Taylor v Campbell - [2019] WASC 168

JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CRIMINAL

CITATION:   TAYLOR -v- CAMPBELL [2019] WASC 168
CORAM:   TOTTLE J
HEARD:   8 MAY 2019
DELIVERED          :   22 MAY 2019
FILE NO/S:   SJA 1136 of 2018
BETWEEN:   TEEGAN MARY TAYLOR
Appellant
AND
SCOTT CAMPBELL
First Respondent
IAN ROBERTS
Second Respondent

ON APPEAL FROM:
For File No:   SJA 1136 of 2018
Jurisdiction              :   MAGISTRATES COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Coram:   MAGISTRATE B AYLING
File Number             :   AR 1816 of 2017 and AR 1455 of 2017

Catchwords:

Criminal law - Appeal against sentence - Totality principle - Failure to identify extent of discount given under s 9AA of Sentencing Act 1995 (WA)

Legislation:

Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA) s 9
Sentencing Act 1995 (WA) s 9AA

Result:

Leave to appeal refused on ground 1, appeal dismissed
Leave to appeal granted on ground 2, appeal dismissed

Category: B

Representation:

Counsel:

Appellant	:	Mr A Mossop
First Respondent	:	Ms M M Yeung
Second Respondent	:	Ms M M Yeung

Solicitors:

Appellant	:	Damien Cripps Barrister & Solicitor
First Respondent	:	The Director of Public Prosecutions for the State of Western Australia
Second Respondent	:	The Director of Public Prosecutions for the State of Western Australia

Case(s) referred to in decision(s):

Biruta v The State of Western Australia [2019] WASCA 52
Eacott v The State of Western Australia [2009] WASCA 112
Kentwell v The Queen [2014] HCA 37; (2014) 252 CLR 601
Newport v The State of Western Australia [2015] WASCA 224
Poduti v The State of Western Australia [2011] WASCA 169
Roberts v The State of Western Australia [2014] WASCA
Rowsell v The State of Western Australia [2015] WASCA 2
Samuels v The State of Western Australia [2005] WASCA 193
Wiltshire v Mafi [2010] WASCA 111

TOTTLE J:

Introduction

On 1 November 2018 the appellant was sentenced in the Magistrates Court of Western Australia to a total effective sentence of 15 months immediate imprisonment following her conviction for 33 offences to which she had pleaded guilty.
The 15 month period comprised a term of imprisonment of 3 months imposed in relation to an offence of reckless driving and a term of imprisonment of 12 months imposed in relation to an offence of receiving stolen goods. The terms of imprisonment were ordered to be served cumulatively with each other and cumulatively with a total effective sentence of imprisonment imposed by the District Court of Western Australia on 30 October 2018. Parole eligibility orders were made.
The appellant seeks leave to appeal against the sentences imposed for the reckless driving and the receiving offences. There are two grounds of appeal. First that the magistrate erred in law by imposing a total effective sentence which infringed the first limb of the totality principle, and second that the magistrate erred in law by failing to identify the extent of any discount given for the appellant's pleas of guilty pursuant to s 9AA(5) of the Sentencing Act 1995 (WA).

