Harris, R.J. v Moore, B

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JIJDGEENT No. ........ .,...,.... ~ o ~ ~ o o ~ a o ~ ~ D 534- 1 93
TASMANIA DISTRICT REGTSTRY NO TG 2 of 1993
GENERAL DIVISION
B E T W E E N : 

ROSSI JUNE HARRIS

Applicant

A N D :

EEVERI,EY MOORE. DELEGATE OF THE SECRETARY

OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH. HOUSING AND COMMUNITY

SERVICES AND DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH. HOUSING AND

COMMUNITY SERVICES

COUZT :  NORTHROP J
PLACE :  HOBART
DATE: 
2 JUNE  1993 11 A U G 1993

FEDERAL COURT OF

AUSTRALIA PRINCIPAL

EX TEMPORE REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

I realise this is a most important matter for the

applicant MS Harris. It can affect her future professional

activities. However, I have formed a very firm view of what
should be done with respect to the motion and I can see no

the Federal Court under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial

useful purpose in reserving my decision in an attempt to
express in a mare lucid way the reasons why I have come to
that firm decision. Therefore, I propose to give my reasons
now, even though they nay be briefer than otherwise they would
have been. In the process I hope to be able to explain why I

have come to the conclusion I have.

In order to explain the position, one should start with

the fact that on 16 March of 1993 an application was filed in

Harris was the applicant and the respondents were Bev Moore,
who was sued as the delegate of the Secretary of the
Department of Health, Housing and Community Services, and the
Department of Health, Housing and Community Services. The
application was brought under s5 of the Judicial Review Act
and sought to review the decision of the delegate that the
employment of the applicant with the Australian Public Service
be terminated with effect from close of business on 3 April
1992. The applicant knew of that termination about that time
and the actual day is not important for present purposes.

Review) Act 1977 (the "Judicial Review Act") in which Rossi be reviewed occurred almost 12 months before the commencement of the proceedings in this Court.

The grounds for the application are merely a summary of certain of the paragraphs of subsection 5(1) of the Judicial Review Act. No particulars were given in the application to support those grounds. The grounds specified are as follows

of the Judicial Review Act in relation to each of them: and I shall insert what I think is the appropriate paragraph "1. That a breach of the rules of natural justice have

(sic) occurred in connection with the making of the
decision; (s5(l)(a))

2. That the making of the decision was an improper exercise of the power conferred by the Public Service Act 1922 in pursuance of which the decision was made; (s5(l)(e), but no particulars are given as required by subsection 5(2))

3.    That there was no evidence or other material to justify the making of the decision; s5(l)(h) but no particulars…

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Details
Case
[1993] FCA 534
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Rossi June Harris brought an application for judicial review of a decision to terminate her employment with the Australian Public Service, specifically her role as a rehabilitation counsellor class 2 within the Commonwealth Rehabilitation Service in Tasmania. The decision to terminate her employment was made on 3 April 1992, and the application for review was lodged on 16 March 1993, well beyond the 28-day statutory limit set out in the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977. The application sought an extension of time to bring the proceedings, which the Court was empowered to grant under the same Act. The substantive merits of the termination decision were not before the Court.

The legal issues before the Court were primarily whether the delay in bringing the application was justified and whether an extension of time should be granted under the Act. The Court considered the principles relevant to the exercise of its discretion to extend time, focusing on the impact of the delay on third parties and whether the applicant had acted with due expedition.

The Court held that the applicant's delay in bringing the proceedings was both unreasonable and prejudicial to others. The applicant had deliberately chosen not to pursue the application for review until after a decision by the Human Rights and Equal Opportunities Commission, which was unrelated to her employment termination. This decision caused further delay, despite the applicant's solicitor being aware of the Judicial Review Act and its time limits. Additionally, the delay resulted in the position being filled by another person, causing further disruption and stress within the department. The Court found that the applicant's lack of knowledge about the time limitation did not excuse the delay, especially given the deliberate decision not to proceed with the application. Therefore, the Court refused to grant an extension of time, and the application was dismissed with costs.

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