Nchouki v The Queen
[2023] ACTCA 8
SUPREME COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY
Case Title: | Nchouki v The Queen |
Citation: | [2023] ACTCA 8 |
Hearing Date: | 1 February 2023 |
DecisionDate: | 16 February 2023 |
Before: | Baker J |
Decision: | Application dismissed. |
Catchwords: | CRIMINAL LAW – BAIL – application for bail pending appeal – special or exceptional circumstances – stay of sentence pending appeal |
Legislation Cited: | Bail Act 1992 (ACT) Criminal Code 2002 (ACT) Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (Cth) |
Cases Cited: | Coleman v Power [2004] HCA 39; (2004) 220 CLR 1 Cvetanovski v R [2020] VSCA 126 Degioannis v David (No 2) [2015] ACTSC 196 Delaney v R; R v Delaney [2013] NSWCCA 150 Dinsdale v The Queen [2000] HCA 54; 202 CLR 321 Incandela v The Queen (No 3) [2022] ACTCA 63 Kelly v The Queen [2015] ACTCA 35 Kember v The Queen [2022] ACTCA 51 Marotta v The Queen [1999] HCA 4; 73 ALJR 265 Monis v the Queen (2013) 249 CLR 92 Moore v Perkins [2022] ACTSC 226 Peters v The Queen (1996) 71 ALJR 309 Quzag v The Queen [2015] ACTCA 9 R v Crowther [2019] ACTSC 338 R v Nchouki [2022] ACTSC 342 Samani v The Queen [2016] ACTCA 48 Sherd v The Queen [2011] ACTCA 17; 5 ACTLR 290 Singh v R [2015] ACTCA 65 The Queen v Giordano [1982] 31 SASR 241 The Queen v Quzag [2015] ACTCA 36; 198 FLR 330 United Mexican States v Cabal [2001] HCA 60; 209 CLR 165 Zreika v the Queen (2012) 223 A Crim R 460; [2012] NSWCCA 44 |
Parties: | Mohammed Nchouki (Applicant) The Queen (Respondent) |
Representation: | Counsel S Whybrow SC (Applicant) E Roff (Respondent) |
| Solicitors Aulich Criminal Law (Applicant) ACT Director of Public Prosecutions (Respondent) | |
File Number: | ACTCA 71 of 2022 |
Baker J:
Introduction
On 2 September 2022, the applicant pleaded guilty to a charge of using a carriage service to menace, harass or offend contrary to s 474.17(1) of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) (“the offence”). The maximum penalty at the time of the offending was three years’ imprisonment.
On 7 December 2022, Mossop J (“the sentencing judge”) sentenced the applicant to 5 months’ imprisonment and made a recognisance release order permitting the applicant’s release after serving 3 months’ imprisonment, with security of $100, without surety, on the condition that he be of good behaviour for a period of two years from the date of his release. The sentence was accumulated on an unrelated existing sentence, but then backdated to take into account 30 days of pre-sentence custody. The sentence commenced on 2 January 2023. As a result, the applicant will be eligible for release on recognisance on 2 April 2023 and the sentence will expire on 2 June 2023.
On 9 January 2023, the applicant filed a Notice of Appeal against this sentence. An Amended Notice of Appeal filed on 23 January 2023 particularises four grounds of appeal, including that the sentence imposed is manifestly excessive, that various factual findings were made by the sentencing judge that were not open, that the sentencing judge’s finding that the offence was in the mid-range of objective seriousness was not open, and that the sentencing judge erred by not considering whether the sentence should be served partly or wholly concurrently with the sentence that the applicant was already serving.
On 30 January 2023, the applicant filed an application for bail pending the hearing of the appeal. That application also seeks a stay of the sentence imposed on 7 December 2022 pending the outcome of the application.
BACKGROUND
The Offending
From prior to November 2020 until May 2021, there was a lawful warrant in force that authorised the interception of telecommunications services used by the applicant.
On 13 December 2020, the applicant was arrested by Officer A and another police officer, Officer B, in relation to several charges. On the following day, the applicant’s solicitor was served with a statement of facts. The statement of facts outlined the case against the applicant and included the fact that a warrant had been issued that allowed police to intercept the incoming and outgoing calls and messages from a phone used by the applicant.
