Perez and Inspector-General in Bankruptcy
[2024] AATA 3277
•11 September 2024
Perez and Inspector-General in Bankruptcy [2024] AATA 3277 (11 September 2024)
Division:TAXATION AND COMMERCIAL DIVISION
File Number(s): 2023/5888
Re:Narciso Perez
APPLICANT
AndInspector-General in Bankruptcy
RESPONDENT
DECISION
Tribunal:Senior Member Diana Benk
Date:11 September 2024
Place:Sydney
The Tribunal affirms the decision under review pursuant to section 43(1)(a) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth).
...................[SGD]....................
Senior Member Diana Benk
CATCHWORDS
BANKRUPTCY – whether trustee was entitled to issue a notice of objection - statutory powers of trustee – special ground of objection – if trustee excused the bankrupt – whether the bankrupt had reasonable excuse for non-compliance with the trustee’s statutory power – decision affirmed
LEGISLATION
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth)
Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth)
Electronic Transactions Act 1999 (Cth)
CASES
Mulhern v Pearce (No.2) [2014] FCA 805
Neffati and Inspector-General in Bankruptcy [2016] AATA 941
Nguyen v Pattison [2004] FMCA 517Rimanic and Inspector-General in Bankruptcy [2008] AATA 307
SECONDARY MATERIALS
Explanatory Memorandum, Bankruptcy Legislation Amendment Bill 2002 (Cth)
REASONS FOR DECISION
Senior Member Diana Benk
Background
The matter has a protracted history. The Applicant was officially declared bankrupt on 4 December 2019. In the ordinary course of events, automatic discharge from bankruptcy would have occurred on 5 December 2022 (being three years and one day after the filing of his statement of affairs). However, the trustee objected to discharge on the basis the Applicant failed to comply with information requests.
The records show the trustee sent the Applicant letters on 1 December 2021 and 24 January 2022, requesting income particulars which particularised what information was required, timeframes for compliance, and consequences for failing to comply.
It is undisputed the Applicant did not respond to the letters, resulting in the trustee lodging a notice of objection to the bankruptcy on 23 November 2022, which had the impact of extending the bankruptcy for a further five years. The Applicant objected, maintaining he had not received the communications sent by the trustee and so was blindsided by the decision. In any event, he has since complied, and so the trustee should take this into account.
A review of this decision was sought. The Respondent refused to change the decision maintaining that a ‘special ground’ of objection had been established and further that the Applicant did not have ‘a reasonable excuse’ for his conduct.
The Applicant now seeks review by the Tribunal and requests that it set aside the decision, as he can establish a ‘reasonable excuse’ for not responding to the notices issued by the trustee. He has obtained and relies on an ‘expert opinion’ supporting his position that the letters sent via email by the trustee were never received. He also contends that the absence of a ‘read receipt’ is sufficient to render the Respondent’s position invalid. The Applicant also maintains that he has now provided the trustee with all of the information sought in the notices and this should be sufficient to set aside the decision.
The matter underwent the usual case management pathway within the Tribunal. Requests by the Applicant to issue summons to certain individuals (mainly decision makers in his case) were filed but ultimately withdrawn by the Applicant.
The review hearing took place on 7 August 2024 at which time the Applicant gave sworn evidence. Exhibits consisted of the hearing book, evidence index filed by the Applicant, and various emails.
Legislation
The law relevant to the objection to bankruptcy is found in the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) (the Act). Generally speaking, the Act regulates Australia's personal insolvency system and provides a framework to allow individuals in severe financial stress to discharge unmanageable debts, while providing for the realisation of a debtor's available assets for distribution to affected creditors. It imposes a number of obligations on both the trustee and bankrupt. The relevant provisions are summarised below.
The duties of the trustee are found in section 19 of the Act, which prescribes (amongst other matters) that the trustee must administer the estate as efficient as possibly by avoiding unnecessary expense.
Section 19AA of the Act states that the trustee of the bankrupt may investigate the bankrupt’s conduct and examinable affairs and books, accounts and records kept by the bankrupt as far as they relate to the bankruptcy.
