New South Wales
Court of Appeal
CITATION: New South Wales Crime Commission v Vu [2009] NSWCA 349 HEARING DATE(S): 8 September 2009
JUDGMENT DATE:
22 October 2009JUDGMENT OF: Spigelman CJ at 1; Allsop P at 55; Hodgson JA at 56 DECISION: 1 Leave to appeal is granted and the appeal allowed.
2 Pursuant to s 10 of the Criminal Assets Recovery Act 1990 no person (other than any registered mortgagee dealing with its right to do so under the registered mortgage) is to dispose of, or attempt to dispose of, or otherwise deal with or attempt to otherwise deal with any interest in property (within the meaning of “interest in property” as defined in s 7 of the Criminal Assets Recovery Act 1990) of Quoc Hoi Vu, including the interest in property in the property described in Schedule 1 hereto.
3 Pursuant to s 10 of the Criminal Assets Recovery Act 1990 no person (other than any registered mortgagee dealing with its right to do so under the registered mortgage) is to dispose of, or attempt to dispose of, or otherwise deal with or attempt to otherwise deal with any interest in property (within the meaning of “interest in property” as defined in s 7 of the Criminal Assets Recovery Act 1990) of Sinh Thi Tran, including the interest in property in the property described in Schedule 1 hereto.
4 Pursuant to s 12(1) of the Criminal Assets Recovery Act 1990 there shall be an examination on oath of the following persons before a Registrar concerning their own affairs and the affairs of each other including the nature and location of any property in which any of them have any interest:
(a) Quoc Hoi Vu; and
(b) Sinh Thi Tran.
5 Leave be granted to the Plaintiff to approach the Court to appoint a time and date for the examinations ordered in Order 5 above.
6 Pursuant to s 12(1)(c1) of the Criminal Assets Recovery Act 1990 Quoc Hoi Vu shall furnish to the plaintiff, within 21 days after service of a sealed copy of these orders on Quoc Hoi Vu, a statement verified by oath of Quoc Hoi Vu setting out the particulars in Schedule 2 hereto.
7 Pursuant to s 12(1)(c1) of the Criminal Assets Recovery Act 1990 Sinh Thi Tran shall furnish to the plaintiff, within 21 days after service of a sealed copy of these orders on Sinh Thi Tran, a statement verified by oath of Sinh Thi Tran setting out the particulars in Schedule 2 hereto.
8 Liberty is granted to the appellant, the first respondent and the second respondent to apply to a judge of the Common Law Division of the Supreme Court of New South Wales on three days notice which liberty can be exercised to seek an order varying orders 2-7 hereof.
9 Pursuant to r 36.4(3) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 these orders are to take effect as of the date hereof.
10 Pursuant to s 6 of…
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- Case
- [2009] NSWCA 349
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Court of Appeal was required to determine whether the affidavit evidence filed by the appellant established reasonable grounds for suspicion that the property in question was derived from or otherwise related to criminal activity, as required by section 10 of the *Criminal Assets Recovery Act 1990*. A further issue was the nature of the appeal itself, specifically whether the first instance decision was an exercise of discretion or a judgment based on facts, and how that characterisation affected the principles applicable to the appeal.
The Court of Appeal held that the affidavit evidence was insufficient to establish reasonable grounds for suspicion. It clarified that the mere fact that a police officer had issued a charge against a person was not, in itself, sufficient to establish reasonable grounds for suspicion under section 10. The Court applied the principles from *Warren v Coombes*, noting that an ex parte determination should be treated as an inference from facts, and that the evidence must demonstrate a sufficient factual basis for the suspicion. The Court also indicated that in interlocutory proceedings, an affidavit need not identify the ultimate source of a statement, but the underlying factual basis for the suspicion must be evident.
The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal, allowed the appeal, and made orders pursuant to section 10 of the *Criminal Assets Recovery Act 1990* restraining the disposal of interests in property by Quoc Hoi Vu and Sinh Thi Tran. Further orders were made for examinations on oath concerning their affairs and for them to furnish statements detailing their property interests and liabilities.
Orders
Orders of the court
1 Leave to appeal is granted and the appeal allowed.
2 Pursuant to s 10 of the Criminal Assets Recovery Act 1990 no person (other than any registered mortgagee dealing with its right to do so under the registered mortgage) is to dispose of, or attempt to dispose of, or otherwise deal with or attempt to otherwise deal with any interest in property (within the meaning of “interest in property” as defined in s 7 of the Criminal Assets Recovery Act 1990) of Quoc Hoi Vu, including the interest in property in the property described in Schedule 1 hereto.
3 Pursuant to s 10 of the Criminal Assets Recovery Act 1990 no person (other than any registered mortgagee dealing with its right to do so under the registered mortgage) is to dispose of, or attempt to dispose of, or otherwise deal with or attempt to otherwise deal with any interest in property (within the meaning of “interest in property” as defined in s 7 of the Criminal Assets Recovery Act 1990) of Sinh Thi Tran, including the interest in property in the property described in Schedule 1 hereto.
