NAAT v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NAAT v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 332

MIGRATION – Phillipino citizen claims to fear persecution by reason of her views concerning unions – whether the RRT addressed the correct issue – whether the RRT was bound to ask the applicant further questions – whether the RRT denied the applicant procedural fairness by failing to warn her that her answers did not seem to make out her case.

Constitution, s 75(v)

Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, art 1A(2)

Judiciary Act, s 39B
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 414, 420(2)(b), 474
Migration Legislation Amendment (Judicial Review) Act 2001 (Cth)

R v Hickman; Ex parte Fox and Clinton (1945) 70 CLR 598, cited.
Walton v Ruddock [2001] FCA 1839, cited.
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Miah (2001) 179 ALR 238, cited.
Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte HB (2001) 179 ALR 513, cited.
Wang v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 167, cited.
Re Refugee Tribunal; Ex parte Aala (2000) 204 CLR 82, cited.
Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321, cited.
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Epeabaka (1999) 84 FCR 411, cited.
Powley v Crimes Compensation Tribunal (1996) 11 VAR 146, cited.
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Rajalingam (1999) 93 FCR 220, followed.
Saliba v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1998) 89 FCR 38, distinguished.
Paramananthan v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1998) 94 FCR 28, distinguished.
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Sarrazola (No 2) (2001) 107 FCR 184, cited.
Htun v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1802, distinguished.
Luu v Renevier (1989) 91 ALR 39, distinguished.
Prasad v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1985) 6 FCR 155, distinguished.
Kola v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 265, cited.
Abebe v The Commonwealth (1999) 197 CLR 510, cited.
NAAX v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 263, cited.

NAAT v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
N 1454 of 2001

SACKVILLE J
SYDNEY
27 MARCH 2002


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 1454 OF 2001

BETWEEN:

NAAT
APPLICANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

SACKVILLE J

DATE OF ORDER:

27 MARCH 2002

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application be dismissed.

2.The applicant pay the Minister’s costs.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 1454 OF 2001

BETWEEN:

NAAT
APPLICANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

SACKVILLE J

DATE:

27 MARCH 2002

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

THE PROCEEDINGS

  1. By an amended application filed in Court, the applicant seeks orders pursuant to s 39B(1) of the Judiciary Act 1903

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Details
Case
[2002] FCA 332
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of NAAT v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs, the applicant, a citizen of the Philippines, sought to challenge the refusal of her application for a protection visa by the Minister's delegate and the subsequent affirmation of that decision by the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT). The case was heard in the Federal Court of Australia, where the applicant sought a writ of mandamus, prohibition, or an injunction against an officer of the Commonwealth, thus invoking the original jurisdiction of the Court under section 75(v) of the Constitution and section 39B(1) of the Judiciary Act.

The central legal issue the court had to address was whether the RRT had committed any jurisdictional errors in its consideration of the applicant’s protection visa application. The applicant contended that the RRT failed to address the correct issue by not appreciating the nature of her case and did not adequately consider the evidence she presented. Specifically, the applicant argued that the RRT should have inquired further into her claims of threats and fear of persecution due to her anti-union stance as a restaurant manager in the Philippines.

The Court found that the RRT had not committed any jurisdictional errors in its review of the delegate’s decision. The Court held that the RRT had properly considered the applicant’s claims and made findings adverse to her, which were consistent with the evidence presented. The RRT had no obligation to inform the applicant that it was contemplating finding against her based on the applicant’s own evidence not satisfying the tribunal that she had a well-founded fear of persecution. Furthermore, the Court noted that there was no basis to infer that the RRT had misunderstood the applicant’s submissions or had misled her in any way. As such, the applicant's claims of jurisdictional error were unfounded.

Consequently, the Court dismissed the application and ordered that the applicant pay the Minister’s costs. The Court’s decision underscored the importance of the RRT’s role in reviewing visa applications and the limited scope of judicial review in such cases, affirming that the RRT had appropriately exercised its discretion in considering the applicant’s claims.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application be dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the Minister’s costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

Since reference was made in argument to s 75(v) of the Constitution, it is convenient to set out its terms here:“75. In all matters: …(v)in which a writ of Mandamus or prohibition or an injunction is sought against an officer of the Commonwealth;the High Court shall have original jurisdiction.”Section 39B(1) of the Judiciary Act grants jurisdiction to the Federal Court with respect to any matter in which a writ of mandamus or prohibition or an injunction is sought against an officer of the Commonwealth. This provision mirrors the language of s 75(v) of the Constitution.BACKGROUND The applicant is a citizen of the Philippines, born in 1967. She arrived in Australia on 31 December 2000 and gained admission as the holder of a tourist visa. On 9 February 2001, she lodged an application for a protection visa. The Minister’s delegate refused her application on 4 April 2001 and the RRT subsequently affirmed the delegate’s decision.THE APPLICANT’S CLAIMS The applicant set out her claims in her application for a protection visa as follows:“I left the Philippines because my life was in danger from employees and former employees of the company I was working. I was a restaurant manager which has about 20 to 25 employees. As restaurant manager, I have the very sensitive function of hiring and firing employees. Union members have talked to our company’s employees to form a union and I was assigned by management to discourage forming union and instead employees have individual contract with the company. I myself was against the organizing of a union because it is only a small company and I knew the harm it will do to our company. With this, the employees accused me of bias, discrimination, injustice, unfairness and narrow mindedness. I even received threats by phone calls on the job and at home. Recently, the threat to my life and person even became more real as a result of my dismissal of 3 employees who were fired because of stealing the company’s cash sales for the day. These three employees were all union members to another company and they just transfer to our company to encourage our employees to form a union. These dismissed employees often followed me around and is always turning up at our workplace. I would not have feared for my life as much were it not for the fact that these employees will not stop threatening unless union is established in our company. I fear that I will be harmed if I go back to the Philippines. I think that the employees and former employees of our company will harm me if I go back to the Philippines. I do not think that the authorities can effectively protect me from our company’s employees or former employees who are angry at me because I did not sympathize with their idea of forming a union.”The application form records that the applicant nominated a migration agent (a solicitor) to act on her behalf in relation to the application.THE DELEGATE’S DECISION The delegate, in his decision record, noted that the applicant’s claim, in summary, was that “she has been subjected to death threats by unionists disgruntled by her anti-union stance”. The delegate said this:“Given that employees have the right to form and join trade unions, and seek review of unfair labour practices, I find it difficult to accept that the applicant’s staff would seriously violate her human rights to resolve an industrial dispute. Nevertheless, for the purposes of this assessment, I accept that the applicant has been subjected to threats and has a subjective fear that the threats will be carried out.”

