Newport v The State of Western Australia
[2015] WASCA 224
•12 NOVEMBER 2015
NEWPORT -v- THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA [2015] WASCA 224
| SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA | Citation No: | [2015] WASCA 224 | |
| THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA) | |||
| Case No: | CACR:12/2015 | 9 SEPTEMBER 2015 | |
| Coram: | McLURE P NEWNES JA CORBOY J | 12/11/15 | |
| 16 | Judgment Part: | 1 of 1 | |
| Result: | Leave to appeal on proposed grounds of appeal 2 and 3 refused Appeal dismissed | ||
| B | |||
| PDF Version |
| Parties: | MARK JOHN NEWPORT THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA |
Catchwords: | Criminal law Appeal against sentence Appellant convicted of burglary, nine counts of receiving, stealing a motor vehicle and reckless driving and traffic offences Offences committed while appellant subject to suspended imprisonment order Total effective sentence 4 years and 10 months' imprisonment Whether sentence manifestly excessive Totality principle |
Legislation: | Criminal Code (WA), s 371A, s 278, s 401(2)(b), s 414 Road Traffic Act 1974 (WA), s 49(1)(a), s 49(3)(c), s 53(1)(b), s 60(1) |
Case References: | Ashworth v The State of Western Australia [2006] WASCA 36 Barbaro v The Queen (2014) 253 CLR 58 Butler v The State of Western Australia [2012] WASCA 249 Chadd v The State of Western Australia [2013] WASCA 99 Dinsdale v The Queen (2000) 202 CLR 321 Drake v The State of Western Australia [2006] WASCA 209 Eacott v The State of Western Australia [2009] WASCA 112 Giglia v The State of Western Australia [2010] WASCA 9 Krijestorac v The State of Western Australia [2010] WASCA 35 Main v The State of Western Australia [2010] WASCA 28 McKenzie v The State of Western Australia [2015] WASCA 163 Nannup v The State of Western Australia [2011] WASCA 257 Nguyen v The State of Western Australia [2007] WASCA 114 Poduti v The State of Western Australia [2011] WASCA 169 Postiglione v The Queen (1997) 189 CLR 295 QJS v The State of Western Australia [2015] WASCA 9 Roffey v The State of Western Australia [2007] WASCA 246 Stokke v The State of Western Australia [2015] WASCA 131 Wilson v The State of Western Australia [2010] WASCA 82 |
JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA TITLE OF COURT : THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA) CITATION : NEWPORT -v- THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA [2015] WASCA 224 CORAM : McLURE P
- NEWNES JA
CORBOY J
- Appellant
AND
THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Respondent
ON APPEAL FROM:
Jurisdiction : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Coram : SIMMONDS J
File No : INS 228 of 2013
Catchwords:
Criminal law - Appeal against sentence - Appellant convicted of burglary, nine counts of receiving, stealing a motor vehicle and reckless driving and traffic offences - Offences committed while appellant subject to suspended imprisonment order - Total effective sentence 4 years and 10 months' imprisonment - Whether sentence manifestly excessive - Totality principle
Legislation:
Criminal Code (WA), s 371A, s 278, s 401(2)(b), s 414
Road Traffic Act 1974 (WA), s 49(1)(a), s 49(3)(c), s 53(1)(b), s 60(1)
Result:
Leave to appeal on proposed grounds of appeal 2 and 3 refused
Appeal dismissed
Category: B
Representation:
Counsel:
Appellant : Ms N Sinton
Respondent : Mr J Scholz
Solicitors:
Appellant : Legal Aid (WA)
Respondent : Director of Public Prosecutions (WA)
Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):