The offences and the sentences imposed

The offences of which the appellant was convicted and the sentencing disposition for each offence together with a summary of the essential facts are set out in the table that forms the appendix to this judgment.
More fulsome reference must be made to the facts of the receiving and reckless driving offences.
(a)The facts of the receiving offence as read to the magistrate were as follows:
At 3.15 pm on 29 January 2017, the accused was at her home address at Brown Crescent, Seville Grove. Police entered the address under a Firearms Act search warrant and the accused was arrested at the scene. Located in the accused's house, behind a chair in the lounge room, were six various rifles that had been wrapped in blankets and cloth tied together with duct tape.
The accused was released pending further inquiries. On 8 February 2017, the accused's storage unit at 2/73 Brant Road, Kelmscott was searched and located were various rounds of ammunition for the rifles. The rifles and ammunition were stolen from a burglary at 75 Spears Drive, Oakford, on 23 January 2017, the owner being a John Dean.
Save that the appellant says that the rifles were in fact found behind a cupboard rather than behind a chair the appellant accepted these facts.
(b)The facts of the reckless driving offence that were accepted by the appellant were as follows:
On Sunday, 27 January 2018, at about 6.30 pm, the accused was driving a blue Holden SS ute, 1GCN005, in a northerly direction along South Western Highway from Pinjarra to Whitby. The accused drove the vehicle in a reckless manner by driving at excessive speed, overtaking vehicles, crossing solid white lines and driving in the opposing carriageway.
Police Air Wing recorded the incident and, at times, estimated the speed of the vehicle to be driven by the accused to be in excess of 160 kilometres an hour. The recording also shows the accused turning left into Keirnan Street, Whitby, losing control of the vehicle, causing it to spin 360 degrees out of control. The accused stops and realigns her vehicle.
Then, driving on the wrong side of the carriageway, turning right into the Whitby estate, taking the wrong way around a roundabout and continuing to drive at speed on the wrong side of the carriageway along Tinspar Avenue, turning left onto Haywire Avenue, and left onto Grapple ‑ into Grapple Road. Eventually, the accused parks her vehicle on the drive of a newly-built property on Grapple Road, and both the accused and the passenger alight from the vehicle and make off on foot across the estate.
Police Air Wing guided police officers to the location of the accused, and both the accused and the passenger were arrested outside an address on Peavey Road, Whitby. On arrest, the accused and passenger were transported to Mundijong Police Station, where they both participated in electronic records of interviews, denying driving – the accused denied driving the vehicle. At the time, the accused was released with follow up inquiries.

The sentences imposed in the District Court

On 30 October 2018 Sleight CJDC sentenced the appellant to a total effective sentence of 21 months' imprisonment. The 21 month period comprised:
(a)12 months' imprisonment backdated to 21 April 2018 for the offence of attempting to pervert the course of justice; and
(b)the activation of a suspended sentence of imprisonment imposed on 22 March 2016 ‑ the original sentence of 12 months was reduced to 9 months.
The suspended sentence was activated because the appellant had re‑offended and because she had failed to comply with the program and supervision requirements of the conditionally suspended order.
The conditionally suspended sentence of 12 months' imprisonment was imposed in respect of two counts of forcibly or fraudulently taking or enticing away or detaining a child under the age of 16 contrary to s 343 of the Criminal Code. The offending related to the appellant's two youngest children who had been removed from her care.
At the sentencing hearing Sleight CJDC was provided with the statements of the material facts for the 33 offences for which the appellant was awaiting sentence in the Magistrates Court. They were provided to the court 'in relation to the breach by reoffending'.[1]
[1] ts 68.4.
The offence of attempting to pervert the course of justice was committed on 27 January 2017, the same day as the reckless driving offence for which the appellant was sentenced to the term of 3 months' imprisonment. The circumstances were as follows. After the appellant had been apprehended for the reckless driving she misled the police officers by telling them that the passenger was the person who had been driving the vehicle. The passenger was charged before the deception was discovered.

The appellant's personal circumstances

The appellant is 38 years old. The appellant's upbringing was not a happy one ‑ her mother abused alcohol and cannabis and suffered from depression, and her father had a gambling addiction. The appellant was the victim of sexual abuse when she was 10 years of age. The appellant left home at the age of 14 with her first partner. That relationship continued until the appellant was about 27 and was one which involved emotional, verbal and physical abuse. After this relationship ended, the appellant entered into a second relationship which was also tainted by violence. The appellant has three children aged 8, 14 and 18 years old.
The appellant started using cannabis at the age of 14 and commenced the use of methylamphetamine in the latter part of her 20s. The appellant's children were taken from her by the Department of Child Protection in 2014, following which the appellant started using methylamphetamine daily for approximately a year and although her use of methylamphetamine has reduced, she admitted to periods of continued daily use. In 2011 and 2012 the appellant completed a residential rehabilitation program and she has had some success in dealing with her drug problem in the past.
The appellant has a lengthy history of offending, primarily related to possession of illicit drugs and traffic offences. There are a number of periods when the appellant stopped offending but the offending would start again and become repetitive.

