Elfar v New South Wales Crime Commission

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NEW SOUTH WALES COURT OF APPEAL

CITATION:
Elfar v New South Wales Crime Commission [2009] NSWCA 348

FILE NUMBER(S):
40056/09

HEARING DATE(S):
8 September 2009

JUDGMENT DATE:
22 October 2009

PARTIES:
Karim John Elfar (Appellant)
New South Wales Crime Commission (Respondent)

JUDGMENT OF:
Spigelman CJ Allsop P Hodgson JA   

LOWER COURT JURISDICTION:
Supreme Court

LOWER COURT FILE NUMBER(S):
15647/08

LOWER COURT JUDICIAL OFFICER:
Hislop J

LOWER COURT DATE OF DECISION:
24 October 2008

COUNSEL:
T J Rickard (Appellant)
I Temby QC with P Singleton (Respondent)

SOLICITORS:
M J Woods & Co (Appellant)
New South Wales Crime Commission (Respondent)

CATCHWORDS:
APPEAL - duty to give reasons - person subject to Order entitled to know more than that primary judge “had regard to” certain matters
CRIMINAL LAW - procedure - confiscation of proceeds of crime and related matters - restraining or freezing order - evidence and procedure - requirements of affidavit under s 10 Criminal Assets Recovery Act 1990
CRIMINAL LAW - procedure - confiscation of proceeds of crime and related matters - restraining or freezing order - evidence and procedure - police officer issuing charge not sufficient to establish reasonable grounds for suspicion under s 10 Criminal Assets Recovery Act 1990
WORDS & PHRASES - “reasonable grounds for suspicion”.

LEGISLATION CITED:
Criminal Assets Recovery Act 1990
Drug Misuse and Trafficking Act 1985
Evidence Act 1995

CASES CITED:
George v Rockett (1990) 170 CLR 104
Hadjigeorgiou v New South Wales Crime Commission [2007] NSWCA 197; (2007) 174 A Crim R 124
International Finance Trust Company Limited v New South Wales Crime Commission [2008] NSWCA 291, (2008) 251 ALR 479
New South Wales Commission v Beneficial Owners of Various Bank and Share Trading Accounts [2009] NSWSC 322
New South Wales Crime Commission v Ollis [2006] NSWCA 76; (2006) 65 NSWLR 478
New South Wales Crime Commission v Vu [2009] NSWCA 349
Soulemezis v Dudley Holdings Pty Ltd (1987) 10 NSWLR 247
Warren Coombes (1979) 142 CLR 531

TEXTS CITED:

DECISION:
1 Extend time for filing the summons up to and including 6 March 2009.
2 Grant leave to appeal.
3 Subject to the appellant filing the Notice of Appeal, appeal allowed.
4 Set aside the order made by Hislop J on 24 October 2008.
5 Orders 3 and 4 to take effect one week from the date hereof.
6 The respondent pay the appellant’s costs.

JUDGMENT:

- 12 -

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF NEW SOUTH WALES
COURT OF APPEAL

CA 40056/09

SPIGELMAN CJ
ALLSOP P
HODGSON JA

Thursday 22 October 2009

Karim John Elfar  v  New South Wales Crime Commission

FACTS

On 23 October 2008 the appellant was charged with possession of precursor drugs for the manufacture or production of prohibited drugs under the Drug Misuse and Trafficking Act 1985. The appellant had been under electronic and physical surveillance and was observed passing containers, allegedly containing Sassafras Oil (the precursor drug) to another party. A search of the appellant’s home the next day uncovered approximately $100 000 in cash.

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Details
Case
[2009] NSWCA 348
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal concerned an application by the appellant, Elfar, to set aside a restraining order made by Hislop J on 24 October 2008, pursuant to the *Criminal Assets Recovery Act 1990* (NSW). The New South Wales Crime Commission sought the restraining order based on a suspicion that the appellant had engaged in serious crime-related activity, specifically a drug trafficking offence under s 24A of the *Drug Misuse and Trafficking Act 1985* (NSW), which concerned the possession of precursors for the manufacture or production of prohibited drugs. The appeal was heard by Spigelman CJ, Allsop P, and Hodgson JA.