Ashworth v The State of Western Australia [2006] WASCA 36
Barbaro v The Queen (2014) 253 CLR 58
Butler v The State of Western Australia [2012] WASCA 249
Chadd v The State of Western Australia [2013] WASCA 99
Dinsdale v The Queen (2000) 202 CLR 321
Drake v The State of Western Australia [2006] WASCA 209
Eacott v The State of Western Australia [2009] WASCA 112
Giglia v The State of Western Australia [2010] WASCA 9
Krijestorac v The State of Western Australia [2010] WASCA 35
Main v The State of Western Australia [2010] WASCA 28
McKenzie v The State of Western Australia [2015] WASCA 163
Nannup v The State of Western Australia [2011] WASCA 257
Nguyen v The State of Western Australia [2007] WASCA 114
Poduti v The State of Western Australia [2011] WASCA 169
Postiglione v The Queen (1997) 189 CLR 295
QJS v The State of Western Australia [2015] WASCA 9
Roffey v The State of Western Australia [2007] WASCA 246
Stokke v The State of Western Australia [2015] WASCA 131
Wilson v The State of Western Australia [2010] WASCA 82
1 McLURE P: I agree with Corboy J.
2 NEWNES JA: I agree with Corboy J.
CORBOY J:
The appeal and the result
3 This is an appeal against sentence. The appellant was convicted on indictment of burglary, stealing a motor vehicle, receiving property from a burglary (6 counts) and receiving (2 counts). He was also convicted on his plea and sentenced on four charges that had been pending in the Perth Magistrates Court. He was subject to a suspended imprisonment order at the time that he committed the offences. Accordingly, the appellant was also dealt with under s 80 of the Sentencing Act 1995 (WA).
4 The total effective sentence imposed was 4 years and 10 months' imprisonment to be served immediately. A parole eligibility order was made.
5 The appellant's case contained three proposed grounds of appeal. The first ground alleged that the aggregate sentence imposed did not bear a proper relationship to the overall criminality involved in the appellant's offending. The second and third grounds alleged that the sentences imposed for the burglary offence and the receiving offences were manifestly excessive.
6 The appellant was granted leave to appeal on the first ground. His application for leave to appeal on the second and third proposed grounds of appeal was referred to the hearing of the appeal (order made by Mazza JA on 10 May 2015).
7 I have concluded that leave to appeal on the second and third proposed grounds of appeal should be refused and that the appeal should be dismissed for the reasons that follow.
The convictions and the sentences imposed
The appellant was convicted on indictment and sentenced as follows:
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8 The appellant was convicted and sentenced on his request under s 32 of the Sentencing Act as follows:
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9 The appellant was convicted on 22 March 2012 in the Rockingham Magistrates Court of two charges of driving without authority, contrary to s 49(1)(a) and s 49(3)(c) of the Road Traffic Act. He was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 8 months, suspended for 12 months. He was dealt with on his re-offending by being sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 3 months cumulative on the other terms of imprisonment imposed by the sentencing judge.
The facts on which the appellant was sentenced
10 Counsel for the respondent annexed to his written submissions a summary of the facts for each of the offences on which the appellant was sentenced. The appellant accepted that the summary was an accurate statement of the facts relevant to his sentencing.
11 The appellant pleaded guilty to the charges alleged in counts 1 and 2 of the indictment. The facts relating to those offences were that the appellant entered a house in Cooloongup sometime between 5.30 am and 12.20 pm on 14 January 2013. He entered by smashing a rear bedroom window. The victim was not home. Various items were taken from the victim's house. The total value of the stolen items was $5,000.
12 The appellant located a set of car keys while searching the house. He used the keys to steal a car that was parked at the house. The car was later recovered from the appellant's house.
13 Counts 3 to 5 of the indictment concerned various items taken in a burglary and which the appellant received, knowing that the items had been obtained by a burglary or by stealing. The items received were a 'Stinger' electrical circuit tester, a motorcycle and a 'Toyota Hi-Ace' van.
14 Counts 7 to 11 also concerned receiving offences. The appellant received:
(a) a 'Playstation 3', a high pressure water sprayer, a metal ute cover and a 'Pioneer' amplifier from a burglary committed on 2 February 2013 (count 7);
(b) a brooch, a ceramic egg, a laptop and a cheque from a burglary also committed on 2 February 2013 (count 8);
(c) a laptop from a burglary committed on 3 February 2013 (count 9);
(d) Australian Navy identification tags from a burglary committed on 4 February 2013 (count 10); and
(e) DJ equipment and a mobile phone from a burglary committed sometime between 8 January and 9 February 2013 (count 11).
