Court of Appeal
New South Wales
Case Title: Origin Energy LPG Ltd (formerly Boral Gas (NSW) Pty Ltd) v BestCare Foods Ltd Medium Neutral Citation: [2013] NSWCA 90 Hearing Date(s): 4-6 March 2013 Decision Date: 24 April 2013 Before: Macfarlan JA at [1]
Hoeben JA at [9]
Ward JA at [10]Decision: 1 The appeal from the judgments of McDougall J of 31 May and 15 June 2012 is allowed.
2 Set aside orders 1 to 7 inclusive made by McDougall J on 15 June 2012.
3 Order that the referee's report of the Honourable JMN Rolfe QC published on 30 August 2011 be adopted save that:
(a) Paragraphs 916, 934, 935 and 936 are rejected.
(b) The referee's reasoning and conclusions are rejected insofar as they constitute, incorporate or reflect findings as to whether, and to what extent, the respondents would, or may, have supplied pet food to the entity known as IAMS (and indefinitely to one or more of Nestlé, Safcol or Doane) if the explosion had not occurred at the respondent's premises on 25 January 2003.4 Remit the proceedings to the Equity Division for the determination of the damages to which the respondent is entitled and the making of orders (including as to costs) that the judge considers appropriate for disposal of the proceedings, on the basis that (subject to the tender of additional evidence as to matters of calculation and the tender of any further evidence that the judge considers is warranted on special grounds), the issues should be determined on the evidence taken before the referee, in accordance with rule 20.24(1)(d) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules. (Note that, as part of this remitter, the question whether there should be a modification of the interest award in order to take into account the reliance placed by BestCare on the IAMS 2 scenario should be a matter for the judge hearing the matter.)
5 Order the respondents to pay the appellant's costs of the quantum appeal.
6 Grant the respondents a certificate under the Suitors' Fund Act 1951, if qualified.
[Note: The Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 provide (Rule 36.11) that unless the Court otherwise orders, a judgment or order is taken to be entered when it is recorded in the Court's computerised court record system. Setting aside and variation of judgments or orders is dealt with by Rules 36.15, 36.16, 36.17 and 36.18. Parties should in particular note the time limit of fourteen days in Rule 36.16.]
Catchwords: EVIDENCE - findings of fact - appellate review - whether a finding of fact by a referee was based on no evidence or no more than a mere scintilla of evidence
DAMAGES - negligence - method for valuing a loss of commercial opportunity(or loss of chance) - whether credit should be given for salvage value of business including any residual goodwill
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - whether primary judge erred in exercise of discretion in adopting the referee's reportLegislation Cited: Evidence Act 1995
Uniform Civil Procedure…
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- Case
- [2013] NSWCA 90
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court was required to determine whether the referee's finding of fact regarding the respondent's potential supply of pet food to IAMS and other entities was based on no evidence or merely a scintilla of evidence. Additionally, the court had to consider the appropriate method for valuing a loss of commercial opportunity, specifically whether credit should be given for the salvage value of the business, including any residual goodwill. The court also examined whether the primary judge erred in exercising their discretion by adopting the referee's report without sufficient scrutiny.
The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, setting aside the orders of the primary judge. The court found that certain findings of fact by the referee, particularly those relating to the respondent's potential supply to IAMS and other entities, were not supported by sufficient evidence. The court rejected these specific findings and the reasoning underpinning them. The court also indicated that the valuation of a loss of commercial opportunity should account for salvage value and residual goodwill.
Consequently, the court ordered that the referee's report be adopted, with specific paragraphs and the aforementioned findings regarding potential supply being rejected. The proceedings were remitted to the Equity Division for the determination of damages, with the judge to consider the existing evidence and any further evidence warranted on special grounds, including the question of modifying the interest award based on the respondent's reliance on the "IAMS 2 scenario." The appellant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs of the quantum appeal.
Orders
Orders of the court
1 The appeal from the judgments of McDougall J of 31 May and 15 June 2012 is allowed.
2 Set aside orders 1 to 7 inclusive made by McDougall J on 15 June 2012.
3 Order that the referee's report of the Honourable JMN Rolfe QC published on 30 August 2011 be adopted save that:
(a) Paragraphs 916, 934, 935 and 936 are rejected.
(b) The referee's reasoning and conclusions are rejected insofar as they constitute, incorporate or reflect findings as to whether, and to what extent, the respondents would, or may, have supplied pet food to the entity known as IAMS (and indefinitely to one or more of Nestlé, Safcol or Doane) if the explosion had not occurred at the respondent's premises on 25 January 2003.
4 Remit the proceedings to the Equity Division for the determination of the damages to which the respondent is entitled and the making of orders (including as to costs) that the judge considers appropriate for disposal of the proceedings, on the basis that (subject to the tender of additional evidence as to matters of calculation and the tender of any further evidence that the judge considers is warranted on special grounds), the issues should be determined on the evidence taken before the referee, in accordance with rule 20.24(1)(d) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules. (Note that, as part of this remitter, the question whether there should be a modification of the interest award in order to take into account the reliance placed by BestCare on the IAMS 2 scenario should be a matter for the judge hearing the matter.)
