Northern Territory of Australia v Noaks

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CITATION:Northern Territory of Australia v Noaks & Anor [2022] NTSC 61

PARTIES:NORTHERN TERRITORY OF AUSTRALIA

v

NOAKS, Anthony

And

WOODCOCK, Judge Alan

TITLE OF COURT:  SUPREME COURT OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORY

JURISDICTION:  APPEAL from LOCAL COURT exercising Territory jurisdiction

FILE NO:2022-01055-SC

DELIVERED:  3 August 2022

HEARING DATE:  6 July 2022

JUDGMENT OF:  Reeves J

CATCHWORDS:

APPEAL — Workers compensation — Appeal from Work Health Court — Worker successfully claimed compensation for mental injury under Return to Work Act 1986 — Employer subsequently served s 69 notice — Judge found that this employer failed to prove pre-existing mental illness was the cause of his incapacity for work — Judge concluded that the worker suffered injury in course of employment and was entitled to compensation —Grounds of appeal ­— Failure to afford natural justice/ procedural fairness — Failure to provide adequate reasons — No evidence to support a finding of fact— No error of law established — Appeal dismissed.

Return to Work Act 1986 ss 69, 104, 116

Cases referred to:

Boyle (a pseudonym) v R [2022] SASCA 50; DL v The Queen [2018] 266 CLR 1; [2018] HCA 26; Hall Contracting Pty Ltd v MacMahon Contractors Pty Ltd & Anor (2014) 34 NTLR 17; JKC Australia LNG Pty Ltd v INPEX Operations Australia Pty Ltd (2018) 41 NTLR 149; Keith v Gal [2013] NSWCA 339Laminex Group v Catford [2021] NTSC 92; Lee v MacMahon Contractors Pty Ltd (2018) 41 NTLR 168; Mitchell v Cullingral Pty Ltd [2012] NSWCA 389; Musico & Ors v Davenport & Ors [2003] NSWSC 977; Paridis v Settlement Agents Supervisory Board (2007) 33 WAR 361; Quality Plumbing & Building Contractors Pty Ltd v Schloss [2015] 253 IR 102; Saeed v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship (2010) 241 CLR 252; Walker v Walker (1937) 57 CLR 630; Wurramara v Blackwell (2018) 346 FLR 391; [2018] NTSC 89; Zurich Bay Holdings Pty Ltd v Brookfield Multiplex Engineering and Infrastructure Pty Ltd [2014] WASC 40.

REPRESENTATION:

Counsel:

Appellant:JW Roper SC with K Frost

First Respondent:  DA Skennar QC with J Hodge

Second Respondent:                   Nil       

Solicitors:

Appellant:Hunt & Hunt 

First Respondent:  Hall Payne Lawyers

Second Respondent:                   Nil       

Judgment category classification:    B

Judgment ID Number:  Ree2202

Number of pages:  29

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORY
OF AUSTRALIA
AT DARWIN

Northern Territory of Australia v Noaks & Anor [2022] NTSC 61

No. 2022-01055-SC

BETWEEN:

NORTHERN TERRITORY OF AUSTRALIA

Appellant

AND:

ANTHONY NOAKS

First Respondent

AND:

JUDGE ALAN WOODCOCK
  Second Respondent

CORAM:    REEVES J

REASONS FOR DECISION

(Delivered 3 August 2022)

Introduction

  1. On 31 March 2022 a Local Court Judge determined that Mr Noaks (the Worker) had suffered an injury in the course of his employment with the Northern Territory of Australia (the Employer) and was entitled to be paid compensation under the provisions of the Return to Work Act 1986 (the RTW Act). This appeal concerns that judgment.   

  2. The Employer alleges…

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Details
Case
[2022] NTSC 61
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Northern Territory of Australia brought this appeal against Noaks, following a decision in the Work Health Court that Noaks must compensate a worker for mental injury sustained in the course of employment. The appeal was based on the grounds that the trial judge failed to afford natural justice, failed to provide adequate reasons, and made findings without evidentiary support. The appeal was dismissed. The Court found that the trial judge's reasoning was sound, and there was no procedural unfairness or error of law. The trial judge had correctly assessed the evidence and made findings in line with the worker's pleaded case, rejecting the employer's defence based on the worker's pre-existing mental illness.

