Moss and Inspector-General in Bankruptcy
[2024] AATA 3523
•4 October 2024
Moss and Inspector-General in Bankruptcy [2024] AATA 3523 (4 October 2024)
Division:TAXATION AND COMMERCIAL DIVISION
File Number(s):2023/6875
Re:Jamie Moss
APPLICANT
AndInspector-General in Bankruptcy
RESPONDENT
DECISION
Tribunal:Senior Member D Benk
Date:4 October 2024
Place:Sydney
The Tribunal affirms the decision under review pursuant to section 43(1)(a) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth).
.........................[sgd]...............................................
Senior Member D Benk
CATCHWORDS
BANKRUPTCY – whether Trustee was entitled to issue a notice of objection - statutory powers of Trustee – special ground of objection – falsehood – lack of credibility – caught out in a falsehood – explanation for mistruth – complete disregard for oath and undertaking – issues of credibility – bona fide transactions – sham – designed to defeat creditors – no reasonable excuse for the conduct – decision affirmed
LEGISLATION
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth)
Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth)
Electronic Transactions Act 1999 (Cth)
CASES
Mulhern v Pearce (No.2) [2014] FCA 805
Neffati and Inspector-General in Bankruptcy [2016] AATA 941
Nguyen v Pattison [2004] FMCA 517Rimanic and Inspector-General in Bankruptcy [2010] AATA 875
SECONDARY MATERIALS
Explanatory Memorandum, Bankruptcy Legislation Amendment Bill 2002 (Cth)
REASONS FOR DECISION
Senior Member D Benk
4 October 2024
Background
Mr Jamie Moss (the Applicant) was declared bankrupt on 26 August 2020. In the ordinary course of events, automatic discharge from bankruptcy would have occurred on 27 August 2023 (being three years and one day after the filing of his statement of affairs). However, the Trustee objected to discharge as it determined the Applicant had engaged in a number of transactions that were void against the Trustee in bankruptcy. The practical effect of this decision was to extend the bankruptcy by a period of five years.
A review of this decision was sought. The Respondent refused to change the decision maintaining that a ‘special ground’ of objection had been established and further the Applicant did not have ‘a reasonable excuse’ for his conduct.
The Applicant now seeks review by the Tribunal and requests that it set aside (reverse) the decision. He maintains he has evidence to establish he has been a victim of incompetent judges, legal practitioners and an unscrupulous Trustee. Further, he contends nothing is to be gained by maintaining his bankruptcy. He has nothing. He has lost it all. He needs to be discharged so that he can have standing in the Family Court to compel access to his child and seek redress from his ex-wife. He needs his passport back so that he can go overseas and meet someone. He needs his life back. He seeks independent review of the decision because;
(i)the Trustee had a conflict of interest caused by a pre-existing relationship with two key creditors;
(ii)the Trustee had failed to communicate with him during the bankruptcy until the report to creditors was issued;
(iii)the Trustee had not properly adjudicated the claims of two key creditors, (Grieff and Neale) allowing these creditors control of the voting outcome;
(iv)the claims of Joseph and Denise Moss (his parents) and L & J Property Developments Pty Ltd (his former company) were not properly considered by the Trustee;
(v)the Trustee and his lawyers are/were irrational and ‘cash grabbing’ in relation to assets and his family court matter;
(vi)the Trustee attempted to blackmail, threaten and extort him and his former spouse to the value of $200,000 in a telephone call on 12 May 2023;
(vii)there is no ‘concrete’ evidence that he engaged in any property transactions that would justify a special reason to object to the bankruptcy.
The matter underwent the usual case management pathway within the Tribunal.
The review hearing took place on 19 September 2024 at which time the Applicant gave sworn evidence. He called his parents as witnesses. Exhibits consisted of the hearing book, evidence index filed by the Applicant, and various emails.
Preliminary comments
The Applicant gave evidence via video conference (teams). He indicated that he was alone in New South Wales. He said that his parents (Joseph and Denise Moss) would give evidence from their home in Queensland. He testified that they were available ‘all day and were waiting for the Tribunal to call’. During the course of the hearing and through to conclusion, the Tribunal understood that Joseph and Denise Moss gave evidence from their residence in Queensland.
There were multiple short adjournments throughout the day as the hearing was protracted. On each occasion the Applicant was directed not to discuss this matter with his witnesses during the day. He made such an undertaking, reassuring the Tribunal that he was alone and had no one to talk to.
