Mulholland v Australian Electoral Commission (No 2)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Mulholland v Australian Electoral Commission (No 2) [2014] FCA 917

Citation: Mulholland v Australian Electoral Commission (No 2) [2014] FCA 917
Appeal from: Mulholland v Australian Electoral Commission [2011] AATA 879
Parties: JOHN VINCENT MULHOLLAND v AUSTRALIAN ELECTORAL COMMISSION and ANTHONY ZEGENHAGEN
File number: VID 13 of 2012
Judge: MORTIMER J
Date of judgment: 1 September 2014
Catchwords: COSTS – Application for costs order of Full Court to be stayed, varied or set aside – whether single judge has power to vary or set aside costs order of Full Court – whether any “special or exceptional circumstances” warranting a stay – application refused.
Legislation:

Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth)
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth)
Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth) Part XI
Electoral Act 2002 (Vic)
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 14(3), 25(2)(d)
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth)

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 39.05, 39.32, 39.35, 40.17, 40.18, 40.20, 40.30, 41.03, 41.11

Cases cited: AD (deceased) on behalf of the Mirning People v Western Australia [2013] FCA 565
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v ActiveSuper Pty Ltd (No 4) [2013] FCA 318
Dunstan v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission [2007] FCA 1326
Flight Centre Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission [2014] FCA 65
Mulholland and Australian Electoral Commission [2011] AATA 879
Mulholland v Australian Electoral Commission (2014) 219 FCR 1; [2014] FCA 136
Mulholland v Australian Electoral Commission [2012] FCAFC 136
Mulholland v Australian Electoral Commission [2013] HCASL 43
Mulholland v Australian Electoral Commission [2014] FCA 916
Re S&D International Pty Ltd (in liq) (No 6) [2011] VSC 11
Teoh v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1994) 49 FCR 409
Date of hearing: 3 July 2014
Date of last submissions: 3 July 2014
Place: Melbourne
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 40
Counsel for the Appellant: The Appellant appeared in person
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr L Brown
Solicitor for the Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

VID 13 of 2012

BETWEEN:

JOHN VINCENT MULHOLLAND
Appellant

AND:

AUSTRALIAN ELECTORAL COMMISSION
First Respondent

ANTHONY ZEGENHAGEN
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

MORTIMER J

DATE OF ORDER:

1 SEPTEMBER 2014

WHERE MADE:

MELBOURNE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The interlocutory application filed in the appeal on 18 June 2014 be dismissed.

Note:Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

VID 13 OF 2012

BETWEEN:

JOHN VINCENT MULHOLLAND
Appellant

AND:

AUSTRALIAN ELECTORAL COMMISSION
First Respondent

ANTHONY ZEGENHAGEN
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

MORTIMER J

DATE:

1 SEPTEMBER 2014

PLACE:

MELBOURNE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

  1. This application arises in the context of a long-running dispute between the applicant Mr Mulholland and others about control of the Democratic Labor Party (DLP) and its executive at state and federal level. The dispute has resulted in litigation in both state and federal jurisdictions. In…

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Details
Case
[2014] FCA 917
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Mulholland v Australian Electoral Commission (No 2), the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia was called upon to consider an application by Mr Mulholland to vary or set aside a costs order made against him in earlier proceedings. The application arose out of a long-standing dispute between Mr Mulholland and the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) over a decision to change the registered officer of the Democratic Labour Party (DLP). The AEC had previously succeeded in having Mr Mulholland's appeal dismissed by the Full Court, which ordered Mr Mulholland to pay the AEC's costs. After the refusal of special leave to appeal to the High Court, the AEC filed a bill of costs with the Court, which were subsequently taxed at $30,700. Mr Mulholland then filed an interlocutory application seeking to set aside or stay the costs order, or in the alternative, that the parties bear their own costs.