The primary legal issues before the court were whether the affidavit supporting the application for the restraining order sufficiently established reasonable grounds for the Commission's suspicion, as required by s 10(3) of the *Criminal Assets Recovery Act 1990*, and whether the primary judge had provided adequate reasons for making the order. Specifically, the court considered whether the mere fact that a police officer had laid a charge was sufficient to establish reasonable grounds for suspicion for the purposes of the Act, and whether the primary judge's statement that he "had regard to" certain matters constituted a sufficient duty to give reasons.

The court reasoned that the affidavit sworn by Mr. Spark, the Assistant Director of Financial Investigations, did not adequately establish reasonable grounds for suspicion. While the affidavit referred to a Facts Sheet prepared by Detective Kiem and a search of the NSW COPS system revealing the appellant had been charged, the court found that the Facts Sheet itself did not provide sufficient information to justify the suspicion. The statement within the Facts Sheet that "It was believed that the accused was to supply a large quantity of prohibited drug or drug precursor" was an assertion of belief, not evidence supporting reasonable grounds for suspicion. Furthermore, the court held that the duty to give reasons required more than simply stating that the primary judge had "had regard to" certain matters; the judge needed to articulate the basis upon which the order was made.

The appeal was allowed. The court extended the time for filing the summons, granted leave to appeal, and set aside the restraining order made by Hislop J. The orders were to take effect one week from the date of the judgment, and the respondent was ordered to pay the appellant's costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1 Extend time for filing the summons up to and including 6 March 2009.

2 Grant leave to appeal.

3 Subject to the appellant filing the Notice of Appeal, appeal allowed.

4 Set aside the order made by Hislop J on 24 October 2008.

5 Orders 3 and 4 to take effect one week from the date hereof.

6 The respondent pay the appellant’s costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

Elfar v New South Wales Crime Commission involves an application for a restraining order under the Criminal Assets Recovery Act 1990 (NSW). The New South Wales Crime Commission applied to the Supreme Court for the order to restrain the disposal of the applicant’s assets, suspecting that the applicant had engaged in serious crime related activity. The application was made on the basis of an affidavit by Mr Jonathan Spark, Assistant Director of Financial Investigations at the Commission. Mr Spark’s affidavit was sworn on 24 October 2008, and he stated that his suspicion was based on two main sources: a Facts Sheet dated 23 October 2008, prepared by Detective Maree Kiem of the New South Wales Police Force, and a record showing that the applicant was charged on 23 October 2008.

The Facts Sheet, authored by Detective Kiem, detailed the investigation under the name of Strike Force Guardian. It included observations of the applicant meeting with a co-accused, Mr Balog, on 22 October 2008, where they transferred four large plastic containers from the applicant’s vehicle to Balog’s. During a subsequent search of Balog’s vehicle, these containers were found to contain a yellow liquid believed to be a drug precursor. The following day, a search of the applicant’s home resulted in the discovery of approximately $100,000 in cash. Based on these events, Detective Kiem concluded that the applicant was believed to be supplying a large quantity of prohibited drugs or drug precursors. This investigation and the subsequent charge against the applicant formed the basis for Mr Spark’s suspicion that the applicant was involved in serious crime related activity.

The matter of Elfar v New South Wales Crime Commission came before the court as an appeal against the decision of Hislop J. The appeal was grounded on the contention that the primary judge did not sufficiently articulate the reasons for the restraining order made under the Criminal Assets Recovery Act 1990. The appellant argued that as a person subject to such an order, they were entitled to know more than merely that the primary judge had regard to certain matters. The appellant also contended that the affidavit supporting the application for the restraining order did not establish the requisite "reasonable grounds for suspicion" as required by s 10 of the Act. The court was asked to determine whether the evidence provided in the affidavit was adequate to satisfy the statutory requirements for issuing a restraining order.

