NGI Savannah Living Communities Pty Ltd v Dunne

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

NGI Savannah Living Communities Pty Ltd v Dunne [2025] QSC 92

PARTIES:

NGI SAVANNAH LIVING COMMUNITIES PTY LTD ACN 613 046 290

(Plaintiff)

v

NEVILLE MARTIN DUNNE

(First Defendant)
And
MP01 PTY LTD ACN 169 614 993

(Seventh Defendant)

FILE NO/S:

BS 11263 of 2018

DIVISION:

Trial Division

PROCEEDING:

Application

DELIVERED ON:

13 May 2025

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

23 April 2025

JUDGE:

Bowskill CJ

ORDERS:

THE COURT DECLARES THAT:

1.        The first defendant, Neville Martin Dunne, is not guilty of the charges of contempt specified in charges 1 and 2 of the application filed on 6 November 2024.

2.        The first defendant, Neville Martin Dunne, is guilty of the charges of contempt specified in charges 3, 4 and 5 of the application filed on 6 November 2024.

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

3.        The parties are directed to make submissions on penalty and costs.

4.        The application is otherwise adjourned to a date to be fixed by the court for the determination of penalty and any order as to costs.

5.        Neville Martin Dunne is directed to appear in person on the date fixed by the court in accordance with paragraph 4.

CATCHWORDS:

COURTS AND JUDGES – CONTEMPT – PARTICULAR CONTEMPTS – DISOBEDIENCE OF ORDERS OF COURT – where the plaintiff alleges the first defendant breached the terms of a freezing order in five particularised circumstances – where there was no evidence the first defendant was personally served with the order, but the order was made by consent and the first defendant filed an affidavit in accordance with one of the requirements of the order – whether the first defendant had knowledge of the terms of the order – whether there was an irregularity in the form of the freezing order, because it did not have a statement written on it or attached to it in terms of r 665(3) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld), such that proceedings for contempt cannot lie – whether the assets of the seventh defendant company are the first defendant’s assets within the meaning of the freezing order – whether the charges of contempt are proved beyond reasonable doubt

Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld) s 32C
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) r 269, r 260A, r 260B, r 371(1), r 371(2), r 661(1), r 665(3), r 898(2)(a), r 904, r 930, r 932

Berghofer v Wicks [2024] QSC 4, applied
Broad Idea International Ltd v Convoy Collateral Ltd [2022] 2 WLR 703, considered
Burton v Spencer [2015] QSC 187, cited
Camm v ASI Development Co Pty Ltd [2007] QCA 317, applied
Cardile v LED Builders Pty Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 380, cited
Commissioner for Fair Trading v TLC Consulting Services Pty Ltd [2011] QSC 233, applied
Construction Forestry Mining and Energy Union v Grocon Constructors (Victoria) Pty Ltd (2014) 47 VR 527; [2014] VSCA 261, cited
Convoy Collateral Ltd v Broad Idea International Ltd [2023] AC 389

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Details
Case
[2025] QSC 92
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of NGI Savannah Living Communities Pty Ltd v Dunne, the plaintiff sought to hold the first defendant, Neville Martin Dunne, in contempt for allegedly breaching a freezing order. The dispute centred on whether Mr Dunne had violated the terms of the order in several instances and whether any procedural irregularities in the order rendered it invalid. The Federal Court of Australia was tasked with determining these issues.

The central legal issues the court needed to address were whether Mr Dunne had knowledge of the terms of the freezing order despite not being personally served, whether the form of the freezing order was irregular as it did not include a statement as required by r 665(3) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld), and whether the assets of the seventh defendant company were considered Mr Dunne’s assets for the purposes of the freezing order. Additionally, the court had to decide if the charges of contempt were proven beyond reasonable doubt.

The court approached the case by first reaffirming the purpose of a freezing order, which is to prevent the dissipation of assets that could be used to satisfy a judgment. The court acknowledged that although MP01 Pty Ltd was a third party, the court had to determine whether its assets were subject to the freezing order. In doing so, the court applied the principles outlined in Cardile v LED Builders Pty Ltd, which provided that a freezing order could apply to third-party assets if they are assets against which a judgment could be enforced. The court found that the enforcement principle, as affirmed by the Privy Council in Convoy Collateral Ltd v Broad Idea International Ltd, justified the freezing order. Regarding the procedural irregularity, the court found that the absence of a specific statement in the order did not invalidate the proceedings for contempt. Finally, the court concluded that Mr Dunne was aware of the freezing order’s terms despite not being personally served, and that the assets of the seventh defendant company were indeed his assets for the purposes of the order. Consequently, the court found Mr Dunne guilty of three of the five charges of contempt.

The court issued orders declaring Mr Dunne not guilty of the first two charges of contempt but guilty of the remaining three. The court directed the parties to submit on penalty and costs and adjourned the application for the determination of penalty and any order as to costs. Mr Dunne was also directed to appear in person on a date to be fixed by the court.