Leave to appeal - applicable principles

Pursuant to s 9(1) of the Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA), leave of the court is required for each ground of appeal.
Leave must not be granted on a ground of appeal unless the court is satisfied that the ground has a reasonable prospect of success,[2] meaning that the ground has a rational and logical prospect of succeeding.[3] The appeal is taken to have been dismissed unless the court gives leave to appeal on at least one ground of appeal.[4]
[2] Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA) s 9(2).
[3] Samuels v The State of Western Australia [2005] WASCA 193 [56].
[4] Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA) s 9(3).

Sentencing appeals - applicable principles

The principles governing appeals in which it is alleged that the totality principle was infringed are well established and were recently summarised by the Court of Appeal as follows:[5]
(1)Sentencing is a discretionary exercise. An appellate court can intervene only if the appellant demonstrates either an express or implied material error. Express error involves acting on a wrong principle, for example by mistaking the law or facts or taking into account an irrelevant matter. Implied error arises where the end result is so unreasonable or unjust that the court must conclude that a substantial wrong has occurred. Thus, an appellate court cannot substitute its own opinion for that of the sentencing court merely because the appellate court would have exercised a sentencing discretion differently.
(2)In order to determine whether a sentence for an individual offence is manifestly excessive or inadequate, the offence should be viewed in light of the maximum sentence prescribed by law for the crime, the standards of sentencing customarily imposed with respect to it, the place that the criminal conduct occupies in the scale of seriousness of crimes of that type, and the offender's personal circumstances.
(3)The first limb of the totality principle requires that the total effective sentence imposed on an offender who has committed multiple offences bears a proper relationship to the overall criminality involved in all of the offences (including those, if any, in respect of which the offender is still serving or is yet to serve a term of imprisonment), viewed in their entirety, having regard to all relevant facts and circumstances including those referable to the offender personally (and including, for example, the desirability of accommodating any wish to rehabilitate), all relevant sentencing factors and the total effective sentences imposed in comparable cases.
(4)The range of sentences customarily imposed for a crime does not establish the range of a sound exercise of the sentencing discretion. Sentences customarily imposed in comparable cases provide a yardstick or reference point for ensuring broad consistency in sentencing, bearing in mind the scope for significant variations in relevant sentencing factors, and that there is no single correct sentence. What is important is the unifying principles which sentences imposed in comparable cases reveal and reflect.
(5)When this court dismisses an appeal against sentence and when it resentences on a successful appeal, its decision does not fix the upper or lower limit of the range.
(6)Where there is a challenge on totality grounds, the severity of a sentence imposed on an individual count generally falls to be assessed in light of the sentences imposed in respect of the other counts and its contribution to the total effective sentence. A heavy individual sentence (which is not manifestly excessive) may be softened by an order that it be served concurrently with sentences imposed in relation to the other counts. A relatively light sentence (which is not manifestly inadequate) may, as a practical matter, have increased severity if it is ordered to be served cumulatively. The real question is whether the total effective sentence is unreasonable or plainly unjust.
[5] Biruta v The State of Western Australia [2019] WASCA 52 [34].
In Newport v The State of Western Australia Corboy J, with whom McLure P and Newnes JA agreed, explained:[6]
The totality principle requires a judge who is sentencing an offender for a number of offences to ensure that the aggregation of the sentences appropriate for each offence is a just and appropriate measure of the total criminality involved. The principle is expressly recognised in the Sentencing Act: s 6(1), read with s 6(3)(b). The total effective sentence imposed must bear a proper relationship to the overall criminality involved in all the offences for which an offender is to be sentenced, viewed in their entirety and having regard to the circumstances of the case, including those referable to the offender personally.
It is of little importance how the ultimate aggregate is made up where considerations of totality apply. However, the severity or leniency of an individual sentence may be relevant to assessing whether the total effective sentence infringes the totality principle.
An allegation that the aggregate sentence imposed infringed the totality principle is an allegation of implied error. The sentence must be unreasonable or plainly unjust before it can be disturbed by an appellate court. (citations omitted)
[6] Newport v The State of Western Australia [2015] WASCA 224 [31] - [33].