During the lunch adjournment, the Applicant had failed to turn his camera off. My Associate observed the Applicant speaking to two individuals in the same room, one male and one female, and was referring to a number of documents.
Following the lunch adjournment, Mr Joseph Moss gave evidence via teams, following which Mrs Denise Moss gave evidence. The Tribunal had some difficulty connecting with Mrs Moss and my Associate enquired of the Applicant as to her whereabouts. The Teams transcript records the Applicant informed my Associate:
‘[s]he should be living at home with dad, probably in another room somewhere maybe they’ve got a big house in Queensland so she might be in another room’.
Mrs Moss ultimately did not connect via teams and evidence was taken via telephone.
Following the hearing, my Associate provided me with a screenshot of the Applicant in the same room with a female and informed me that he had also observed Mr Joseph Moss in the same room, recalling him from the evidence given by teams and the distinctive shirt he was wearing. As the Applicant had at all times represented that he was alone in Sydney and his parents were in Queensland, an explanation for this mistruth was requested.
Immediately following the hearing, the following letter was sent to the Applicant; (unedited)
Dear Mr Moss
During the course of your evidence under affirmation, you informed the Member that you were alone whilst giving evidence. Tribunal records confirm this not to be the case. A screen shot is attached. Our Registry also a observed a gentleman entering the room wearing the same/similar clothing to Mr Moss Senior. The Registry also observed you marking up documents and giving information and instructions to these individuals.
The Member now requires you to respond to the following
1.Provide the name of the female in the attached screenshot.
2.Provide the name of the gentleman that was also present in the room
3.Provide declarations signed by these two individuals confirming the reason for their presence along with confirmation of their identity.
The Tribunal requires this information by midday 20.9.2024. Failure to respond may result in an adverse credibility inference.
Mr Moss responded stating (unedited);
Dear Registry,
I acknowledge your email below.
In regard to your email I can explain the events that took place today.
My parents, Denise and Joe Moss, were not due here until tomorrow as my mother has an appointment with her specialist on Friday 20th September 2024, in Sydney, so I was surprised they came here today. My Parents were worried about my welfare, and they came down early.
At the time that I was on the call to you all morning, I was in my room with the door shut , alone, and I had no idea my parents would arrive.
During the lunch break I walked out of my room to get some water and my parents were sitting at the kitchen table, I was surprised to see them, but I was also relieved to see them. They bought me some lunch and we had a coffee together They said they arrived at around 12pm, as they have their own key. They said to me that they were waiting to be examined. and didn't want to disturb me.
I said to mum what are you doing here so early, you shouldn't be here you need go into another room. When I went back into my room during the lunch break my mum came into the room and mum sked me if they both could have a copy of their stat decs, .and their transcripts, which I gave them and that's why she was in my room. I wrote on mums, statc dec and transcripts their names, and for dads, dads stat dec and transcripts his name.. Thats all I gave them and that's all I wrote. dad pooped his head in and they both left the room. We DID NOT discuss anything about the hearing as I was under oath, This all occurred during the lunch break.
My father has onset dementia and struggles with his memory and that's why I gave them the stat decs.
They took their calls in separate rooms, and I was alone in my room the whole time with my door shut and we were all in conference in separate rooms as you could see on the video. and we did not discuss the hearing whatsoever during the day.
If you wish my parents can provide you proof of the appointment with her specialist for tomorrow, if required a stat dec to state that they didn't discuss anything about the hearing whatsoever.
I apologise if there was any confusion with my parents arriving here, as they didn't think they were doing anything wrong as long as we didn't discuss the hearing, which we didn't.
Similar statements were made by Joseph and Denise Moss.
The Applicant clearly forgot that he informed my Associate in my presence that his mother was giving evidence from Queensland and it was “a big house and she was probably just in another room”. This is entirely inconsistent with his written explanation above. The screenshot forwarded to the Applicant clearly shows him in a room with a female whom he later acknowledged was his mother.
Ordinarily I would be required to consider the primary and secondary principles of law and authority as they relate to the assessment of credibility. However, this is entirely unnecessary as the Applicant has been caught out in a falsehood. Similar falsehoods have been the subject of discussion and Judgement in the District Court Proceedings and indeed the internal review of the Trustee, (which do not influence my findings in this review) but do expose the Applicant’s complete disregard for his oath and undertaking to the Tribunal.