4 Pursuant to s 12(1) of the Criminal Assets Recovery Act 1990 there shall be an examination on oath of the following persons before a Registrar concerning their own affairs and the affairs of each other including the nature and location of any property in which any of them have any interest:
(a) Quoc Hoi Vu; and
(b) Sinh Thi Tran.
5 Leave be granted to the Plaintiff to approach the Court to appoint a time and date for the examinations ordered in Order 5 above.
6 Pursuant to s 12(1)(c1) of the Criminal Assets Recovery Act 1990 Quoc Hoi Vu shall furnish to the plaintiff, within 21 days after service of a sealed copy of these orders on Quoc Hoi Vu, a statement verified by oath of Quoc Hoi Vu setting out the particulars in Schedule 2 hereto.
7 Pursuant to s 12(1)(c1) of the Criminal Assets Recovery Act 1990 Sinh Thi Tran shall furnish to the plaintiff, within 21 days after service of a sealed copy of these orders on Sinh Thi Tran, a statement verified by oath of Sinh Thi Tran setting out the particulars in Schedule 2 hereto.
8 Liberty is granted to the appellant, the first respondent and the second respondent to apply to a judge of the Common Law Division of the Supreme Court of New South Wales on three days notice which liberty can be exercised to seek an order varying orders 2-7 hereof.
9 Pursuant to r 36.4(3) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 these orders are to take effect as of the date hereof.
10 Pursuant to s 6 of the Suitors’ Fund Act 1951 an indemnity certificate be granted to the first respondent and the second respondent in respect of this appeal, if otherwise entitled.
Schedule One
The whole of the property described as Lot B in Deposited Plan 354450, Parish of St George, County of Cumberland also known as 30A Victoria Road, Punchbowl, New South Wales and registered in the names of Quoc Hoi Vu and Sinh Thi Tran as tenants in common in equal shares.
Schedule Two
1. Provide full particulars of the nature and extent of all your interests in property (within the meaning of “interest in property” as defined in s 7 of the Criminal Assets Recovery Act 1990), including in relation to each item of property:
(a) a full description of your interest in the property, including the nature of that interest and, where possible, the estimated value, or in the case of bank accounts or deposits – the estimated balance, of that interest;
(b) the location of the interest;
(c) the name of the person or institution in whose custody title documents in respect of the interest are believed to be;
(d) the approximate date of acquisition of the interest;
(e) the source of funds used to acquire the interest.
2. Provide full particulars of your liabilities on both a capital and recurring basis, including, in relation to each liability:
(a) a full description of the liability including the nature of that liability and the amount of that liability;
(b) the name of the person or institution to which the liability is owed.
Background
Background to the litigation
The application was made ex parte, without the respondents present, and the affidavit supporting the application included statements from a police officer and hearsay information. The magistrate granted the orders, finding that the evidence provided reasonable grounds for suspicion that the property was the proceeds of crime. Quoc Hoi Vu and Sinh Thi Tran subsequently appealed against the orders, arguing that the magistrate erred in accepting the hearsay evidence and in finding that there were reasonable grounds for suspicion without requiring evidence from a police officer with sufficient experience or a detailed investigation. They also contended that the orders were disproportionate and should not have been made without their presence in court.
The appeal raised questions about the standard of proof required for an ex parte order under the Act, the sufficiency of the evidence presented, and the process for making such orders. The court had to determine whether the magistrate correctly exercised the discretion to grant the orders and whether the process followed complied with the requirements of the Act and natural justice. The appeal hinged on the factual evidence presented in the affidavit and the interpretation of the statutory provisions governing the making of such orders.
The matter of New South Wales Crime Commission v Vu has its origins in an application under the Criminal Assets Recovery Act 1990, brought by the New South Wales Crime Commission. The Commission sought a freezing order against the property of Quoc Hoi Vu and Sinh Thi Tran, as well as a statement of their interests and liabilities under the Act. The initial application was heard ex parte, and the orders were made by a single judge of the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The respondents, Quoc Hoi Vu and Sinh Thi Tran, subsequently appealed against the orders made by the primary judge. The appeal was brought before the Court of Appeal, which heard arguments from both sides regarding the sufficiency of the evidence provided by the New South Wales Crime Commission and the validity of the orders under the Criminal Assets Recovery Act 1990. The Court of Appeal examined the procedural steps taken by the Commission, including the affidavits and evidence presented, as well as the requirements under sections 10 and 12 of the Act. The respondents argued that the police officer who issued the charge did not provide sufficient evidence to establish reasonable grounds for suspicion under section 10, and that the hearsay nature of the evidence did not meet the necessary standards for an interlocutory proceeding. The appeal was ultimately allowed, with the Court of Appeal setting aside the primary judge's orders and directing the Commission to provide further evidence to meet the statutory requirements.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the first instance decision in the case was best characterised as an exercise of 'discretion' or 'judgment', and if so, how this affects the nature of the appeal.
2. Whether the ex parte nature of the first instance determination should influence how it is treated, and if so, how.
3. Whether the principles outlined in Warren v Coombes are applicable to the current case.
4. What are the requirements of an affidavit under section 10 of the Criminal Assets Recovery Act 1990?
5. Whether a police officer issuing a charge is sufficient to establish reasonable grounds for suspicion under section 10 of the Criminal Assets Recovery Act 1990.
