Oswal v Commissioner of Taxation

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Oswal v Commissioner of Taxation [2015] FCA 1439

Citation: Oswal v Commissioner of Taxation [2015] FCA 1439
Parties: PANKAJ OSWAL and RADHIKA PANKAJ OSWAL v COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
File number: NSD 1442 of 2015
Judges: GRIFFITHS J
Date of judgment: 17 December 2015
Catchwords: TAXATION – application for judicial review under s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) of the respondent’s refusal to give the applicants undertakings not to issue a departure prohibition order (‘DPO’) under s 14S of the Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth) (‘TAA’) – where the applicants claim the respondent misconstrued his powers under s 3A of the TAA in refusing to give the undertakings and acted unreasonably
Legislation:

Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s 33(2A)

Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39B

Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth) ss 3A, 14S, 14V

Cases cited:

Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223

Carr v Western Australia [2007] HCA 47; (2007) 232 CLR 138

Commissioner of Taxation v Arnold [2014] FCA 959

Commissioner of Taxation v Clark (No 2) [2011] FCAFC 140; (2011) 197 FCR 251

Grofam Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1997] FCA 660; (1997) 36 ATR 493

House v The King [1936] HCA 40; (1936) 55 CLR 499

Hutchins v Commissioner of Taxation [1996] FCA 201; (1996) 65 FCR 269

Julius v Bishop of Oxford (1880) 5 App Cas 214

Leach v R [2007] HCA 3; (2007) 230 CLR 1

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh [2014] FCAFC 1; (2014) 231 FCR 437

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18; (2013) 249 CLR 332

Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang [1996] HCA 6; (1996) 185 CLR 259

NBMZ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCAFC 38; (2014) 220 FCR 1

New South Wales v Bardolph [1934] HCA 74; (1935) 52 CLR 455

Precision Pools Pty Limited v Commissioner of Taxation [1992] FCA 746; citation [1992] FCA 445; (1992) 37 FCR 554

Queensland Trustees Limited  v Fowles [1910] HCA 51; (1910) 12 CLR 111

Sean Investments Pty Ltd v MacKellar [1981] FCA 191; citation [1981] FCA 174; (1981) 38 ALR 363

Strictly Stainless Pty Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [1993] FCA 854; citation [1993] FCA 534

Date of hearing: 11 December 2015
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 65
Counsel for the Applicants: Ms S Kaur-Bains
Solicitor for the Applicants: Kennedys (Australasia) Pty Ltd
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr N J Williams SC with Mr D F C Thomas
Solicitor for the Respondent: Minter Ellison

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 1442 of 2015

BETWEEN:

PANKAJ OSWAL
First Applicant

RADHIKA PANKAJ OSWAL
Second Applicant

AND:

COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
Respondent

JUDGE:

GRIFFITHS J

DATE OF ORDER:

17…

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Details
Case
[2015] FCA 1439
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Oswal v Commissioner of Taxation concerns an application for judicial review filed by Mr and Mrs Oswal against the Commissioner of Taxation. The applicants sought an undertaking from the Commissioner that he would not issue a departure prohibition order (DPO) under section 14S of the Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth) if they returned to Australia for specific purposes related to the mortgage proceedings. The Commissioner had refused to give the requested undertakings, leading to the applicants' claim that the Commissioner had misconstrued his powers under section 3A of the Taxation Administration Act and acted unreasonably.

The primary legal issues in this case revolved around whether the Commissioner had misconstrued his powers under section 3A of the Taxation Administration Act and whether his refusal to provide the requested undertakings constituted an unreasonable exercise of discretion. The applicants argued that the Commissioner had misinterpreted his authority by not providing the undertakings as requested, while the Commissioner maintained that there was no legal obligation to do so and that his reasons for refusing the undertakings were sufficient and understandable.

The court examined the principles of judicial review for jurisdictional error as established in the cases of Li and Singh. It was determined that the standard of reasonableness in exercising statutory powers is not confined to 'Wednesbury unreasonableness' but rather is indicated by the true construction of the relevant statute. The court held that the Commissioner's reasons, though brief, were not subject to critical scrutiny and could be understood in context. The Commissioner's decision to refuse the undertakings was deemed to be within his discretionary powers and not an unreasonable exercise of those powers.