Magistrate's sentencing remarks

The learned magistrate's sentencing remarks may be summarised as follows:
(a)The magistrate referred to the sentence imposed by the District Court and the facts of the offence for which the conditional imprisonment sentence had been imposed.
(b)The magistrate referred to the description of the appellant's background contained in the pre-sentence report and to the submissions in mitigation that had been made to her Honour and to Sleight CJDC. Her Honour observed that the appellant had experienced a 'tough life' and that she had been a victim of violence and that this and other issues had led the appellant to use illicit drugs. At the time of the offending she was using drugs on a daily basis. Her Honour observed that the difficulties that the appellant had experienced in her life made it difficult to resist the lifestyle that the appellant was living during the period in which the offences were committed.
(c)In the context of the receiving offence the magistrate acknowledged that the appellant's background made it difficult for her to resist pressure from those around her to engage in criminal activities (in the case of the stolen firearms - the pressure came from her sons) but the 'sheer volume of offences' committed by the appellant meant that her background only provided a partial explanation for the offending.
(d)The magistrate referred to the requirement that she impose penalties commensurate with the seriousness of the offences subject to the application of both limbs of the totality principle. In this context her Honour referred to the need to take into account the sentence imposed by the District Court.
(e)The magistrate referred to the need to take into account the time the appellant had already spent in custody not only for the purpose of backdating any terms of imprisonment but also for the purpose of the totality principle.
(f)The magistrate noted that 22 of the offences were committed whilst the appellant was the subject of the suspended sentence was an aggravating factor. Her Honour also observed that the number of offences meant that the offending was not 'an isolated lapse of judgment' but was a continuing pattern of behaviour.
(g)The magistrate described the possession of firearms as a serious offence and referred to the need to take general deterrence into account as a sentencing consideration.
(h)Turning to the question of penalties, the magistrate observed that she needed to impose a term of imprisonment for some of the matters and went on to say:[7]
[7] ts 11.7. The magistrate made further reference to the appellant's guilty pleas at ts 10.4 and 12.1.
… really, it's a question of cumulation or concurrency. Considering all the issues both positive and negative in your favour, I have formed the view that there needs to be some cumulation on your District Court sentence to bear a proper relationship with the overall criminality.
In terms of the head sentence, I'm going to impose a head sentence on the receiving offence. That's Armadale charge 1816 of 2017. It's a serious matter, in my view, taking into account everything that has been said, taking into account a plea of guilty discount with reference to s 9AA of the Sentencing Act and discount for the time you have already spent in custody I arrive at a sentence of 12 months' imprisonment for that offence.
(i)The magistrate made the following observations about the reckless driving offence:
In relation to the reckless driving offence, as I have indicated I consider that to be a serious offence of itself. You have two prior convictions for reckless driving. Taking into account your discount for a plea of guilty and the time spent in custody and the other factors in relation to your background there is a term of three months' imprisonment on that matter and there's an order that it be served cumulatively on the head sentence.
(j)The magistrate then went through each of the remaining offences and imposed the sentences recorded in the table that appears in the appendix.
(k)The magistrate concluded her remarks with the following observation:
So that completes your matters but to summarise, I have taken a last look considering all matters as to issues of totality and as I have indicated that the orders for concurrency and cumulation that I have made in my view represent a proper reflection of the criminality. It means that there's a total sentence imposed of 15 months' imprisonment. It's to be imposed cumulatively on your District Court sentence and you're eligible for parole.