Subsection 77(1) outlines the obligations of a bankrupt and specifically states that a bankrupt shall, unless ‘excused by the trustee or prevented by illness or other sufficient cause’ provide to the trustee all books that are in the possession of the bankrupt and relate to examinable affairs. Subsection (ba) states that the bankrupt must give such information about any of the ‘bankrupt’s conduct and examinable affairs as the trustee requires’. (It is relevant to mention here that the Applicant has not claimed illness or other sufficient cause and had not at any time been excused by the trustee from compliance).
A bankrupt must also observe contribution assessment periods. This period is defined in section 139K of the Act as beginning on the day the bankrupt becomes bankrupt or on an anniversary of that day during the bankruptcy.
Subsection 139U(1) of the Act requires the bankrupt to provide within 21 days after the end of a contribution assessment period, a statement setting out income both received during the contribution assessment period and income forecasted during the next income assessment period. The Act prescribes penalty for non-compliance.
Subsection 139W(1) requires the trustee ‘as soon as practicable’ after the start of each contribution assessment period to make an assessment of the income that has been derived or likely to be derived by the bankrupt. Surprisingly, section 139WA does not impose a timeframe in which this activity must be undertaken by the trustee.
Subsection 149(1) of the Act provides that a bankrupt is usually discharged from bankruptcy at the end of a period of three years (subject to certain conditions).
Section 149B states that ‘at any time’ prior to discharge from bankruptcy, the trustee may file with the official receiver a written notice of objection to the discharge provided the trustee believes that doing so will help make the bankrupt discharge a duty that has not been discharged and that there is no other way for the trustee to induce the bankrupt to discharge any duties that the bankrupt has not discharged.
Section 149C provides that the notice of objection must set out the ground or grounds of objection (as nominated in subsection 149D(1) of the Act) and must refer to the evidence or material that establishes the ground and further must give reasons for the objection. A copy of the notice of objection must be given to the bankrupt as soon as practicable after it has been filed by the trustee under subsection 149F of the Act.
Section 149D provides 12 grounds in which a trustee may objection to a bankruptcy discharge. In this case there is no dispute that the ground of objection was raised with reference to subsection 149D(1)(d), that is the ‘bankrupt, when requested in writing by the trustee to provide written information about the bankrupt’s property, income or expected income, failed to comply with the request. However, I also note that the trustee’s objection letter dated 23 November 2022 also referred to subsection 149D(1)(e), relevantly the failure to comply with the section 139U request, and subsection 149D(1)(n) a failure by the Applicant, whether intentional or otherwise to disclose to the trustee an interest in any beneficial property. However, the Act only requires one special ground to be established, and whilst I acknowledge that three grounds were initially relied upon, only one needs to be established to raise an objection.
Subsection 149N(1) of the Act states that objection decisions can be reviewed by the Inspector-General and an objection can be cancelled if the grounds of objection were not a ground specified in subsection 149D(1) of the Act; or in circumstances where there is insufficient evidence to support the existence of the ground of objection, or alternatively the reasons given for objecting on that ground or those grounds do not justify the making of the objection.
Relevantly, subsection 149N (1A) provides that an objection must not be cancelled if the objection specifies:
·at least one special ground; and
·there is sufficient evidence to support the existence of at least one special ground; and
·the bankrupt fails to establish a ‘reasonable excuse’ for the condition or failure that constituted the ‘special ground’.
When assessing whether the objection must not be cancelled, subsection 149N (1B) states that ‘no notice is to be taken of any conduct of the bankrupt after the time when the ground concerned first commenced to exist’. Simply put, even if Mr Perez had complied with the information requests after the event, I cannot take his conduct into account.
A special ground is defined as grounds specified in subparagraph 149D(1) and specifically subsection 149D(1)(d). There is no dispute that the ground upon which the objection has been made is a ‘special ground’.
The policy behind the introduction of special grounds has been the subject of comment both before the Courts and the Tribunal.[1] The Explanatory Memorandum to the Bill introducing the concept of ‘special grounds’ stated that one of the objects of the Bill was to “strengthen the objection-to-discharge provisions of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 by making it easier for trustees to lodge objections to a person’s discharge from bankruptcy and harder for bankrupts to sustain challenges to objections”.[2]
[1] Nguyen v Pattison [2004] FMCA 517 at [28]-[36]; Neffati and Inspector-General in Bankruptcy [2016] AATA 941 at [24]-[25].
[2] Explanatory Memorandum, Bankruptcy Legislation Amendment Bill 2002 (Cth) at paragraph 3(c).
