Nyoni v Pharmacy Board of Australia

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Nyoni v Pharmacy Board of Australia [2018] FCA 1707

Appeal from: Application for leave to appeal:  Nyoni v Pharmacy Board of Australia [2018] FCA 1313
File number: WAD 408 of 2018
Judge: MCKERRACHER J
Date of judgment: 8 November 2018
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for leave to appeal – application seeking to appeal an interlocutory decision made by a single judge exercising appellate jurisdiction – where the Federal Court lacked jurisdiction to hear and determine the proposed appeal – application treated as an application to vary or set aside the interlocutory orders pursuant to s 25(2B)(bc) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) – application dismissed.
Legislation:

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 25(2B)(ab), 25(2B)(bc), 37M, 56

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 39.05

Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) ss 46(2)(b), 46(4)

Cases cited:

AAI15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1110

Australian Securities and Investments Commission v ActiveSuper Pty Ltd (No 4) [2013] FCA 318

Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Yandal Gold [2003] FCA 77

Burrell v The Queen (2008) 238 CLR 218

Campaign Master (UK) Limited v Forty Two International Pty Ltd (No 4) [2010] FCA 398

Dunstan v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission [2007] FCA 1326

Finch v Heat Group Pty Ltd (No 3) [2016] FCA 102

Fokas v Mansfield (No 3) [2017] NSWCA 315

Mulholland v Australian Electoral Commission (No 2) [2014] FCA 917

Perre v Apand [2004] FCA 1220

Spencer v Commonwealth (No 2) (2017) 249 FCR 246

Date of hearing: Determined on the papers
Date of last submissions: 17 October 2018 (Applicant)
24 October 2018 (First and Third Respondents)
Registry: Western Australia
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Other Federal Jurisdiction
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 29
Counsel for the Applicant: The Applicant represented himself
Counsel for the First and Third Respondents: Ms J McKenzie
Solicitor for the First and Third Respondents: Minter Ellison
Table of Corrections
15 November 2018 On the coversheet, change “17 November 2018” (as the Date of Last Submissions) to “17 October 2018”.
In paragraph 2, change “on AHPRA on” to “AHPRA on”.
In paragraph 11, change “s 25(2b)(bc)” to “s 25(2B)(bc)”.
In paragraph 17, final sentence, after “order” add “of”.
In paragraph 18, add apostrophe after parties.
In paragraph 21, add an apostrophe after Respondents.
In paragraph 23, change “under” to “by”.
In paragraph 25, change “this issues” to “this issue”.
In paragraph 25, change “‘a strong prospects’” to “‘strong prospects’”.
In paragraph 28, change “My Nyoni” to “Mr Nyoni”.
In paragraph 29, change “is Honour” to “his Honour”.

ORDERS

WAD 408 of 2018
BETWEEN:

EMSON NYONI

Applicant

AND:

PHARMACY BOARD OF AUSTRALIA

First Respondent

DR ANDREW ROBERTSON IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE DELEGATE TO THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH

Second Respondent

AUSTRALIAN HEALTH PRACTITIONER REGULATION AGENCY

Third Respondent

JUDGE:

MCKERRACHER J

DATE OF ORDER:

8 NOVEMBER 2018

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The applicant’s application for leave to appeal, filed…

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Details
Case
[2018] FCA 1707
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Nyoni v Pharmacy Board of Australia involved the applicant, Mr. Nyoni, seeking leave to appeal an interlocutory decision made by a single judge of the Federal Court exercising appellate jurisdiction. The nature of the dispute was the applicant's challenge to the Federal Court's jurisdiction to hear and determine the proposed appeal. The court was required to decide whether the Federal Court had the jurisdiction to hear the proposed appeal and, if not, whether the application should be treated as an application to vary or set aside the interlocutory orders.

The court considered the applicant's contention that the Federal Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the proposed appeal. The court noted that the power exercised by the single judge was comparable to the power exercised by the Court of Appeal under the Supreme Court Act, but found that the Federal Court of Australia Act did not contain a similar confinement as the Supreme Court Act. The court concluded that the application should be treated as an application to vary or set aside the interlocutory orders pursuant to s 25(2B)(bc) of the Federal Court of Australia Act. The court further dismissed the application with costs.

In summary, the court found that the Federal Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the proposed appeal and treated the application as one to vary or set aside the interlocutory orders. The application was dismissed with costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The applicant’s application for leave to appeal, filed 11 September 2018, be treated as an application to vary or set aside orders pursuant to s 25(2B)(bc) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth).

2. The applicant’s application be dismissed with costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case of Nyoni v Pharmacy Board of Australia revolves around an application by the Respondents for an order that Mr Nyoni provide security for their costs on the appeal. Mr Nyoni, the appellant, had previously been involved in a proceeding where the Pharmacy Board of Australia was a party. The Respondents, seeking security for costs, argued that Mr Nyoni's financial situation made it unlikely that they would be compensated for their legal costs if the appeal were unsuccessful. The matter came before White J, who was tasked with assessing the application for security for costs, considering the principles and factors pertinent to such an assessment.