Ground 1

The appellant's submissions were appropriately focussed and it is helpful to begin by recording what is not put in issue by the appellant. First, the appellant does not challenge the individual sentences imposed by the magistrate. Second, the appellant accepts that the reckless driving offence and the attempting to pervert the course of justice offence involved different categories of offending and that the offending conduct was 'not entirely in the same course of conduct'.[8] Third, it was accepted that in imposing a penalty in respect of the attempting to pervert the course of justice offence Sleight CJDC was not imposing a punishment in respect of the reckless driving offence. His Honour had regard to the reckless driving offence because an assessment of the seriousness of that offence was relevant to the seriousness of the attempt to pervert the course of justice offence. Fourth, the appellant accepts that one view of the magistrate's approach to sentencing was that the application of the totality principle was reflected in her Honour's order that the 23 terms of imprisonment imposed in respect of the offences, other than the reckless driving and receiving offences, be served concurrently.[9]
[8] ts 17.2.
[9] ts 18.

The focus of the appellant's submission was on the 'interplay' between the 21 month total effective sentence imposed by Sleight CJDC and the 15 month total effective sentence imposed by the magistrate. It was submitted on the appellant's behalf that because there was an overlap in the events that gave rise to the offences of reckless driving offence and attempting to pervert the course of justice (even though the offending was constituted by different conduct) this warranted an order that the sentence for reckless driving be served wholly or partially concurrently with the sentence for attempting to pervert the course of justice.
Although the appellant did not argue that the 12 month sentence of imprisonment in respect of the receiving offence was manifestly excessive her counsel described the sentence as a severe one.
Counsel for the appellant submitted that a remark made by her Honour in the course of exchanges with counsel at the sentencing hearing to the effect that some of the 33 offences to which the appellant had pleaded guilty were '…very, very serious' was indicative, in effect, of an error in the assessment of the criminality involved in the offences generally. In this context counsel for the appellant acknowledged that the receiving charge was aggravated by the fact that the goods received were firearms but drew attention to the fact that there was no evidence that the firearms were part of a broader criminal or commercial enterprise and that the evidence suggested that the appellant might have been in possession of the firearms out of a misguided attempt to assist her children and there was no sophisticated attempt to conceal them.[10]
[10] ts 21.1.
I am not persuaded that ordering that the sentences for the reckless driving and receiving offences be served cumulatively on each other and the 21 month sentence imposed in the District Court was plainly unreasonable or unjust for the following reasons.
First, in my judgment the magistrate took full and proper account of the first limb of the totality principle by ordering that the 23 other terms of imprisonment imposed by her as part of the sentencing exercise be served concurrently with the sentences for the reckless driving and receiving offences. A challenge to the sentences of two immediate terms of imprisonment in a sentencing exercise that involves the imposition of 23 other terms of imprisonment to be served concurrently is artificial and does not pay adequate regard to the reality of the sentencing exercise that was undertaken. As the Court of Appeal has said where there is a challenge on totality grounds the sentence imposed on an individual count generally falls to be assessed in respect of the sentences imposed on other grounds.
Second, (and this is essentially an extension of the first point) the appellant's focus on the facts of the reckless driving and receiving charges and the sentences imposed for those offences, whilst understandable, distracts attention from the critical assessment that the magistrate was required to make and did make. The magistrate was required to assess the criminality involved in all of the appellant's offending. It is clear from her Honour's sentencing remarks that her Honour directed her consideration to all of the offending and was troubled by the number and seriousness of the offences committed by the appellant and by the fact that 22 out of the 33 offences were committed whilst the appellant was serving a suspended sentence. The table that forms the appendix records a pattern of persistent serious offending over two years and I am satisfied that the total effective sentence bore a proper relationship to the overall criminality of the appellant's offending.
I acknowledge that a challenge to a sentence on totality grounds involves an assessment of the total effective sentence but before leaving ground 1 I make the following additional observations.
(a)I do not accept that the factual connection between the reckless driving and attempt to pervert the course of justice offences necessitated an order that the sentence for reckless driving be served concurrently with the sentence imposed for the attempt to pervert the course of justice. The offences involved separate episodes of conduct even if they were part of the same chain of events.
(b)The sentences imposed for the reckless driving and receiving offences were themselves within the standards of sentencing for the offences. Specifically:
(i)In my judgment the reckless driving offence was a very serious example of the offence and the sentence of three months' imprisonment was lenient given that the appellant had two prior convictions for reckless driving. Further, the imposition of a lenient penalty in respect of the reckless driving offence may be viewed as reflecting some recognition of the first limb of the totality principle.
(ii)In Newport Corboy J described the offence of receiving as a serious offence and observed that it is difficult to discern a clear range of sentences for receiving as considerations of totality often intrude and there is a wide variation in the value of the property received and the circumstances in which offenders come to receive property. Corboy J referred to the decisions of the Court of Appeal in Poduti v The State of Western Australia[11] and Eacott v The State of Western Australia.[12] In Poduti McLure P concluded that a review of the decided cases confirms that a sentence of 2 years' imprisonment is towards the higher end of sentences imposed for a single offence of receiving ‑ in the acse the goods comprised stolen furniture with a retail value of $29,535. In Eacott Wheeler JA described a total effective sentence of 18 months' imprisonment for five offences of receiving vehicles worth more than $170,000 as moderate and not lenient.
(c)Whilst there may be differing views as to whether a sentence of 12 months immediate imprisonment for the receiving offence merits the description of severe in my judgment given the aggravating circumstances it was within the range of appropriate sentencing dispositions.
(d)In my judgment the magistrate gave appropriate weight to the mitigatory effect of the appellant's very difficult personal history and how it contributed to the appellant's offending.
[11] Poduti v The State of Western Australia [2011] WASCA 169.
[12] Eacott v The State of Western Australia [2009] WASCA 112.
I will not grant leave to appeal in relation to ground 1.