Relevant to this application is also the law relating to the electronic service of documents, found in the Electronic Transactions Act 1999 (the Transactions Act). Section 9 of the Transactions Act provides that if under a law of the Commonwealth a person is required to give information in writing, that requirement is taken to have been met if the person gives the information by means of an electronic communication subject to the following requirements: at the time when the information was given, it was reasonable to expect that the information would be readily accessible so as to be usable for subsequent reference; and the person to whom the information is required to be given, consents to the information being given by way of electronic communication.
Section 14A of the Transactions Act states that, for the purposes of a law of the Commonwealth, unless otherwise agreed by the originator and the addressee of an electronic communication, the time of receipt of an electronic communication is the time when it becomes capable of being retrieved at an electronic address designated by the addressee. Subsection 14A(2) of the Transactions Act provides that unless otherwise agreed between the originator and addressee, it is to be assumed that the electronic communication is capable of being retrieved by the addressee when it reaches the addressee’s electronic address.
As regards the scope of review, subsection 25(1) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) (the AAT Act), requires me to consider the decision afresh and ‘stand in the shoes’ of the respondent which in this case requires me to be bound by the provisions in subsection 149N of the Bankruptcy Act.
Issues
The issues that I must determine are whether
(a)Did the Applicant fail to comply with information requests issued by the trustee under subsection 149D(1)(d) of the Act and specifically;
(i)Had the Applicant consented to the electronic communication of information?
(ii)Has the Applicant designated an electronic address for electronic communication?
(iii)Was an electronic communication sent to the Applicant’s designated electronic address?
(iv)When did the electronic communication leave the information system controlled or used by the decision-maker?
(vi)When was the electronic communication delivered to the Applicant’s designated electronic address?
(vii)Was the electronic communication capable of being retrieved by the Applicant at the designated electronic address?
(b)Does any failure constitute a ‘special ground’ of objection under subsection 149D (1) of the Act;
(c)Is there sufficient evidence to support the existence of the ‘special ground” - of objection under subsection 149N(1A)(b) of the Act;
(d)Does the Applicant have a ‘reasonable excuse’ for any conduct that is found to be a ‘special ground’ under subsection 149N(1A) (c ) of the Act;
(e)Can actions taken by the Applicant after the ‘special ground’ commenced to exist provide relief from the objection under subsection 149N (1B) of the Act;
(f)Has the trustee’s notice of objection complied with the statutory requirements with regards to notice of objection under subsection 149C of the Act; and
(g)Has the date of discharge from bankruptcy on objection been correctly calculated and imposed under subsection 149A of the Act.
Onus of Proof
In examining whether there has been a contravention of the Act, the standard of proof to which the Tribunal must be persuaded, is the standard of proof applicable in civil proceedings in Courts, which is on the ‘balance of probabilities’.[3]
[3] Rimanic and Inspector-General in Bankruptcy [2008] AATA 307 at [31].
In contrast, when considering the application of section 149N(1A), Parliament places the onus on the bankrupt ‘to establish’ that he had a reasonable excuse.[4]
[4] Ibid.
I will now deal with the evidence as it relates to each of the issues identified.
Issue one
Did the Applicant fail to comply with information requests issued by the trustee; -subsection 149D(1)(d) of the Act and specifically;
·Had the Applicant consented to electronic communication of information?
·Has the Applicant designated an electronic address for electronic communication?
·Was an electronic communication sent to the Applicant’s designated electronic address?
·When did the electronic communication leave the information system controlled or used by the decision-maker?
·When was the electronic communication delivered to the Applicant’s designated electronic address?
·Was the electronic communication capable of being retrieved by the Applicant at the designated electronic address?
The documents establish that on 1 December 2021[5] the Applicant was emailed a letter to [email protected] by the trustee. That letter required and directed the Applicant to complete an income questionnaire under subsection 139U(1) of the Bankruptcy Act, requesting the provision of payment summaries/income statements, income tax return and the Notice of Assessment for the year ending 30 June 2021; along with the last three pay slips and books and records inclusive of bank statements no later than 14 January 2022.
[5] T6 44 to 49 of the papers.
