Dunne v NGI Savannah Living Communities Pty Ltd

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Dunne v NGI Savannah Living Communities Pty Ltd [2025] QCA 167

PARTIES:

NEVILLE MARTIN DUNNE
(appellant)
v
NGI SAVANNAH LIVING COMMUNITIES PTY LTD
ACN 613 046 290
(respondent)

FILE NO/S:

Appeal No 2113 of 2025
SC No 11263 of 2018

DIVISION:

Court of Appeal

PROCEEDING:

General Civil Appeal

ORIGINATING COURT:


Supreme Court at Brisbane – [2025] QSC 92 (Bowskill CJ)

DELIVERED ON:

9 September 2025

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

28 August 2025

JUDGES:

Boddice and Doyle JJA and Martin SJA

ORDERS:

1.   The appeal is dismissed.

2.   The appellant is to pay the costs of the respondent of the appeal.

CATCHWORDS:

COURTS AND JUDGES – CONTEMPT – PARTICULAR CONTEMPTS – DISOBEDIENCE OF ORDERS OF COURT – where the respondent obtained freezing orders restraining the appellant from disposing of or dealing with his assets in Australia up to a specified amount – where the appellant subsequently transferred his shareholdings and resigned as sole director in three companies – where the respondent brought an application for civil contempt alleging breach of the freezing orders – where the appellant was found guilty of contempt in respect of three charges – where each of the charges was particularised in a composite form comprising the transfer of shares and resignation as director – where the appellant contends that paragraph 5 of the freezing orders is not broad enough to prohibit him resigning as sole director of the various companies – where the respondent contends that the only essential element of the charge was the transfer of the shares such that it was unnecessary to prove the resignation contravened the freezing orders – whether the term “deal with” in the freezing orders extended to resignation as a director – whether the primary judge erred in finding that the concept of “dealing with” was broad enough to include the appellant’s resignation as sole director of the various companies – whether the composite form of the charges required every aspect of the formation of the charge to be proved beyond reasonable doubt

Berghofer v Wicks [2024] QSC 4, considered
Bromley v Muswellbrook Coal Co Pty Ltd (1973) 129 CLR 342; [1973] HCA 56, cited
Coward v Stapleton (1953) 90 CLR 573; [1953] HCA 48, cited
Lakatamia Shipping Co Ltd v Nobu Su [2015] 1 WLR 291; [2014] EWCA Civ 636, cited
Lazar v Taito (Australia) Pty Ltd (1985) 5 FCR 395; (1985) 67 ALR 652; [1985] FCA 35, considered
Matthews v ASIC [2009] NSWCA 155, considered
University of Wollongong v Metwally (No 2) (1985) 59 ALJR 481; [1985] HCA 28, cited

COUNSEL:

D A Savage KC, with M J Downes, for the appellant
D P de Jersey KC, with P Williams, for the respondent

SOLICITORS:

Enyo Lawyers for the appellant
GRT Lawyers for the respondent

  1. BODDICE JA:  I agree with Doyle JA.

  2. DOYLE JA:  On 13 May 2025 Bowskill CJ found the appellant (Mr Dunne) guilty of the contempt specified…

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Details
Case
[2025] QCA 167
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Dunne v NGI Savannah Living Communities Pty Ltd involves a dispute between the appellant, Dunne, and the respondent, NGI Savannah Living Communities Pty Ltd. Dunne had obtained freezing orders that restrained him from disposing of or dealing with his assets in Australia up to a specified amount. Despite these orders, Dunne transferred his shareholdings and resigned as the sole director of three companies. NGI subsequently brought an application for civil contempt, alleging that Dunne had breached the freezing orders. Dunne was found guilty of contempt in respect of three charges, each particularised in a composite form comprising the transfer of shares and resignation as director. Dunne contended that the term "deal with" in the freezing orders did not extend to resignation as a director, while NGI argued that the essential element of the charge was the transfer of the shares.

The central legal issue was whether the term "deal with" in the freezing orders encompassed Dunne's resignation as a director of the companies, and whether the primary judge erred in finding that this term was broad enough to include Dunne's resignation. Additionally, the court had to determine whether the composite form of the charges required every aspect of the formation of the charge to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. The court referenced Berghofer v Wicks [2024] QSC 4, particularly the principles expressed by Burns J concerning the strict procedural requirements in contempt proceedings and the need for proof to the criminal standard. The court found that although all elements of a charge of contempt must be made out, the particulars of the charge did not need to be made out in their entirety, provided that the essential elements of the charge were established.

The court dismissed Dunne's appeal, holding that the term "deal with" in the freezing orders was sufficiently broad to include Dunne's resignation as a director. The court found that the primary judge had correctly interpreted the term and that the essential element of the charge was the transfer of the shares, making it unnecessary to prove that the resignation also contravened the freezing orders. The court further held that the composite form of the charges did not require every aspect of the formation of the charge to be proved beyond reasonable doubt, as long as the essential elements were established. The appeal was dismissed, and Dunne was ordered to pay the costs of the respondent's appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal is dismissed.

2. The appellant is to pay the costs of the respondent of the appeal.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The core question is whether the elements of the charge include each fact included in the statement of the particulars of the charge even if not otherwise essential to the contravention of the freezing order? A convenient starting point for this discussion is the summary of principles expressed in Berghofer v Wicks [2024] QSC 4 commencing at paragraph 15 where his Honour Burns J stated (emphasis added):“[15] As I have previously observed, the jurisdiction of the court to punish for contempt is both inherent and provided for under Chapter 20 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld). Because the liberty of the subject is potentially at stake, it is well established that strict compliance with the rules of procedure is required in a proceeding for contempt. It is equally well settled, and for the same reason, that nothing short of proof to the criminal standard will suffice in order to make out such a case. Of course, although it has been observed that a proceeding for contempt is essentially criminal in nature, it is not a proceeding that can be equated with a trial on indictment. Rather, it is a proceeding in the civil jurisdiction of the court and, as such, the UCPR apply…[16]When a party moves the court to punish someone for contempt, the onus is at all times on that party. That said, although all of the elements of a charge of contempt must be made out, the particulars of the charge do not need to be made out in their entirety; it is enough if those particulars which are established by the evidence are sufficient to constitute proof of the essential elements of the charge.[17]In order to prove a charge of contempt involving the breach of a court order, it must be established that ‘the order is clear and capable of compliance, that the alleged contemnor has knowledge of the terms of the order and has by his act or omission breached the terms of the order’. The ordinary rules of construction apply, it not being the case that an order cannot be enforced unless the language of the undertaking is unambiguous and certain. To the contrary, if the order ‘bears a meaning which the court is satisfied is one which ought fairly to have been in the contemplation of the person to whom the order was directed ... as a possible meaning, the fact that that meaning results from a process of construction and involves a choice of possible meanings does not ... preclude the court from enforcing the order ... in the sense which the Court assigns to it’.” (citations omitted). The particular aspect adverted to in the highlighted part of this judgment draws upon the New South Wales Court of Appeal decision of Matthews v ASIC [2009] NSWCA 155. In that case, in October 2000 Santow J had made a number of orders including, by Order 8, that Matthews be permanently restrained from undertaking either directly or indirectly, the business of:(a)advising other persons about securities; and/or(b)publishing securities reports,except as otherwise permitted by the Corporations Law.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established