15 Counts 3 to 5 and count 7 alleged that the appellant had committed the offences charged on dates unknown between 31 January and 9 February 2013. Count 9 alleged that the appellant had committed the offence on an unknown date between 2 and 9 February 2013; count 10 alleged that the offence was committed on a date unknown between 3 and 9 February 2013 and count 11 alleged that the offence was committed on a date unknown between 8 January and 9 February 2013. It will be seen that the receiving offences were committed across a period of approximately one month with the majority of the offences being committed in early February 2013.
16 The facts alleged in respect of the charges dealt with under s 32 of the Sentencing Act were that the appellant drove a motorcycle in Warnbro on the afternoon of 9 December 2012 in a manner that was admitted to have been reckless. The motorcycle had been stolen.
17 The police pursued the appellant in a marked vehicle. The vehicle's emergency lights were activated. The appellant accelerated the motorcycle in an attempt to escape. He reached speeds estimated to be in excess of 80 km per hour in a 50 km per hour speed limit zone.
18 The appellant braked heavily as he approached an intersection. That caused the rear wheel of the motorcycle to lock up and skid. Other vehicles were forced to brake to avoid colliding with the appellant. He then drove on the wrong side of the road in an attempt to escape the pursuing police and, again, other vehicles were forced to brake to avoid colliding with the appellant. He crossed four lanes of traffic as he continued to evade the police. The appellant was not authorised to drive a motorcycle.
19 The offences for which the appellant was convicted on indictment were committed while he was on bail for the summary offences. All of the offences for which he was sentenced were committed while he was subject to the suspended imprisonment order made in March 2012.
The appellant's personal circumstances
20 The appellant was born on 24 August 1980. Consequently, he was 32 years of age at the time that he committed the offences.
21 The appellant left school at the age of 15 years to commence an apprenticeship as a chef. He did not complete the apprenticeship and he has subsequently worked in the mining industry and as a painter. The sentencing judge accepted that the appellant's 'first significant period of unemployment or inactivity' occurred after he was disqualified from driving in March 2012 [77].
22 The appellant has two children from a relationship that has ended. The appellant's mother cares for the children.
23 The appellant advised Ms Lynn, the author of a psychological report prepared for sentencing, that he had commenced consuming amphetamines at about the age of 14 years. It was apparent from the information that he provided to Ms Lynn that he has developed a significant substance abuse problem. He reported consuming methylamphetamine three to four times weekly prior to his arrest in February 2013. His mother advised Ms Lynn that she considered that the appellant had also abused alcohol. The appellant informed Ms Lynn that he had only used methylamphetamine on a few occasions following his arrest and that his consumption of alcohol had moderated.
24 The appellant advised Ms Lynn that his offending was the result of an extended period of unemployment and the need to fund his drug use. Ms Lynn considered that the appellant had a history of poor problem solving and antisocial decision making exacerbated through habitual and entrenched drug use. Psychometric testing indicated some level of compromised functioning accompanied by low self-confidence. Ms Lynn thought that those factors were also likely to impact on the appellant's decision making. She noted that the appellant had not received counselling for his drug use and associated personal and psychological problems. However, the sentencing judge also noted from the psychological and pre-sentence reports that the appellant had been required to undertake counselling in the past but had not complied with those requirements.
25 The appellant was first convicted of an offence as an adult in June 1999 (stealing). He has convictions for offences against the Road Traffic Act, for public nuisance offences, common assault and for possessing a prohibited drug. He has not been previously convicted on indictment and the suspended imprisonment order was the first occasion on which he had been sentenced to a term of imprisonment. A community based order made in July 2006 was terminated due to non-compliance.
Sentencing remarks
26 The sentencing judge identified several factors that aggravated the seriousness of the appellant's offending: the offences were committed while the appellant was on bail and during the term of a suspended imprisonment order; the victim's house was damaged during the burglary; the offences were not isolated events; the value of the received property was substantial and the property that was the subject of count 8 had significant personal value to the victim. However, his Honour was not satisfied that the appellant was 'shown to have been in the business of a fence (a distributor for reward of unlawfully obtained property)' [53].
27 In relation to the offences dealt with under s 32 of the Sentencing Act, the sentencing judge found that the seriousness of the reckless driving and failing to stop offences was aggravated by the duration of the driving; the area and traffic conditions in which the driving occurred; the appellant's efforts to avoid pursuit by police; his persistence in failing to stop and the fact that the appellant was subject to a suspended imprisonment order at the time that the offences were committed.