The letter by the trustee put the Applicant on notice by stating “failure to provide information in respect of your income or expected income is an offence and grounds for an objection to your discharge from bankruptcy…”
As no response had been received to this letter the records reveal the trustee sent a further letter to [email protected], requesting immediate attention to the letter dated 1 December 2021, and again repeating the potential consequences for failure to comply[6].
[6] T12 115-127.
On 23 November 2022, given no response was received to the information requests, the trustee lodged the notice of objection and sent a copy to the Applicant also using the email address [email protected]. The Applicant responded to this email within two hours of its transmission, stating (unedited):
Thank you for let me know that you are objecting the bankruptcy state, as this stage I do not know if I will go to the AAT or not, as my case still at federal court, if I will I understand you guy will be paid by ATO or an offer will be sent to you, may be one to five cent per dollar.
I am trying to put cross claim now.
Of the cross claim is not accepted, there will still the possibility of a court win
In that case you guys should apply for damages, as the actions of the ATO, is what is creating this problem.
In my negotiations always are you guys to be paid.
I think everyone should be paid with the exemption of stoke technology because it is fraud, already told you and you guys have not report it to the AFP[7]
[7] T3 Folio 61-62.
The Applicant’s evidence is that he has never received the emails requesting information and had he done so he would have complied, as history shows a record of compliance. Further, in any event he has since provided the information and so he maintains that this review is unnecessary as the trustee has all the information it requires. In cross examination he explained his email response on 23 November 2022 was an emotional knee jerk reaction to the notification by the trustee and hence his failure to raise the issue of non-receipt of correspondence at that time.
The Applicant maintains that in the past he had always received emails from the trustee to his Gmail address but believes that emails sent by Rod Hobart (from the trustee’s office) were somehow blocked or spammed and prevented transmission via his server. The Applicant accepts that in the past he had received all emails from the trustee’s office and specifically sent to emails Vanessa Duckworth' [email protected]; 'Daniel Soire' [email protected] and 'Bruce Gleeson' [email protected]. He maintains it is only the two letters in question, sent by Rob Hobart [email protected] were infected, hence preventing receipt.
Consistent with oral evidence, the written evidence confirmed (unedited)
“The trustee was fully aware that I am in overseas and in a very remote area with poor communications, I did not receive any of his communications, I do not know if it went to spam I cannot find them, however the trustee knew that I do have several email addresses. I am very happy to cooperate with the trustee and follow the rules from day one, however there was a problem with the trustee, as he took some money that an associate put in my account by mistake, because he copy and paste an invoice, as the ATO took me out of business, it is approx. 29k. Not only that the customer was disqualified for his R&D, and as per contract there is no grant no fees, so the money must be returned to the customer, and the trustee is refusing. I think it is illegal that he has done and the Inspector general should look into it. I do not have a job or any assets or liability.
I am not longer live in Australia and or have any intention of coming back If the matter gets resolved the ATO will take case of the case, so I do not see the case to extended for another 5 years which I do considered unfair”[8]
[8] Folio 89 of the T docs.
In response to cross examination by the respondent, the Applicant testified he has several email addresses and generally used his Gmail account to send large documents. He confirmed that although he had nominated [email protected][9] as an email address for communication via his statement of affairs (SOA), he had sent information and communicated to the trustee via his [email protected] email address from the time of his bankruptcy to the time of the objection. Thereafter he commenced using other email addresses which included; [email protected]; [email protected], [email protected], and [email protected].
[9] Folio 149 of the T docs.
The Applicant accepted in cross examination that he responded to emails regarding the objection through his Gmail address but again reinforced that he did not receive the two emails sent by Rob Hobart. Whilst he accepts that delivery receipts are in evidence, he maintains that without a ‘read receipt’ that the Respondent cannot demonstrate that the email had been received. Throughout his oral evidence, the Applicant maintained that there are several reasons why an email may not be received including but not limited to:
·the email was sent to the wrong address; and/or
·it remains in the host’s emails distribution center and not released;
·stuck in the system;
·diverted to SPAM;
·or that the delivery receipt relied upon by the respondent has been modified to suit its own agenda.
At hearing the Applicant relied on ‘expert evidence’ by Azam Samad. In a letter to the Tribunal undated he provided the following opinion[10]
[10] Folio 524 of the T docs.
