ACT CIVIL & ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL
O’SHAUGHNESSY v JWLAND GROUP PTY LTD (Appeal) [2025] ACAT 10
AA 33/2024; AA 35/2024 (XD 199/2024; XD 202/2024)
Catchwords: APPEAL – civil dispute – contract – general release – interpretation – general words of a release are to be read subject to the particular matters that are shown by the recitals to be the occasion of the instrument – regard to be had to the language used by the parties, the surrounding circumstances known to them and the commercial purpose or objects to be secured by the contract – appreciation of the commercial purpose is facilitated by an understanding of the genesis of a transaction, the background and the context.
Cases cited:Di Liristi v Matautia Developments Pty Ltd [2021] NSWCA 328
Electricity Generation Corporation v Woodside Energy Ltd [2014] HCA 7
Grant v John Grant & Sons Pty Ltd [1954] HCA 23
Protheroe v Protheroe [2023] NSWCA 328
Pye v Registrar, Domestic Animals Act 2000 [2022] ACAT 102
Sabouni v Revelop Building and Developments Pty Ltd [2021] NSWSC 31
Tribunal:Acting Presidential Member G Curtin SC
Date of Orders: 12 February 2025
Date of Reasons for Decision: 12 February 2025
Date of Publication: 21 February 2025
AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY )
CIVIL & ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL ) AA 33/2024
BETWEEN:
BERNADINE O’SHAUGHNESSY
Appellant
AND:
JWLAND GROUP PTY LTD ACN 614 864 792
Respondent
AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY )
CIVIL & ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL ) AA 35/2024
BETWEEN:
BERNADINE O’SHAUGHNESSY
Appellant
AND:
JWLAND GROUP PTY LTD ACN 614 864 792
First Respondent
CELESTIAL DEVELOPMENT NO 4 PTY LTD ACN 169 997 655
Second Respondent
APPEAL TRIBUNAL: Acting Presidential Member G Curtin SC
DATE:12 February 2025
ORDER
The Tribunal orders that in both appeals:
Appeal upheld.
The orders of the Original Tribunal dated 15 July 2024 are set aside.
The proceedings are remitted to the Original Tribunal as originally constituted to be determined according to law and in accordance with these reasons.
………………………………..
Acting Presidential Member G Curtin SC
REASONS FOR DECISION
Introduction
In 2020, the appellant commenced proceedings against the respondents (numbered XD 1171) in relation to alleged defects in a residential unit she had purchased off-the-plan. As explained in more detail below, the issues in dispute between the parties in those proceedings were finalised by two sets of Tribunal orders and, subsequently, by a Settlement Deed (the Deed).
In 2024, the appellant commenced three proceedings against the respondents and another party (numbered XD 199, 201 and 202) for further alleged defects in the unit. The three proceedings were heard together with evidence in each proceeding being evidence in the others.
In defence of those three claims, the respondents submitted that a general release clause in the Deed prevented the appellant from bringing the three proceedings. The first respondent also cross-claimed. It claimed a contractual right to payment of its legal costs on an indemnity basis in defending the three proceedings relying upon certain terms of the Deed. The respondents were successful on both counts.
The…
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- Case
- [2025] ACAT 10
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the court was how to properly construe the deed of release in light of the principles established in relevant case law, particularly Electricity Generation Corporation v Woodside Energy Ltd and Grant v John Grant & Sons Pty Ltd. The court had to determine whether the appellant could rely on evidence of the parties' subjective intentions to argue for rectification, and if so, under what circumstances such evidence could be considered. The court also needed to clarify the extent to which principles of equity might permit a broader interpretation of the deed beyond what the strict common law would allow.
The Tribunal found that the principles for construing commercial contracts were well-established, focusing on what a reasonable businessperson would have understood the terms to mean, taking into account the language used, the surrounding circumstances, and the commercial purpose of the contract. The Tribunal noted that the Original Tribunal had not fully considered the relevant legal principles, particularly those relating to equitable interpretations of deeds of release. The Tribunal held that the evidence of the parties' subjective intentions, which was not admissible at common law, could be considered under equity if it was relevant to establishing the commercial purpose or objects of the transaction. The Tribunal concluded that the appellant had not demonstrated a common mistake or misrepresentation sufficient to warrant rectification of the deed, but the appeal was upheld on the basis that the Original Tribunal had not properly applied the legal principles in its reasoning.