The appeal followed the initial application for a restraining order made by the respondent, the New South Wales Crime Commission, which was heard and granted by Hislop J on 24 October 2008. The application was supported by an affidavit sworn by Mr Jonathan Spark, Assistant Director of Financial Investigations at the Commission. The affidavit stated that the suspicion arose from a Facts Sheet prepared by Detective Maree Kiem of the New South Wales Police Force, which detailed a surveillance operation where the appellant was observed meeting with a co-accused and transferring containers of a substance believed to be a drug precursor. The appellant was subsequently arrested, and a significant sum of cash was found during a search of their home. The respondent relied on this affidavit as fulfilling the requirements of s 10(3) of the Act. The court's decision to allow the appeal and set aside the order hinged on whether the affidavit provided sufficient evidence to establish the necessary "reasonable grounds for suspicion".

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

This ground of appeal should be upheld.The Evidence The affidavit in support of the application before Hislop J was sworn by Mr Jonathan Spark, who is the Assistant Director of Financial Investigations at the New South Wales Crime Commission. He deposed to the fact that he had a suspicion that the applicant “has engaged in serious crime related activity”. Section 6(1) of the Act identifies “serious crime related activity” in terms of conduct constituting a “serious criminal offence”, which is further defined in s 6(2)(b) to encompass a “drug trafficking offence”. For present purposes, by s 6(3)(b1), a drug trafficking offence is an offence under specific provisions of the Drug Misuse and Trafficking Act 1985 including under s 24A of that Act, ‘possession of precursors for manufacture or production of prohibited drugs’. It is relevant to note that mere supply is not included in the offence presently under consideration. Mr Spark stated that his suspicion was determined as follows:“3 The suspicion … is held by me having had regard to:(a) the contents of a 3 page Facts Sheet dated 23 October 2008 prepared by Detective Maree Kiem of the New South Wales Police Force and forwarded to the Commission, a copy of which is annexed hereto and marked ‘A’ (‘the Facts Sheet’); and(b) a search of the records of the New South Wales COPS system which revealed that on 23 October 2008 Elfar was charged with the offence described in the Facts Sheet.” It is this paragraph upon which the respondent relies as satisfying the requirements of s 10(3) of the Act. The annexed Facts Sheet identified the author as Detective Maree Kiem, who was one of two arresting officers. She was also the informant on the charge. She was identified as an officer in the Drug Squad. The Facts Sheet referred to investigations under the name of Strike Force Guardian, which “utilised various electronic and physical surveillance techniques”. No reference is made to the product of any electronic surveillance. However, physical surveillance of the appellant revealed that on 22 October 2008 he drove a car on the Hume Highway and met a co-accused, Mr Balog, at a service station. The Facts Sheet stated “a number of police monitored the meeting between the accused and Mark Balog”. The monitoring revealed that the accused and Balog removed four large plastic containers from the rear of the accused’s vehicle and placed them in the vehicle driven by Balog. Balog was subsequently stopped and an inspection of the plastic containers revealed that “each of these containers had a 10 litre capacity and were filled with a yellow coloured oil type liquid”. On the next day a search was executed at the home of the appellant, where he was arrested. Approximately $100,000 in cash was discovered during that search. The Facts Sheet contained the following statement, which appears in the context of the meeting between the appellant and Balog:“It was believed that the accused was to supply a large quantity of prohibited drug or drug precursor.”

Decision

Reasons for decision

SPIGELMAN CJ
Issues
1. Was the affidavit provided by Mr Jonathan Spark, Assistant Director of Financial Investigations at the New South Wales Crime Commission, sufficient to establish reasonable grounds for suspicion under s 10 of the Criminal Assets Recovery Act 1990?
2. Did the mere fact that the appellant was charged with an offence, as stated in the Facts Sheet, satisfy the requirements of s 10(3) of the Criminal Assets Recovery Act 1990?
3. Did the Court err in finding that the police officer issuing the charge was sufficient to establish reasonable grounds for suspicion under s 10 of the Criminal Assets Recovery Act 1990?
4. Does the person subject to an Order under s 10 of the Criminal Assets Recovery Act 1990 have the right to know more than that the primary judge "had regard to" certain matters when determining the application?