The Applicant along with his parents Denise and Joseph were less than candid with the Tribunal. Simply put, they lied. The maxim “falsus in uno, falsus in ombibus” comes to mind which holds that a witness who has proved to have lied on one matter will be willing to lie on all matters and this assessment appears to be in alignment to the findings of other decision makers both in the District and Federal Court.
On cross examination, the Respondent referred the Applicant to a number of prior inconsistent statements (falsehoods). In response the Applicant sought to blame others, maintaining he was poorly represented in prior proceedings. He added his former Solicitor, Senior Counsel along with the Judge in the District Court had little knowledge about the law and sided with the other defendants in what he seemed to suggest was a conspiracy against him.
There were multiple other inconsistencies in the Applicant’s evidence which extended for more than five hours. However, little turns on this. I find as a consequence of what I have detailed above, I can place little or no weight on all of the oral evidence and prefer the documentary evidence. I will proceed to discern the matter on that basis.
The Applicant called his father Mr Joseph Moss to give evidence. During the course of the evidence, the Applicant asked leading questions and sought to correct the evidence given by his father. No objection to these questions was raised by the Respondent, possibly as I was quick to interrupt the conduct indicating it was inappropriate. In closing submissions, the Applicant stated his father’s evidence may be unreliable as he suffers multiple orthopaedic problems for which he takes strong medication and is also suffering from memory decline (however I noted that the evidence was consistent with that given in the public examination proceedings specifically in regards to the inception of the mortgage agreement), the transcript of which was included in the hearing book). Further, Mr Moss Senior impressed upon the Tribunal that he was not present with the Applicant whilst giving his evidence, a disingenuous statement, causing me to cast significant doubt on his credibility. I make similar conclusions about the testimony of Mrs Moss.
Legislation
The law relevant to the objection to bankruptcy is found in the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) (the Act).
Subsection 149(1) of the Act provides that a bankrupt is usually discharged from bankruptcy at the end of a period of three years (subject to certain conditions).
Section 149B states that ‘at any time’ prior to discharge from bankruptcy, the Trustee may file with the official receiver a written notice of objection to the discharge.
Section 149C provides that the notice of objection must set out the ground or grounds of objection (as nominated in subsection 149D(1) of the Act), must refer to the evidence or material that establishes the ground and further must give reasons for the objection. A copy of the notice of objection must be given to the bankrupt as soon as practicable after it has been filed by the Trustee under subsection 149F of the Act.
Section 149D provides the grounds in which a Trustee may object to a bankruptcy discharge. In this case there is no dispute that the ground of objection was raised with reference to subsection 149D(1)(ab), that is, the Applicant engaged in a transfer that is void against the Trustee with reference to section 121 of the Act.
Section 121 of the Act states generally that a transfer of property prior to a person’s bankruptcy is void if the property would probably have become part of the bankrupt’s estate and that the purpose in making the transfer was to defeat creditors.
Subsection 121(2) of the Act states that the purpose in making the transfer is taken to have been to defeat creditors, (either by way of delay, hinderance or prevention), if it can be reasonably inferred from all the circumstances that, at the time of the transfer, the transferor was, or was about to become, insolvent. (my emphasis).
Subsection 121(9)(b) of the Act states that a person who grants a mortgage or interest in property to another person is taken to have transferred the property to the other person.
Subsection 149N(1) of the Act states that objection decisions can be reviewed by the Inspector-General and an objection can be cancelled if the grounds of objection were not a ground specified in subsection 149D(1) of the Act; or in circumstances where there is insufficient evidence to support the existence of the ground of objection, or alternatively the reasons given for objecting on that ground or those grounds do not justify the making of the objection.
Relevantly, subsection 149N(1A) provides that an objection must not be cancelled if the objection specifies:
·at least one special ground; and
·there is sufficient evidence to support the existence of at least one special ground; and
·the bankrupt fails to establish a ‘reasonable excuse’ for the condition or failure that constituted the ‘special ground’.
A special ground is defined as grounds specified in subparagraph 149D(1) and specifically subsection 149D(1)(ab). There is no dispute that the ground upon which the objection has been made is a ‘special ground’.