Consequently, the court dismissed the amended originating application brought by the Oswals. The applicants were ordered to pay the respondent's costs as agreed or assessed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The amended originating application be dismissed.

2. The applicants pay the respondent’s costs as agreed or assessed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

It is convenient to summarise the background facts (which are not in dispute) and to outline the submissions made on behalf of the parties. Summary of background facts The Commissioner has issued Mr and Mrs Oswal with various notices of assessment and penalty which impose significant tax liabilities on each of them. The Commissioner has also obtained judgment against Mrs Oswal in the amount of approximately $186m and against Mr Oswal in the amount of approximately $6.5m. The assessments are the subject of Pt IVC proceedings which are scheduled to be heard by Pagone J in April next year. Apparently Mr and Mrs Oswal have also brought Pt IVC proceedings in the Administrative Appeals Tribunal relating to the assessments. The Commissioner has commenced separate proceedings in the Court which are listed for hearing before Gilmour J for six days commencing on 29 January 2016 (the mortgage proceedings). The Commissioner alleges in the mortgage proceedings that Mrs Oswal entered into a mortgage with a company called Mercury Services Ltd with the intention of defrauding her creditors. A declaration is also sought that the mortgage is void. Mrs Oswal proposes to defend the proceedings. Both she and Mr Oswal have filed affidavits in the mortgage proceedings. By a letter dated 29 October 2015, the Commissioner notified the Oswals’ solicitors that he required both the Oswals to attend at the hearing in the mortgage proceedings so that they could be cross-examined. By letter dated 30 October 2015, the Oswals’ solicitors wrote to the Commissioner and sought an undertaking in respect of the Commissioner’s power under s 14S of the TAA. After setting out various matters, including the nature of the mortgage proceedings and the Oswals’ concerns that if they were to return to Australia the Commissioner might issue a DPO against them, an undertaking was sought from the Commissioner. Paragraphs 13 and 14 of that letter were as follows:13The Commissioner has power to give an undertaking of the type given at paragraph [21] in Commissioner of Taxation v Arnold [2014] FCA 959. A copy of that case is enclosed. 14Mr and Mrs Oswal ask the Commissioner to give such an undertaking to Mrs and Mr Oswal that if they were to return to Australia for the purposes of:(a)preparing further supplementary evidence between 16 November to 30 November 2015; and(b)preparing for the hearing and being available to be cross-examined at the hearing of this matter between mid January to 12 February 2016;the Commissioner will not issue a departure prohibition order within the meaning of s 46 of the TAA (DPO). The Commissioner was asked to take into account various matters which were set out in the letter in considering the request. The Commissioner was asked to indicate whether he agreed to give an undertaking that, if the Oswals returned to Australia for the purposes of preparing further supplementary evidence in the mortgage proceedings and being available for cross-examination, the Commissioner would not issue a DPO. The Commissioner was also asked to give reasons and identify the matters he had taken into account in the event that he was not prepared to give an undertaking in respect of either or both of the two matters identified above.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