28 The sentencing judge accepted that the appellant acknowledged responsibility for his offending; that he was remorseful and had expressed empathy for his victims and that he had some prospects of rehabilitation given his work history. It was also accepted that the appellant had facilitated the course of justice in the conduct of his defence to the charges on which he had been tried. However, his Honour noted the appellant's history of substance abuse and the factors that Ms Lynn had identified in assessing the risk of re-offending.
29 His Honour made the sentence imposed for the burglary offence the head sentence. He referred to both limbs of the totality principle and partially accumulated the sentences imposed. He considered that it would be unjust to fully activate the suspended term of imprisonment as the appellant had re-offended 'some period into the period of suspension', there had been 'some progress in addressing the issues contributing to [the appellant's] offending' and totality was a relevant factor in exercising the discretion conferred by s 80 of the Sentencing Act [114] - [115].
The principles to be applied
30 This court can only intervene if a sentencing judge has made an express or implied material error of fact or law. The court can only allow an appeal against sentence if, in its opinion, a different sentence should have been imposed: s 31(4)(a) of the Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA). The principles to be applied by the court in forming its opinion were summarised by McLure P and Owen JA in Wilson v The State of Western Australia [2010] WASCA 82 [2]. They reflect the discretionary nature of sentencing.
31 The totality principle requires a judge who is sentencing an offender for a number of offences to ensure that the aggregation of the sentences appropriate for each offence is a just and appropriate measure of the total criminality involved: Postiglione v The Queen (1997) 189 CLR 295, 307 - 308 (McHugh J). The principle is expressly recognised in the Sentencing Act: s 6(1), read with s 6(3)(b). The total effective sentence imposed must bear a proper relationship to the overall criminality involved in all the offences for which an offender is to be sentenced, viewed in their entirety and having regard to the circumstances of the case, including those referable to the offender personally: Roffey v The State of Western Australia [2007] WASCA 246 [24].
32 It is of little importance how the ultimate aggregate is made up where considerations of totality apply: Roffey [26]. However, the severity or leniency of an individual sentence may be relevant to assessing whether the total effective sentence infringes the totality principle: Giglia v The State of Western Australia [2010] WASCA 9 [40] (Owen JA); McKenzie v The State of Western Australia [2015] WASCA 163 [43] (Buss JA).
33 An allegation that the aggregate sentence imposed infringed the totality principle is an allegation of implied error. The sentence must be unreasonable or plainly unjust before it can be disturbed by an appellate court: Barbaro v The Queen (2014) 253 CLR 58 [26]; Stokke v The State of Western Australia [2015] WASCA 131 [63].
34 An allegation that a sentence is manifestly excessive is also an allegation of implied error. In determining whether a sentence is manifestly excessive, the court will have regard to the maximum sentence for the offences; the standards of sentencing customarily imposed for sentences of a relevant type; the seriousness of the offending and the personal circumstances of the offender. However, the court will not intervene merely because it might have imposed a different sentence to that which had been imposed. Error may be implied if the result is unreasonable or plainly unjust: Dinsdale v The Queen (2000) 202 CLR 321.
The merit of the appeal
35 The appellant linked ground 1 of his appeal to the allegation that the sentences imposed for the burglary and receiving offences were manifestly excessive:
[T]aking a last look at the total sentence imposed in the circumstances of this case, the combination of excessive sentences for the burglary and receiving offences and the learned sentencing judge's orders for cumulation had the result that the aggregate sentence did not reflect either the criminality of the appellant's offending conduct or his personal circumstances (appellant's submissions, par 16).
36 It is, therefore, convenient to first consider the appellant's second and third proposed grounds of appeal and to then return to the question of whether the total effective sentence imposed infringed the totality principle.
Proposed ground of appeal 2
37 The maximum penalty for the offence created by s 401(2) of the Criminal Code is 18 years' imprisonment if the place in which the offence is committed is ordinarily used for human habitation. The primary sentencing considerations for burglary are personal and general deterrence, especially where the burglary was committed on residential premises. Ordinarily, a substantial penalty must be imposed. The sentences imposed have 'firmed up' in recent years to reflect the prevalence of the offence and considerations of general deterrence: Nannup v The State of Western Australia [2011] WASCA 257 [68] (Buss JA); Butler v The State of Western Australia [2012] WASCA 249 [40] (Mazza JA).
