Orion Corporation v Actavis Pty Ltd (No 3)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Orion Corporation v Actavis Pty Ltd (No 3)
[2015] FCA 1373

Citation: Orion Corporation v Actavis Pty Ltd (No 3) [2015] FCA 1373
Parties: ORION CORPORATION AND OTHERS AS NAMED IN THE SCHEDULE v ACTAVIS PTY LTD ACN 003 854 626 AND ANOTHER AS NAMED IN THE SCHEDULE
File number: NSD 2456 of 2013
Judge: RARES J
Date of judgment: 4 December 2015
Catchwords:

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY – PATENTS –  CONTRACTS – whether contract for licence of patent was exclusive licence – whether licence granted  all or only some of the congeries rights of patentee in Patents Act 1990 (Cth) – whether construction of apparently exclusive licence read down by reference to pre-existing distributorship contract between patentee and licensee or by promise of licensee to purchase patented product and active ingredients exclusively from patentee – whether purchase promise in licence separate to or derogated from patentee’s grant of exclusive licence as defined in the Act

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY – PATENTS – whether s 120(1) precluded exclusive sub-licensee from bringing infringement proceedings when patentee and exclusive licence were parties – whether sub-licensee had title to sue to enforce exclusive sub-licence rights assigned to it to exploit the patent

Legislation: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth)
Patents Act 1952 (Cth)
Patents Act 1990 (Cth)
Patents Regulations 1991 (Cth)
Cases cited: Apotex Pty Ltd v Les Laboratoires Servier (No 5) (2015) 324 ALR 549
Ashby v White (1703) 2 Ld Raym 938
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co v Apotex Pty Ltd (No 5) (2013) 104 IPR 23
Bristol-Myers Squibb Company v Apotex Pty Ltd (2015) 228 FCR 1
Cohen & Co v Ockerby & Co Ltd (1917) 24 CLR 288
Colbeam Palmer Ltd v Stock Affiliates Pty Ltd (1968) 122 CLR 25
Edwards v Santos Ltd (2011) 242 CLR 421
Electricity Generation Corporation v Woodside Energy Ltd (2014) 251 CLR 640
Equuscorp Pty Ltd v Glengallan Investments Pty Ltd (2004) 218 CLR 471
Ex parte British Nylon Spinners Ltd (1963) 109 CLR 336
Grant v Australian Temporary Fencing Pty Ltd (2003) 59 IPR 170
Gray v Richards (No 2) (2014) 315 ALR 1
John Alexander’s Clubs Pty Ltd v White City Tennis Club Ltd (2010) 241 CLR 1
JT International SA v Commonwealth (2012) 250 CLR 1
Maggbury Pty Ltd v Hafele Australia Pty Ltd (2001) 210 CLR 181
Norman v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1963) 109 CLR 9
Orion Corporation v Actavis Pty Ltd  [2015] FCA 909
Orion Corporation v Actavis Pty Ltd (No 2) [2015] FCA 1026
Pacific Carriers Ltd v BNP Paribas (2004) 218 CLR 451
Pharmacia Italia SpA v Interphama Pty Ltd (2005) 67 IPR 397
Royal Botanic Gardens and Domain Trust v South Sydney Council (2002) 240 CLR 45
Toll (FGCT) Pty Ltd v Alphapharm Pty Ltd (2004) 219 CLR 165
Date of hearing: 13 November 2015
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 71
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr C Dimitriadis SC with Mr C Burgess
Solicitor for the Applicant: Clayton Utz
Counsel…
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Details
Case
[2015] FCA 1373
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Orion Corporation v Actavis Pty Ltd (No 3) involves a dispute between Orion Corporation, the patentee, and Actavis Pty Ltd, a competitor, concerning the validity and enforcement of a patent related to pharmaceutical formulations for Parkinson’s disease treatment. The case was heard in the Federal Court of Australia. The primary legal issues revolve around the interpretation of a licence agreement between Orion and Novartis, a pharmaceutical company, and whether Novartis, and subsequently Novartis Australia, had the requisite standing and rights to enforce the patent against Actavis. Specifically, the court needed to determine whether the licence granted by Orion to Novartis constituted an exclusive licence as defined by the Patents Act 1990 (Cth), and whether Novartis Australia, as a sub-licensee, had the legal standing to bring infringement proceedings against Actavis.

The court's reasoning focused on the construction of the licence agreement and the implications of the Patents Act 1990. The court found that the 2014 licence agreement between Orion and Novartis clearly granted an exclusive licence, as it gave Novartis the exclusive rights to exploit the patented invention in Australia. The court rejected Actavis’ argument that the licence was not exclusive due to pre-existing agreements or other contractual obligations. Furthermore, the court held that the statutory definition of an "exclusive licensee" under the Act meant that Novartis had the exclusive right to prevent others from exploiting the patented invention, including Actavis. The court also addressed the question of whether an exclusive sub-licensee, such as Novartis Australia, could bring infringement proceedings. The court concluded that the statutory language allowing infringement proceedings to be started by the patentee or an exclusive licensee was permissive, meaning that an exclusive sub-licensee could indeed bring such proceedings.