Held
1. The court held that the affidavit provided by Mr Jonathan Spark, Assistant Director of Financial Investigations at the New South Wales Crime Commission, was not sufficient to establish reasonable grounds for suspicion under s 10 of the Criminal Assets Recovery Act 1990. As a result, the appeal was upheld on this ground.

2. The court held that the mere fact that the appellant was charged with an offence, as stated in the Facts Sheet, did not satisfy the requirements of s 10(3) of the Criminal Assets Recovery Act 1990. Consequently, this ground of appeal was also upheld.

3. The court held that there was no error in finding that the police officer issuing the charge was not sufficient to establish reasonable grounds for suspicion under s 10 of the Criminal Assets Recovery Act 1990. Therefore, this ground of appeal was dismissed.

4. The court held that a person subject to an Order under s 10 of the Criminal Assets Recovery Act 1990 has the right to know more than that the primary judge "had regard to" certain matters when determining the application. This ground of appeal was upheld, leading to the setting aside of the order made by Hislop J on 24 October 2008 and the allowance of the appeal.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: SPIGELMAN CJ

The appeal in the case of Elfar v New South Wales Crime Commission centred on the sufficiency of the affidavit provided by Mr Jonathan Spark, the Assistant Director of Financial Investigations at the New South Wales Crime Commission, in establishing reasonable grounds for suspicion under section 10 of the Criminal Assets Recovery Act 1990 (Cth). The primary judge, Hislop J, had granted an Order freezing the appellant’s assets. The appellant argued that the affidavit did not meet the requirements of s 10(3) of the Act, which stipulates that the affidavit must include "a statement of the facts upon which the suspicion is based". In considering the sufficiency of the affidavit, the court held that it was insufficient as it did not detail the facts upon which the suspicion was based. Mr Spark’s affidavit merely referred to a Facts Sheet prepared by Detective Maree Kiem and the record of a charge against the appellant, without providing the specific details of the evidence or observations that formed the basis of the suspicion. This was insufficient to satisfy the statutory requirement.

Furthermore, the court examined whether the mere fact that the appellant was charged with an offence, as stated in the Facts Sheet, satisfied the requirements of s 10(3) of the Act. The court found that a charge alone does not equate to reasonable grounds for suspicion under the Act. The Act requires a detailed statement of facts that form the basis of the suspicion. The court emphasised that the requirement is not merely met by pointing to a charge but must include a substantive statement of the facts supporting the suspicion. The reliance on the charge without further details rendered the affidavit deficient in this regard.

The court also considered whether the police officer issuing the charge was sufficient to establish reasonable grounds for suspicion under s 10 of the Act. It held that the role of the police officer in issuing a charge does not inherently satisfy the requirement for reasonable grounds for suspicion under the Act. The affidavit needed to go beyond identifying the officer and charge to provide the underlying facts supporting the suspicion. The court underscored that the quality and specificity of the evidence, not the mere act of charging, are what matter in establishing the required suspicion.

Lastly, the court addressed whether the person subject to an Order under s 10 of the Act has the right to know more than that the primary judge “had regard to” certain matters when determining the application. The court held that the duty to give reasons requires more than just stating that certain matters were considered. The person subject to the Order is entitled to know the specific facts and evidence upon which the suspicion is based. The court found that the primary judge’s reasoning was insufficient because it did not detail the facts that led to the suspicion, thereby failing to meet the transparency and specificity required by the Act.

The ratio decidendi of this case is that an affidavit under s 10(3) of the Criminal Assets Recovery Act 1990 must include a detailed statement of the facts upon which the suspicion is based, and cannot merely rely on a charge or the fact that a police officer had regard to certain matters. The court departed from any previous authority that may have allowed for a more lenient interpretation of the sufficiency of the affidavit, reinforcing the need for specificity and detail in the evidence provided.