The policy behind the introduction of special grounds has been the subject of comment both before the Courts and the Tribunal.[1] The Explanatory Memorandum to the Bill introducing the concept of ‘special grounds’ stated that one of the objects of the Bill was to “strengthen the objection-to-discharge provisions of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 by making it easier for Trustees to lodge objections to a person’s discharge from bankruptcy and harder for bankrupts to sustain challenges to objections”.[2]
[1] Nguyen v Pattison [2004] FMCA 517 at [28]-[36]; Neffati and Inspector-General in Bankruptcy [2016] AATA 941 at [24]-[25].
[2] Explanatory Memorandum, Bankruptcy Legislation Amendment Bill 2002 (Cth) at paragraph 3(c).
As regards the scope of review, subsection 25(1) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) (the AAT Act), requires me to consider the decision afresh and ‘stand in the shoes’ of the Respondent which in this case requires me to be bound by the provisions in subsection 149N of the Act.
Issues
The issue that I must determine is whether the ‘transfer of property’ (as defined by the Act) falls within the provisions of section 121 of the Act and if so;
(a)Has a ‘special ground’ of objection under subsection 149D(1) of the Act been established;
(b)Is there sufficient evidence to support the existence of the ‘special ground’ - of objection under subsection 149N(1A)(b) of the Act;
(c)Does the Applicant have a ‘reasonable excuse’ for any conduct that is found to be a ‘special ground’ under subsection 149N(1A)(c) of the Act.
Onus of Proof
In examining whether there has been a contravention of the Act, the standard of proof to which the Tribunal must be persuaded, is the standard of proof applicable in civil proceedings in Courts, which is on the ‘balance of probabilities’.[3]
[3] Rimanic and Inspector-General in Bankruptcy [2010] AATA 875.
In contrast, when considering the application of section 149N(1A), Parliament’s intention is to place the onus on the bankrupt ‘to establish’ that he had a reasonable excuse.
I will now deal with the evidence as it relates to each of the issues identified.
Background
The history leading up to the insolvency is protracted but has been succinctly summarised by the Respondent in its outline of submissions. Relevantly;
·On 15 October 2014, the Applicant’s parents Joseph and Denise Moss advanced $555,010 to the Applicant by taking out a mortgage against their property. The interest rate was 4.8% p.a.
·On 15 October 2014, the Applicant and his parents execute a loan agreement for $555,010 secured against a Padstow Property. The loan agreement specified an interest rate of 15-30%. (the Respondent disputes that this is a bona fide transaction – discussed further below).
·On 6 March 2015, the Applicant purchased 25 Alliance Avenue, Revesby with an intention to subdivide the property into two residential lots.
·On 24 March 2016, Creagh Investment Group Pty Ltd advanced $94,000 to the Applicant.
·On 25 March 2016, the Applicant and L & J Property Developments Pty Ltd execute a loan agreement for $94,000 secured against both the Padstow and Revesby Property with an interest rate nominated between 25-60%. (the Respondent disputes that this is a bona fide transaction – discussed further below).
·On 10 October 2016, Creagh Investment Group and L & J Property Developments Pty Ltd execute a deed of assignment to assign the benefit of the Applicant’s loan from Creagh Investment Group to L & J Property Developments Pty Ltd. (the Respondent disputes that this is a bona fide transaction – discussed further below).
·On 8 March 2017, the ANZ mortgage against the Applicant’s parent’s property is discharged and repaid in full.
·On 8 February 2018, the Applicant commenced proceedings in the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal (NCAT) against Bradley Neale and Matthew Grieff for breach of contract, misrepresentation, defective and incomplete building works with those proceedings being transferred to the District Court of New South Wales on 25 June 2018.
·On 17 March 2020, the Applicant was unsuccessful in his proceedings in the District Court with judgement against him with an order that he pay the costs of the defendant’s, Neale and Grieff, ultimately assessed to be $630,348.00. The Applicant did not appeal these proceedings due to a lack of funds.
·On 27 March 2020, the Applicant grants a mortgage over the Revesby and Padstow properties to his parents and L & J Property Developments Pty Ltd which are not registered against the titles.
·On 7 April 2020, L & J Property Developments Pty Ltd lodges a caveat over both the Revesby and Padstow Properties.
·On 26 August 2020, the Australian Financial Security Authority accepted the Applicant’s debtors petition and he becomes bankrupt.