38 There is no tariff for the offence as it may be committed in a wide variety of circumstances. However, the appellant referred to Main v The State of Western Australia [2010] WASCA 28 to submit that the offence of burglary can attract a range of sentences between 8 months and at least 4 years. However, Main involved a burglary on commercial premises. The appellant in that case submitted that aggravated burglaries committed on commercial premises, without violence, tended to attract lower sentences (see at [34]). Accordingly, the pattern of sentencing to which the court referred involved commercial not residential premises.
39 This court has reviewed sentences imposed for burglary and aggravated burglary on residential premises in a number of cases: Ashworth v The State of Western Australia [2006] WASCA 36; Drake v The State of Western Australia [2006] WASCA 209; Nguyen v The State of Western Australia [2007] WASCA 114; Krijestorac v The State of Western Australia [2010] WASCA 35 (residential and commercial premises) and Butler. Those decisions indicate that the sentence received by the appellant was not outside the range of sentences customarily imposed for the offence of burglary.
40 The appellant contended that the sentence imposed for the burglary offence was manifestly excessive having regard to a number of factors: the offence was not committed in circumstances of aggravation; the offence was not committed at night; the appellant had not been previously convicted of burglary; the appellant was entitled to some credit for the fact that he had spent approximately 22 months prior to sentencing on remand subject to 'onerous' bail conditions, including some time on a home detention condition and during that period he had not offended (however, the appellant breached a protective bail condition on 8 January 2015 for which he was sentenced on 4 March 2015 in the Magistrates Court at Moora to one months' imprisonment).
41 The respondent submitted that the appellant's offence was a serious example of a burglary. The total value of the property taken was substantial and the victim's home had been damaged by the appellant's forced entry. It was evident from the variety of items taken that the appellant had completed an extensive search of the victim's home. Further, the appellant was on bail and serving a suspended imprisonment order at the time that the offence was committed.
42 In my view, the sentence imposed for the burglary offence was not plainly unjust or unreasonable having regard to the seriousness of the offence, the pattern of sentencing for the offence, the need for general deterrence and the appellant's personal circumstances at the time that the offence was committed. It was not submitted that the appellant knew that the house would be unoccupied if he entered during the day and the value of the stolen property was substantial. The offence was committed while the appellant was on bail and subject to a suspended imprisonment order (see QJS v The State of Western Australia [2015] WASCA 9). Although the burglary represented a significant escalation in the seriousness of the appellant's offending, the appellant had a history of persistent offending. Personal deterrence, as well as general deterrence, was a relevant sentencing factor.
43 I would not grant leave to appeal on this proposed ground.
Proposed ground of appeal 3
44 The maximum penalty for the offence of receiving depends on whether the court is satisfied as to the act by means of which the property was obtained. Section 414 of the Criminal Code provides that:
The offender is liable -
(a) if the court is satisfied as to the act by means of which the property was obtained, to the penalty provided for the offence constituted by that act, or to imprisonment for 14 years, whichever is the lesser;
(b) otherwise, to imprisonment for 14 years.
45 The appellant was convicted of six counts of receiving property knowing that the property had been obtained from a burglary (counts 3 and 7 to 11). The maximum penalty for burglary is 14 years. The appellant was convicted of two counts of receiving property knowing that the property had been stolen. The maximum penalty for stealing is 7 years' imprisonment.
46 Receiving is a serious offence. As with stealing and burglary, the primary sentencing considerations are personal and general deterrence. It is difficult to discern a clear range for the offence as considerations of totality often intrude and there is a wide variation in the value of the property received and the circumstances in which the offender came to receive the property. A review of sentences imposed for the offence was undertaken by this court in Poduti v The State of Western Australia [2011] WASCA 169 and Eacott v The State of Western Australia [2009] WASCA 112.
47 The appellant submitted that an effective sentence of 20 months' imprisonment for the receiving offences was manifestly excessive, having regard to the court's comments in Poduti and Eacott, the appellant's below average cognitive functioning and his efforts to remain offence free while on bail.