Careful review of the report confirms that the ‘expert’ did not inspect the device, nor does he appear to have accessed the server, but rather describes general IT issues that may prevent receipt of an email, which are not specific to the circumstances here. I find this report unhelpful and further find it does not advance the Applicant’s case due to the fact that the opinion fails to address the ‘delivery receipts’ which are in evidence. I have noted the extraordinary claim that the delivery receipt may have been manufactured (fake) but this is unsupported by any forensic evidence. For these reasons, I place little weight on this evidence. I note that the expert refers to an ‘extra R’ in the email address of the trustee’s letter, however, this extra R was excluded from the email address to which the communication was sent, as evidenced by the delivery receipt.
During testimony, the Applicant submitted he did not expressly agree to email communication and I cannot ignore the papers reveal he had not ticked the box for electronic communication in his SOA. However, by virtue of his conduct, I find that the Applicant has agreed and consented to electronic communication, as since bankruptcy, he has near exclusively communicated by email and realistically there was no other means of doing so whilst he was outside of Australia. He had at all times since completing the initial SOA and the objection decision been communicating with the respondent via email, and ultimately conceded during the course of cross examination, that he admitted consent to email communications. His testimony confirmed he did not provide the Trustee with any other alternative email addresses until after the objection.
The issue here is whether the email was delivered. The respondent has provided two delivery receipts which confirm that the emails had been delivered using the Microsoft platform. Following the communication sent on 1 December 2021, the following delivery receipt was generated:
‘Delivery to these recipients or groups is complete, but no delivery notification was sent by the destination server: [email protected] ([email protected])’
Again, following the electronic despatch of the letter dated 24 January 2022 the following delivery receipt was generated by the Microsoft system:
‘Delivery to these recipients or groups is complete, but no delivery notification was sent by the destination server: [email protected] ([email protected]).
On the basis of the evidence, I find that the Applicant had consented to email communication, had consistently communicated with the Trustee via his Gmail address both prior to the above notices and following the objection, and further find that the emails with the attached letters were sent to the correct email address.
Whilst I have summarised the law with respect to the Transmissions Act, given that this issue is the epicentre of the dispute, I will repeat in full the provisions relating to the timing of dispatch and receipt of an electronic communication found in ss 14 and s 14A of the Transmissions Act:
14 Time of dispatch
(1) For the purposes of a law of the Commonwealth, unless otherwise agreed between the originator and the addressee of an electronic communication, the time of dispatch of the electronic communication is:
(a) the time when the electronic communication leaves an information system under the control of the originator or of the party who sent it on behalf of the originator; or (my emphasis)
(b) if the electronic communication has not left an information system under the control of the originator or of the party who sent it on behalf of the originator—the time when the electronic communication is received by the addressee.
Note: Paragraph (b) would apply to a case where the parties exchange electronic communications through the same information system.
(2) Subsection (1) applies even though the place where the information system supporting an electronic address is located may be different from the place where the electronic communication is taken to have been dispatched under section 14B.
14A Time of receipt
(1) For the purposes of a law of the Commonwealth, unless otherwise agreed between the originator and the addressee of an electronic communication:
(a) the time of receipt of the electronic communication is the time when the electronic communication becomes capable of being retrieved by the addressee at an electronic address designated by the addressee; or (my emphasis)
(b) the time of receipt of the electronic communication at another electronic address of the addressee is the time when both:
(i) the electronic communication has become capable of being retrieved by the addressee at that address; and
(ii) the addressee has become aware that the electronic communication has been sent to that address.
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), unless otherwise agreed between the originator and the addressee of the electronic communication, it is to be assumed that the electronic communication is capable of being retrieved by the addressee when it reaches the addressee’s electronic address.
(3) Subsection (1) applies even though the place where the information system supporting an electronic address is located may be different from the place where the electronic communication is taken to have been received under section 14B.