White J summarised the background leading to the application, highlighting that the power to order the provision of security must be exercised judicially and that each case depends on its own circumstances. His Honour noted several factors that could be pertinent in determining the application for security for costs, including the prospects of success of the appeal, the risk that an order for costs would not be satisfied, whether the making of an order for security would be oppressive, whether the impecuniosity of the appellant arises out of the conduct which is the subject of complaint in the relevant proceeding, whether there are any aspects of public interest that weigh in the balance against granting security, and whether there are any other particular discretionary matters peculiar to the circumstances of the case.

After considering these factors, White J concluded that it was inappropriate for the Court to attempt a detailed evaluation of the prospects of success of Mr Nyoni’s appeal at that stage. Instead, his Honour assessed that it was sufficient to proceed on the basis that it should not be concluded at that stage that Mr Nyoni’s appeal had no prospects of success but nor should it be concluded that the appeal had strong prospects. The Respondents contested White J's approach, arguing that he failed to adequately consider the appeal’s prospects of success. However, White J maintained that his approach was appropriate given the context of the application for security for costs.

The procedural history of this matter began with Mr Nyoni filing an application for leave to appeal on 11 September 2018. This application was in response to an interlocutory decision made by White J exercising appellate jurisdiction. The Federal Court was required to determine whether it had jurisdiction to hear and determine the proposed appeal. In the course of the proceedings, the court treated the application for leave to appeal as an application to vary or set aside the interlocutory orders made by White J. This treatment was pursuant to s 25(2B)(bc) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth). Ultimately, the court dismissed the application, with costs awarded against the applicant.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether the Federal Court had jurisdiction to hear and determine the proposed appeal.
2. Whether the application for leave to appeal should be treated as an application to vary or set aside the interlocutory orders made by White J under s 25(2B)(bc) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth).
3. Whether White J's assessment of the factors pertinent to the application for security for costs was appropriate and whether there was any error in his approach.

Held
1. The Federal Court held that it did not have jurisdiction to hear and determine the proposed appeal.
2. The application for leave to appeal was treated as an application to vary or set aside the interlocutory orders made by White J under s 25(2B)(bc) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth).
3. White J's assessment of the factors pertinent to the application for security for costs was appropriate, and there was no error in his approach.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In relation to the Respondents’ reliance on Fokas it is important to note that whilst the power exercised by White J pursuant to s 25(2B)(ab) of the FCA Act is largely comparable to the power exercised by White JA pursuant to s 46(2)(b) of the Supreme Court Act under review in Fokas, s 46(4) of the Supreme Court Act requires that a judgment of a Judge of Appeal exercising the powers of the Court of Appeal be only discharged or varied by the Court of Appeal. Section 25(2B)(ab) is not similarly confined.CONSIDERATION The application before White J concerned an application by the Respondents for an order that Mr Nyoni provide security for their costs on the appeal. After summarising the background which gave rise to the application, his Honour correctly identified the principles applicable to an assessment of security for costs, noting (at [17]):[T]he power to order the provision of security must be exercised judicially and that each case depends on its own circumstances: Bell Wholesale Co Ltd v Gates Export Corporation (1984) 2 FCR 1 at 3-4. The authorities also indicate that a number of matters may be pertinent in the determination of an application for the provision of security for costs in relation to an appeal, including:(a)the prospects of success of the appeal;(b)the risk that an order for costs will not be satisfied;(c)whether the making of an order for security would be oppressive insofar as it would stifle a reasonably arguable claim;(d)whether the impecuniosity of the appellant arises out of the conduct which is the subject of complaint in the relevant proceeding;(e)whether there are any aspects of public interest that weigh in the balance against granting security; and(f)whether there are any other particular discretionary matters peculiar to the circumstances of the case. I note Mr Nyoni takes issue with White J’s treatment of the authorities referred to by the parties, however his Honour provided an accurate summation of the principles which can inform the Court’s assessment of whether to exercise the discretion conferred by s 56 of the FCA Act to order security for costs. White J considered each of these factors in turn (at [18]-[38]). In respect of the appeal’s prospects of success his Honour remarked (at [19]):I consider it inappropriate for the Court to attempt, at this stage, a detailed evaluation of the prospects of success of Mr Nyoni’s appeal. I consider it appropriate instead to proceed on the basis that it should not be concluded at this stage that Mr Nyoni’s appeal has no prospects of success but nor should it be concluded that the appeal has strong prospects. The Respondents contend that his Honour was wrong in approaching this issue ‘without some consideration of the appeal’s prospects of success’. However, I do not consider that his Honour’s remarks reveal any absence of consideration. Rather, without engaging in a detailed evaluation which would be inappropriate in the context of an application for security for costs, he assessed that it was sufficient to proceed in relation to this discretionary consideration on the basis that the appeal neither had ‘no prospects of success’ nor ‘strong prospects’ of success. There is no error in that approach.