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

In response to the applicant’s submissions on the substance of the application for judicial review, Mr Lloyd submitted that, even if the Court retained jurisdiction and power to grant relief in respect of any jurisdictional error committed by the RRT, none had been demonstrated in the present case. The RRT was under no duty to inquire further than the claims made by the applicant. In any event, even if there was a duty on the RRT to inquire further in some circumstances, the RRT had not breached that duty since it had asked the questions on the significant issues. The RRT had considered the applicant’s claim and made findings adverse to her. There was no obligation on the RRT to tell the applicant that it was contemplating finding against her on the ground that her own evidence did not satisfy it that she had a well-founded fear of persecution on a Convention ground. Nor was there anything in the RRT’s reasons to attract the so-called “what if I am wrong” principle.THE EVIDENCE At the outset of the hearing, Mr McCarthy sought to read an affidavit by the applicant. In this affidavit the applicant recounts in some detail the nature of the threats she claims were made against her in the Philippines. More specifically, she claims that some of the threats by the three dismissed employees suggested that she would be killed unless a union was formed at her workplace. She had not given this evidence before the RRT; nor had she made claims in these terms in her written application for a protection visa. It is important to note what is not in the affidavit. The applicant does not suggest that she misunderstood the RRT’s questions or explanations, nor that she felt inhibited in any way in responding to the questions or in making submissions to the RRT. She does not provide any explanation for failing to present the material in the affidavit to the RRT when she had the opportunity to do so. And she does not suggest that she was misled by anything the RRT member said in the course of the hearing: cf Re Refugee Tribunal; Ex parte Aala (2000) 204 CLR 82, at 114, per Gaudron and Gummow JJ. Mr McCarthy ultimately accepted that the affidavit was not relevant to whether the applicant had made out a ground of review identified in the amended application. He pressed the affidavit on one basis only, namely that it identified evidence that the applicant would wish to give if the matter were to be remitted to the RRT. I admitted the affidavit on that basis: that is, as relevant only to such discretion as the Court might have to grant or withhold relief should the applicant establish grounds for the relief sought in the application.REASONING I shall consider first the applicant’s claim that the RRT committed jurisdictional errors. It is only if the applicant establishes jurisdictional error that the question of the construction and effect of s 474 of the Migration Act arises. DID THE RRT ADDRESS THE CORRECT ISSUE? It is convenient to deal first with the applicant’s submission that the RRT failed in its duty under s 414 of the Migration Act to review the delegate’s decision, by reason of a failure to address the correct question. This submission, as I understood it, turned on the proposition that the RRT had not appreciated the nature of the case the applicant was advancing.

Decision

Reasons for decision

SACKVILLE J
The applicant set out her claims in her application for a protection visa as follows:“I left the Philippines because my life was in danger from employees and former employees of the company I was working. I was a restaurant manager which has about 20 to 25 employees. As restaurant manager, I have the very sensitive function of hiring and firing employees. Union members have talked to our company’s employees to form a union and I was assigned by management to discourage forming union and instead employees have individual contract with the company. I myself was against the organizing of a union because it is only a small company and I knew the harm it will do to our company. With this, the employees accused me of bias, discrimination, injustice, unfairness and narrow mindedness. I even received threats by phone calls on the job and at home. Recently, the threat to my life and person even became more real as a result of my dismissal of 3 employees who were fired because of stealing the company’s cash sales for the day. These three employees were all union members to another company and they just transfer to our company to encourage our employees to form a union. These dismissed employees often followed me around and is always turning up at our workplace. I would not have feared for my life as much were it not for the fact that these employees will not stop threatening unless union is established in our company. I fear that I will be harmed if I go back to the Philippines. I think that the employees and former employees of our company will harm me if I go back to the Philippines. I do not think that the authorities can effectively protect me from our company’s employees or former employees who are angry at me because I did not sympathize with their idea of forming a union.”The application form records that the applicant nominated a migration agent (a solicitor) to act on her behalf in relation to the application.THE DELEGATE’S DECISION The delegate, in his decision record, noted that the applicant’s claim, in summary, was that “she has been subjected to death threats by unionists disgruntled by her anti-union stance”. The delegate said this:“Given that employees have the right to form and join trade unions, and seek review of unfair labour practices, I find it difficult to accept that the applicant’s staff would seriously violate her human rights to resolve an industrial dispute. Nevertheless, for the purposes of this assessment, I accept that the applicant has been subjected to threats and has a subjective fear that the threats will be carried out.” It will be seen that the delegate did not make a positive finding that the applicant’s account was credible and should be accepted (as some of the applicant’s submissions in this Court rather suggested). Instead, the delegate expressed reservations about aspects of her account but accepted “for the purposes of this assessment” that she had been subjected to threats and had a subjective fear that the threats would be carried out.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: SACKVILLE J

Full text does not contain this section.