Ground 2

Section 9AA(5) of the Sentencing Act 1995 (WA) provides that if a court reduces the head sentence under s 9AA(2) the court must state that fact and the extent of the reduction in open court. The magistrate stated that she was taking into account the appellant's pleas of guilty and giving a discount for those pleas before she stated the penalties for those offences but did not state the extent of the discount.
Counsel for the appellant argued that one of the objects underlying s 9AA of the Sentencing Act was to increase transparency in sentencing and the magistrate's failure to state the extent of the discount in open court deprived the appellant of the ability to challenge the quantum of the discount or the reasons why the magistrate fixed upon a particular figure for the discount. Counsel for the appellant also argued that the failure to identify the discount compounded 'the totality' issue because (whilst disclaiming any assertion of a weighting error) it was not possible to determine whether the extent to which the totality principle had been applied.
Not all errors in the sentencing of an offender will vitiate the exercise of the sentencing discretion. An appellate court's jurisdiction to intervene is only enlivened if the error is material.[13]
[13] Kentwell v The Queen [2014] HCA 37; (2014) 252 CLR 601 [42]; Rowsell v The State of Western Australia [2015] WASCA 2 [34]; Roberts v The State of Western Australia [2014] WASCA 239 [47].
The question is whether the magistrate's error in failing to state the extent of the discount is a material error in the context of the sentencing exercise. The failure to state the extent of the discount does not mean that her Honour did not give the appellant the benefit of the discount. It is clear from her Honour's express references to discounting the sentences for the receiving and reckless driving offences that discounts were allowed. In this case any discount for the guilty pleas would have been modest in part because the evidence against the appellant in respect of the two offences was overwhelming and in part because the guilty pleas were not early pleas. Putting that to one side the fundamental reason why I am not persuaded that the error was material is because I have concluded that the sentence imposed by the magistrate was the correct sentence. This conclusion is sufficient to dispose of this ground of appeal either on the basis that the error was not material or on the basis that no substantial miscarriage of justice has occurred.[14]
[14] Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA) s 14(2).
I will grant leave to appeal in relation to ground 2 but dismiss the appeal.