Orders

Orders of the court

THE COURT DECLARES THAT:

1. The first defendant, Neville Martin Dunne, is not guilty of the charges of contempt specified in charges 1 and 2 of the application filed on 6 November 2024.

2. The first defendant, Neville Martin Dunne, is guilty of the charges of contempt specified in charges 3, 4 and 5 of the application filed on 6 November 2024.

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

3. The parties are directed to make submissions on penalty and costs.

4. The application is otherwise adjourned to a date to be fixed by the court for the determination of penalty and any order as to costs.

5. Neville Martin Dunne is directed to appear in person on the date fixed by the court in accordance with paragraph 4.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

A return to legal principle assists to resolve this dispute. The purpose of a freezing order is to prevent frustration of the court’s processes; or, put another way, “to facilitate the enforcement of a judgment or order for the payment of money by preventing assets against which such a judgment could potentially be enforced from being dealt with in such a way that insufficient assets are available to meet the judgment”.[33][33]Convoy Collateral Ltd v Broad Idea International Ltd [2022] 2 WLR 703 at [84]-[86]. Although MP01 Pty Ltd is a party to the proceedings, in the present context (proceedings for contempt brought against Mr Dunne), in order to understand the effect of paragraph 13 of the freezing order, it is apt to think of MP01 Pty Ltd as a third party, in asking the question whether its asset (the Jamieson Street property), held on trust pursuant to the MT Trust deed, is an asset of Mr Dunne’s. Where the assets of a third party are sought to be captured by a freezing order – including in the case of the extended definition of assets which appears in paragraph 13 of the order – the question is whether those assets are assets against which a judgment could be executed. The High Court in Cardile v LED Builders Pty Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 380 at [57] identified two circumstances in which that might be case:“(i)the third party holds, is using, or has exercised or is exercising a power of disposition over, or is otherwise in possession of, assets, including ‘claims and expectancies’, of the judgment debtor or potential judgment debtor; or(ii)some process, ultimately enforceable by the courts, is or may be available to the judgment creditor as a consequence of a judgment against that actual or potential judgment debtor, pursuant to which, whether by appointment of a liquidator, trustee in bankruptcy, receiver or otherwise, the third party may be obliged to disgorge property or otherwise contribute to the funds or property of the judgment debtor to help satisfy the judgment against the judgment debtor.”[34][34]Reference omitted. Justice Stewart in Viterra BV v Shandong Ruyi Technology Group Company Ltd (2022) 291 FCR 640 at [73] suggests that subsequent decisions may have expanded these circumstances. However, the justification for a freezing order, by reference to what is described as the “enforcement principle”, was recently affirmed by the Privy Council in Convoy Collateral Ltd v Broad Idea International Ltd [2022] 2 WLR 703 at [88]-[89], as follows: “88The enforcement principle also explains the basis and scope of the jurisdiction to grant a freezing injunction against a third party against whom no claim for substantive relief lies (ie a ‘non-cause of action defendant’). The ordinary prerequisite for granting such an injunction (before taking account of discretionary factors) is that the third party is in possession or control of an asset against which a judgment could be executed. That test may be satisfied because there is good reason to suppose that the asset is beneficially owned by a defendant against whom the claimant has obtained or has a right to obtain a judgment, as in the Chabra case. But it may also be satisfied in other ways: for example, where the defendant would have a right of indemnity against the third party which could be enforced by a receiver (C Inc plc v L[2001] 2 All ER (Comm) 446); or where a transaction by which the defendant transferred an asset to the third party might be avoided under section 423 of the Insolvency Act 1986 (Lemos v Lemos [2017] 1 P & CR 12); or where enforcement of a judgment against the defendant might lead to its liquidation whereupon the liquidator would be able to pursue a claim against the third party (Revenue and Customs Comrs v Egleton [2007] Bus LR 44). In each case the key question is whether the assets are or would be available to satisfy a judgment through some process of enforcement: see also Cardile v LED Builder Pty Ltd 198 CLR 380; Algosaibi v Saad Investments Co Ltd 2011 (1) CILR 178, para 43; Linsen International Ltd v Humpuss Sea Transport Pte Ltd [2012] Bus LR 1649, paras 146–154; PJSC Vseukrainskyi Aktsionernyi Bank v Maksimov [2013] EWHC 422 (Comm) at [7(5)]; Lakatamia Shipping Co Ltd v Su [2015] 1 WLR 291, para 32.89Although it is unnecessary to make the enforcement principle dependent on the identification of a legal or equitable right, there is no harm in expressing the interest of the applicant which a freezing injunction seeks to protect in these terms, provided it is understood to be different, and different in character, from the right on which a cause of action for substantive relief is based. The interest protected by a freezing injunction is the (usually prospective) right to enforce through the court’s process a judgment or order for the payment of a sum of money. A freezing injunction protects this right to the extent that it is possible to do so without giving the claimant security for its claim or interfering with the respondent’s right to use its assets for ordinary business purposes. The purpose of the injunction is to prevent the right of enforcement from being rendered ineffective by the dissipation of assets against which the judgment could otherwise be enforced.”

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established