Oceanic Coal Australia Pty Ltd v Parker - [2010] FCA 1018

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Oceanic Coal Australia Pty Ltd v Parker [2010] FCA 1018

Citation: Oceanic Coal Australia Pty Ltd v Parker [2010] FCA 1018

Appeal from: Parker v Oceanic Coal Australia Pty Ltd (Chief Industrial Magistrate's Court of New South Wales, Case no. 2009/191059, 3 February 2010)

Parties: OCEANIC COAL AUSTRALIA PTY LTD (ACN 003 856 782) v STEPHEN JAMES PARKER

File number: NSD 176 of 2010

Judge: COWDROY J

Date of judgment: 17 September 2010

Catchwords: INDUSTRIAL LAW – Appeal from decision of Chief Industrial Magistrate – Workplace agreement – Interpretation of West Wallsend Underground Mine Collective Agreement 2007 – ‘Accident Pay’ – Whether Chief Industrial Magistrate erred in not giving effect to the plain and ordinary meaning of ‘Accident Pay’ clause – Whether Chief Industrial Magistrate erred in not taking into account defined terms ‘Classification Rate’ and ‘Rostered Hours’ – Whether Chief Industrial Magistrate erred in taking into account extraneous principles of perceived injustice and apparent ‘purpose’ of ‘Accident Pay’ – Held – ‘Accident Pay’ clause unambiguous – Chief Industrial Magistrate erred in not giving effect to the plain and ordinary meaning of relevant ‘Accident Pay clause’ – Appeal allowed.

Legislation: Workers Compensation Act 1987 (NSW)
Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth)

Cases cited: Amcor Limited v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union and Others (2005) 222 CLR 241
Ansett Australia Limited (subject to Deed of Company Arrangement) v Australian Licensed Aircraft Engineers’ Association [2003] FCAFC 209
Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing and Kindred Industries Union v Skilled Engineering Ltd [2003] FCA 260
City of Wanneroo v Holmes (1989) 30 IR 362
The Clothing Trades Award [1950] 68 CAR 597
Codelfa Construction Proprietary Limited v State Rail Authority of New South Wales (1982) 149 CLR 337
Kucks v CSR Limited (1996) 66 IR 182
Toll (FGCT) Pty Limited v Alphapharm Pty Limited and Others (2004) 219 CLR 165
Whittaker v Unisys Australia Pty Ltd (2010) 192 IR 311

Date of hearing: 11 June 2010

Place: Sydney

Division: FAIR WORK DIVISION

Category: Catchwords

Number of paragraphs: 68

Counsel for the Appellant: Mr J Murdoch SC

Counsel for the Respondent: Mr T Slevin

Solicitor for the Appellant: Corrs Chambers Westgarth

Solicitor for the Respondent: Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

FAIR WORK DIVISION

NSD 176 of 2010

ON APPEAL FROM CHIEF INDUSTRIAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF NEW SOUTH WALES

BETWEEN:
OCEANIC COAL AUSTRALIA PTY LTD (ACN 003 856 782)
Appellant

AND:
STEPHEN JAMES PARKER
Respondent

JUDGE:

COWDROY J

DATE OF ORDER:

17 SEPTEMBER 2010

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The Appeal is allowed.
2.The decision of Chief Industrial Magistrate Hart dated 3 February 2010 be quashed.
3.The Orders of Chief Industrial Magistrate Hart dated 24 February 2010 be set aside.

Note:Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
The text of entered orders can be located using Federal Law Search on the Court’s website.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Oceanic Coal Australia Pty Ltd v Parker and more:

Read every judgment in full
Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
Download judgments as PDF or Word

Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details

Case: [2010] FCA 1018
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Oceanic Coal Australia Pty Ltd and Mr Parker were the parties involved in this case. The dispute centred on the interpretation of clause 12(b)(i) in an industrial agreement. The case was heard by the Federal Court of Australia. The Court was asked to determine whether the Chief Industrial Magistrate had correctly interpreted clause 12(b)(i) of the industrial agreement. The Court considered whether the Chief Industrial Magistrate's interpretation aligned with the plain meaning of the clause and whether he had correctly applied the definitions of 'Classification Rate' and 'Overtime Rate'.