APPENDIX

Date of offence	Offence and dates of pleas	Facts	Maximum sentence (indictment; summary) (if applicable)[15]	Sentencing disposition imposed (terms of imprisonment concurrent unless specified)
1	8/8/16	Fraud Plea: Not guilty 3 April 2018; Guilty 12 June 2018	The appellant attended a Cash Converters store and sold ring which had been reported stolen to Cash Converters for $30	7 years imprisonment; 2 years imprisonment and a fine of $24,000 (s 409(1)(h) Criminal Code)	1 month imprisonment
2		Possess methylamphetamine Plea: Not guilty 3 April 2018; Guilty 12 June 2018	Small clip bag containing less than 1 gram of methylamphetamine located in the appellant's bedroom	A fine not exceeding $2,000 or imprisonment for a maximum of 2 years or both (s 34(1)(e) MDA)	1 month imprisonment
3		Possess drug paraphernalia Plea: Not guilty 3 April 2018; Guilty 12 June 2018	Two glass smoking pipes located inside sunglass case in the appellant's bedroom	A fine of $36,000 or imprisonment for 3 years or both (s 7B(6) MDA)	1 month imprisonment
4	28/8/16 - 13/9/16	Steal motor vehicle Plea: Not guilty 3 April 2018; Guilty 12 June 2018	The appellant had a Holden Commodore which had broken down close to her home towed to her premises where she undertook repairs on the vehicle	7 years imprisonment; 2 years imprisonment and a fine of $24,000 (s 378, 426(3)(a) Criminal Code)	6 months imprisonment
5	28/8/16 - 13/9/16	Stealing Plea: Not guilty 3 April 2018; Guilty 12 June 2018	Items taken from the stolen Commodore were located in the appellant's shed	7 years imprisonment; a fine of $6,000 (s 378, s 426(4) Criminal Code)	$600 fine
6	27/1/17	Reckless driving Plea: Not guilty 25 July 2017; Guilty 12 June 2018	See [5]	For a third or subsequent offence, a fine of $12,000 or 12 months imprisonment (s 60B(2)(c) and (3)(c) Road Traffic Act)	3 months imprisonment (cumulative) and permanent disqualification of licence
7	27/1/17	No authority to drive Plea: Not guilty 25 July 2017; Guilty 12 June 2018	Driving while licence suspended	For a subsequent offence, a fine of not less than $1,000 and not more than $4,000 and imprisonment for not more than 18 months, and mandatory disqualification of driver's licence for not less than 9 months and not more than 3 years (s 49(1)(a) and (3)(c) Road Traffic Act)	3 months imprisonment and licence disqualified for 9 months
8	29/1/17 - 8/2/17	Receiving Plea: Not guilty 3 April 2018; Guilty 12 June 2018	See [5]	14 years imprisonment; imprisonment for 2 years and a fine of $24,000 (s 414, s 426 Criminal Code)	12 months’ imprisonment (cumulative)
9		Aggravated possession of firearm Plea: Not guilty 3 April 2018; Guilty 12 June 2018	Six rifles located hidden behind chair in lounge room of appellant's home, one rifle had its identification number removed	10 years imprisonment; Imprisonment for 3 years or a fine of $12,000 (s 19(1)(ab)(b) and (1ac)(a)(c) Firearms Act)	No penalty (s 11, Sentencing Act 1995)
10		Possess ammunition Plea: Not guilty 3 April 2018; Guilty 12 June 2018	Rifle rounds located at the premises	5 years imprisonment; Imprisonment for 3 years or a fine of $12 000 (s 19(1ad) Firearms Act)	No penalty (s 11, Sentencing Act 1995)
11		Possess stolen or unlawfully obtained property Plea: Not guilty 3 April 2018; Guilty 12 June 2018	Possession of black Canon digital camera suspected of being stolen	7 years imprisonment; 2 years imprisonment and a fine of $24,000 (s 417(1) Criminal Code)	1 month imprisonment
12		Possess a prohibited plant Plea: Not guilty 3 April 2018; Guilty 12 June 2018	Possession of small cannabis plant being grown out of a pot	A fine not exceeding $2,000 or imprisonment for a maximum of 2 years or both (s 34(1)(e) MDA)	$600 fine