The applicant entered pleas of not guilty to all charges. On 10 February 2021, the applicant’s solicitor was served with a brief of evidence. That brief contained audio recordings and transcripts of various telephone conversations from the applicant’s phone.
On 28 April 2021, police searched a car and trailer belonging to the applicant’s younger brother, Jomal Nchouki. In that search, police found ten small bags containing cocaine. Jomal Nchouki was subsequently charged with trafficking in a controlled drug other than cannabis contrary to s 603(7) of the Criminal Code 2002 (ACT). Officer A was also the informant in that matter.
On 23 May 2021, the applicant spoke with Jomal Nchouki on the telephone. During this conversation, the applicant made threats of sexual violence towards Officer A’s wife, and explicit slurs about the officer’s sexuality and sexual behaviour. The applicant also accused Officer A of paedophilia and of beating his wife and made a threat of serious violence against the officer. This call was recorded pursuant to an interception warrant issued on 28 April 2021. Members of the Australian Federal Police (“AFP”) listened to the call and brought the call to the attention of Officer A.
A warrant authorising the interception of a telecommunications service lasts 90 days: s 176(5) of the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (Cth). None of the material previously served on the applicant had disclosed that further warrants had been obtained, or that the applicant’s telecommunications services were still being intercepted, in the period after the brief was served. However, in recorded conversations on 7 April 2021 and 23 April 2021, the applicant made reference to his phone being “tapped”.
The charge and the plea
The applicant was charged with using a carriage service in a way that reasonable persons would regard as being, in all the circumstances, menacing, harassing or offensive, contrary to s 474.17(1) of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth). He pleaded guilty to this charge. The applicant entered the plea on the basis that he intentionally used the telecommunications service, and that he was reckless as to whether the conversation would be heard by Officer A.
It was an agreed fact in the sentencing proceedings that, at the time of the 23 May 2021 call, the applicant was aware that the police were “probably still intercepting and listening to his telephone calls, and if this was the case, the content of such calls would likely be bought to the attention of [Officer A].”
It was further agreed that the comments made by the applicant in the course of the telephone call were menacing, harassing and offensive.
The sentencing decision
The sentencing proceedings were heard before the sentencing judge on 2 December 2022. Later that day, the sentencing judge convicted and sentenced the applicant as set out at [2] above.
That order was subsequently vacated to enable the applicant’s counsel to consider whether the sentence was consistent with Commonwealth legislation. The parties subsequently advised the sentencing judge that both agreed that the order previously pronounced was consistent with Commonwealth legislation. On 7 December 2022, the sentencing judge reinstated the order: R v Nchouki [2022] ACTSC 342.
RELEVANT PRINCIPLES
This Court has power to grant bail to a person appealing to the Court of Appeal from a sentence imposed by a judge of the Supreme Court (Sherd v The Queen [2011] ACTCA 17; 5 ACTLR 290), provided that a stay of the Supreme Court’s order is made prior to the grant of bail: The Queen v Quzag [2015] ACTCA 36; 198 FLR 330. The question of whether a stay may be granted, and whether bail should be granted, may be determined together: Kelly v The Queen [2015] ACTCA 35 at [23].
Section 9E of the Bail Act 1992 (ACT) prohibits the Court granting bail to a person who has been convicted and sentenced to a period of imprisonment unless the Court is satisfied that “special or exceptional circumstances” exist. As Refshauge J observed in Sherd at [46], the requirement for “special or exceptional circumstances” to justify a grant of bail pending an appeal is uniform in all Australian jurisdictions. The stringency of this requirement:
… reflects the fact that the conviction and sentence are valid unless and until set aside, and are not in any sense provisional or contingent upon confirmation by an appellate court. A grant of bail pending appeal also carries with it the risk that, should the appeal fail, the convicted person will have to return to prison”: Cvetanovski v R [2020] VSCA 126 at [2], per Maxwell P, Beach and Weinberg JJ.
Similarly, in United Mexican States v Cabal [2001] HCA 60; 209 CLR 165 at [39], the High Court also referred to the risk that a grant of bail pending an appeal may “undermine[] respect for the judicial system in having ‘a recently sentenced man walking free’” and “undermine[] the public interest in having convicted persons serve their sentences as soon as is practicable.”