The Tribunal ordered that the appeals be upheld, the orders of the Original Tribunal be set aside, and the proceedings be remitted to the Original Tribunal to be determined according to law and in accordance with the Tribunal's reasons.
Orders
Orders of the court
The Tribunal orders that in both appeals:
1.
Appeal upheld.
2.
The orders of the Original Tribunal dated 15 July 2024 are set aside.
3.
The proceedings are remitted to the Original Tribunal as originally constituted to be determined according to law and in accordance with these reasons.
Background
Background to the litigation
This matter has been before the court on appeal from the Original Tribunal's decision. The Original Tribunal had found in favour of the respondent, holding that the Deed of Release was clear and that it released all claims Ms O'Shaughnessy had against the respondent. Dissatisfied with this outcome, Ms O'Shaughnessy appealed to the Tribunal, which heard the appeal. Prior to the Original Tribunal, there were no other significant proceedings or decisions that need to be noted. The appeal before the Tribunal was the first appellate review of the matter.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. What are the principles to apply when construing the Deed of Release?
2. Did the Deed of Release intend to release all claims or only some of them?
3. Can evidence of the parties' subjective intentions be admitted in the construction of the Deed of Release?
Held
1. The court held that the principles to apply when construing the Deed of Release were well established and followed the approach set out in Electricity Generation Corporation v Woodside Energy Ltd. The court concluded that the meaning of the terms of a commercial contract is to be determined by what a reasonable businessperson would have understood those terms to mean, taking into account the language used, surrounding circumstances, and the commercial purpose or objects of the contract.
2. The court held that the Deed of Release intended to release all claims, not just some of them. The court concluded that the Deed of Release was clear and unambiguous in its intention to fully release the claims as understood by a reasonable businessperson.
3. The court held that evidence of the parties' subjective intentions could not be admitted in the construction of the Deed of Release. The court concluded that such evidence was not relevant to the objective interpretation of the Deed, aligning with the principles established in Electricity Generation Corporation v Woodside Energy Ltd and Grant v John Grant & Sons Pty Ltd.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The principles to apply when construing the Deed were not in dispute. They were summarised in Electricity Generation Corporation v Woodside Energy Ltd [2014] HCA 7 (Electricity Generation) at [35]:The meaning of the terms of a commercial contract is to be determined by what a reasonable businessperson would have understood those terms to mean. That approach is not unfamiliar. As reaffirmed, it will require consideration of the language used by the parties, the surrounding circumstances known to them and the commercial purpose or objects to be secured by the contract. Appreciation of the commercial purpose or objects is facilitated by an understanding “of the genesis of the transaction, the background, the context [and] the market in which the parties are operating”. As Arden LJ observed in Re Golden Key Ltd, unless a contrary intention is indicated, a court is entitled to approach the task of giving a commercial contract a businesslike interpretation on the assumption “that the parties … intended to produce a commercial result”. A commercial contract is to be construed so as to avoid it “making commercial nonsense or working commercial inconvenience”. An earlier authority was also cited by the appellant, namely Grant v John Grant & Sons Pty Ltd [1954] HCA 23 (Grant). In the plurality’s judgment their Honours said:From the authorities which have already been cited it will be seen that equity proceeded upon the principle that a releasee must not use the general words of a release as a means of escaping the fulfilment of obligations falling outside the true purpose of the transaction as ascertained from the nature of the instrument and the surrounding circumstances including the state of knowledge of the respective parties concerning the existence, character and extent of the liability in question and the actual intention of the releasor. This authority was important to the outcome of these appeals and, it must be said, was not cited to the Original Tribunal by the appellant. That is not to be critical of the appellant, who appeared before the Original Tribunal without legal representation, but as is not uncommon the Original Tribunal did not receive as much assistance on the applicable legal principles as one would prefer to see. In relation to Grant, the appellant submitted that equity and the common law operated differently when construing deeds of release, and that if she failed on her common law interpretation she could succeed on her “equitable” interpretation (which, it was submitted, would allow evidence of the parties’ subjective intentions to be admitted whereas at common law they could not be admitted). Quite how Grant is to be applied after Electricity Generation in that respect has been the subject of some debate at intermediate appellate level. One view which has been expressed is that Grant’s holding was to the effect that evidence of the subjective intention of the parties (otherwise inadmissible at law) was admissible when equitable relief was being sought in relation to a release. However, that view is not universal.