the collision. However, this form did not indicate any intention to pursue legal action against the defendant. On 22nd July 1954, the plaintiff wrote a letter to the Officer in Charge of the Claims Branch of the defendant, enclosing a list of personal effects damaged and lost in the collision and stating that a claim for personal injuries would follow at a later date. The plaintiff's action against the defendant was based on the failure to provide the required notice of the intended action within the one month period prescribed by Section 233 of the Transport Act, 1930 (N.S.W.).

The High Court of Australia was required to determine whether the documents provided by the plaintiff amounted to a notice of the intended action and a notice under the Act. The Court found that neither the claim form nor the letter expressed the plaintiff's intention to institute an action against the defendant. The letter merely indicated an intention to submit a claim for damages at a later date, and the claim form did not allude to the probability of a suit or an intention to sue. The Court concluded that the documents could not amount to a notice of the intended action, and the plaintiff's appeal was dismissed. The absence of the required notice barred the plaintiff's remedy but did not extinguish his right to claim damages for his injuries.

The matter before the High Court of Australia in Scoles v Commissioner for Government Transport is an appeal from a decision of the New South Wales Court of Appeal. The plaintiff, Mr. Scoles, suffered injuries as a result of a collision between two trams operated by the Commissioner for Government Transport. Despite receiving workers' compensation from his employer, the Department of Motor Transport, Mr. Scoles sought damages from the Commissioner for Government Transport, which admitted negligence. The case hinges on whether Mr. Scoles complied with the statutory requirement to give notice of his intention to sue within one month, as prescribed by section 233 of the Transport Act, 1930 (N.S.W.). The lower courts had differing opinions on the sufficiency of the notice provided by Mr. Scoles, leading to the appeal being heard by the High Court. The Court examined the contents of the letter and claim form submitted by Mr. Scoles to determine if they constituted the required notice. Ultimately, the High Court found that neither the letter nor the claim form amounted to a valid notice of intended action, thus affirming the dismissal of the appeal and dismissing it with costs.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Did the plaintiff provide a valid notice of intended action within the requirements of section 233(1) of the Transport Act, 1930 (N.S.W.)?
2. Can the defects or inaccuracies in the notice be overlooked under section 233(3) of the Transport Act, 1930 (N.S.W.) if the defendant was not prejudiced by them?
3. Does the failure to give a valid notice of intended action bar the plaintiff's right to bring an action against the defendant?
4. Can the Commissioner for Government Transport waive the requirement of notice of intended action under section 233 of the Transport Act, 1930 (N.S.W.)?

Held
1. Did the plaintiff provide a valid notice of intended action within the requirements of section 233(1) of the Transport Act, 1930 (N.S.W.)?
The Court concluded that the documents provided by the plaintiff did not amount to a valid notice of intended action. The result was that the plaintiff failed to comply with the statutory requirement.

2. Can the defects or inaccuracies in the notice be overlooked under section 233(3) of the Transport Act, 1930 (N.S.W.) if the defendant was not prejudiced by them?
The Court found that the notice did not meet the requirements of section 233(1) regardless of whether it contained defects or inaccuracies, hence section 233(3) did not apply. The result was that the defects or inaccuracies could not be overlooked.

3. Does the failure to give a valid notice of intended action bar the plaintiff's right to bring an action against the defendant?
The Court concluded that while the failure to provide a valid notice bars the remedy, it does not extinguish the plaintiff's right to bring an action. The result was that the plaintiff's right to bring an action was not extinguished but the remedy was barred.

4. Can the Commissioner for Government Transport waive the requirement of notice of intended action under section 233 of the Transport Act, 1930 (N.S.W.)?
The Court held that the Commissioner could not waive the requirement of notice of intended action as it is a condition precedent to the right of action. The result was that the Commissioner's defence based on the absence of notice could not be waived.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The High Court in Scoles v Commissioner for Government Transport considered whether the plaintiff had provided a valid notice of intended action under section 233(1) of the Transport Act, 1930 (N.S.W.). The Court held that the plaintiff's documents did not constitute a valid notice because they did not expressly or by implication manifest an intention to institute an action against the defendant. The claim form and the letter from the plaintiff did not contain language indicating a forthcoming lawsuit but rather suggested an intention to submit a claim for settlement. This aligns with the principle that a notice of action must explicitly or implicitly express an intention to sue. The Court distinguished the present case from the view that a layman's expression of a claim necessarily implies an intention to bring an action.

The Court also examined whether the defects in the notice could be overlooked under section 233(3) of the Transport Act, 1930 (N.S.W.). Section 233(3) allows the judge to deem a notice valid if the defendant was not prejudiced by its defects or inaccuracies. However, the Court found that the documents did not constitute a valid notice at all, making the question of prejudice irrelevant. The failure to provide a valid notice was a procedural requirement that, if not waived, bars the remedy but does not extinguish the right.

Regarding whether the failure to give a valid notice bars the plaintiff's right to bring an action, the Court clarified that the absence of a valid notice bars the remedy but does not extinguish the right. This procedural condition can be waived by the defendant. However, the Commissioner for Government Transport was not precluded from insisting on compliance with the notice requirement as provided by the statute.

Lastly, the Court addressed whether the Commissioner for Government Transport could waive the requirement of notice of intended action under section 233 of the Transport Act, 1930 (N.S.W.). The Court noted that the Commissioner had the statutory authority to enforce the notice requirement and did not see any basis for waiving it in this case. The Commissioner had a valid defence based on the procedural non-compliance, which was not waived.

The ratio decidendi of this case is that for a notice to be valid under section 233(1) of the Transport Act, 1930 (N.S.W.), it must explicitly or implicitly express an intention to institute an action against the defendant. If a notice does not meet this requirement, it cannot be deemed valid under section 233(3), and the failure to provide such a notice bars the remedy unless the defendant waives the requirement. The Commissioner for Government Transport has the authority to enforce the notice requirement unless there is a statutory or other basis for waiver.