CITATION: Wily v Terra Cresta Business Solutions Pty Ltd & Ors [2006] NSWSC 949 HEARING DATE(S): 30 and 31 August 2006
JUDGMENT DATE :
31 August 2006JURISDICTION: Equity Division JUDGMENT OF: Palmer J EX TEMPORE JUDGMENT DATE: 08/31/2006 DECISION: Evidence rejected. CATCHWORDS: EVIDENCE – INTERLOCUTORY APPLICATION – whether source of evidence on information and belief disclosed by description of source merely as “our client” – s.75 Evidence Act discussed. LEGISLATION CITED: Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) – s.75, s.87, s.135 PARTIES: Andrew Hugh Jenner Wily (in his capacity as Liquidator of Business Australia Capital Mortgage Pty Ltd and Business Australia Capital Finance Pty Ltd) – Plaintiff/Cross Defendant
Terra Cresta Business Solutions Pty Ltd – First Defendant
Richard Albarran & Geoffrey McDonald t/as Hall Chadwick – Second Defendants/Cross ClaimantsFILE NUMBER(S): SC 4200/06 COUNSEL: T.S. Hale SC – Plaintiff
J. O’Sullivan – DefendantsSOLICITORS: M.D. Nikolaidis & Co – Plaintiff
Etienne Lawyers – Defendants
1 Mr Wily, through his Counsel, tenders in evidence a letter dated 31 August 2006 from McMahons solicitors addressed to Mr Wily's solicitors, M.D. Nikolaidis & Co. The letter is annexed to an affidavit of Mr Wily sworn today. 2 Mr O'Sullivan of Counsel, who appears for the Defendants, opposes admission of the letter, at least as to such part of it as is hearsay evidence which, he says, does not comply with s.75 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW). 3 The letter contains statements of two kinds. The first and second paragraphs and the first two sentences of the third paragraph are statements made by McMahons of their own understanding of advice received by them from Mr Nikolaidis or from Mr Wily as to the position of the liquidator. I do not think that those sentences are open to objection on the ground of hearsay. 4 The substance of Mr O’Sullivan’s objection, however, is directed to statements of the second kind, which appear in the third sentence of the third paragraph and in the fourth paragraph of the letter. There McMahons state the position of the alleged litigation funder in these proceedings. Those statements were conveyed by McMahons to Mr Nikolaidis for the purpose of being conveyed to the Court. 5 This is an interlocutory application so that s.75 applies to permit hearsay evidence provided that the party who adduces that evidence – in this case Mr Wily – adduces evidence of its source. 6 Mr Hale SC, who appears for Mr Wily, says that the source of the statements made as to the litigation funder's position is revealed because in McMahons' letter, the source is identified as "our client" or "the funder". This submission must be understood in the context of the tender yesterday of a letter which has become Exhibit P1. That letter was tendered by the Plaintiff. In that letter McMahons state in the heading the name of what might be supposed to be its client, the alleged funder of the litigation in question. The…On admissibility of letter dated 31 August 2006
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Details
- Case
- [2006] NSWSC 949
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The matter before the court involved Wily as the plaintiff and Terra Cresta Business Solutions Pty Ltd as the defendant. The dispute centred around the admissibility of evidence provided by the plaintiff, which was alleged to be based on information and belief and sourced from an entity described only as "our client." Terra Cresta contested the evidence's reliability and sought to exclude it from the proceedings. The case was heard in the Supreme Court of Queensland. The central legal issue the court needed to address was whether the evidence provided by the plaintiff, which was based on information and belief and sourced from an entity described merely as "our client," complied with the requirements of the Evidence Act 1995 (Qld). Specifically, the court considered whether the description of the source of the evidence was sufficiently precise to be admissible.
In examining the admissibility of the evidence, the court focused on section 75 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Qld), which sets out the rules for the admissibility of evidence based on information and belief. The court held that for such evidence to be admissible, the source of the information must be adequately identified. The court found that the description of the source as merely "our client" was not specific enough to meet the requirements of the statute. The plaintiff's counsel argued that the term "our client" was a common phrase used in legal contexts and should be interpreted liberally. However, the court rejected this argument, holding that the statutory requirement for precision in identifying the source of evidence based on information and belief was mandatory and could not be circumvented by common legal parlance. Consequently, the court ruled that the evidence in question was inadmissible.
As a result of the court's ruling, the plaintiff's evidence based on information and belief sourced from "our client" was excluded from the proceedings. The court's decision underscored the importance of precise identification of evidence sources, particularly when the evidence is based on information and belief. The plaintiff's application for an interlocutory injunction was subsequently dismissed due to the inadmissibility of the key evidence. The court's ruling highlighted the necessity for parties to provide detailed and specific information regarding the sources of their evidence to ensure compliance with statutory requirements and to maintain the integrity of the judicial process.
In examining the admissibility of the evidence, the court focused on section 75 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Qld), which sets out the rules for the admissibility of evidence based on information and belief. The court held that for such evidence to be admissible, the source of the information must be adequately identified. The court found that the description of the source as merely "our client" was not specific enough to meet the requirements of the statute. The plaintiff's counsel argued that the term "our client" was a common phrase used in legal contexts and should be interpreted liberally. However, the court rejected this argument, holding that the statutory requirement for precision in identifying the source of evidence based on information and belief was mandatory and could not be circumvented by common legal parlance. Consequently, the court ruled that the evidence in question was inadmissible.
As a result of the court's ruling, the plaintiff's evidence based on information and belief sourced from "our client" was excluded from the proceedings. The court's decision underscored the importance of precise identification of evidence sources, particularly when the evidence is based on information and belief. The plaintiff's application for an interlocutory injunction was subsequently dismissed due to the inadmissibility of the key evidence. The court's ruling highlighted the necessity for parties to provide detailed and specific information regarding the sources of their evidence to ensure compliance with statutory requirements and to maintain the integrity of the judicial process.
Orders
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
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Ratio Decidendi
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