Nonetheless, the requirement for “special or exceptional circumstances” may be satisfied where an appeal cannot be dealt with by the appellate court until after the expiry of the custodial portion of an applicant’s sentence: Sherd at [47]; Kember v The Queen [2022] ACTCA 51 at [7]. As the Victorian Court of Appeal explained in Cvetanovski at [3]:
… the fundamental principle is one of fairness. Bail is granted in order to avoid the injustice which would arise should the appellant end up serving more time in custody than would be lawfully justified in the event that the appeal succeeds. In that event, success on appeal is effectively rendered meaningless.
However, “special or exceptional circumstances” will not be established in all cases in which an appeal will be rendered nugatory by the expiry of the custodial portion of the appellant’s sentence prior to the hearing of an appeal. It is also necessary for the Court to consider the prospects of the appeal: Kelly at [32]; Sherd at [52]; Moore v Perkins [2022] ACTSC 226 at [9]. Fairness does not require that bail be granted in respect of an appeal which does not have “reasonable” or “realistic” prospects of success, even where the expiry of an appellant’s sentence is imminent.
For this reason, bail has been granted where expiry of the custodial portion of a sentence was imminent and the prospects of success were assessed as “reasonable” (Samani v The Queen [2016] ACTCA 48), “reasonably arguable” (Quzag v The Queen [2015] ACTCA 9 at [18]), “clearly not hopeless” and where there was a “reasonable prospect” that the appeal would succeed (Peters v The Queen (1996) 71 ALJR 309) or where the appeal raised an “arguable point, which may have real substance” (Marotta v The Queen [1999] HCA 4; 73 ALJR 265). In other cases where the expiry of the custodial portion of a sentence was imminent, bail was refused where the appeal did not have a “realistic prospect of success” (Moore v Perkins [2022] ACTSC 226 at [16]); or where the prospects were “very low” (Kember v The Queen [2022] ACTCA 51 at [19]).
As Refshauge J observed in Degioannis v David (No 2) [2015] ACTSC 196 at [23], “[i]t is, of course, difficult to assess the prospects of success on an appeal on a bail application. That difficulty does not obviate the requirement.” In assessing the prospects of success of an appeal, it is not possible or desirable to “try the appeal”: Sherdat [53], citing The Queen v Giordano[1982] 31 SASR 241 at 243. For this reason, “it is undesirable for a court considering a bail application to analyse the alleged errors in too great a detail. That is the function of the appellate court”: Degioannisat [23].
CONSIDERATION
Introduction
The applicant’s full term will expire on 1 June 2023, and he will be entitled to be released on a recognisance on 2 April 2023. The applicant has not sought expedition of his appeal. Without expedition, the appeal is likely to be heard on a date after the applicant is entitled to be released.
Both parties accepted that the potential for an appeal to be rendered nugatory by the expiry of the custodial component of the sentence will constitute special or exceptional circumstances within the meaning of s 9E, provided that the appeal itself has “reasonable” or “realistic” prospects of success. The Director of Public Prosecutions (“the Director”) did not submit that there was any other basis for the Court to refuse bail. In particular, the Director did not submit that there are any “bail concerns” under s 22 of the Bail Act. In these circumstances, it was common ground between the parties that the “real issue” in the present application is whether the applicant’s appeal has “reasonable” or “realistic” prospects of success.
It is not possible to reach a firm conclusion as to whether the custodial portion of the applicant’s sentence would be served before the hearing of an appeal if an application for expedition were made at this time. There is at least a possibility that the appeal could be heard and determined before the non-custodial component of the sentence expires in early April, if expedition were granted. However, in view of the parties’ agreed position, I have proceeded on the basis that even if an order is made for expedition of the appeal, the custodial portion of the sentence will be served, or substantially served, before the determination of the appeal.
The prospects of success of the appeal
In his Amended Notice of Appeal filed on 23 January 2023, the applicant relies on the following four grounds of appeal:
1.The sentence imposed was manifestly excessive.
2.The sentencing judge erred by finding:
(i)The appellant was aware that members of the Australian Federal Police were “probably” still intercepting and listening to his telephone calls at the time of the offence and that if this was the case, the contents of such calls would “likely” be bought to the attention of ‘Officer A’.
(ii)The appellant’s offending conduct was done with the intention, if it was heard by Officer A, of menacing or offending the officer.
