Neffati and Inspector-General in Bankruptcy

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Neffati and Inspector-General in Bankruptcy [2016] AATA 941 (25 November 2016)

Division

TAXATION & COMMERCIAL DIVISION

File Number

2016/2868

Re

Moncef Neffati

APPLICANT

And

Inspector-General in Bankruptcy

RESPONDENT

DECISION

Tribunal

Senior Member J F Toohey

Date 25 November 2016
Place Sydney

For the reasons set out in this decision, the answer to the preliminary question is “No”.

.........................[sgd]...............................................

Senior Member J F Toohey

CATCHWORDS

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – jurisdiction – bankruptcy – decision refusing to review trustees’ objection to discharge – scope of Tribunal’s power on review – powers and discretions conferred on the decision maker – whether in setting aside and substituting a decision the Tribunal can conduct review of the trustees’ decision – Tribunal has jurisdiction to review decision not to conduct a review – no jurisdiction to conduct the review

LEGISLATION

Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975, ss 2A, 25(1), 43(1)

Bankruptcy Act 1966, ss 149A, 149B, 149K, 149N, 149Q

CASES

Lavin and Inspector-General in Bankruptcy [2016] AATA 798

MNWA Pty Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [2016] FCAFC 154
Phillips and Inspector-General in Bankruptcy [2012] AATA 788
Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355

Woodman and Inspector-General in Bankruptcy [1996] AATA 115

SECONDARY MATERIALS

Explanatory Memorandum, Bankruptcy Legislation Amendment Bill 2002 (Cth)

REASONS FOR DECISION

Senior Member J F Toohey

25 November 2016

Background

  1. A preliminary question has arisen in an application for review of a decision by the respondent under the Bankruptcy Act 1966. The question concerns the scope of Tribunal’s power, in particular when setting aside a decision under review and making a decision in substitution for that decision.

  2. In February 2013, the applicant became bankrupt on a Debtor’s Petition and a trustee of his estate was appointed.  In October 2015, joint trustees were appointed.    

  3. On 12 January 2016, the trustees filed a notice under s 149B(1) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 objecting to the applicant’s discharge. The effect of such notice, unless it is cancelled or withdrawn, is to extend the period of bankruptcy: s 149A(1). In the applicant’s case, the effect was to extend the period by five years to eight years.

  4. By s 149K(1) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966, the respondent may review a trustee’s decision to file a notice of objection on his or her own initiative, or if requested by a bankrupt for reasons that appear sufficient to justify such a review.

  5. On 11 March 2016, the applicant requested the respondent to review the trustees’ decision to file the notice of objection. 

  6. Section 149K(5) provides:

    Within 60 days after the request is received, the [respondent] must: 

    (a)decide whether to review the decision; and

    (b)if the [respondent] decides to review the decision – make his or her decision on the review.

  7. On 10 May 2016, the respondent decided to refuse to review the decision. 

    The application for Tribunal review

  8. Section 149Q of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 provides:

    An application may be made to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal for the review of:

    (a)a decision…

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Details
Case
[2016] AATA 941
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter concerned an application for review before the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) by Mr. Neffati against a decision of the Inspector-General in Bankruptcy. The dispute centred on the scope of the Tribunal's power when reviewing a decision by the Inspector-General not to conduct a review of a trustee's objection to a bankrupt's discharge. The core question was whether the AAT, in reviewing the Inspector-General's refusal to conduct a review, could itself conduct the substantive review of the trustee's objection.

The legal issues before the Tribunal were whether it possessed the jurisdiction to review the trustee's decision to object to discharge, or if its power was limited to reviewing only the Inspector-General's decision to refuse to conduct such a review. Specifically, the Tribunal had to determine if, under section 43(1) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975, it could exercise all the powers and discretions of the original decision-maker, including the power to initiate a review that the Inspector-General had declined to undertake.

The Tribunal reasoned that while it could substitute its own decision for that of the Inspector-General, its power was confined to reviewing the decision that was actually made. In this instance, the Inspector-General had decided *not* to conduct a review, and it was this decision that was before the Tribunal. The Tribunal acknowledged that the Inspector-General had the discretion to decide whether sufficient reasons existed to justify conducting a review under section 149K(1) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966. However, the Tribunal concluded that the fact the Inspector-General *could* have conducted a review did not confer upon the Tribunal the power to conduct that review itself. The Tribunal's role was to review the Inspector-General's decision to refuse a review, not to step into the shoes of the Inspector-General and conduct the initial review of the trustee's objection.

The Tribunal answered the preliminary question in the negative. It held that it had jurisdiction to review the Inspector-General's decision not to conduct a review, but it did not have jurisdiction to conduct the substantive review of the trustee's objection to discharge.

