CITATION:Northern Territory of Australia v Noaks & Anor [2022] NTSC 61
PARTIES:NORTHERN TERRITORY OF AUSTRALIA
v
NOAKS, Anthony
And
WOODCOCK, Judge Alan
TITLE OF COURT: SUPREME COURT OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORY
JURISDICTION: APPEAL from LOCAL COURT exercising Territory jurisdiction
FILE NO:2022-01055-SC
DELIVERED: 3 August 2022
HEARING DATE: 6 July 2022
JUDGMENT OF: Reeves J
CATCHWORDS:
APPEAL — Workers compensation — Appeal from Work Health Court — Worker successfully claimed compensation for mental injury under Return to Work Act 1986 — Employer subsequently served s 69 notice — Judge found that this employer failed to prove pre-existing mental illness was the cause of his incapacity for work — Judge concluded that the worker suffered injury in course of employment and was entitled to compensation —Grounds of appeal — Failure to afford natural justice/ procedural fairness — Failure to provide adequate reasons — No evidence to support a finding of fact— No error of law established — Appeal dismissed.
Return to Work Act 1986 ss 69, 104, 116
Cases referred to:
Boyle (a pseudonym) v R [2022] SASCA 50; DL v The Queen [2018] 266 CLR 1; [2018] HCA 26; Hall Contracting Pty Ltd v MacMahon Contractors Pty Ltd & Anor (2014) 34 NTLR 17; JKC Australia LNG Pty Ltd v INPEX Operations Australia Pty Ltd (2018) 41 NTLR 149; Keith v Gal [2013] NSWCA 339Laminex Group v Catford [2021] NTSC 92; Lee v MacMahon Contractors Pty Ltd (2018) 41 NTLR 168; Mitchell v Cullingral Pty Ltd [2012] NSWCA 389; Musico & Ors v Davenport & Ors [2003] NSWSC 977; Paridis v Settlement Agents Supervisory Board (2007) 33 WAR 361; Quality Plumbing & Building Contractors Pty Ltd v Schloss [2015] 253 IR 102; Saeed v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship (2010) 241 CLR 252; Walker v Walker (1937) 57 CLR 630; Wurramara v Blackwell (2018) 346 FLR 391; [2018] NTSC 89; Zurich Bay Holdings Pty Ltd v Brookfield Multiplex Engineering and Infrastructure Pty Ltd [2014] WASC 40.
REPRESENTATION:
Counsel:
Appellant:JW Roper SC with K Frost
First Respondent: DA Skennar QC with J Hodge
Second Respondent: Nil
Solicitors:
Appellant:Hunt & Hunt
First Respondent: Hall Payne Lawyers
Second Respondent: Nil
Judgment category classification: B
Judgment ID Number: Ree2202
Number of pages: 29
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORY
OF AUSTRALIA
AT DARWINNorthern Territory of Australia v Noaks & Anor [2022] NTSC 61
No. 2022-01055-SC
BETWEEN:
NORTHERN TERRITORY OF AUSTRALIA
Appellant
AND:
ANTHONY NOAKS
First Respondent
AND:
JUDGE ALAN WOODCOCK
Second Respondent
CORAM: REEVES J
REASONS FOR DECISION
(Delivered 3 August 2022)
Introduction
On 31 March 2022 a Local Court Judge determined that Mr Noaks (the Worker) had suffered an injury in the course of his employment with the Northern Territory of Australia (the Employer) and was entitled to be paid compensation under the provisions of the Return to Work Act 1986 (the RTW Act). This appeal concerns that judgment.
The Employer alleges…
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- Case
- [2022] NTSC 61
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues the Court had to decide included whether the trial judge had failed to afford natural justice or procedural fairness, whether he had provided adequate reasons for his findings, and whether there was sufficient evidence to support his findings of fact. The Court held that the trial judge had correctly applied the principles of natural justice and provided adequate reasons for his findings. The evidence supported the trial judge's conclusion that the worker had suffered a mental injury in the course of employment, arising from racist bullying by a co-worker. The Court found that the employer had not established any error of law in the trial judge's decision.
The Court's reasoning was based on a detailed review of the evidence and the trial judge's reasons for decision. The trial judge had considered the worker's history of mental health issues and found that it was insufficiently cogent to draw a conclusion about a pre-existing diagnosable mental illness. The trial judge accepted the worker's evidence of ongoing racist bullying by a co-worker, which he found to be a significant factor in the worker's mental injury. The Court held that the trial judge's findings were supported by the evidence and that there was no basis for the employer's claims of procedural unfairness or evidentiary error. The appeal was dismissed with no orders as to costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Worker therefore contended that his Honour “was entitled to give such weight to [or Dr Achan’s diagnosis] as he might think proper or as the circumstances warranted” relying upon Walker v Walker (1937) 57 CLR 630 per Latham CJ at 635, Dixon J at 636 and Evatt J at 638. Finally, the Worker contended that the failure to alert the parties to an intention to ascribe no weight to Dr Achan’s report could not, in all the circumstances, be characterised as a failure to afford natural justice or procedural fairness.Consideration The short answer on this alleged error is that the words “no specific personality diagnosis could be made” in [19] of the Reasons did not constitute a finding that Dr Hundertmark was propounding no diagnosis at all. Instead those words were, as the Worker’s counsel correctly contended, an accurate précis of the words of Dr Hundertmark’s report (set out at [35] above). Moreover, those words were not directed to Dr Hundertmark’s diagnosis as to the nature of the Worker’s injury - which he had earlier identified at [12] of the Reasons (set out at [18] above) - but rather to the related issue about whether he had any resulting incapacity for work. Specifically whether, in the terms of the introductory words to [19] of the Reasons, it was possible to make a finding that the Worker had “a diagnosable mental illness prior to the events the subject of these proceedings”. Hence the observations in [19] and [20] of the Reasons were directed to that issue and, in particular, to the difficulty posed by the Worker’s “uncooperative and at times non-responsive” attitude to facilitating that pursuit (at [20] of the Reasons). The same theme was pursued at [25] of the Reasons. There, his Honour concluded that neither Dr Hundertmark, nor any of the other medical practitioners, including Dr Achan, was able to obtain a useful history from the Worker. As well, he earlier observed that Dr Hundertmark had the additional disadvantage of being inadequately briefed with respect to the “medical treatment of the Worker in the relevant period” (at [20] of the Reasons). Ultimately his Honour concluded that he was “unable to reach a conclusion as to a diagnosable mental illness prior to the injury as pleaded” (at [25] of the Reasons). On this basis, he rejected Dr Hundertmark’s opinion that the Worker’s incapacity for work was caused by that pre-existing mental illness. Instead, he accepted the Worker’s pleaded case based on Dr Takyar’s opinions that he “… suffered an injury in the form of Major Depressive Disorder..[which]..arose out of or in the course of [his] employment with the Employer” (at [26] of the Reasons). That, in turn, led to him specifically rejecting the countering pleading in the Employer’s amended defence and counterclaim based on Dr Hundertmark’s opinions (at [28] of the Reasons, set out at [25(a)] above). There is, therefore, no basis for the Employer’s claim that the trial judge dealt with the case on a basis that had not been pleaded, nor raised in argument, at the trial. In the absence of any indication that his Honour decided the matter on that basis, none of the authorities upon which the Employer has relied is relevant. In any event, most of those authorities are directed to the judicial review of administrative decision makers. Consequently, with one or two exceptions[4], they do not shed any relevant light on the obligations of a judicial decision maker to afford natural justice when determining a matter before him or her.