·On 21 April 2023, the Trustee filed a Notice of Objection to Discharge against the bankrupt (Applicant).
·On 26 June 2023, the Applicant sought a review of the Notice of Objection to Discharge.
·On 23 August 2023, following review, the Respondent refused to overturn the Notice of Objection to Discharge.
·On 27 September 2023, the Applicant sought a review of the decision by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal.
Consideration
The Applicant asks the Tribunal to cancel the objection maintaining the Respondent has failed to establish at least one special ground exists because it has done so on pure speculation or hypothetical assessment of the facts.
The Tribunal can only cancel an objection if it is satisfied that the Respondent has failed to establish a special ground enumerated in section 149D(1).
Section 149D(1)(ab) of the Act requires the evidence establish the Applicant made a transfer that is void pursuant to section 121 of the Act. This is the epicentre of the dispute and so assessment of the transactions relating to the property and specifically the mortgages is crucial to any outcome.
At hearing, the Applicant was unrestrained in his criticism of the Trustee and those associated with this process maintaining there is no hard and fast or ‘concrete’ evidence that he engaged in transactions to prevent the properties being divided among potential creditors, or to hinder or delay the property being available for division among creditors. The Applicant says that in the absence of a concrete evidence of this intention the objection must be cancelled.
Careful review of section 121 of the Act does not require ‘concrete evidence’ as advanced by the Applicant. All that needs to be shown is that that at the time the property transaction took place, ‘it can reasonably be inferred from all the circumstances that, at the time of the transfer, the transferor was, or was about to become, insolvent’.
Naturally, this will require an assessment of the timeline of events. Here the Applicant maintains that on 15 October 2014 he executed a loan agreement with his parents for the sum of $555,010 with an interest rate varying between 15-30%. The inflated interest rate was intended to provide a means of financial support to his parents. Likewise, the Applicant maintains he executed a loan agreement with L & J Property Developments Pty Ltd on 26 March 2016 in the sum of $96,000 charging an interest rate of 15% per annum to the Applicant for two years and 30% per annum (compounding) (default rate) thereafter.
The Respondent postulates that after the Applicant was made aware of the Judgement and his loss in the District Court Proceedings, insolvency was on the cards, primarily because he was ordered to pay costs of both parties, an outcome that he did not forecast. The Applicant also testified the Judgement was wrong but that he could not afford to appeal having already spent over $100,000 (approximately) in legal costs and being told that it may cost more than twice that to appeal the Judgement.
The Respondent submits that on learning of the verdict, the Applicant entered into a loan agreement which more likely than not were executed after the Judgement on 17 March 2020 but backdated to reflect an agreement between his parents on 15 October 2014 and with L & J Property Developments Pty Ltd on 26 March 2016, in the sole attempt to secure what assets he had left knowing he would likely be insolvent.
The Respondent further contends that these backdated loan agreements were motivated to defeat creditors and possibly if that did not work out, would ensure that his parents were recorded as creditors. As it transpired, his parents lodged a proof of debt with the Trustee claiming an amount of $970,233 pursuant to a purported unpaid loan (largely consisting of interest at rates varying between 15% to 30% under their alleged private loan agreement).
The Respondent emphasised the circumstances and chronology allow for an inference (satisfying section 121 of the Act) that the above dealings were designed to defeat creditors because;
(a)The loan agreement between the Applicant and his parents dated 15 October 2014 only created a security interest over the Padstow property. There was no security interest over the Revesby property at that time (as it was not purchased until 6 March 2015 approximately) and so it can be inferred that the mortgage over the Revesby property to the Applicant’s parents was a transfer of property to the Applicant’s parents entered into after the District Court verdict;
(b)The loan agreement between the Applicant and L & J Property Developments Pty Ltd dated 24 March 2016 is invalid or unenforceable because;
a.The evidence does not establish that L & J Property Developments Pty Ltd loaned $94,000 to the Applicant on 24 March 2016 and therefore no consideration has been demonstrated making the contract unenforceable (monies were actually paid by Creagh Investment Group Pty Ltd); and
b.The loan agreement between L & J Property Developments Pty Ltd and the Applicant was signed by Brian Wheadon on 24 March 2016 as ‘director’ yet official ASIC records show Mr Wheadon was only appointed as a director on 5 October 2016, replacing the Applicant. Therefore, the loan agreement also fails for lack of capacity.