Orders

Orders of the court

For the reasons set out in this decision, the answer to the preliminary question is “No”.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

For the reasons that follow, the answer to that question is “No”.The Tribunal’s decision on review An enactment may provide that applications may be made to the Tribunal for review of decisions made in the exercise of powers conferred by that enactment or by another enactment having effect under that enactment: s 25(1) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (AAT Act). Section 43(1) of the AAT Act provides:For the purpose of reviewing a decision, the Tribunal may exercise all the powers and discretions that are conferred by any relevant enactment on the person who made the decision and shall make a decision in writing:(a)affirming the decision under review; (b)varying the decision under review; or (c)setting aside the decision under review and:(i) making a decision in substitution for the decision so set aside; or (ii) remitting the matter for reconsideration in accordance with any directions or recommendations of the Tribunal. The applicant’s contentions can be summarised as follows:(i)the Tribunal has all the powers and discretions conferred on the respondent in making the decision under review;(ii)as it was within the respondent’s power to decide to review the trustees’ decision, the Tribunal also has that power; (iii)if (as the applicant says it should) the Tribunal sets aside the decision under review, it can, and should, proceed to review the trustees’ decision;(iv)on reviewing the trustees’ decision, the Tribunal can substitute its own decision upholding or cancelling the trustees’ decision. The applicant submits that, not only is this reading of s 43(1) of the AAT Act correct in law, it would achieve “the overriding purpose of the entire review process and minimise delay and inconvenience to the parties”. Consideration In deciding whether or not to conduct a review, the question for the respondent is, essentially, whether there appear to be reasons “sufficient to justify such a review”: s 149K(1). Only if the respondent determines there are sufficient reasons, does he or she proceed to conduct the review in which case different considerations arise. If satisfied of any of the matters in s 149N(1), the respondent must cancel the objection (and must not cancel the objection if the provisions of s 149N(1A) apply). The distinct decisions available to the respondent, which in turn are reviewable by the Tribunal, are reflected in s 149Q which provides for an application for review of one or the other. In this case, the respondent determined there were not sufficient reasons to justify a review. That is the decision of which review by the Tribunal is sought, and which the Tribunal has power to review. The respondent decided not to conduct a review and did not make a decision under s 149N of the Bankruptcy Act 1966. Although the Tribunal is commonly said to “stand in the shoes” of the original decision-maker, its power remains one of review. It has “all the powers and discretions conferred on the person who made the decision” (emphasis added). The fact that the respondent could have decided to conduct a review does not give the Tribunal power to do so.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The applicant submits that, not only is this reading of s 43(1) of the AAT Act correct in law, it would achieve “the overriding purpose of the entire review process and minimise delay and inconvenience to the parties”. Consideration In deciding whether or not to conduct a review, the question for the respondent is, essentially, whether there appear to be reasons “sufficient to justify such a review”: s 149K(1). Only if the respondent determines there are sufficient reasons, does he or she proceed to conduct the review in which case different considerations arise. If satisfied of any of the matters in s 149N(1), the respondent must cancel the objection (and must not cancel the objection if the provisions of s 149N(1A) apply). The distinct decisions available to the respondent, which in turn are reviewable by the Tribunal, are reflected in s 149Q which provides for an application for review of one or the other. In this case, the respondent determined there were not sufficient reasons to justify a review. That is the decision of which review by the Tribunal is sought, and which the Tribunal has power to review. The respondent decided not to conduct a review and did not make a decision under s 149N of the Bankruptcy Act 1966. Although the Tribunal is commonly said to “stand in the shoes” of the original decision-maker, its power remains one of review. It has “all the powers and discretions conferred on the person who made the decision” (emphasis added). The fact that the respondent could have decided to conduct a review does not give the Tribunal power to do so. The applicant submits that the Tribunal should come to the same conclusion as was reached in Woodman and Inspector-General in Bankruptcy [1996] AATA 115. In that case, the Tribunal decided there were sufficient reasons to justify it reviewing the trustee’s decision to file the notice of objection. It set aside the Inspector-General’s decision to refuse a request for review and substituted a decision cancelling the notice of objection to discharge. At the time of the decision in Woodman, s 149Q provided:An application may be made to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal for the review of:(a)a decision of the trustee or Official Receiver to file a notice of objection; or(b)a decision of the Inspector-General on the review of such a decision; or(c)a decision of the Inspector-General refusing a request to review an objection. Section 149Q allowed application direct to the Tribunal for review of a trustee’s decision. It was amended with effect from 5 May 2003 to remove that right of review. According to the Explanatory Memorandum to the Bankruptcy Legislation Amendment Bill 2002, it would make a number of “significant changes” to bankruptcy law and would “address concerns at the bankruptcy system is biased towards the debtor”. Its objects included to “strengthen the objection-to-discharge provisions of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 by making it easier for trustees to lodge objections to a person’s discharge from bankruptcy and harder for bankrupts to sustain challenges to objections” and to “abolish a bankrupt’s direct access to an external tribunal for review of trustee decisions, eg, those about income contributions and objections to discharge”.