(iii)The appellant’s conduct was a “direct challenge to the lawful authority of the officer to do his job.”
3.The sentencing judge erred by finding the appellant’s offending was “mid-range of objective seriousness for this offence” in circumstances where the conversation was a private conversation between the appellant and his brother and as a result of the incorrect findings.
4.The sentencing judge erred by not considering whether in all of the circumstances the sentence should be served partly or wholly concurrently with the sentence the appellant was already serving.
For the reasons outlined below, I am not satisfied that any of the grounds of appeal have sufficient prospects of success to justify a grant of bail.
Ground 1: Manifest excess
In order to succeed in this ground of appeal, the applicant must demonstrate that the sentence is “manifestly excessive” in the sense that it is “unreasonable or plainly unjust”: Dinsdale v The Queen [2000] HCA 54; 202 CLR 321, (Gleeson CJ and Hayne J at [6]).
I am not satisfied that the applicant has reasonable prospects of establishing that an undiscounted sentence of six months’ imprisonment, reduced to five months, of which the applicant was required to serve three months, is manifestly unreasonable or unjust. In so concluding, I have taken into account the following matters:
(a)The maximum penalty for the offence is imprisonment for three years;
(b)The applicant’s statements were not just offensive, but were also menacing and harassing, particularly in respect of Officer A’s wife;
(c)The remarks were not made directly to Officer A, but the applicant was aware members of the AFP were “probably” listening to his calls, and that if this was the case, the content of the call would “likely” be brought to Officer A’s attention;
(d)Whilst Officer A was a police officer, and was not a vulnerable person, he was a public officer who exercises public functions. Police are by their training and temperament expected to resist the sting of insults directed to them: see Coleman v Power [2004] HCA 39; (2004) 220 CLR 1 at [200] (Hayne J). However, they are not required to be completely impervious to insult (Coleman at [16], per Gleeson CJ), and they should not be expected to endure the threat of physical violence. In this respect, it must also be borne in mind that the threats extended not only to Officer A, but also to his wife;
(e)There was little by way of mitigation in the applicant’s subjective case. The sentencing judge found that the applicant had little remorse and poor prospects of rehabilitation. Whilst aspects of these findings were criticised in the bail application, no ground of appeal alleges that it was not open to the sentencing judge to make these findings; and
(f)Neither of the comparative cases presented by the applicant demonstrated that the sentence imposed was unreasonable or unjust: Monis v the Queen (2013) 249 CLR 92; R v Crowther [2019] ACTSC 338. There was insufficient detail in the decisions (in particular, describing the subjective circumstances of the offenders in question) to enable any proper comparison to be made.
Ground 2: Alleged factual errors
Ground 2 relates to three factual findings that were made by the sentencing judge. Senior counsel for the applicant accepted that success on this ground requires the applicant to establish that one or more of these findings were “not open” to the sentencing judge
The factual error alleged in ground 2(i) may be dealt with shortly. The factual finding that is impugned by the applicant (Nchouki at [10]) was in relevantly identical terms as [15] of the Agreed Statement of Facts. It could not be an error for the sentencing judge to make a factual finding that was in the same terms as an agreed fact.
Grounds 2(ii) and 2(iii) relate to the sentencing judge’s finding at [17] of the judgment, in which his Honour held:
The remarks were directed at a police officer. They were not, however, made directly. They were done with the intention, if it was heard by the police officer, of menacing or offending the officer. While in one sense the status of the intended recipient as a police officer was someone less vulnerable than other members of the community, it was a direct challenge to the lawful authority of the officer to do his job. I would place the offending the mid-range of objective seriousness for this offence. (emphasis added)
Ground 2(ii) relates to the sentencing judge’s finding that the remarks were made with the intention, if heard, of menacing or offending the officer. The applicant has not established that he has reasonable prospects of establishing that this finding was not open.
The sentencing judge made clear that the applicant was being sentenced on the basis that he was aware that police were “probably” listening to the call and not that the applicant knew that police were listening to the call: Nchouki at [43]. The finding was conditional in nature: the applicant’s intent was that, if the remarks were heard, Officer A should be menaced or offended.