13		Possess a prohibited weapon Plea: Not guilty 3 April 2018; Guilty 12 June 2018	Commercially produced 'slingshot' or catapult located inside base of dining room chair in appellant's home	Imprisonment for 3 years and a fine of $36,000 (s 6(1)(b) Weapons Act).	1 month imprisonment
14		Possess a controlled weapon Plea: Not guilty 3 April 2018; Guilty 12 June 2018	Plastic 'BB' located by police in appellant's home	Imprisonment for 2 years and a fine of $24 000 (s 7(1) Weapons Act)	1 month imprisonment
15		Possess ammunition Plea: Not guilty 3 April 2018; Guilty 12 June 2018	Single round of .22 ammunition and 13 air rifle pellets located in dining room buffet unit in appellant's home	5 years imprisonment; Imprisonment for 3 years or a fine of $12 000 (s 19(1ad) Firearms Act)	1 month imprisonment
16 - 22	8 - 11/2/17	Possess stolen or unlawfully obtained property (x 7) Plea: Not guilty 3 April 2018; Guilty 12 June 2018	Appellant found in possession of various items which had been reported stolen including jewellery, a camera, electronics and a motorcycle	7 years imprisonment; 2 years imprisonment and a fine of $24,000 (s 417(1) Criminal Code)	1 month imprisonment for each offence
23	20/1/18	Trespass Plea: Guilty 1 November 2018	Drove onto a property in an attempt to evade police	12 months imprisonments and a fine of $12,000 (s 70A(2) Criminal Code)	$600 fine
24		Disorderly behaviour(Plea: Guilty 1 November 2018	Swearing and abuse directed at police officers in the presence of public	Fine of $6,000 (s 74A(2)(a) Criminal Code)	$600 fine
25		Possess methylamphetamine Plea: Guilty 1 November 2018	0.2 grams of methylamphetamine crystals found in clip-seal bag in appellant's vehicle	A fine not exceeding $2,000 or imprisonment for a maximum of 2 years or both (s 34(1)(e) MDA)	1 month imprisonment
26		Possess a controlled weapon Plea: Guilty 1 November 2018	Canister of pepper spray located in appellant's handbag	Imprisonment for 2 years and a fine of $24 000 (s 7(1) Weapons Act)	1 month imprisonment
27		Threats to harm Plea: Guilty 1 November 2018	Threatened police officer while being arrested	3 years imprisonment; 18 months imprisonment and a fine of $18,000 (s 338B(b) Criminal Code)	1 month imprisonment
28		Possess stolen or unlawfully obtained property Plea: Guilty 1 November 2018	Thirteen 5mg diazepam tablets located in a bag in appellant's vehicle	7 years imprisonment; 2 years imprisonment and a fine of $24,000 (s 417(1) Criminal Code)	1 month imprisonment
29	21/4/18	Possess a prohibited plant Plea: Guilty 9 May 2018	Possession of small cannabis plant	A fine not exceeding $2,000 or imprisonment for a maximum of 2 years or both (s 34(1)(e) MDA)	$600 fine
30		Possess drug paraphernalia Plea: Guilty 9 May 2018	Possession of glass smoking pipe with signs of use	A fine of $36,000 or imprisonment for 3 years or both (s 7B(6) MDA)	1 month imprisonment
31		Possess stolen or unlawfully obtained property Plea: Guilty 9 May 2018	Possession of rifle which had been stolen during a burglary and commit and stealing offence between 1 and 2 October 2016	7 years imprisonment; 2 years imprisonment and a fine of $24,000 (s 417(1) Criminal Code)	1 month imprisonment
32		Possess stolen or unlawfully obtained property Plea: Guilty 9 May 2018	Possession of numerous lingerie items to which security tags were attached	7 years imprisonment; 2 years imprisonment and a fine of $24,000 (s 417(1) Criminal Code)	1 month imprisonment
33		Possess firearm Plea: Guilty 9 May 2018	Possession of rifle without firearms licence	5 years imprisonment; imprisonment for 3 years or a fine of $12 000 (s 19(1ad) Firearms Act)	No penalty (s 11, Sentencing Act 1995)

[15] As outlined in Wiltshire v Mafi [2010] WASCA 111, references to maximum penalties in summary courts should be read and understood as jurisdictional limits.

I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia.
JB
Associate to the Honourable Justice Tottle
22 MAY 2019