The legal issues before the Court were whether a single judge has the power to vary or set aside a costs order of the Full Court and whether there were any special or exceptional circumstances warranting a stay of the costs order. The Court found that while there was jurisdiction to consider all aspects of Mr Mulholland's application, his submissions amounted to a challenge to the correctness of the Full Court's approach to its exercise of discretion on costs, and were in the nature of an appeal. The Court held that even if the Court had jurisdiction to vary or set aside the costs order, Mr Mulholland's application was outside the circumstances set out in r 39.05 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth). The Court also held that Mr Mulholland had not established any special or exceptional circumstances justifying a stay of the costs order. The Court concluded that Mr Mulholland's principal challenge was not based on any exceptional circumstance which justified the Court precluding enforcement of the costs order. Rather, he sought to impugn the correctness of the Full Court's costs order. The interlocutory application filed in the appeal on 18 June 2014 was dismissed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The interlocutory application filed in the appeal on 18 June 2014 be dismissed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the following reasons, and assuming without deciding there is jurisdiction to consider all aspects of Mr Mulholland’s application, it should be refused.FACTUAL BACKGROUND The long history of the dispute between Mr Mulholland and other members of the DLP is set out in detail in my reasons for judgment in proceeding VID 323 of 2014: see Mulholland v Australian Electoral Commission [2014] FCA 916 at [6]-[26]. In summary, Mr Mulholland’s claims centre around a decision of a delegate of the AEC to change an entry in the register of political parties which it maintains under Part XI of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth) (the Electoral Act), and to substitute the name of the second respondent, Mr Anthony Zegenhagen, for Mr Mulholland’s name as the registered officer for the DLP. Between January 2010 and October 2012, Mr Mulholland pursued the avenues available to him under the Electoral Act, the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) and the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) to have the AEC’s decision internally and externally reviewed on its merits, and then subject to scrutiny for errors of law in this Court. On 19 September 2012, the Full Court (Jacobson, Cowdroy and Flick JJ) ordered that the appeal be dismissed, and that Mr Mulholland pay the AEC’s costs: Mulholland v Australian Electoral Commission [2012] FCAFC 136. Mr Mulholland then unsuccessfully sought special leave to appeal to the High Court from the Full Court’s orders: Mulholland v Australian Electoral Commission[2013] HCASL 43. After the refusal of special leave to appeal, on 2 September 2013, the AEC filed a bill of costs with the Court, pursuant to rr 40.17 and 40.18 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth). On 8 October 2013, pursuant to r 40.20 of the Federal Court Rules, Registrar Allaway as taxing officer made and provided to the parties an estimate of the taxed costs at $30,700. Meanwhile, undeterred by his lack of success in the Tribunal, this Court and the High Court, on 13 September 2013, Mr Mulholland instituted judicial review proceedings in this Court under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) (AD(JR) Act) and the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) (Judiciary Act) seeking orders setting aside the same decision of the AEC delegate that had been subject of the proceedings in the Full Court. The AEC sought summary dismissal of the Judiciary Act claim, and an order refusing to extend time under the AD(JR) Act. That application was heard by the primary judge on 1 November 2013 and, on 26 February 2014, his Honour made orders refusing the application for an extension of time under the AD(JR) Act, and summarily dismissing Mr Mulholland’s application under the Judiciary Act: Mulholland v Australian Electoral Commission (2014) 219 FCR 1; [2014] FCA 136. Shortly before the primary judge heard argument on the first respondent’s application to dismiss those judicial review proceedings, pursuant to rr 40.21 and 40.25 of the Federal Court Rules Mr Mulholland filed an objection to the estimate of costs made by Registrar Allaway in the Full Court proceeding. The objection was filed on 28 October 2013.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

On 18 June 2014, Mr Mulholland filed a purported interlocutory application in the Full Court proceeding, seeking the following orders:1.That the costs Order of the Full Court made on 19 September 2012, and/or its execution, be set aside or stayed;2.That the Order/Certificate of Taxation of Registrar Burns made on 6 March 2014, and/or its execution, be set aside or stayed;3.In the alternative to 1 and 2, that the costs Order of the Full Court be varied, by way of an order that the parties carry their own costs;4. That there be any other orders as the Court deems appropriate.MR MULHOLLAND’S EVIDENCE AND ARGUMENTS Filed with the interlocutory application was an affidavit, sworn by Mr Mulholland on 18 June 2014. No objections were taken to that affidavit. Mr Mulholland also swore an affidavit on 11 June 2014 in support of his application in respect of Murphy J’s decision (VID 323 of 2014). During the hearing of this matter, which was heard together with VID 323 of 2014, Mr Mulholland sought leave to read each affidavit in both of his proceedings. The first respondent did not object to this request and I have treated each affidavit as read in both proceedings. None of the evidence was contested, although the relevance of some of it was in issue. In the 18 June 2014 affidavit filed in this proceeding, Mr Mulholland sets out the attempts made by the AEC to recover its costs prior to it filing the bill of costs on 2 September 2013, and recounts the procedural steps leading up to this application, which I have described above. He refers in the affidavit to his application for a fee waiver, which he sought from the Court on 9 January 2012, when filing his notice of appeal from the decision of the Tribunal. He describes his circumstances as an age pensioner with minimal assets and no other source of income. He states:The waiver was granted on the basis of my being a pensioner and I was informed by the Registry officer attending to me, that my waiver application would be sealed and placed on the Court file to be viewed only by the judges. At the conclusion of the Full Court hearing, in an exchange with the bench, Mr Mulholland deposes that he was invited to make any submissions as to why costs orders should not be made against him, should the appeal be unsuccessful. In response, Mr Mulholland submitted that it would “create considerable financial hardship”. Mr Mulholland deposes (and the first respondent did not contest) that Flick J observed that there was “no evidence” before the Court to support Mr Mulholland’s submission. Mr Mulholland seeks to place considerable weight on this remark by Flick J. Mr Mulholland deposes that, on 8 May 2014, following the certificate of taxation being issued by Registrar Burns, he received from the AEC’s solicitors a letter requesting payment of the taxed costs by 22 May 2014. If payment was not received by 22 May 2014, the letter states, the AEC had instructed its solicitors to issue a bankruptcy notice against Mr Mulholland.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Rules 41.03 and 41.11 provide that a party may apply to the Court for an order that a judgment or order, or execution of a judgment or order, be stayed:41.03 Application for stay of judgment or orderA party bound by a judgment or order may apply to the Court for an order that the judgment or order be stayed.41.11 Stay of executionA party may apply to the Court for a stay of execution of a judgment or order. Applications to stay an order of a Full Court are to be heard and determined by a single judge: see s 25(2)(d) of the Federal Court Act. Although the Court’s discretion to grant a stay on final orders is broad, the Court should not lightly deprive a litigant of the benefit of a judgment. Generally, an applicant must show “special or exceptional circumstances” that warrant the exercise of discretion in her or his favour: see Flight Centre Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission [2014] FCA 658 at [9] per Rangiah J, and the authorities cited therein. A stay does not operate to impugn the order or judgment itself, but simply prevents or delays its enforcement. As Robson J observed in Re S&D International Pty Ltd (in liq) (No 6) [2011] VSC 119 at [130]:In my view, the reference to special circumstances is an acknowledgement that prima facie a successful litigant is entitled to the fruits of its litigation. The applicant for a stay bears the onus of establishing that in those circumstances a stay should be granted. The grounds must be relevant to a stay of the enforcement proceedings, rather than grounds which may bear upon the validity or correctness of the judgment.(Emphasis added.)CONSIDERATION The Court records show that the orders of the Full Court dated 19 September 2012 were entered and sealed on 15 October 2012, and copies of these orders were sent to Mr Mulholland on that date. I infer this was done in preparation for Mr Mulholland to apply for special leave to appeal the Full Court’s decision to the High Court, which he did on 17 October 2012. Mr Mulholland does not in his submissions make any challenge to the regularity of the order of the Full Court. He does not invoke any of the provisions in r 39.05. Rather, he submits that the Full Court failed to take into consideration his application for a fee waiver, as evidence of his financial situation, and of any hardship that may be faced by him should a costs order be made against him. During the course of the hearing, Mr Mulholland conceded that he did not raise the issue of costs with the High Court in his application for special leave to appeal. It is well established that, even if an application to vary or set aside orders once entered is within the terms of r 39.05, those powers are not exercisable as a form of appeal: see Australian Securities and Investments Commission v ActiveSuper Pty Ltd (No 4) [2013] FCA 318 at [15] per Gordon J, and the authorities there referred to. Mr Mulholland’s submissions amount to a challenge to the correctness of the Full Court’s approach to its exercise of discretion on costs, and are in the nature of an appeal.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

