FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Mulholland v Australian Electoral Commission (No 2) [2014] FCA 917
Citation: Mulholland v Australian Electoral Commission (No 2) [2014] FCA 917 Appeal from: Mulholland v Australian Electoral Commission [2011] AATA 879 Parties: JOHN VINCENT MULHOLLAND v AUSTRALIAN ELECTORAL COMMISSION and ANTHONY ZEGENHAGEN File number: VID 13 of 2012 Judge: MORTIMER J Date of judgment: 1 September 2014 Catchwords: COSTS – Application for costs order of Full Court to be stayed, varied or set aside – whether single judge has power to vary or set aside costs order of Full Court – whether any “special or exceptional circumstances” warranting a stay – application refused. Legislation: Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth)
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth)
Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth) Part XI
Electoral Act 2002 (Vic)
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 14(3), 25(2)(d)
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth)Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 39.05, 39.32, 39.35, 40.17, 40.18, 40.20, 40.30, 41.03, 41.11
Cases cited: AD (deceased) on behalf of the Mirning People v Western Australia [2013] FCA 565
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v ActiveSuper Pty Ltd (No 4) [2013] FCA 318
Dunstan v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission [2007] FCA 1326
Flight Centre Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission [2014] FCA 65
Mulholland and Australian Electoral Commission [2011] AATA 879
Mulholland v Australian Electoral Commission (2014) 219 FCR 1; [2014] FCA 136
Mulholland v Australian Electoral Commission [2012] FCAFC 136
Mulholland v Australian Electoral Commission [2013] HCASL 43
Mulholland v Australian Electoral Commission [2014] FCA 916
Re S&D International Pty Ltd (in liq) (No 6) [2011] VSC 11
Teoh v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1994) 49 FCR 409Date of hearing: 3 July 2014 Date of last submissions: 3 July 2014 Place: Melbourne Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 40 Counsel for the Appellant: The Appellant appeared in person Counsel for the Respondent: Mr L Brown Solicitor for the Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
VID 13 of 2012
BETWEEN: JOHN VINCENT MULHOLLAND
AppellantAND: AUSTRALIAN ELECTORAL COMMISSION
First RespondentANTHONY ZEGENHAGEN
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
MORTIMER J
DATE OF ORDER:
1 SEPTEMBER 2014
WHERE MADE:
MELBOURNE
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The interlocutory application filed in the appeal on 18 June 2014 be dismissed.
Note:Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
VID 13 OF 2012
BETWEEN: JOHN VINCENT MULHOLLAND
AppellantAND: AUSTRALIAN ELECTORAL COMMISSION
First RespondentANTHONY ZEGENHAGEN
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
MORTIMER J
DATE:
1 SEPTEMBER 2014
PLACE:
MELBOURNE
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
This application arises in the context of a long-running dispute between the applicant Mr Mulholland and others about control of the Democratic Labor Party (DLP) and its executive at state and federal level. The dispute has resulted in litigation in both state and federal jurisdictions. In…
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- Case
- [2014] FCA 917
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the Court were whether a single judge has the power to vary or set aside a costs order of the Full Court and whether there were any special or exceptional circumstances warranting a stay of the costs order. The Court found that while there was jurisdiction to consider all aspects of Mr Mulholland's application, his submissions amounted to a challenge to the correctness of the Full Court's approach to its exercise of discretion on costs, and were in the nature of an appeal. The Court held that even if the Court had jurisdiction to vary or set aside the costs order, Mr Mulholland's application was outside the circumstances set out in r 39.05 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth). The Court also held that Mr Mulholland had not established any special or exceptional circumstances justifying a stay of the costs order. The Court concluded that Mr Mulholland's principal challenge was not based on any exceptional circumstance which justified the Court precluding enforcement of the costs order. Rather, he sought to impugn the correctness of the Full Court's costs order. The interlocutory application filed in the appeal on 18 June 2014 was dismissed.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The interlocutory application filed in the appeal on 18 June 2014 be dismissed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
A stay does not operate to impugn the order or judgment itself, but simply prevents or delays its enforcement. As Robson J observed in Re S&D International Pty Ltd (in liq) (No 6) [2011] VSC 119 at [130]:In my view, the reference to special circumstances is an acknowledgement that prima facie a successful litigant is entitled to the fruits of its litigation. The applicant for a stay bears the onus of establishing that in those circumstances a stay should be granted. The grounds must be relevant to a stay of the enforcement proceedings, rather than grounds which may bear upon the validity or correctness of the judgment.(Emphasis added.)CONSIDERATION The Court records show that the orders of the Full Court dated 19 September 2012 were entered and sealed on 15 October 2012, and copies of these orders were sent to Mr Mulholland on that date. I infer this was done in preparation for Mr Mulholland to apply for special leave to appeal the Full Court’s decision to the High Court, which he did on 17 October 2012. Mr Mulholland does not in his submissions make any challenge to the regularity of the order of the Full Court. He does not invoke any of the provisions in r 39.05. Rather, he submits that the Full Court failed to take into consideration his application for a fee waiver, as evidence of his financial situation, and of any hardship that may be faced by him should a costs order be made against him. During the course of the hearing, Mr Mulholland conceded that he did not raise the issue of costs with the High Court in his application for special leave to appeal. It is well established that, even if an application to vary or set aside orders once entered is within the terms of r 39.05, those powers are not exercisable as a form of appeal: see Australian Securities and Investments Commission v ActiveSuper Pty Ltd (No 4) [2013] FCA 318 at [15] per Gordon J, and the authorities there referred to. Mr Mulholland’s submissions amount to a challenge to the correctness of the Full Court’s approach to its exercise of discretion on costs, and are in the nature of an appeal. Even if the Court as constituted has jurisdiction to consider Mr Mulholland’s application to vary or set aside the costs order made by the Full Court (which may be doubtful, for the reasons expressed at [25]-[26] above), its power to do so is limited to the circumstances set out in r 39.05. The grounds of Mr Mulholland’s application are outside r 39.05. His application to vary or set aside the Full Court’s order as to costs should be dismissed. As to the application to stay the Full Court’s cost order, there is both jurisdiction and power to grant a stay but Mr Mulholland has not established any special or exceptional circumstances justifying such an order. His principal challenge is not based in any exceptional circumstance which justifies the Court precluding enforcement of the costs order. Rather, he seeks to impugn the correctness of the Full Court’s costs order, contrary to the observations of Robson J in Re S&D International.