The legal issues the Court had to decide included whether the trial judge had failed to afford natural justice or procedural fairness, whether he had provided adequate reasons for his findings, and whether there was sufficient evidence to support his findings of fact. The Court held that the trial judge had correctly applied the principles of natural justice and provided adequate reasons for his findings. The evidence supported the trial judge's conclusion that the worker had suffered a mental injury in the course of employment, arising from racist bullying by a co-worker. The Court found that the employer had not established any error of law in the trial judge's decision.

The Court's reasoning was based on a detailed review of the evidence and the trial judge's reasons for decision. The trial judge had considered the worker's history of mental health issues and found that it was insufficiently cogent to draw a conclusion about a pre-existing diagnosable mental illness. The trial judge accepted the worker's evidence of ongoing racist bullying by a co-worker, which he found to be a significant factor in the worker's mental injury. The Court held that the trial judge's findings were supported by the evidence and that there was no basis for the employer's claims of procedural unfairness or evidentiary error. The appeal was dismissed with no orders as to costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Importantly, the trial judge expanded on his statement about “the state of the evidence” which appears in the first line of [19] of the Reasons (emphasised at [21]) above), in the following terms at ([25]):The Worker has suffered from mental health problems all of his adult life, his medical history makes this clear. In circumstances where he does not accept this, he has not provided his prior history to either of the expert witnesses. The documentary history of mental health problems is insufficiently cogent to draw a rational conclusion as to a definitive mental illness prior to the pleaded injury. The attempts to further investigate his mental illness historically have not been followed up by the Worker. There are previous endeavours at diagnosis that are not adequately founded in a meaningful history for reasons discussed. A broad range of different working diagnosis are made or mused upon by various treating medical service providers; they are many and varied. The state of the evidence is such that I am unable to reach a conclusion as to a diagnosable mental illness prior to the injury as pleaded. Though clearly he was a vulnerable person with a history of need for medical assistance and traumatic experiences, and consequently carried with him personal challenges. He was also possibly addicted to prescription opioids, but again I cannot be satisfied of a diagnosable medical condition for the same reasons. (Emphasis added). Furthermore, with respect to the commencement of the Worker’s symptoms mentioned in the penultimate sentence of [24] of the Reasons (emphasised at [22] above) his Honour made several additional observations after which he made a finding that the Worker had suffered an injury in the course of his employment with the Employer as follows (at [26]):The Worker was clearly a vulnerable person with challenges when he commenced employment with the Employer at the Alice Springs Hospital, an institution that provides treatment for ill or injured people in Alice Springs. However he was, until on or about 28 March 2018 of sufficiently sound health to attend work and complete his daily tasks as a switchboard operator. The Employer shows by virtue of its pleadings and cross-examination of the Worker a lack of insight into the potential effects of race based bullying in the work place. Ms Pine, under the guise of training, bullied the vulnerable special provision Worker on the basis that he was an Aboriginal person with light skin. I am satisfied for reasons previously stated that this type of comment was especially hurtful to the Worker. The mock emergency staged by Ms Pine left the Worker believing a person had died as a result of his incapacity to help. I am satisfied she regularly insulted and demeaned the Worker, including in the presence of co-workers.As a consequence of the ongoing bullying by his co-worker Ms Pine in the workplace, I am satisfied the Worker suffered an injury in the form of Major Depressive Disorder. I am satisfied the injury arose out of or in the course of the Worker’s employment with the Employer (Emphasis added).