The conditional finding was not an element of the offence, nor was it implied in the plea. However, the sentencing judge was not bound to sentence on the facts most favourable to the accused. It was well open to the sentencing judge to make the conditional finding. The remarks were clearly and unambiguously offensive, menacing and harassing. Further, the call commences with the applicant making offensive remarks in terms that directly referenced Officer A (“Brother, you’ve got to understand that … who is listening to us right now that [Officer A]…) and at times were made in terms that directly addressed Officer A (“you know I’m talking to you,… while you’re listen’ to this”). Officer A could have been in no doubt that the comments were directed at him, and that they were designed to offend him.
Ground 2(iii) relates to the sentencing judge’s finding that the remarks constituted a “direct challenge to the lawful authority of the officer to do his job”. The applicant challenges two aspects of this finding: first, that the remarks were not “direct” and second, that the applicant was challenging the “lawful authority” of the officer to do his job, because the applicant believed that the officer was not acting lawfully.
The first aspect of the challenge can be addressed briefly. The reasons for sentence must be read fairly and as a whole. As outlined above, the sentencing judge expressly recognised that Officer A was not a party to the conversation, and that the applicant did not know that his remarks would necessarily be heard by the officer. The sentencing judge explained (at [43]) that:
… had the statements been made directly or in circumstances where it was known that they would be communicated to Officer A, a significantly greater sentence would be appropriate.
The sentencing judge’s finding at [17] must be read in this context. In that context, it is clear that the sentencing judge was making a finding as to the nature of the remarks, and not the applicant’s knowledge of whether they would be heard.
The second aspect of the applicant’s challenge requires more elaboration. In the oral hearing of this application, senior counsel for the applicant submitted that the call the subject of the charge occurred in the context of the police having spoken to the applicant’s brother (Jomal) following Jomal’s arrest on drug charges.
The applicant’s counsel further submitted that it was “clear” from the transcript of the call contained in the Agreed Statement of Facts that Jomal had told the applicant that police (specifically Officer A) had told him (Jomal) that police were going to (falsely) tell other people that he (Jomal) was providing police with information or assistance. The applicant’s counsel emphasised that he was not submitting that Officer A had in fact made this threat, but merely that the call needed to be understood in the context that the applicant believed that this threat had been made by Officer A to his brother.
The applicant’s counsel took me to various aspects of the call which were consistent with this context. The applicant’s counsel submitted that, in view of this context, it was not open to the sentencing judge to find that the applicant’s remarks were a “direct challenge to the lawful authority of the officer to do his job”:
If [it is] accepted that the context of the call is a belief, right or wrong, that the police are pressuring Jomal to give up other people because they’re going to go around and tell other people he is anyway, so you might as well be hung as a sheep as a lamb, that would not be, in my submission, doing their duty of enforcing the law. That would be improper conduct, so again a direct challenge to the lawful authority of the officer to do his job. When one reads that call, it’s a direct challenge to the underhanded tactics he believes are being employed by the police to enforce the law.
There are two difficulties with this submission. First, whilst aspects of the call are consistent with Jomal having told the applicant about an alleged threat made by Officer A, they do not clearly indicate that this had occurred. Notably, it is the applicant who refers to Officer A wanting “to make us look like dogs”, and it is the applicant who tells Jomal that “that’s their game they are going to try and make you look like a snitch.” Jomal does not make any allegations about Officer A within the call, and it is not entirely clear from the transcript that the call was preceded by Jomal having previously informed the applicant of threats made by Officer A.
A more significant hurdle, however, is that this ground of appeal is directly inconsistent with the way in which the proceedings were advanced before the sentencing judge.
In the first instance sentencing proceedings, the sentencing judge noted that the applicant’s counsel’s submissions were “based on the proposition that it was an emotionally heightened situation”. His Honour then asked:
I can infer from the transcript that it was emotionally heightened but was there some part of the background you’re relying on other than the proposition that his brother had been charged by police?
In response, senior counsel noted that there had been evidence given in the Magistrates’ Court that was relevant to this issue, but that this evidence was not before the Court in the present proceedings. Senior counsel properly accepted that it was not appropriate for him to give evidence from the bar table in respect of those matters. The sentencing judge then stated:
Okay. So I will proceed on the basis that he was aware his brother had been charged and he has demonstrated loyalty to his brother and upset at the police.