5 Order the respondents to pay the appellant's costs of the quantum appeal.
6 Grant the respondents a certificate under the Suitors' Fund Act 1951, if qualified.
[Note: The Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 provide (Rule 36.11) that unless the Court otherwise orders, a judgment or order is taken to be entered when it is recorded in the Court's computerised court record system. Setting aside and variation of judgments or orders is dealt with by Rules 36.15, 36.16, 36.17 and 36.18. Parties should in particular note the time limit of fourteen days in Rule 36.16.]
Background
Background to the litigation
Origin Energy LPG Ltd v BestCare Foods Ltd originated from a primary judgment delivered by McDougall J on 31 May and 15 June 2012, which was subsequently appealed. The matter came before the court as an appeal against the primary judgment. Prior to this, a referee's report had been submitted by the Honourable JMN Rolfe QC on 30 August 2011, which was partially adopted but also subject to significant modifications by the appellate court. The appeal primarily addressed the correctness of factual findings made by the referee, the methodology for valuing a loss of commercial opportunity, and the exercise of discretion by the primary judge in adopting the referee's report. Key procedural steps included the filing of the appeal, the consideration of the referee's report, and the making of interlocutory orders regarding the remittal of the case to the Equity Division for further determination of damages and costs.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the findings of fact by the referee were based on no evidence or no more than a mere scintilla of evidence.
2. Whether credit should be given for the salvage value of the business, including any residual goodwill, in the method for valuing a loss of commercial opportunity (or loss of chance).
3. Whether the primary judge erred in the exercise of discretion in adopting the referee's report.
4. Whether the court should remit the proceedings to the Equity Division for the determination of the damages to which the respondent is entitled, on the basis that the issues should be determined on the evidence taken before the referee, in accordance with rule 20.24(1)(d) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules.
5. Whether there should be a modification of the interest award in order to take into account the reliance placed by BestCare on the IAMS 2 scenario.
Held
1. The court concluded that the findings of fact by the referee were not based on no evidence or no more than a mere scintilla of evidence. Appeal allowed and orders set aside.
2. The court held that credit should not be given for the salvage value of the business, including any residual goodwill, in the method for valuing a loss of commercial opportunity (or loss of chance). Referee's reasoning and conclusions rejected.
3. The court determined that the primary judge did not err in the exercise of discretion in adopting the referee's report, save for specific paragraphs and findings. Orders varied accordingly.
4. The court decided that the proceedings should be remitted to the Equity Division for the determination of the damages to which the respondent is entitled, based on the evidence taken before the referee. Remittal ordered.
5. The court found that there should not be a modification of the interest award to take into account the reliance placed by BestCare on the IAMS 2 scenario, leaving this matter for the judge hearing the remitted proceedings.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court addressed the issue of whether the findings of fact by the referee were based on no evidence or no more than a mere scintilla of evidence. It was established that the referee's findings concerning the respondents' business prospects were not supported by the evidence. The court found that the referee's conclusions were not sufficiently grounded, particularly in relation to the possibility of the respondents supplying pet food to IAMS or Nestlé, Safcol, or Doane if the explosion had not occurred. The court held that the referee's findings were based on mere speculation rather than credible evidence, leading to the rejection of certain paragraphs of the referee's report and the overall reasoning and conclusions as to the respondents' business prospects.
In determining the appropriate method for valuing a loss of commercial opportunity or loss of chance, the court considered whether credit should be given for the salvage value of the business, including any residual goodwill. The court held that the referee's approach to valuing the loss of commercial opportunity did not adequately account for the salvage value of the business or any residual goodwill. The court determined that the referee's method was flawed as it did not consider the possibility of the respondents continuing their business with some level of success despite the explosion. As a result, the court decided that the method for valuing the loss of commercial opportunity should be revisited in the remitted proceedings.
The court examined whether the primary judge erred in the exercise of discretion in adopting the referee's report. The court found that the primary judge had not erred in adopting most of the referee's findings and recommendations, as they were supported by the evidence. However, the court held that the primary judge should not have adopted the referee's findings and conclusions regarding the respondents' business prospects. The court concluded that the primary judge's decision to adopt the referee's report in its entirety was incorrect, and certain findings and conclusions needed to be rejected.
The court considered whether the proceedings should be remitted to the Equity Division for the determination of the damages to which the respondent is entitled. The court held that the issues should be determined on the evidence taken before the referee, in accordance with rule 20.24(1)(d) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules. The court decided to remit the proceedings to the Equity Division for the reassessment of damages, taking into account the evidence presented before the referee and any additional evidence that the judge considers warranted on special grounds. The court also held that the question of modifying the interest award to account for the respondents' reliance on the IAMS 2 scenario should be determined by the judge hearing the remitted matter.
Finally, the court addressed the issue of whether there should be a modification of the interest award to take into account the reliance placed by BestCare on the IAMS 2 scenario. The court held that this question should be determined by the judge hearing the remitted matter, as it involves an assessment of the appropriate interest award in light of the respondents' reliance on the IAMS 2 scenario. The court did not make a definitive ruling on this issue but left it to the judge to consider in the remitted proceedings. The ratio decidendi of this case lies in the court's approach to the appellate review of findings of fact, the valuation of loss of commercial opportunity, the exercise of discretion in adopting a referee's report, and the remittal of proceedings for the reassessment of damages. The court distinguished itself from prior authority by holding that the referee's findings were not sufficiently grounded in evidence and that the primary judge erred in adopting the referee's report in its entirety.