It was correctly pointed out by Ms Kaur-Bains, who appeared for the Oswals, that the current leading authorities in Australia on this head of judicial review for jurisdictional error are the decisions in Li and Singh. The relevant principles established by those authorities may be summarised as follows.The decision in Li Li involved judicial review of a statutory discretionary power which was vested in the Migration Review Tribunal under s 363(1)(b) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Migration Act) to adjourn a review by the tribunal from time to time. The plurality (Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ) held that there was a legal presumption that the legislature intended that such a statutory discretionary power be exercised reasonably (see also at [23]-[29] per French CJ and at [88]-[92] per Gageler J). In determining the standard of reasonableness in such a case, the plurality held that it was not confined to the concept of “Wednesbury unreasonableness” as defined by Lord Greene MR in Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223. The plurality emphasised that the “legal standard of unreasonableness” in Australia is not limited to “what is in effect an irrational, if not bizarre, decision – which is to say one that is so unreasonable that no reasonable person could have arrived at it…” (at [68]). The legal standard of reasonableness is the standard which is indicated by the true construction of the relevant statute. This serves to underline the central importance of construing the statute in determining whether or not an exercise of a statutory power is unreasonable in the legal sense (at [63] and [67]). Within the bounds of legal unreasonableness, there “is an area within which a decision-maker has a genuinely free discretion” ([66]). It is critical that, in exercising a judicial review function, the courts not exceed “their supervisory role by undertaking a review of the merits of an exercise of discretionary power” ([66]). Application of a standard of legal unreasonableness “does not involve substituting a court’s view as to how a discretion should be exercised for that of a decision-maker” ([66]). (To similar effect, see at [30] per French CJ and at [105]-[113] per Gageler J who, arguably, placed even greater emphasis on the “stringency” of the test). By analogy with the approach in House v The King [1936] HCA 40; (1936) 55 CLR 499, i.e. that an appellate court should not interfere with the exercise of a discretionary power by an inferior court merely because the appellate court would have taken a different course, it must be evident in a judicial review of the exercise of a statutory power by a tribunal that there has been some error in exercising the discretion ([75]). Their Honours stated at [76] (footnotes omitted):As to the inferences that may be drawn by an appellate court, it was said in House v The King that an appellate court may infer that in some way there has been a failure properly to exercise the discretion "if upon the facts [the result] is unreasonable or plainly unjust". The same reasoning might apply to the review of the exercise of a statutory discretion, where unreasonableness is an inference drawn from the facts and from the matters falling for consideration in the exercise of the statutory power. Even where some reasons have been provided, as is the case here, it may nevertheless not be possible for a court to comprehend how the decision was arrived at. Unreasonableness is a conclusion which may be applied to a decision which lacks an evident and intelligible justification.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Section 3A of the TAA provides:3A General administration of ActThe Commissioner has the general administration of this Act.Note:An effect of this provision is that people who acquire information under this Act are subject to the confidentiality obligations and exceptions in Division 355 in Schedule 1. Section 14S of the TAA provides:14S Departure prohibition orders(1) Where:(a) a person is subject to a tax liability; and(b)the Commissioner believes on reasonable grounds that it is desirable to do so for the purpose of ensuring that the person does not depart from Australia for a foreign country without:(i) wholly discharging the tax liability; or(ii)making arrangements satisfactory to the Commissioner for the tax liability to be wholly discharged;the Commissioner may, by order in accordance with the prescribed form, prohibit the departure of the person from Australia for a foreign country.(2)Subject to subsection (3), a departure prohibition order remains in force unless and until revoked under section 14T or set aside by a court.(3)A departure prohibition order made in respect of a person shall be taken, by virtue of this subsection, not to be in force in respect of the person during any period during which an order is in force under the Migration Act 1958 for the deportation of the person.(4)Where a departure prohibition order is made in respect of a person, the Commissioner shall forthwith:(a)cause the person to be informed, as prescribed, of the making of the order; and(b)subject to subsection (5), cause a copy of the order, and such information as the Commissioner considers is likely to facilitate the identification of the person, to be given to:(i) the Immigration Secretary; and(ii)such other persons as the Commissioner considers appropriate, being persons prescribed, or included in a class of persons prescribed, for the purposes of this paragraph.(5)Where a departure prohibition order is made in respect of a person whom the Commissioner is satisfied is an Australian citizen, the Commissioner shall not cause a copy of the order, or any information likely to facilitate the identification of the person, to be given to the Immigration Secretary unless the Commissioner is of the opinion that it is desirable to do so. Section 14V of the TAA provides that a person who is aggrieved by the making of a DPO may appeal to the Federal Court or the Supreme Court of a State or Territory against the making of the DPO.Has the Commissioner misconstrued his powers under s 3A? I accept the Commissioner’s contention that the Oswals have misconstrued the reasons provided one behalf of the Commissioner in the solicitor’s letters dated 4 and 11 November 2015. There was no legal obligation on the Commissioner to provide any reasons for his decision. The Oswals do not suggest that a provision such as s 25D of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) had any application here. The Commissioner’s reasons are brief. I see no reason why those reasons should not be construed and understood by the well-established principle that even more formal reasons provided by administrative tribunals or decision-makers should not be read critically and with an eye for error (see, for example, Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang [1996] HCA 6; (1996) 185 CLR 259 at 272).