The court's decision resulted in a declaration that Novartis and subsequently Novartis Australia had the proper standing and title to sue for patent infringement. This finding was crucial as it established the legal basis for Novartis Australia to enforce its rights against Actavis, ensuring that the patent remained protected and enforceable. The court's interpretation of the licence agreement and the statutory provisions provided clarity on the rights and obligations of the parties involved in patent licensing and enforcement under Australian law.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. It be declared that:

(a) on and after 7 March 2014 the second applicant was; and

(b) on and after 11 March 2014 the third applicant was

a proper and necessary party to the proceedings and had title to sue for the relief claimed in the originating application.

2. Subject to order 3 below, the respondents pay two-thirds of the applicants’ costs of the claim and cross-claim.

3. The second and third applicants respectively pay the costs of the respondents thrown away that were incurred in respect of the joinder of the second applicant up to 7 March 2014 and third applicant up to 11 March 2014.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

In Bristol-Myers 228 FCR at 33 [103]-[105] Besanko, Jagot and Nicholas JJ approved of the reasoning of Yates J at first instance (Bristol-Myers Squibb Co v Apotex Pty Ltd (No 5) (2013) 104 IPR 23 at 105-106 [434]-[436]) that “the right to exploit” a patent in the Act’s definition of “exclusive licensee” was a single, indivisible right. They held that, accordingly, under the Act, the definition of “exclusive licensee” entailed that the grant of an exclusive licence had the necessary consequence of precluding both the patentee and any person other than the exclusive licensee (or a person authorised by it), from exercising any right to do each and all of the acts of exploitation of the patented invention.Background – the earlier distributorship agreements On 7 September 2000, Orion announced to the Finnish Stock Exchange that it was developing new formulations combining three active drug substances for the treatment of Parkinson’s disease and that it had signed a marketing agreement for the new product with Novartis. Orion and Novartis entered into three licence, supply and distribution agreements for territories comprising, respectively, Europe, the United States of America, and, relevantly for these proceedings on 7 September 2000, the rest of the world (the ROW agreement). The territory for the ROW agreement included Australia. Orion granted Novartis a number of exclusive rights in the ROW agreement. The definitions of “Product” and “Finished Product” included first, any and all orally administered dosage forms and strengths containing the 3 APIs as the three sole active ingredients in any ratio formulated and manufactured by, on behalf of, or under licence from, Orion, for which Orion made or authorised a regulatory marketing application for the treatment of Parkinson’s disease and, secondly, “Product in ready to use, packaged form” (cll 1.20, 1.10). In particular, in cl 2.1(a) Orion granted Novartis the exclusive right under Orion’s patents “to import Product and use Product and Finished Product and offer to sell, sell, use and distribute Finished Product” in Australia. Additionally, Orion or its agents could meet any unsolicited orders for the Product received from customers located in the ROW agreement territory. However, cl 2.4 excluded from the grant of patent rights “any rights whatsoever for Novartis or any of its Affiliates to manufacture the Product … which rights [Orion] expressly reserves for itself”. (I will refer only to Orion below, without repeating the reference to a party authorised by it or acting on its behalf or its affiliates, in order to simplify the expression of these reasons.) As I found in my principal reasons, Orion had filed the complete specification for the patent in Australia on 29 June 2000 ([2015] FCA 909 at [11]). Thus, the ROW agreement would apply, unless terminated, to the exploitation of Orion’s exclusive rights as patentee, if and when the patent were granted, as ultimately it was.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