(c)The Respondent submits that the above reveals that the agreements were backdated after the verdict of the District Court, where the Applicant knew well that the defendant’s in those proceedings would come after him for costs likely rendering him insolvent given his financial circumstances at the time. It therefore submits that the transfers of the property come within the operation of section 121 of the Act and satisfy the ground of objection under section 149D(1)(ab) of the Act.
The Applicant acknowledged that some of the paperwork may be incomplete or incorrect, particularly in relation to the loan agreement between L & J Property Developments Pty Ltd but said that he relied on the advice of others. The Respondent queried why ‘these others’ were not called to give evidence. The Applicant submitted Brian Wheadon is “on his deathbed” and can no longer give evidence and his ex-wife, who allegedly witnessed the documents “is against me and wont help me”. I find the reasons provided were unsupported by evidence or justified in the circumstances of this case. The Applicant acknowledged the evidence given by his parents regarding the signing of the contracts did not support his version of events but maintained that his parents were tricked by those who cross examined them in the past (particularly at the public examination) and that their memory is now somewhat impaired due to age but also the stress of the process. He was unable to offer any evidence to explain these significant discrepancies apart from that described above although did suggest his father evidence was impaired because of the use of medication following back surgery. It was however acknowledged that the ANZ loan was paid out in full on 8 March 2017 and that there was no further evidence that he had made any payments to his parents.
The Applicant repeatedly indicated that the agreements were entered into to protect his parent’s interests. His evidence informed the Tribunal that he knew he could not afford to appeal the Judgement against him in the District Court as he did not have the funds to do so. Given that he knew his own legal costs were suffocating and that he was required to pay the costs of two other defendants, I am comfortably satisfied in finding that the loan agreements were entered into after the District Court Judgement, that is after March 2020. I comfortably make this inference, which is all that I am required to do with reference to section 121 of the Act. I am reassured that this finding is correct as the attempt to back date the agreements can be seen to have been botched, due to a lack of attention to detail as described above. Had these documents been executed at the time alleged by the Applicant, these significant omissions would not and could not have occurred. Further, I cannot ignore that not a single instalment was paid in the interim towards these agreements and as per terms, only reinforcing that they were not genuine.
In summary, I find:
(i)Had the interests in the properties not been granted to Joseph and Denise Moss in March 2020, either one or both of the properties would have formed part of any asset pool available to creditors;
(ii)Due to the errors in the loan agreements, I find more likely than not that the property arrangements/transactions had been entered into in 2020 when the Applicant learned of the Judgement against him, likely rendering him insolvent. I further find the transactions have been backdated. This is because the original agreement with Joseph and Denise Moss in 2014 did not include the Revesby property (and nor could it as it had not been acquired at that time). Further the loan agreement with L & J Property Developments Pty Ltd was also backdated as Mr Wheadon was not the Director at the time of the transaction. I find these errors critical and demonstrative of backdating of agreements without a full appreciation of the chronology and time frame. I further find that the arrangements are a sham, designed to defeat creditors. The Applicant repeatedly gave evidence that the arrangements were entered into to protect his parents interests, but in essence, if the agreement were entered into in 2014, there was nothing to protect, especially since the ANZ mortgage was discharged in 2017. There was no litigation at the time and the Applicant was solvent. It was not until the adverse Judgement in 2020 that panic set in with a realisation that the Applicant was about to lose everything arising out of what he deems to be a flawed Judgement.
As a result, a special ground of objection has been established with reference to section 149D(1)(ab) of the Act as the ‘mortgages/loans’ over one or both properties meet all of the elements of a transfer within section 121 of the Act. Given the above history and my findings in relation to how these mortgages have arisen, I cannot find that there is any reasonable excuse for the conduct. As a special ground exists and no reasonable excuse has been established, section 149N(1A) of the Act prevents cancellation of the objection as the Act allows no discretion to do so.
Finally, I find that the period of five years has been correctly applied with reference to subsection 149A of the Act.
For these reasons, the decision is affirmed. This means that the Application is unsuccessful.
I certify that the preceding 54 (fifty-four) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of Senior Member D Benk
.......................[sgd].................................................
Associate
Dated: 4 October 2024
Date(s) of hearing: 19 September 2024 - by Video Date final submissions received: 20 September 2024 Applicant: Self-represented Solicitors for the Respondent: McInnes Wilson Lawyers
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