Decision

Reasons for decision

The trial of that proceeding occurred over four days in February 2021. As already mentioned, on 31 March 2022, the trial judge found that the Worker had suffered an injury arising out of or in the course of his employment and ordered that the Employer pay him compensation.The Local Court Decision The trial judge began his reasons for decision (hereafter “the Reasons”) by briefly setting out the history to the Worker’s claim (at [1] to [4]). His Honour then reviewed the evidence before him concerning the question whether the Worker had sustained an injury in the course of his employment (at [5] to [8]). At the conclusion of that review, he made the following findings, all but one of which were in the Worker’s favour (at [9]):I accept the Worker’s evidence that Ms Pine was regularly rude and demeaning to him in the course of his employment, amounting to bullying. I accept the Worker’s account that Ms Pine facilitated a mock medical emergency phone call. These findings are consistent with Ms Pine’s account as quoted. I do not accept the suggestion this was invented by the Worker at a time after the initial Application. I accept the Worker’s account of the mock emergency and am satisfied he was distressed as a result. I also accept Ms Pine said words to the effect that the Worker did not look Aboriginal and disparaged his ethnicity, commencing on the first day of his employment. I do not accept comments were made about the Worker’s grandmother. Rather, it would seem to me this is more of a rationale as to why comments about the Worker’s ethnicity hurt so much (he takes such insults as an insult to his grandmother who he reveres). I am satisfied that the bullying by Ms Pine of the Worker was ongoing, persistent and racist. I reject the suggestion that this behaviour is trivial. However, immediately following those findings, his Honour made the following mixed findings about the Worker’s reliability as an “historian of fact” (at [10]):The Worker gave evidence at length and was vigorously cross-examined for some hours. It became apparent that he is a person of limited capacity and at times an indifferent historian of fact. He appears to me a person of limited literacy and bad at filling out forms as a result. He has a long history of mental health issues, of which he is in complete denial. He has over the course of various physical injuries come to use opioid medication recreationally, possibly he is or was addicted to them. He has a number of physical ailments as a result of previous injuries. He revealed himself to be a fantasist as to his usual recreational pursuits and some of his former capacities. He has a long history of threatening violence and often sexual violence to men, women and children in perusing perceived grievances with medical advisers, public servants, administrators and co-workers in various settings (not in the work place the subject of these proceedings). He has at times during his numerous historic interactions with medical advisers and service providers been dishonest and threatening.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Worker therefore contended that his Honour “was entitled to give such weight to [or Dr Achan’s diagnosis] as he might think proper or as the circumstances warranted” relying upon Walker v Walker (1937) 57 CLR 630 per Latham CJ at 635, Dixon J at 636 and Evatt J at 638. Finally, the Worker contended that the failure to alert the parties to an intention to ascribe no weight to Dr Achan’s report could not, in all the circumstances, be characterised as a failure to afford natural justice or procedural fairness.Consideration The short answer on this alleged error is that the words “no specific personality diagnosis could be made” in [19] of the Reasons did not constitute a finding that Dr Hundertmark was propounding no diagnosis at all. Instead those words were, as the Worker’s counsel correctly contended, an accurate précis of the words of Dr Hundertmark’s report (set out at [35] above). Moreover, those words were not directed to Dr Hundertmark’s diagnosis as to the nature of the Worker’s injury - which he had earlier identified at [12] of the Reasons (set out at [18] above) - but rather to the related issue about whether he had any resulting incapacity for work. Specifically whether, in the terms of the introductory words to [19] of the Reasons, it was possible to make a finding that the Worker had “a diagnosable mental illness prior to the events the subject of these proceedings”. Hence the observations in [19] and [20] of the Reasons were directed to that issue and, in particular, to the difficulty posed by the Worker’s “uncooperative and at times non-responsive” attitude to facilitating that pursuit (at [20] of the Reasons). The same theme was pursued at [25] of the Reasons. There, his Honour concluded that neither Dr Hundertmark, nor any of the other medical practitioners, including Dr Achan, was able to obtain a useful history from the Worker. As well, he earlier observed that Dr Hundertmark had the additional disadvantage of being inadequately briefed with respect to the “medical treatment of the Worker in the relevant period” (at [20] of the Reasons). Ultimately his Honour concluded that he was “unable to reach a conclusion as to a diagnosable mental illness prior to the injury as pleaded” (at [25] of the Reasons). On this basis, he rejected Dr Hundertmark’s opinion that the Worker’s incapacity for work was caused by that pre-existing mental illness. Instead, he accepted the Worker’s pleaded case based on Dr Takyar’s opinions that he “… suffered an injury in the form of Major Depressive Disorder..[which]..arose out of or in the course of [his] employment with the Employer” (at [26] of the Reasons). That, in turn, led to him specifically rejecting the countering pleading in the Employer’s amended defence and counterclaim based on Dr Hundertmark’s opinions (at [28] of the Reasons, set out at [25(a)] above). There is, therefore, no basis for the Employer’s claim that the trial judge dealt with the case on a basis that had not been pleaded, nor raised in argument, at the trial. In the absence of any indication that his Honour decided the matter on that basis, none of the authorities upon which the Employer has relied is relevant. In any event, most of those authorities are directed to the judicial review of administrative decision makers. Consequently, with one or two exceptions[4], they do not shed any relevant light on the obligations of a judicial decision maker to afford natural justice when determining a matter before him or her.