The Court examined the relevant case law on interpreting awards and industrial agreements, including Amcor Limited v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union and Others, and Toll (FGCT) Pty Limited v Alphapharm Pty Limited and Others. The Court noted that the object of interpreting such documents is to determine the intention of the parties from the words used, considering the context and surrounding circumstances. The Court found that the Chief Industrial Magistrate had erred in his interpretation of clause 12(b)(i) because it was contrary to the plain and ordinary meaning of the words. The Court also found that the Chief Industrial Magistrate's failure to apply the definitions of 'Classification Rate' and 'Overtime Rate' constituted an error of law. Therefore, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the decision of the Chief Industrial Magistrate, and quashed the orders made by him.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The text of cl 12(b)(i) remains determinative in its interpretation. The above considerations, while fortifying the Court’s conclusion that Oceanic’s interpretation of cl 12(b)(i) is to be preferred, are ultimately unnecessary in light of the Court’s finding on the plain meaning of the clause.CONCLUSION The Court is satisfied that the Chief Industrial Magistrate has erred in his interpretation of cl 12(b)(i). His Honour’s interpretation was contrary to the plain and ordinary meaning of the words contained with cl 12(b)(i) and his Honour’s failure to give effect to the definitions of ‘Classification Rate’ and ‘Overtime Rate’ within such interpretation constitutes an error of law. Accordingly the Court will order that the appeal be allowed, that the decision made by the Chief Industrial Magistrate dated 3 February 2010 be set aside and that the Orders made by the Chief Industrial Magistrate on 24 February 2010 be quashed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Mr Parker submits that the objective intent of the parties is clear from the words used in the relevant clause. CONSIDERATION The approach to interpretation of awards and industrial agreements is considered in Amcor Limited v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union and Others (2005) 222 CLR 241. In Amcor at [30] their Honours Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ observed in relation to the relevant clause in question, cl 55.1.1:Clause 55.1.1 must be read in context. It is necessary, therefore, to have regard not only to the text of clause 55.1.1, but also to a number of other matters: first, the other provisions made by clause 55; secondly, the text and operation of the Agreement both as a whole and by reference to other particular provisions made by it; and, thirdly, the legislative background against which the Agreement was made and in which it was to operate. Accordingly the content of the relevant clause must be considered together with the relationship of that clause or other clauses, the text and operation of the award and the legislative background. Effect must be given to the meaning of the award (or industrial agreement) as expressed in the terms that it uses (see Amcor per Kirby J at [70]). Further, if ‘reasonably available’ the award should be construed to make it operate ‘fairly towards both parties’ (see Amcor per Callinan J at [131]). As stated by Finkelstein J in Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing and Kindred Industries Union v Skilled Engineering Ltd [2003] FCA 260 at [21]:The object as always is to objectively determine the intention of the parties from the words of the document. That intention can manifest itself not only from words used but from words considered in light of the circumstances surrounding the transaction. In assessing the circumstances surrounding the transaction, Mason J’s observations in Codelfa Construction Proprietary Limited v State Rail Authority of New South Wales (1982) 149 CLR 337 are applicable. At 352 his Honour said:Consequently when the issue is which of two or more possible meanings is to be given to a contractual provision we look, not to the actual intentions, aspirations or expectations of the parties before or at the time of the contract, except in so far as they are expressed in the contract, but to the objective framework of facts within which the contract came into existence, and to the parties’ presumed intention in this setting. We do not take into account the actual intentions of the parties and for the very good reason that an investigation of those matters would not only be time consuming but it would also be unrewarding as it would tend to give too much weight to these factors at the expense of the actual language of the written contract. The above statement must be considered together with the observations of the High Court of Australia in Toll (FGCT) Pty Limited v Alphapharm Pty Limited and Others (2004) 219 CLR 165. At [40] the Court observed:It is not the subjective beliefs or understandings of the parties about their rights and liabilities that govern their contractual relations. What matters is what each party by words and conduct would have led a reasonable person in the position of the other party to believe. References to the common intention of the parties to a contract are to be understood as referring to what a reasonable person would understand by the language in which the parties have expressed their agreement. The meaning of the terms of a contractual document is to be determined by what a reasonable person would have understood them to mean. That, normally, requires consideration not only of the text, but also of the surrounding circumstances known to the parties, and the purpose and object of the transaction.[Footnotes omitted]

Citation:		Oceanic Coal Australia Pty Ltd v Parker [2010] FCA 1018
Appeal from:		Parker v Oceanic Coal Australia Pty Ltd (Chief Industrial Magistrate's Court of New South Wales, Case no. 2009/191059, 3 February 2010)
Parties:		OCEANIC COAL AUSTRALIA PTY LTD (ACN 003 856 782) v STEPHEN JAMES PARKER
File number:		NSD 176 of 2010
Judge:		COWDROY J
Date of judgment:		17 September 2010
Catchwords:		INDUSTRIAL LAW – Appeal from decision of Chief Industrial Magistrate – Workplace agreement – Interpretation of West Wallsend Underground Mine Collective Agreement 2007 – ‘Accident Pay’ – Whether Chief Industrial Magistrate erred in not giving effect to the plain and ordinary meaning of ‘Accident Pay’ clause – Whether Chief Industrial Magistrate erred in not taking into account defined terms ‘Classification Rate’ and ‘Rostered Hours’ – Whether Chief Industrial Magistrate erred in taking into account extraneous principles of perceived injustice and apparent ‘purpose’ of ‘Accident Pay’ – Held – ‘Accident Pay’ clause unambiguous – Chief Industrial Magistrate erred in not giving effect to the plain and ordinary meaning of relevant ‘Accident Pay clause’ – Appeal allowed.
Legislation:		Workers Compensation Act 1987 (NSW) Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth)
Cases cited:		Amcor Limited v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union and Others (2005) 222 CLR 241 Ansett Australia Limited (subject to Deed of Company Arrangement) v Australian Licensed Aircraft Engineers’ Association [2003] FCAFC 209 Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing and Kindred Industries Union v Skilled Engineering Ltd [2003] FCA 260 City of Wanneroo v Holmes (1989) 30 IR 362 The Clothing Trades Award [1950] 68 CAR 597 Codelfa Construction Proprietary Limited v State Rail Authority of New South Wales (1982) 149 CLR 337 Kucks v CSR Limited (1996) 66 IR 182 Toll (FGCT) Pty Limited v Alphapharm Pty Limited and Others (2004) 219 CLR 165 Whittaker v Unisys Australia Pty Ltd (2010) 192 IR 311
Date of hearing:	11 June 2010
Place:	Sydney
Division:	FAIR WORK DIVISION
Category:	Catchwords
Number of paragraphs:	68
Counsel for the Appellant:	Mr J Murdoch SC
Counsel for the Respondent:	Mr T Slevin
Solicitor for the Appellant:	Corrs Chambers Westgarth
Solicitor for the Respondent:	Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
FAIR WORK DIVISION	NSD 176 of 2010

BETWEEN:	OCEANIC COAL AUSTRALIA PTY LTD (ACN 003 856 782) Appellant
AND:	STEPHEN JAMES PARKER Respondent

JUDGE:	COWDROY J
DATE OF ORDER:	17 SEPTEMBER 2010
WHERE MADE:	SYDNEY