A stay does not operate to impugn the order or judgment itself, but simply prevents or delays its enforcement. As Robson J observed in Re S&D International Pty Ltd (in liq) (No 6) [2011] VSC 119 at [130]:In my view, the reference to special circumstances is an acknowledgement that prima facie a successful litigant is entitled to the fruits of its litigation. The applicant for a stay bears the onus of establishing that in those circumstances a stay should be granted. The grounds must be relevant to a stay of the enforcement proceedings, rather than grounds which may bear upon the validity or correctness of the judgment.(Emphasis added.)CONSIDERATION The Court records show that the orders of the Full Court dated 19 September 2012 were entered and sealed on 15 October 2012, and copies of these orders were sent to Mr Mulholland on that date. I infer this was done in preparation for Mr Mulholland to apply for special leave to appeal the Full Court’s decision to the High Court, which he did on 17 October 2012. Mr Mulholland does not in his submissions make any challenge to the regularity of the order of the Full Court. He does not invoke any of the provisions in r 39.05. Rather, he submits that the Full Court failed to take into consideration his application for a fee waiver, as evidence of his financial situation, and of any hardship that may be faced by him should a costs order be made against him. During the course of the hearing, Mr Mulholland conceded that he did not raise the issue of costs with the High Court in his application for special leave to appeal. It is well established that, even if an application to vary or set aside orders once entered is within the terms of r 39.05, those powers are not exercisable as a form of appeal: see Australian Securities and Investments Commission v ActiveSuper Pty Ltd (No 4) [2013] FCA 318 at [15] per Gordon J, and the authorities there referred to. Mr Mulholland’s submissions amount to a challenge to the correctness of the Full Court’s approach to its exercise of discretion on costs, and are in the nature of an appeal. Even if the Court as constituted has jurisdiction to consider Mr Mulholland’s application to vary or set aside the costs order made by the Full Court (which may be doubtful, for the reasons expressed at [25]-[26] above), its power to do so is limited to the circumstances set out in r 39.05. The grounds of Mr Mulholland’s application are outside r 39.05. His application to vary or set aside the Full Court’s order as to costs should be dismissed. As to the application to stay the Full Court’s cost order, there is both jurisdiction and power to grant a stay but Mr Mulholland has not established any special or exceptional circumstances justifying such an order. His principal challenge is not based in any exceptional circumstance which justifies the Court precluding enforcement of the costs order. Rather, he seeks to impugn the correctness of the Full Court’s costs order, contrary to the observations of Robson J in Re S&D International.