Administrative Appeals Tribunal
DECISION AND REASONS FOR DECISION [2010] AATA 792
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL )
) No 2007/0486
GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION ) Re ANTONIO MURDACA Applicant
And
AUSTRALIAN SECURITIES AND INVESTMENTS COMMISSION
Respondent
DECISION
Tribunal Deputy President P E Hack SC Date11 October 2010
PlaceMelbourne
Decision The Tribunal directs, pursuant to s 25(4A) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), that the scope of the hearing be limited by precluding the applicant from relying upon the matters set out in paragraphs 2.1 to 2.4 and paragraph 4.1 of the Statement of Facts and Contentions dated 22 August 2010.
.............Signed..................
Deputy President
On 29 September 2006 a delegate of the respondent, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission, decided to disqualify the applicant, Mr Antonio Murdaca, from managing corporations for a period of two years. The decision was made in reliance on s 206F of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). Mr Murdaca made application to the Tribunal to review that decision and was successful[1]. The Tribunal, as then constituted, set aside the Commission’s decision.
[1] See Murdaca & ASIC [2008] AATA 209.
Mr Murdaca’s success was short-lived. The Commission appealed to the Federal Court. On 16 September 2008 the Court set aside the Tribunal’s decision and remitted the matter for a re-hearing[2]. There was a further appeal[3] by Mr Murdaca but it was, in substance, dismissed.
[2] See Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Murdaca [2008] FCA 1399; (2008) 105 ALD 461 (Gordon J).
[3] Murdaca v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2009] FCAFC 92; (2009) 178 FCR 119 (North, Kenny & Foster JJ).
A preliminary issue has arisen and has been argued in advance of the hearing of the substantive issues. Mr Murdaca wishes to contend at the hearing (and to lead evidence in support of the contention[4]) that the original decision maker, the delegate of the Commission,
“did not comply with the legislative prerequisites for making [the] decision insomuch as he did not provide the applicant with a genuine ‘opportunity to be heard’ before purporting to disqualify him from managing corporations”.[5]
Mr Murdaca wishes to give and call evidence that, if accepted, is capable of establishing that the Commission’s delegate had determined, prior to any hearing, that Mr Murdaca was to be disqualified. The consequence, it is said, is that the original decision is invalid and ought, for that reason alone, be set aside by the Tribunal and remitted to the Commission for reconsideration by an “unbiased” decision maker.
[4] The applicant’s written submissions identify paragraphs 194-206 of the applicant’s affidavit sworn on 7 July 2010, the affidavit of Ian Hone sworn on 9 June 2010 and the affidavit of John Sitkiewicz sworn on 17 July 2010 as the evidence in support of the contention.
[5] Applicant’s outline of submission, paragraph 1.
The Commission contends[6] that such allegations are irrelevant and serve no useful purpose in the conduct of the Tribunal’s review. For the reasons that I will now seek to explain I consider…
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- Case
- [2010] AATA 792
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues the court had to address included whether the AAT had the authority to review ASIC's decision despite alleged procedural errors in the original hearing and whether the AAT could remit the case back to ASIC for reconsideration. The court also considered whether the AAT should limit the scope of the review to prevent the litigation of irrelevant issues, as requested by ASIC.
The court reasoned that the AAT has the statutory authority to conduct a de novo review of ASIC's decision, regardless of any procedural errors that may have occurred in the original hearing. The court rejected the argument that ASIC's alleged procedural errors could deprive the AAT of the power to review the decision on its merits. Furthermore, the court held that the AAT's power to remit a case for reconsideration under section 42D of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act should not be exercised merely because of inadequate findings or reasons, but only in exceptional circumstances where the decision-maker's reasoning was fundamentally flawed.
In light of these findings, the court directed that the scope of the hearing be limited to prevent the applicant from relying on certain irrelevant matters. This decision aimed to avoid raising false issues, incurring unnecessary expenses, and delaying the final determination of the case.
ORDERS:
The Tribunal directs, pursuant to s 25(4A) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), that the scope of the hearing be limited by precluding the applicant from relying upon the matters set out in paragraphs 2.1 to 2.4 and paragraph 4.1 of the Statement of Facts and Contentions dated 22 August 2010.
Orders
Orders of the court
The Tribunal directs, pursuant to s 25(4A) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), that the scope of the hearing be limited by precluding the applicant from relying upon the matters set out in paragraphs 2.1 to 2.4 and paragraph 4.1 of the Statement of Facts and Contentions dated 22 August 2010.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
I would reach the same conclusion if the question were to be whether the matter ought be remitted for reconsideration under s 42D(1) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act. It provides:“42D Power to remit matters to decision‑maker for further consideration (1) At any stage of a proceeding for review of a decision, the Tribunal may remit the decision to the person who made it for reconsideration of the decision by the person.” The argument advanced is that the evidence of prejudgment ought be allowed to be given and if the Tribunal were satisfied that it was made out the matter ought be remitted for reconsideration. The ambit of the section was considered by Deputy President Forgie in Re Lavery & Registrar, Supreme Court of Queensland (No 2)[14] in which the Deputy President concluded:“It would follow from the framework of the AAT Act and the nature of administrative merits review that the power given by section 42D to remit a decision to a decision maker should not be exercised simply because inadequate findings of fact, references to evidence or reasons have been given. Nor should it be exercised simply because a decision-maker supports his, her or its decision on a basis different from that originally put forward. The AAT Act provides other means to remedy those situations.”I entirely agree. The present case is one, and an extreme one, where then decision maker seeks to support the decision on a basis that is considerably wider that the original decision. But that would not, without more, warrant the making of an order under s 42D. [14] (1996) 23 AAR 52. Whether the matter were to be viewed as a request for the Tribunal to act under s 42 D or s 43(1)(c) of the Adminsitrative Appeals Tribunal Act the position remains the same. Mr Murdaca seeks to give and call evidence which, if accepted, would demonstrate that the original decision was not a proper exercise of the power under s 206F of the Corporations Act. But that demonstration is irrelevant where any defect in the decision making process will be cured by giving Mr Murdaca the opportunity to present afresh his case and to respond to that propounded by the Commission. It is unnecessary, in those circumstances, to decide whether the decision making process was flawed in the manner alleged by Mr Murdaca. To do so would be to raise (and require the Commission to answer) false issues and incur needless public and private expense. It would, as well, be likely to delay the final determination of the matter.. There is power, granted by s 25(4A) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act, for the Tribunal to determine then scope of the review of a decision by limiting the questions of fact, the evidence and the issues that it considers. The present case is one where it is appropriate to rely upon that power to prevent the litigation of irrelevant and unnecessary issues. There will then be a direction that the scope of the hearing be limited by precluding Mr Murdaca from relying upon the matters set out in paragraphs 2.1 to 2.4 and paragraph 4.1 of the Statement of Facts and Contentions dated 22 August 2010. It follows that I would regard evidence going to that issue as being irrelevant however appropriate rulings can be made in due course.I certify that the 27 preceding paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of Deputy President P E Hack SCSigned: ..........Signed............................................................ AssociateDate of Hearing 11 October 2010 Date of Decision 11 October 2010Solicitors for the Applicant MW Law Counsel for the Respondent Mr R Knowles Solicitor for the Respondent Australian Securities & Investments Commission