Counsel did not demur, but only added that “it was the officer he is mouthing off about who was the person who had arrested and charged his brother and had been involved in that investigation” and that it “was not just some random police officer”.
Later in the proceedings, the sentencing judge asked senior counsel whether it was “significant that [the applicant’s remarks] involves what appears to be a direct confrontation with police, and an attempt to menace a police officer who is apparently lawfully doing their duty of enforcing the law?” In responding to this question, senior counsel submitted that the applicant’s intent was to:
[make] his brother feel better by saying bad things about the police officer who was involved in the investigation, reckless as to whether or not those bad things would get through [to Officer A].
Senior counsel did not at any time contend that the sentencing judge should find that the call occurred in a context where the applicant believed that Officer A was acting unlawfully, or that the applicant believed that Officer A had made improper threats to the applicant’s brother.
In circumstances where the factual finding that is challenged was made in conformity with concessions made by senior counsel at first instance, the applicant will face significant difficulties in establishing this ground of appeal. In Zreika v the Queen (2012) 223 A Crim R 460; [2012] NSWCCA 44 at [81], Johnson J held that:
The Court will not lightly entertain arguments that could have been put, but were not advanced on the plea, and will have an even greater reluctance to entertain arguments that seek to resile from concessions made below or are a contradiction of submissions previously made.
The comments in Zreika apply with particular force to the present appeal. Indeed, unlike Zreika, which concerned arguments that “could have been put” to the Court of Criminal Appeal, ground 2(iii) directly contradicts the concession and submissions made before the sentencing judge. It will be difficult for the applicant to demonstrate that the sentencing judge erred in sentencing the offender on a basis that was acceded to by his counsel. In these circumstances, I am not satisfied that the applicant’s prospects of success in respect of this ground of appeal are reasonable.
Ground 3 – Finding as to objective seriousness
To succeed in this ground of appeal, it is necessary for the applicant to establish that the sentencing judge’s assessment of the objective seriousness of the offence as within the mid-range was not open: Singh v R [2015] ACTCA 65 at [58], citing Delaney v R; R v Delaney [2013] NSWCCA 150 at [57].
I am not satisfied that this ground of appeal has reasonable prospects of success. As outlined in respect of ground 1 above, the remarks were unequivocally offensive, harassing and menacing. They were made not only in respect of Officer A, but also his wife. They included a threat of serious violence against Officer A, and a threat of sexual violence against his wife. Whilst the applicant did not know for certain that his remarks would be heard by Officer A, he was aware that members of the AFP were “probably” listening to his calls, and that if this was the case, the content of the call would “likely” be brought to Officer A’s attention. In all of these circumstances, I am of the view that it was well open to the sentencing judge to assess the objective seriousness of the offence as within the mid-range of objective seriousness.
Ground 4: Totality
I am not satisfied that this ground of appeal has reasonable prospects of success. Whilst the applicant’s counsel submitted in the proceedings before the sentencing judge the relevant offending did not cross the s 10 threshold and, in the alternative, that the offender should be sentenced to time served, no submission was made that there should be concurrency of any sentence imposed with the existing sentence.
The sentence that the applicant was then serving was an Intensive Corrections Order which had been revoked upon breach. It concerned entirely unrelated offending. It was well open to the sentencing judge to conclude that the sentence should be effectively accumulated on the applicant’s existing sentence.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons outlined above, I am not satisfied that the appeal has reasonable prospects of success. Accordingly, even assuming that the appeal cannot be heard before the custodial portion of the sentence expires, it is not appropriate for bail to be granted.
In these circumstances, it is not necessary for me to consider whether a stay of the sentence should be ordered, or to consider whether the requirement for the grant of a stay differs from the “special or exceptional circumstances” test that applies to the grant of appeal bail: see Incandela v The Queen (No 3) [2022] ACTCA 63 at [12] – [15].
The application for bail and for a stay of the sentence are therefore dismissed.
I acknowledge that my assessment of the prospects of success of the appeal is limited by the nature of the hearing which I have conducted. It remains preferable for the appeal to be determined before the custodial portion of the applicant’s sentence expires if possible. For this reason, the applicant may wish to consider filing a Notice of Motion seeking expedition of his appeal.
| I certify that the preceding fifty-eight [58] numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of her Honour Justice Baker Associate: Date: 16 February 2023 |
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