In those circumstances, there is no reason to arrive at the construction of the 2014 licence that Actavis propounded. Such a construction would require cl 1 to be read down and in a way that would negate the only reason why, in the circumstances, Orion and Novartis wanted to enter into the 2014 licence, namely to give Novartis the actual rights of an exclusive licensee: Maggbury 210 CLR at 188 [11]; Electricity Generation 251 CLR at 657 [35].Conclusion – exclusive licence For these reasons, I am of opinion that Novartis had title to sue in these proceedings as the exclusive licensee of the patent from the time that the 2014 licence was entered into on 7 March 2014.Novartis Australia’s position It was common ground that Novartis Australia had no status to sue as a patentee or exclusive licensee. However, it held the 2014 sub-licence from 11 March 2014. By force of s 139(1) “any person claiming an interest in the patent as exclusive licensee or otherwise” is a party to revocation proceedings under s 138, of the kind in Actavis’ cross-claim here. Thus, Novartis Australia was a person entitled to the exclusive rights to exploit Novartis’ rights by force of their assignment to it in the 2014 sub-licence. Novartis Australia would be affected by Actavis’ revocation proceeding. Novartis Australia also had an interest in the enforcement of the patent pursuant to Orion’s claim as patentee, and Novartis’ as exclusive licensee, that Actavis would infringe the patent. Under the 2014 sub-licence, Novartis Australia had the exclusive right to exploit the patent in Australia. I do not consider that s 120(1) of the Act precluded a person other than the patentee or exclusive licensee from bringing infringement proceedings. The words of s 120(1) are permissive in providing that “infringement proceedings may be started … by the patentee or an exclusive licensee”. Indeed, s 120(2) contemplated that if an exclusive licensee brings such proceedings, the patentee might not support it and, in that case, the subsection provided that the patentee must be joined as a defendant. Moreover, a patent and its exclusive rights are assignable under ss 13(2) and 14 of the Act. If Actavis’ argument that only a patentee or the exclusive licensee could bring infringement proceedings were right, an exclusive sub-licensee would not be able to enforce its rights directly. Yet, an exclusive licensee can assign its statutory exclusive rights to a sub-licensee under the Act. Both the 2014 licence and the 2014 sub-licence involved an assignment of exclusive, if incorporeal, rights of property that consisted of the power to enforce a statutory monopoly in respect of exploiting the patented invention during the term of the patent: cf JT International SA v Commonwealth (2012) 250 CLR 1 at 30-32 [34]-[37] per French CJ, 49 [105] per Gummow J, 97-98 [269]-[275] per Crennan J, 125 [347]-[348] per Kiefel J; Colbeam Palmer Ltd v Stock Affiliates Pty Ltd (1968) 122 CLR 25 at 34 per Windeyer J.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Actavis did not argue that the 2014 licence took the form of a legally effective transaction that the parties to it intended should not have its apparent, or any, legal consequences: see Equuscorp Pty Ltd v Glengallan Investments Pty Ltd (2004) 218 CLR 471 at 486 [46] per Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Kirby, Hayne and Callinan JJ. Indeed, Actavis disavowed that it was asserting that Orion and Novartis had engaged in a sham by entering into the 2014 licence.Consideration – exclusive licence No contract is made in a factual or contextual vacuum. The words that parties use to express an agreement have to be understood from the perspective of an objective third person who is aware of the surrounding circumstances, known to both parties, in which the contract was entered into and the commercial purpose or objects to be secured by the contract. The subjective beliefs and understandings of the parties to a contract have no role to play in its construction. The contract must be construed from the perspective of what a reasonable person, in the position of the parties, would have understood from the words (and, where relevant, conduct) used by each party and the language in which they expressed their agreement. Normally, that “requires consideration not only of the text, but also of the surrounding circumstances known to the parties, and the purpose and object of the transaction”, as Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Callinan and Heydon JJ held in Toll (FGCT) Pty Ltd v Alphapharm Pty Ltd (2004) 219 CLR 165 at 179 [40] relying on what they had held in Pacific Carriers Ltd v BNP Paribas (2004) 218 CLR 451 at 461-462 [22]. In Electricity Generation Corporation v Woodside Energy Ltd (2014) 251 CLR 640 at 657 [35] French CJ, Hayne, Crennan and Kiefel JJ explained that:Appreciation of the commercial purpose or objects is facilitated by an understanding “of the genesis of the transaction, the background, the context [and] the market in which the parties are operating” [Codelfa Construction Pty Ltd v State Rail Authority (NSW) (1982) 149 CLR 337 at 350 per Mason J, citing Reardon Smith Line v Hansen-Tangen [1976] 1 WLR 989 at 995-996; [1976] 3 All ER 570 at 574. See also Zhu v Treasurer (NSW) (2004) 218 CLR 530 at 559 [82] per Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby, Callinan and Heydon JJ; International Air Transport Association v Ansett Australia Holdings Ltd (2008) 234 CLR 151 at 160 [8] per Gleeson CJ]. As Arden LJ observed in Re Golden Key Ltd [2009] EWCA Civ 636 at [28]], unless a contrary intention is indicated, a court is entitled to approach the task of giving a commercial contract a businesslike interpretation on the assumption “that the parties … intended to produce a commercial result”. A commercial contract is to be construed so as to avoid it “making commercial nonsense or working commercial inconvenience” [Zhu v Treasurer (NSW) (2004) 218 CLR 530 at 559 [82] per Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby, Callinan and Heydon JJ. See also Gollin & Co Ltd v Karenlee Nominees Pty Ltd (1983) 153 CLR 455 at 464]. (emphasis added)