6. Whether the need to identify the ultimate source of a statement applies in interlocutory proceedings under the Criminal Assets Recovery Act 1990.
7. What constitutes "reasonable grounds for suspicion" in the context of the Criminal Assets Recovery Act 1990.
Held
1. The court concluded that the first instance decision was best characterised as an exercise of 'judgment', which affects the nature of the appeal as an appeal against a judgment rather than a discretionary decision.
2. The ex parte nature of the first instance determination was considered, but it was held that it should not influence how the determination is treated.
3. The principles outlined in Warren v Coombes were held to be applicable to the current case.
4. The requirements of an affidavit under section 10 of the Criminal Assets Recovery Act 1990 were clarified by the court.
5. The court held that a police officer issuing a charge is not sufficient to establish reasonable grounds for suspicion under section 10 of the Criminal Assets Recovery Act 1990.
6. It was held that the need to identify the ultimate source of a statement does not apply in interlocutory proceedings under the Criminal Assets Recovery Act 1990.
7. The court defined what constitutes "reasonable grounds for suspicion" in the context of the Criminal Assets Recovery Act 1990.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Court began by examining the characterisation of the first instance decision as an exercise of 'discretion' or 'judgment'. This distinction is crucial in determining the nature of the appeal. If the decision was one of judgment, the appeal would generally involve a re-assessment of the evidence and the decision itself, potentially leading to a new conclusion. However, if the decision was discretionary, the scope of the appeal would be more limited, focusing on whether the discretion was exercised correctly. In this case, the Court determined that the first instance decision was best characterised as an exercise of judgment. This characterisation meant that the appeal was not restricted to the correctness of the discretion but could involve a broader reassessment of the evidence and the decision itself.
The ex parte nature of the first instance determination was another significant factor the Court considered. An ex parte application, made without notice to the other party, typically results in a decision that is provisional and subject to review once the other party has had an opportunity to be heard. The Court held that the ex parte nature of the first instance determination meant it should be treated in the same way as an inference from facts, rather than a definitive finding. This approach aligns with the principles in Warren v Coombes, where the High Court established that ex parte decisions should be treated with caution and are subject to review when the other party has the opportunity to be heard.
In applying the principles from Warren v Coombes, the Court emphasised that the ex parte determination must be revisited once the respondent has had a chance to present their case. This principle was crucial in ensuring that the respondent's rights were adequately protected and that the decision was not based on incomplete information. The Court further noted that the ex parte nature did not diminish the need for the respondent to provide a robust response to the application, but it did affect how the initial determination was treated in subsequent proceedings.
The Court then turned to the requirements of an affidavit under section 10 of the Criminal Assets Recovery Act 1990. The Court reiterated that an affidavit must contain sufficient information to establish reasonable grounds for suspicion that the property involved is connected to criminal activity. The affidavit must detail the basis for this suspicion, including any relevant facts and circumstances. In this case, the Court found that the affidavit met the statutory requirements as it provided detailed information about the suspected criminal activity and the connection to the property in question.
Addressing whether a police officer issuing a charge is sufficient to establish reasonable grounds for suspicion under section 10, the Court held that such a charge alone is not enough. The affidavit must go beyond the mere fact of the charge and provide additional information that substantiates the suspicion. The Court emphasised that reasonable grounds for suspicion require more than a bare assertion; they must be supported by specific facts and evidence. In this instance, the affidavit included detailed information beyond the mere charge, which the Court found sufficient to meet the statutory requirements.
The need to identify the ultimate source of a statement in interlocutory proceedings under the Criminal Assets Recovery Act 1990 was another issue the Court addressed. The Court clarified that in interlocutory proceedings, the need to identify the ultimate source of a statement is not as stringent as in final hearings. The focus in interlocutory proceedings is on whether there are reasonable grounds for suspicion, rather than on the strict evidentiary rules that apply at trial. This approach allows for a more flexible application of evidence rules in interim proceedings, where the primary goal is to prevent the dissipation of assets that may be subject to confiscation.
Finally, the Court defined "reasonable grounds for suspicion" in the context of the Criminal Assets Recovery Act 1990. The Court held that reasonable grounds for suspicion require a belief based on facts and circumstances that are more than merely speculative. The suspicion must be grounded in concrete information that a reasonable person would consider sufficient to warrant further investigation. In this case, the Court found that the information provided in the affidavit met this standard, as it included detailed and specific evidence that supported the suspicion of criminal activity related to the property.
The ratio decidendi of this case is that an ex parte decision in proceedings under the Criminal Assets Recovery Act 1990 must be treated with caution and is subject to review once the respondent has had an opportunity to be heard. Additionally, an affidavit under section 10 of the Act must provide more than just the fact of a police charge to establish reasonable grounds for suspicion; it must include specific facts and evidence that support the suspicion. The Court's decision aligns with the principles in Warren v Coombes and provides clarity on the requirements for making an application under the Act.