48 In Poduti, McLure P concluded that 'a review of the decided cases confirms that the sentence of 2 years' imprisonment is towards the higher end of sentences customarily imposed for a single offence of receiving' [15]. Nevertheless, the court held that the sentence imposed in that case was not manifestly excessive, considering the seriousness of the circumstances in which the offence was committed (the offender received stolen furniture with a retail value of $29,535 and the furniture was subsequently stored in a unit which the offender rented for the purpose of committing the offence) and the personal circumstances of the offender (the offence was committed while he was on parole and the offender had prior convictions for offences of dishonesty).
49 In Eacott, Wheeler JA described a total effective sentence of 18 months' imprisonment for five offences of receiving vehicles worth in excess of $170,000 as 'moderate' and 'not lenient' [16]. Two of the offences had been committed while the offender was on bail.
50 The sentencing judge sentenced the appellant to 20 months' imprisonment on count 8 of the indictment. He made the sentence cumulative on the other terms of imprisonment that he imposed. His Honour noted that the aggravating factors for the offence included that the value of the property taken was 'not insignificant' and that some of the stolen items were of 'significant personal value' to the victim [44]. He sentenced the appellant on the remaining receiving offences to lesser terms of imprisonment to be served concurrently with all of the terms of imprisonment that he imposed.
51 The review of sentencing for the offence of receiving undertaken by this court in Poduti and Eacott does not suggest, in my view, that the sentence imposed for count 8 of the indictment was outside the range of sentences customarily imposed for the offence. Further, I do not consider that it can be inferred from the court's comments in those cases or from any other matter relevant to the appellant's sentencing that the sentence of 20 months' imprisonment was manifestly excessive having regard to the nature and value of the property that was received, the sentencing judge's finding that the appellant knew that the property had been taken in a burglary and the circumstances in which the offence was committed.
52 Ms Lynn suggested that the appellant's apparently poor decision making might be partly explained by a possible compromise in his cognitive functioning. However, it was not suggested that the appellant's intellectual functioning was linked to his offending. Counsel for the appellant did not submit that the seriousness of the appellant's offending was diminished by a possible compromise in cognitive functioning. Rather, the possibility was referred to as one explanation for the appellant's failure to adhere to conditions that had been imposed by courts in the past.
53 The sentence imposed on count 8 constituted the total effective sentence for all of the receiving offences. The sentence was appropriate in light of the totality and seriousness of the appellant's offending when all of the receiving offences are considered.
54 I would not grant leave to appeal on this proposed ground.
Ground 1 of the appeal
55 The sentencing judge gave effect to the totality principle by ordering that only some of the terms of imprisonment imposed be served cumulatively: the terms of imprisonment that were imposed on counts 1 and 8 of the indictment, the summary charge of stealing a motor vehicle and driving recklessly and the sentencing under s 80 of the Sentencing Act. In my view, no error can be implied from those orders or from the total effective sentence that was imposed.
56 The appellant's primary submission on ground 1 of the appeal has already been noted. The appellant also submitted that the sentence imposed in Poduti supported his contention that the sentence he received did not bear a proper relationship to the overall criminality of his conduct. It was said, among other things, that the appellant's conduct did not demonstrate the same 'contumacious disregard of the criminal law' as the offender in Poduti (appellant's submissions, par 22).
57 Mazza JA observed in Chadd v The State of Western Australia [2013] WASCA 99 that:
It is relevant to refer to comparable cases when considering whether the totality principle has been infringed. However, their utility is limited. They may provide broad guidance, but it must be borne in mind that there will often be significant differences in the circumstances of the offending and the offenders. In the end, each case must be determined having regard to its own particular circumstances [45].
58 The guidance that might be provided by one sentencing decision is, at best, slight. The appellant's offending occurred over a relatively short period of time. However, the offences did not form a single criminal enterprise, apart from the offences alleged in counts 1 and 2 of the indictment. Rather, the offences constituted a course of persistent offending. The appellant was subject to a suspended imprisonment order and the more serious offences were committed while he was on bail. The appellant's offending was serious and demonstrated a disregard for the law. Any further comparison with the circumstances considered by the Court of Appeal in Poduti does not assist.
59 I do not consider that the appellant has established that the total effective sentence imposed by the sentencing judge was unreasonable or unjust. Accordingly, I would dismiss the appeal.
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