The occurrence of malfunctions, glitches or interruptions to service in digital communications is a matter of common knowledge. It is for this reason, where certainty of dispatch and delivery of electronic communication is required, verifiable certification mechanisms are commonly used, such as delivery receipts. In this case, I am satisfied the delivery receipts establish the emails have been correctly sent and have been delivered to the Applicant’s email address. The Applicant maintains without a ‘read receipt’, the Respondent cannot maintain its case. The Transmissions Act does not require the email to be read, just evidence of delivery. I am satisfied that the proof of delivery by the trustee is sufficient to meet the threshold in s 14(1)(a), and so find. As an aside, a read receipt requires the recipient to confirm delivery by manual verification. The “read receipt” is generated if the recipient clicks a prompt to send such a receipt. They are generally not automatic. Whilst I am not an expert in information technology, I note that the Applicant’s ‘expert’ has failed to explore this in his report. Nothing turns on this, as I only need to be satisfied that the email has been delivered to the correct address and is capable of retrieval. I note that the Applicant’s ’expert’ did not comment on the nuances of read receipts and further I am satisfied that the email was capable of retrieval as all other emails in the intervening period were in fact received and acknowledged by the Applicant with the objection email being responded to within two hours of delivery. The upshot of this assessment is that I am satisfied that the emails were correctly addressed and delivered to the Applicant. It follows that the Applicant has failed to reply to the requests within the timeframe required. I so find. I acknowledge the Applicant maintains that the delivery receipts may have been tampered with or manipulated, however his evidence has failed to satisfy me with any degree of actual persuasion that this is the case. His ‘expert’ failed to particularise how such properties could be manipulated and only asserted that they were capable of tampering without explanation.
Issue two
Does any failure constitute a ‘special ground’ of objection under subsection 149D (1) of the Act;
Section 149D (1) contains a number of grounds of objection but relevant to this case is the failure to comply with the request for information.
For the reasons above, I have found that there is a failure to comply. As a result, a special ground of objection has been established.
Issue three
Is there sufficient evidence to support the existence of the ‘special ground” - of objection under subsection 149N(1A)(b) of the Act;
I find the Applicant had been served with information requests on two separate occasions.
I further find that the ground was established with reference to subsection 149D(1) of the Act, and there is sufficient evidence to support the existence of the special ground (failure to comply) and that the reasons for objecting were based on that sufficient ground.
Issue four
Does the Applicant have a ‘reasonable excuse’ for any conduct that is found to be a ‘special ground’ - subsection 149N(1A) (c ) of the Act;
The Applicant’s reasons for non-compliance are evident from the discussion above. Whilst resolute in his position, the law relating to electronic communications is against him. I have not ignored the ‘expert evidence’ but have found it to be unsatisfactory as it fails to address the issues of delivery in the circumstances of this case. I have found that the report is general, lacks particulars, was submitted without any evidence of access to the device, email address, transactional history or server. I have given it little weight. I cannot find that there is a reasonable excuse for the conduct given my findings that the documents had been delivered to the Applicant.
Issue five
Can actions taken by the Applicant after the ‘special ground’ commenced to exist provide relief from the objection under subsection 149N (1B) of the Act;
I have explored this extensively. I acknowledge the Applicant’s distress arising out of the extension of the bankruptcy and the impact on his financial freedoms as a result of this decision. Bankruptcy is a significant sanction and has far reaching impacts on an individual both financially, physically and emotionally. Whilst the Applicant now maintains that he has provided the information sought by the trustee, this information was provided after the objection. The law prevents such action being taken into account with the aim of staying the objection or reversing it.
Issue six
Has the Trustee’s notice of objection complied with the statutory requirements with regards to notice of objection under subsection 149C of the Act;
Careful review of the notice of objection confirms that the trustee has set out the grounds of objection, referred to the evidence that has established the ground and has clearly stated the reasons for objecting to the trustee with reference to the ground relied upon. For this reason, I find that the trustee’s notice of objection has complied with the statutory requirements.
Issue seven
Has the date of discharge from bankruptcy on objection been correctly calculated and imposed subsection 149A of the Act.
Finally, I find that the period of five years has been correctly applied with reference to subsection 149A of the Act.
Overall, I appreciate the Applicant maintains the decision is unfair and that communication error/administrative oversight or IT failures have now imposed upon him an extended period of bankruptcy which has impacted all areas of his life. Careful review of the Act confirms that I have no discretion to set aside the objection with reference to subsection 149N (1A) of the Act.
For these reasons, the decision is affirmed. This means that the Application is unsuccessful.
I certify that the preceding 57 (fifty-seven) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of Senior Member Diana Benk.
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Associate
Dated: 11 September 2024
Date(s) of hearing: 7 August 2024 Applicant: By video Counsel for the Respondent: J Giacco Solicitors for the Respondent: D Thorpe-Jones
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